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Abstract 
This thesis is about the complex relationship between governance, corruption and 
economic development. It seeks to extend the literature via exploring the complex 
web of connections between corruption, development and the quality of political 
institutions in the specific case of Nigeria. In so doing the thesis explores some of the 
limitations of mainstream approaches to corruption and postulates that, rather than 
being a simple issue of rent-seeking that requires a prescription of orthodox 
economic policy reforms, corruption is an issue that requires contextualizing within 
the evolution of particular political cultures in specific places and a sensitivity to the 
impacts of culture on the definitions, causes and impacts of corruption. The thesis 
also reflects upon the impacts of market reforms on the opportunities for corrupt 
activity and the potential role of civil society in rendering anti-corruption interventions 
more effective. 
Accordingly, the thesis places the current high-profile debates over corruption and 
poor governance in Nigeria within an historical analysis of the patterns of 
governance in Nigeria over the years since independence in order to understand the 
intricate issues surrounding the historical, cultural and socio-political context of the 
problems of governance and corruption and their influence on anti-corruption reforms 
in the Nigerian context. Data were collected and analyzed using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods; the methods used in data collection included questionnaires 
and in particular a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with key political 
stakeholders.  The analysis culminates in an extensive exploration of the anti-
corruption measures and strategies adopted by Nigerian administrations and the 
efforts of the international organisations which have supported them in tackling 
corruption. 
Key Words: Good governance, Corruption and Anti-Corruption, Development, 
Nigeria. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between governance, corruption and economic 
development in Nigeria. It extends some of the complex academic and political 
debates surrounding these relationships with specific emphases on our 
understanding of the measurement, impacts and causation of corruption and the 
dynamics of anti-corruption interventions. Since the 1990s, following the end of the 
Cold War, there has been a dramatic growth of global and national interest in good 
governance, and anti-corruption agendas have come to form a central component of 
this. This “good governance agenda,” as it is frequently called, now constitutes an 
essential part of the international financial institutions‟ (IFIs) concessional aid and 
lending packages to countries across the developing world. To a large extent, this 
emphasis has emerged in direct response to the continued underdevelopment and 
unacceptable poverty levels experienced by many African countries despite decades 
of economic reforms and the evolution of development strategies. Development 
actors, such as the World Bank, have increasingly connected the poor 
developmental experiences of many African countries, including Nigeria, to bad 
leadership and endemic corruption, hence the increasing emphases upon improved 
governance, democratisation and anti-corruption reforms. On the other hand, many 
scholars and political commentators have pointed to the role of other factors in 
generating Africa‟s economic and social problems, with a particular emphasis upon 
external and historical factors such as the impact of colonial legacies, the role of bad 
economic advice and the influence of international agencies. Others have also been 
strongly critical of the procedural approaches to the promotion of good governance 
and anti-corruption reforms across Africa by the international institutions and their 
reading of the causation and dynamics of the weak institutional structures and 
corrupt political cultures which they are supposed to deal with. These critics have 
suggested the need for the design of governance reforms to be more strongly 
located within analyses of the particular political cultures of specific countries, if they 
are to be successful, and have also stressed the need to complement institutional-
level governance and anti-corruption reforms with the active engagement and 
participation of civil society within the struggle to combat corruption.    
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The overall intention of this thesis is, therefore, to explore the light that the Nigerian 
experience can shed upon these complex relationships between governance and 
economic development in Africa. Clearly, such a broad aim is beyond the scope of a 
single thesis therefore the thesis addresses this question through the specific lens of 
debates surrounding corruption (and anti-corruption initiatives) in Nigeria. It explores 
the historical, socio-economic and political complexities surrounding the 
manifestation of the pattern of poor governance and corruption in Nigeria and 
competing perspectives of key stakeholders over the extent of corruption, its major 
impacts and influences in Nigeria as well as the influences of these complexities on 
the evolution of anti-corruption reforms in Nigeria.   
 
Why Nigeria? 
 
Although corruption is a global phenomenon which cuts across both developed and 
developing countries alike, there are strong suggestions that its adverse effects are 
felt more severely in developing and transitional economies in comparison to more 
industrialized countries where social and economic institutions are more strongly 
developed and the illegal proceeds from corruption are more likely to be re-invested 
locally. Nigeria is frequently cited as one of the leading examples of resource-rich 
countries in the developing world that have been beset by underdevelopment and 
poverty after decades of poor governance and corruption. It has regularly featured as 
one of the world‟s most corrupt countries within Transparency International surveys 
for example (see discussions in Chapter Five below). The estimated extent of 
corruption in Nigeria is simply overwhelming, as a result of the staggering figures 
involved in just those stolen public funds which have been discovered. It has been 
estimated, for example, that between 1960 and 1999 over $440 billion of public 
revenue was stolen by  public officials (civil servants and politicians) in Nigeria (see: 
Ribadu, 2009b: 2 and Blair, 2005). Several decades of poor governance and 
corruption have seemingly played a role in exacerbating the levels of socio-economic 
inequality between a small select group of politicians, public officials and business 
elites and the mass of ordinary Nigerians. According to World Bank estimates, 
approximately 80% of Nigeria‟s oil wealth is concentrated in the hands of 1% of the 
population, while over 70 percent of the population live below the poverty line (United 
Nation for Children Education Fund 2003, World Bank 2006 and World Development 
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Report 2006). It is this paradox of underdevelopment/poverty amidst fabulous oil 
wealth which first got me interested in this topic and led to my interest in exploring 
the degree to which mismanagement and corruption lay behind the continued socio-
economic hardship (endemic poverty, the lack of basic services, the levels of 
disease, and illiteracy) experienced by so many citizens of the largest black nation in 
the world.  
 
Chapter outline and structure 
 
This study consists of eight chapters. Chapters one and two play an essential role in 
the overall thematic development of the thesis. They outline some of the complex 
academic and political debates surrounding the relationship between governance 
and economic development (chapter one) before then focussing down onto those 
elements of those debates which relate specifically to corruption (chapter two). Both 
chapters outline the broad conceptual and contextual context within which the thesis 
has been situated and from which the research questions have been derived. 
Chapter three then situates the general discussion over the relationships between 
governance, corruption and economic development outlined within the first two 
chapters within the specific Nigerian context and offers a detailed historical overview 
of the nature and complexities involved in the historical pattern of poor governance, 
corruption and development experience in Nigeria since attaining independence in 
1960.  
 
Chapter four explains the research methods employed in conducting this study. The 
research utilised a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. The 
quantitative methods used involved the design and administration of a sizable 
electronic survey of respondent attitudes toward governance, corruption and 
development over different periods in Nigerian history, whilst the qualitative 
approach involved the use of a series of semi-structured interviews to extract the 
viewpoints of key stakeholders in Nigeria of their experiences of corruption in 
Nigeria. Another key element explored in chapter 4 was the issue of positionality, 
which is an issue that clearly has significant effects upon the research conducted 
and the knowledge produced in the thesis. It was important to ensure that the 
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production and interpretation of data, as well as the interplay of power, was 
subjected to careful reflexivity during the fieldwork exercise. 
 
The primary aim of chapter 5 is to build upon the strands of academic literature 
explored in the previous chapters, to explore in more detail the perceived extent of 
poor governance and corruption in Nigeria amongst a wide variety of Nigerian 
stakeholders. In doing this, the chapter examines a variety of existing external (e.g.  
transparency international‟s corruption perception indexes from 1980-2009) and 
domestic (e.g. the World Bank‟s diagnostic governance and corruption survey which 
was undertaken in 2001 and the Business Survey on Crime and Corruption 
conducted by the National Bureau for Statistics and the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission in 2007) surveys, as well as data from the primary research 
undertaken for this study of the magnitude and scope of corruption in Nigeria.  
 
Chapter 6 moves the debate on from the various ways in which the extent of 
corruption has been perceived in Nigeria to consider the perceptions of key 
stakeholders in Nigeria on the major impacts and causes of corruption in Nigeria.  In 
order to do this, the chapter was divided into two separate sections. The first begins 
by tracing a variety of perspectives on the impacts of corruption in Nigeria by firstly 
briefly exploring the findings of the World Bank governance and corruption diagnostic 
survey before then exploring in detail the attitudes of key stakeholders towards this 
issue from the ideas articulated within the semi-structured interviews. The second 
section moves on to consider the breadth of positions held by these stakeholders 
over the causation of corruption, themes which are then related to the complexities 
surrounding the perceived major influences on the historical dynamics of corruption 
distilled from the academic literature discussed previously in chapter 3.  
 
Chapter 7 shifts the focus on from the complexities surrounding the perceived extent, 
major consequences and causation of corruption in Nigeria explored in the preceding 
chapters to thoroughly examine the various anti-corruption measures and strategies 
taken by successive Nigerian governments to try and address the issue. It explores 
the attitudes of the stakeholders interviewed regarding the effectiveness of the major 
anti-corruption agencies and closes by making some observations about the 
involvement of international donors in the formulation and dynamics of anti-
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corruption policies in Nigeria. The conclusion then draws together the major findings 
of this study and highlights the contribution of the study to the research themes listed 
above. In addition to this, the thesis suggests tentative recommendations, with more 
emphases on the potential role of civil society in the design and implementation of 
governance and anti-corruption reforms. The thesis concludes by discussing 
possible directions for future research and reflections upon the research 
methodology.  
 
 
  
6 
 
Chapter 1: Governance and Economic Development   
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Whilst this thesis is primarily about the issue of corruption in Nigeria, it is important to 
situate discussions of the phenomenon within a wider historical and conceptual 
context. Accordingly, this chapter and that which follows outline the broad conceptual 
and contextual context within which the thesis has been situated. Chapter two 
focuses specifically upon the various definitional and political debates about the 
nature, impacts and causation of corruption but it is important that those debates are 
placed within the broader context of the debates over „good governance‟. Both of 
these terms (governance and corruption) have generated significant national and 
international discussion and controversy and there still exist widespread differences 
about their meanings, relationships and differences, issues which will be highlighted 
in the ensuing chapters. This chapter deals specifically with the context of the good 
governance agenda before the thesis moves on to consider its relationship with the 
specific questions of corruption and accountability that are dealt with in the next 
chapter. 
 
Over the last couple of decades, governance has become perhaps the central issue 
of development debate and discourse at local, national and international levels. This 
idea of „good governance‟ is now seen as an integral part of sustainable economic 
development for countries around the world and particularly the developing nations. 
Almost every aspect of a nation‟s economy, which includes education, health, 
industry, infrastructure, peace and security as well as human rights, is said to be 
linked to sound administrative policies. Hence the idea of good governance has been 
increasingly promoted, by national governments, Non-Governmental Organisations, 
Civil Liberty Organisations and International Financial Institutions (International 
Monetary Funds, World Bank, World Trade Organisation etc.) as the key to 
sustainable economic development. However, the aims, objectives and procedural 
approaches to the promotion of this idea across the globe by the International 
Financial Institutions, as the major stakeholders in international development, is a 
contentious issue which we shall explore in detail over the course of this chapter.  
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The first part of the chapter begins by examining some prominent interpretations of 
the concept of good governance by selected actors (mainly key officials of 
international organisations and political leaders) in national and international 
development, thereby highlighting the increasingly acceptability and popularity of the 
concept in the contemporary development discourse. The second part focuses on 
the lack of consensus over the definitions of the idea of Good Governance. The third 
part outlines the efforts of the International Financial Institutions at strengthening 
governance in developing countries, it then moves on to consider more critical 
interpretations of the implications of aid conditionality and considers the question of 
the accountability, transparency and legitimacy of the donor agencies themselves. 
The final section then explores governance and underdevelopment within the African 
context, thus, laying the foundation for discussing the specific issues of corruption in 
chapter 2. We turn first, however, as explained above, to the controversial debates 
surrounding the concept of good governance, which has continued to gain currency 
since the concept first rose to prominence in the late 1980s. 
 
Currently, many developing countries across the globe are required by a host of 
international organisations to adopt good governance measures in their decision-
making processes and this has become a veritable mantra. Table 1 presents some 
selected instances of the use of the idea of Good Governance by selected political 
leaders and within the documentation produced by influential international 
organizations over the past 15 years. 
 
Apart from the universal acceptance of governance as integral to achieving 
sustainable economic development, there are important differences between specific 
institutions and individual academic approaches in respect of theoretical 
formulations, policy prescriptions and conceptualisation of the subject itself which are 
explored in subsequent sections of the chapter. The next section will discuss the 
conflicting concept of good governance, as proffered by different academic schools 
of thought and major international development institutions like the World Bank and 
the United Nations Development Programme.  
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Table 1.1: Selected instances of the use of the idea of Good Governance in the documentation of 
international organizations 
 
 
 
Michael Candessus, Former 
managing Director of the IMF. 
”promoting good governance in all its aspects, which 
includes rule of law efficiency and accountability of 
public sector and tackling corruption is essential to 
sustainable economic development” Michael (1997: np). 
 
KOFI ANNAN, UN Secretary–
General, (24
th
 April, 2002) 
”What is encouraging about recent developments in 
Africa is that the pressure for good governance is no 
longer coming from one side or the other, but from 
peoples and leaders alike. The spirit of democratic 
empowerment is challenging all leaders to live up to the 
ideals of independence and to deliver the freedoms, the 
rights and the opportunities that their people deserve” 
United Nations (2002: np). 
 
Group of Seven Leaders 
Kananaskis, Canada 
June 27, 2002 
“No matter how generous, dept relief alone cannot 
guarantee fiscal solvency, long term economic growth, 
and social development. Good governance, prudent 
new borrowing, and sound debt management by heavily 
indebted poor countries, as well as responsible 
financing by creditors, are also essential elements of the 
policy framework needed to achieve these goals” G8 
Information Centre (2002). 
 
Ministers of (OECD) and 
(NEPAD) 16 May, 2002. 
“The dialogue between NEPAD and OECD will consider 
the scope for OECD-NEPAD Co-operation building on 
existing OECD programmes, including among other 
things: Consulting in a spirit of mutual trust and 
partnership on best development practices, and 
effectiveness and on development benefits of trade, 
investment, good governance and approaches to 
sustainable development” OECD (2002: nd). 
 
Ambassador Jan KUBIS, 
Secretary–General, 
Organisation for Security and  
Co-operation in Europe  
 
 “The standard for democracy, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, rule of law and good governance 
should be pretext of combating terrorism and extremism 
and under the imperative of gaining allies for that” 
Wouters and Ryngaert (2004: 6) 
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1.2 Conflicting Concepts of Good Governance  
 
The term governance, in its dictionary meaning, had commonly been used to 
describe the micro-level behaviour of corporate organisations. It only came into wider 
usage in the 1950s and 1960s as academic discourse excavated the state 
dominated models of economic development that were prevalent, throughout the 
socialist bloc and developing world (Thomas 2000). It is worth noting right from the 
outset that there exists a dilemma in the explanation of the concept of good 
governance since it appears to have no universally accepted meaning. Scholars and 
international development agencies (both regional and international) have tended to 
confront these conceptual difficulties by defining and interpreting the term within their 
area of interests and scope of work. In this regard, some scholars (such as Martin 
Doornbos) has argued that the concept‟s “intrinsic open-ended quality, vagueness, 
and inherent lack of specificity have tended to generate a good deal of searching 
and debate as to what its proper meaning is or should be, prompting multiple efforts 
to appropriate it and define it in particular ways” (Doornbos 2003: 4). 
 
These different emphases can be quite clearly seen when comparing the definitions 
employed by specific scholars and actors. For instance considering the contrasting 
definitions of some scholars such as Albrow and Schneider can be instructive. 
Albrow (2001: 151, cited in Punyaratabandhu 2004: 2) broadly defines governance 
as “the management of society by the people,” whilst Schneider (1999: 7) defines 
governance as “the exercise of authority or control to manage a country‟s affairs and 
resources” (Schneider 1999: 7). While Albrow emphasises the role of citizens in the 
management of a country‟s affairs, albeit without much clarification of the process, 
Schneider simply identifies governance as the management of a country‟s affairs 
without stating the way and manner by which the authority is constituted and 
monitored. These definitions are clearly rather too simplistic and narrow in content.  
 
However, a more elaborate approach to the definition of governance has been 
proffered by a host of international donor agencies. In the view of the UNDP for 
instance, “governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative 
authority in managing a country‟s affairs. It is therefore concerned with the 
mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which citizens and groups 
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articulate their interest, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate 
their differences” (UNDP, 1997: 2-3). As such, the UNDP is of the opinion that 
political, social and economic issues should be at the forefront within discussions 
concerning good governance which, they argue, must ensure that the voices of the 
poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in the processes of decision-making and 
over resource allocation. Similarly, other key attributes like participation, 
transparency and accountability, efficiency and equity have also been highlighted by 
the UNDP as important elements to consider in the definition of good governance 
(UNDP 1994). The UNDP draws attention to the roles of the state, private sector and 
civil society as all being critical factors for sustainable human development.  
 
The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on the other 
hand, view the concept of governance as “the use of political power and the exercise 
of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and 
economic development” (OECD DAC, 1995: 14). It thus emphasizes the role of the 
state as the most important element for the creation of enabling environments for 
economic activities and the distribution of benefits, as well as the nature of 
relationship between the government and the governed. For the OECD, therefore, 
governance is more concerned with formal elements like accountability, legitimacy, 
competence of governments to formulate policies and deliver services, as well as 
respect for human rights and the rule of law, rather than questions of participation 
and power. 
 
However, the most prominent and widely used definition of the concept of “good 
governance” is the one provided by the World Bank. As such, it is worth spending a 
little more time here exploring quite how the World Bank has interpreted and 
operationalized the idea. The World Bank sees the concept as the manner in which 
power is exercised in the management of a country‟s economic and social resources 
(World Bank, 1991, 1992, 1994). Three distinct aspects of governance have been 
identified by the bank and they include:  
(a) the form of political regime,  
(b) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country‟s 
economic and social resources for development, and  
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(c) The capacities of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies 
and discharge function (World Bank, 1997).  
 
In essence, the Bank‟s interest in governance is concerned with reforming the 
relationship between the government, civil society and market in borrowing 
countries. Three aspects of the Bank‟s good governance initiatives are worthy of 
comment here. The first is the fact that their good governance agenda recognises 
that aid cannot be effective in the absence of a good policy framework. Secondly, in 
contrast to the Bank‟s aggressively pro-market stance of the 1980s, which had 
provided structural adjustment loans as incentive to reduce the role of the state in 
developing countries economies, during the 1990s (see discussions below in section 
1.3), there was a shift from “getting the prices right” to “getting the institutions right”. 
As such, the present good governance initiatives postulate an important, albeit a 
restricted role, for the state and its institutions. Thirdly, the Bank‟s good governance 
initiatives have stretched to a large extent the traditional “technocratic” character of 
the Bank to new areas like participation, corruption, and democratic reforms. The 
Bank‟s role in these areas is, however, not very clear, which has resulted in critical 
questioning of the organisation‟s role in the development process and in the system 
of global governance as a whole. Some critics have asked what sort of governance 
the Bank has promoted in practice and whether the good governance initiatives 
represent a real break from the neo-liberal policies of the 1980s, or merely represent 
the old “Washington consensus” in new clothes (Collingwood 2002: 4). 
 
This introduction to the basic definitions of what is constituted under the concept of 
good governance has suggested that there are substantial differences over what is 
encompassed under the term. Good governance does seem to convey the idea that 
the quality of institutions and public management is integral to a sustainable 
economic development although there is also a sense in the literature that good 
governance cannot be limited to technical debates about efficiency and 
management. The next section will explore in more detail how the concept of good 
governance has evolved over time, with a particular focus upon the role of the IFIs in 
promoting this idea across the globe. 
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1.3 The Evolving Concept of Good Governance 
 
The growth of interest in questions of governance which followed the end of the Cold 
War ushered a fundamental twist into international development circles, as good 
governance and issues of state reform had not been particularly prominent within the 
international development arena prior to this era. To a large degree, this lack of 
concern was not unconnected with the rigid power relations and political 
manipulations that had characterised North-South relations during the Cold War. 
Military and other dictatorship regimes thrived during this period, as development aid 
agencies and western interventions were more directly aimed at promoting anti 
communist regimes rather than promoting democracy per se, as their rhetoric 
suggested (Lowenthal 1991). A classic example was the US Foreign Assistance Act 
(Title IX) of 1961, which supposedly promoted increasing popular participation in 
development. In practice, however, many democracy programs were covertly 
executed by the CIA to promote anticommunism, even if this meant the promotion of 
„non-democratic‟ activities (Goldman 1988: 13). This double standard in the 
ideological and practical application of development aid, despite protestation to the 
contrary, still remains prominent in contemporary times.   
 
Although during the 1980s, donor agencies had began attaching conditions to their 
development aid as part of the neoliberal emphasis upon market opening, the end of 
the Cold War at the end of the decade, ushered in a new chapter in the global 
development agenda where questions of democracy, accountability and state reform 
were raised up the political agenda. At the same time, the allocation of development 
aid to governments in developing countries in return for political support towards 
donor governments substantially reduced, and dubious government regimes, with 
track records of bad socio-economic policies, anti-democratic practices or corruption 
seemingly became more unpopular amongst the donor agencies. Consequently, 
there was a change in the ideological goals of institutional and political reform 
through aid, where donor states demanded that recipient governments be held 
accountable for their mode of internal governance, which, to a large extent led to the 
promotion of the idea of good governance (see: Grindle 2010).  
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Specifically, the concept of good governance itself was first promoted by the World 
Bank in 1989. The idea emerged partly due to geopolitical factors, such as the end of 
the Cold War already mentioned above, but also due to the failure of structural 
adjustment programmes in developing countries in the 1980s as well as “shock 
therapy” in post communist countries in the early 1990s. Between 1980 and 1998 
multiple adjustment loans were granted to countries in Africa, Latin America and 
Asia, however the per capita growth rate of the countries affected was zero (Easterly 
2001: 135–157). Something clearly needed to change. 
 
In the early 1990s, the World Bank published two major works on governance, 
Governance and Corruption (World Bank 1992) and Governance: The World Bank‟s 
Experience (World Bank 1994). Gradually since then the Bank has placed more 
emphasis on the issue of good governance, which increasingly serves as a criterion 
for deciding which countries qualify for aid assistance and which do not. The 
importance of good governance to economic growth and aid effectiveness was also 
re-echoed in the 1997 World Development Report (World Bank 1997a) which 
suggested that an effective state was crucial to achieving higher levels of growth and 
that financial aid targeted at encouraging and rewarding good governance would 
lead to better growth and welfare results in developing countries and better aid 
effectiveness. This direction was further strengthened by the introduction, in 1998, of 
the Comprehensive Development Framework1 the first element of what was to 
become the Integrated Development Model (IDM), which was to come to serve as a 
key mechanism for Aid allocation, together with the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSP)2, Country Assistance Strategy3 (CAS) and Country Policy and 
                                            
1
 The Comprehensive Development Formwork is a World Bank designed strategy to support its national poverty reduction 
programmes. First introduced in 1998, the framework spells out four principles which state that (i) development approaches 
should be comprehensive and long-term in focus (ii) individual countries should design and become the driving force of their 
own development programmes through citizen participation (iii) Governments, donors, civil society, the private sector and other 
key actors should work in partnership led by recipient countries to implement development initiatives (iv) Development 
performance should be assessed on the basis of measurable results (World Bank, nd). 
2
 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) were introduced in 1999 by the World Bank and IMF. PRSPs are conceived as 
providing a framework designed to increase domestic accountability for poverty reduction programmes and to enhance the 
coordination of development assistance between governments and development partners. It also serves as a mechanism for 
granting dept relief and concessional financing from both the World Bank and IMF‟s Highly Indebted Poor Countries‟ Initiative 
(HIPC). A PRSP defines a country‟s macroeconomic, structural, and social policies and programmes for promoting growth and 
poverty reduction as well as external financing needs (World Bank, nd).  
3
 The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) was designed for active borrowers from the International Development Association 
(IDA) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). It begins by considering a country‟s own vision 
for its development, as outlined in a Poverty Reduction Paper. The CAS is produced in partnership with governments, civil 
society groups, development partners and other development stakeholders (World Bank, nd).      
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Institutional Assessment4 (CPIC) which were introduced to enhance aid 
effectiveness, largely by rethinking conditionality. The IFIs have employed these 
strategies to implement principles like participation and ownership, in an effort to 
encourage support and commitment from citizens (and governments) toward the 
programmes that they have funded. The governance agenda has been underlined by 
a belief that the active participation of local policy makers and citizens in the process 
of planning, design and implementation of the IFIs programmes will encourage local 
commitment and action in implementing and maintaining them. For example, the 
World Bank (1998) places emphasis on greater involvement of “major stakeholders” 
in the preparation of country assistance strategies (CASs) providing “sharper client 
focus”, and “responsiveness of clients” (World Bank 1998: 39). In a similar vein, the 
IMF has increasingly placed emphasis on issues of ownership, suggesting that if a 
programme is designed and imposed from outside, the successful implementation of 
such a programme may be minimal, thus, policies and programmes must be 
perceived as local initiatives (Camdessus 1993: 51). Critics, however, have argued 
that despite these measures designed to increase participation and ownership, the 
basic modus operandi of the institutions has remained pretty much the same, as 
participation for instance, is frequently equated with merely explaining projects to 
stakeholders, instead of actively involving them in the decision making (Piciotto and 
Weaving 1994).  
 
The IFIs have viewed good governance as a tool for strengthening the institutional 
framework of government by enhancing the rule of law. This has also included anti-
corruption measures aimed at reducing corruption and rent-seeking activities through 
promoting increases in transparency, accountability and access to information about 
the management of public resources to concerned citizens (IMF 1998: 38). For 
example, the IMF has encouraged greater fiscal transparency in its operations, it 
argues that it is within its mandate to compel governments to be transparent about 
their structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public accounts, and provide 
access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable and internationally 
comparable information on government activities (IMF 1999).   
                                            
4
 The CPIC ranks countries based on a set of 16 criteria in four key areas: (i) economic management, (ii) structural policies (iii) 
policies for social inclusion and equity and (iv) public sector management and institutions (World Bank, nd) 
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In summary therefore, the good governance agenda has introduced some 
fundamental changes in the way that the IFIs identify, prepare, approve, implement 
and evaluate projects and policies, driven by the need to improve effectiveness in 
programmes supported by them. The principles of good governance have been 
applied to institutions in borrowing countries and governance within the IFIs 
themselves (to some extent). In fact, some scholars (such as Alexander 2004) 
argued that the application of good governance criteria had seen a reduction of up to 
50% in aid allocation to some countries over the preceding decade (Alexander, 
2004: 18). For example, the Bank‟s own record shows that, between 1999 and 2003, 
countries with good and improving state institutions received higher allocations of aid 
assistance (OED, 2004: 13). The Bank lending criteria according to Hout (2007) 
have been directed towards institutional strengthening, public sector/civic service 
reforms, the creation of new institutional oversight organizations and anti-corruption 
agencies, reforms to the judiciary and electoral systems as well as greater 
participation of civil society in policy design and implementation  etc, thus the Bank 
concentrated its lending more in countries that have relatively good and better 
institutional environments, with up to 89.4% of Bank lending going to countries with a 
better CPIC rating (Hout, 2007: 23). 
 
This shift in policy has also been criticised for a number of reasons. For instance, 
one fundamental defect in using good governance as criteria for allocating aid loans 
is the degree of social economic hardship that such a policy framework creates (or 
perhaps condones). Specifically, if one of the determinants of good governance 
relates strongly to the undertaking of measures that will improve the socio economic 
condition and possibilities for political participation of the poor in a particular country, 
when funds are withdrawn due to poor governance, it is the poor that are already 
suffering as a result of the leadership deficit who will suffer the hardest from the 
removal of those funds (see: Collier and Dollar 1999, Cogneau and Naudet 2004 and 
Hout 2007). 
 
Another controversy related to the adoption of good governance as a condition for 
aid or loans is the controversial nature of the concept itself. It is important to ask who 
defines what good governance constitutes (clearly in most cases it is the IFIs 
16 
 
themselves, see discussions in Hout (2009) about the indicators used by the World 
Bank to measure governance as part of their Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment) and under what conditions could consensus be struck without 
interfering with questions of political sovereignty. Against this background, other 
scholars, like Jan Pronk, argue that “what really matters is not good policies but 
better policies, policies which are better than previous ones that can achieve a 
greater impact” (Pronk 2001: 626). In this view, policy improvement and better 
governance should not be seen as preconditions to be met before development 
assistance is made available, but also as development objectives in and of 
themselves. These issues suggest the importance of taking a slightly more detailed 
critical look at some of the issues surrounding the aid conditionality of the donor 
agencies. 
 
1.4 Conditionality and Adjustment Aid Programmes 
 
The notion and use of conditionality in international development aid have spawned 
intense controversy from different quarters. Conditionality, according to Frerks (2006: 
15) “is the promise or increase of aid assistance in the case of compliance by a 
recipient with conditions set by a donor. It also includes the withdrawal or reduction 
of aid in the case of noncompliance” (Frerks 2006: 15). This definition is pretty broad 
in the sense that it includes both positive and negatives terms. In a similar vein   
Killick et al, usefully define conditionality as “a mutual arrangement by which a 
government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an 
international financial institution or other agency will provide specified amounts of 
financial assistance” (Killick et al, 1998: 6). This aid conditionality is an incentive 
used by international donor agencies, like the World Bank and IMF, to influence 
policy reform in developing countries.  
 
However, many critics, for example African leaders, have used the existence of this 
conditionality to blame their economic woes on World Bank and IMF policies. They 
argue that declining average incomes, the increasing poverty in the continent and 
the worsening of Africa‟s debt crisis over the past two decades, are due to the 
failures of IFI intervention; factors which, in turn, have led to a continued 
dependence on the taking out of new loans (see: George 1990, Stein 2004). 
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Although the role of the IFIs in addressing the perennial issues of poverty across the 
globe may have generated a lot of controversies, the governments of developing 
countries themselves have equally come under heavy criticism for what has been 
presented as a culture of miss-management and endemic corruption. Along this line 
of argument, some scholars like Obadan (2004: 146) asserts that, “poor economic 
management reflected in wasteful and unproductive expenditures, as well as 
management of borrowed funds by inefficient public enterprises, contributed to the 
poverty and debt problems of many African countries.” Whilst Guest (2004a: 14) 
argues that this situation has further made it difficult for indebted African countries to 
“service their loans, let alone repay them.” 
 
However, while this debate over the causation of mass poverty and the continued 
underdevelopment of many African countries continues, it is important to note here 
that aid without some sort of conditionality is unrealistic and politically impossible, as 
donor governments must account for the use of their taxpayer‟s money. Therefore, to 
a large extent, it could be said that conditionality is an integral part of concessional 
lending. Nevertheless, while the principle of conditionality does not lack legitimation, 
it is open to criticism as to how it is applied and its ultimate socio-economic impact in 
the countries where it is applied. Against this back drop, Collier warns against the 
abuse of conditionality: “the extension of the practice of conditionality from the 
occasional circumstances of crisis management to the continuous process of general 
economic policy-making has implied a transfer of sovereignty which is not only 
unprecedented but is often dysfunctional” (Collier 1999: 319).  
 
For example, aid conditionality was intensified from the early 1980s through the use 
of structural adjustment programmes, the package of measures adopted by IMF and 
World Bank for loans to developing countries at this time (Mosley et al 1991). This 
idea of structural adjustment reflected the break from the dominant post-war state 
led development models and attempted to overcome the problems of developmental 
stagnation by promoting open and free competitive market economies under minimal 
states. Specifically, these policies were pursued in two stages (stabilization and 
“adjustment”). Stabilisation involved immediate devaluation and drastic public 
expenditure cuts. This was accompanied by a set of institutional and economic 
reforms such as: deregulation, privatisation, slimming down allegedly oversized 
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public bureaucracies, reducing subsidies and encouraging realistic prices to promote 
competition, efficiency and productivity for export (Robinson 1991). Whilst the 
withdrawal of the state from the economy through privatization and deregulation may 
have had some beneficial impacts, the widespread growth of poverty in developing 
countries over this period suggests that these reforms did not have their desired 
effects. For instance, according to some scholars (such as Picard et al 1994: 123), in 
the 1980s, “the IFI‟s structural policies compelled many African countries to 
undertake certain policy measures that were not compatible with their domestic 
terrain.” The resultant effects of these policies, according to Keet (1994: 10), only 
succeeded in “deepening the economic hardships, social divisions, and political 
tensions between the African nations.” 
 
What became clear over time was that the World Bank and the IMF had adopted 
market liberalization as part of their policy framework for developing countries 
without giving adequate attention to those institutional and infrastructural constraints 
that restrict participation by the poor in opportunities created by newly liberalised 
markets (IDS, 1994). Critics, therefore, argued that under the influence of the 
conditionality of World Bank policy prescriptions, governments failed to reach the 
poor and in urban areas, for instance, poor neighbourhoods became less well 
supplied with services than well to do ones (World Bank 1990). The Bank responded 
to this criticism by claiming that its national level policy instruments are produced in 
dialogue with governments. According to the (1990) World Bank Report on poverty, 
the Bank also claimed to have tackled poverty reduction by creating economic 
opportunities (particularly via agriculturally-driven growth) as well as providing social 
safety nets (World Bank 1990).  
Critics also argued that under structural adjustment, whilst governments of 
developing countries have been constrained by the IFIs from using protectionism 
through the application of conditionality (in other words, discouraged from raising 
tariffs in order to protect domestic industries from the influx of highly subsidized 
products from foreign countries), the governments of developed countries have 
continued to heavily subsidize and protect products in their own countries (Khor 
2005). Thus critical observers argued that while there might be nothing wrong with 
letting the outside world into Africa, they perhaps should have been invited to 
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compete in global markets on an even playing ground. Subsidies for rich farmers and 
tariffs on food exports to rich countries are an unbearable burden for Africa. 
According to Robert Guest (2004), "farm subsidies in rich countries are running at a 
billion dollars a day. This is roughly the equivalent of the entire GDP of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Farmers in rich countries sometimes are paid to grow stuff. Other times they 
are paid to stop growing stuff that they have grown too much of because they were 
paid to grow it" (Guest 2004a: 112). Surplus food is dumped on African markets, 
lowering the prices that African farmers can get at home. Opening agricultural 
markets to exports from Africa by eliminating tariffs and subsidies that shelter rich 
farmers overseas could make more difference for Africa than any aid program 
(Guest 2004a). In the case of Ghana, for example, most farmers whose livelihood 
depends on the cultivation of tomato have been jeopardized because of the massive 
importation of tomato paste from foreign countries, particularly from Europe. 
Similarly, many poultry farmers in Africa, the Caribbean and Asia have been 
rendered redundant and unemployed because of the imports of cheap chicken parts 
from Europe and the United States, which have been heavily subsidized by the 
governments of these countries. There is also the case of farmers who are very 
efficient in cotton farming, but are unable to export cotton, because of subsidized 
cotton from elsewhere (Khor 2005). 
Against this back drop, many critics have argued that the conditionality used by the 
donor agencies promotes major imbalances in international trade and foreign 
exchange speculation, generating intense competition among exporters from poor 
countries, which gives the industrial nations an inflow of imports at constantly 
decreasing prices relative to the price of exports, keeping inflation down and living 
standards up in the North, while poor countries terms of trade and living standards 
fall. This situation has prompted a certain cynicism on the part of developing 
countries who might argue that governments of developed nations have created the 
international financial institutions to promulgate their national interests in a co-
operative way by delegating some power to international agencies of their own 
making (Keohane 1984). Thus, many governments in the third world believe that 
their interests are not best pursued through international agencies like the World 
Bank, IMF, considering that they are underrepresented and often ill served by these 
organisations (Woods 1999: 5). At this juncture, therefore, it is worth examining the 
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governing structure of these major international financial institutions themselves in a 
little more detail, which perhaps may shed more light on understanding the 
contending debates over the question of internal governance, accountability and 
legitimacy of the IFIs themselves.    
 
1.5 The IFIs and their Governing Structure 
 
Many development practitioners and scholars have expressed serious concerns over 
the governing structure of the IFIs, from the weighted votes of member countries to 
the process of making important decisions and appointments on the board. These 
concerns have led many critics (e.g. Wood, 2006) to the conclusion that, due to the 
vested interests of the US and other wealthy countries that control them, these 
institutions have failed to bring about the major transformational changes that might 
translate into poverty eradication in developing countries. The structure of 
Governance of the IFIs, thus, faces a crisis of legitimacy that undermines their 
credibility and effectiveness (Ariel 2005). These institutions are dominated by a small 
group of industrial countries, overriding at times the interests of minority groups. In 
other words, the IFI‟s as international organizations might be best compared to 
cooperatives of member states who each have the same rights, which would confer 
the legitimacy of multilateralism, in reality however decision-making is controlled by 
the industrial nations in the manner of decision-making in large corporations where 
outcomes are determined by those with the most number of shares. 
 
According to critics, therefore, a key disadvantage of the existing model of 
governance, is that share holders exert too much influence over the organisations, a 
factor which appears to have increased since 1990 (Conttarlli 2005, Kahler 2001). 
More specifically, critics have argued that the influence of large shareholders is often 
exerted for political or foreign policy reasons, undermining the supposed central 
purposes of the IMF and World Bank (see: Blustein 2001 and Stone 2002, 2004). 
That influence is also deployed outside formal avenues, such as via the executive 
board, thereby undermining the institutions‟ legitimacy. Relatively, less represented 
member states of these institutions may be treated differently from other members in 
the planning and implementation of their lending programs.  
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The US undoubtedly exerts the most profound influence in today‟s global political 
economy. According to US Commission on National Security, American leadership in 
the emerging world will be of paramount importance, which will neither seek territory 
nor political empires (USCNS 1999). US influence over the international policy-
making environment is, however, nothing new. The US emerged from the Second 
World War ready for international leadership and became involved in international 
political and international affairs from a pre–eminent position, and most commitments 
made conformed to American interests (peet 2003). More importantly for our 
purposes, however, the early leadership and staff of the World Bank and the IMF, 
which were also founded at this time, were largely provided by the US who also 
provided most of its capital. The result was a “strong and enduring American input 
into all aspects of the Bank, including its structure, general policy direction, and 
forms of lending” (Gwin1997:197). According to Gwin, the United States has viewed 
all multilateral organisations, including the World Bank and IMF, as instruments of 
foreign policy to be used in support of specific US aims and objectives. The IMF for 
instance played the role of surveying national economic policies and exerting 
disciplinary controls over nations, whilst the World Bank and the host of other 
international financial organisations formed from the 1970s onwards were certainly 
not formed as democratic institutions in the sense of inter-country equality.  
 
This has led to a strongly-argued criticism which has suggested that global 
governance should be democratised (see: Dingwerth 2010). In fact, as long ago as 
1979, Beitz (1979) argued that globalisation or growing interdependence in fact 
could present opportunities to establish a more global democracy. In view of the 
strategic influence and global outlook of the IFIs in the 21st century geopolitical and 
economic world order, the issues of their legitimacy and how they might be 
effectively restructured has become a major concern for the effective functioning of 
these organisations. The section that follows will focus in a little more detail on the 
debates over the re-structuring of the IFIs, with particular focus on the procedures for 
appointing senior staff onto the board of these financial institutions. 
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1.6 The Need for Restructuring of the IFIs 
 
There have been a lot of concerns expressed by critics over the fact that the World 
Bank has always been headed by an American (see: Weiss 2005). The World Bank 
cannot really be seen to be promoting democratic and good governance to other 
parts of the world, while in its own institution, leadership is reserved for Americans 
only. The same also applies to the control of the IMF by Europeans. According to 
Tajudeen Rahmann5, the IMF and World Bank are global institutions, which are 
constituted by about 182 member states and that there cannot be global governance 
without global democratic values, which should also apply to the IFIs (Zeinab 2007). 
In stark contrast, Bhagwati, professor of Economics at Columbia University and 
author of, “In Defense of Globalization”, in 2007, argues that the IFIs, as donor 
agencies, should exercise power more directly as, in his opinion, there cannot be 
democracy without actual economic success and that apart from corruption which he 
claims is endemic everywhere in the world, the bad policies, which he claims have 
characterised most of the developing countries‟ system of governance, make it very 
unlikely that they will (or should have) more say in the running of the IMF and World 
Bank. He backs this up by suggesting that India and China, for instance, unlike in the 
1960s and 1970s, currently have more say within IFI decision making processes 
because they now have greater economic powers. He does agree, however, that the 
headship of the World Bank and the IMF should not automatically be reserved for 
people from the United States of America and Western Europe alone (BBC, 
September 25, 2007). Similarly, Ghani6 (2007) argues that there is an unequal 
weight between countries in the management of the institutions because of unequal 
resources and power and that this will not change until the developing countries 
develop economically, as evidenced in the case of Dubai and Singapore, who now 
have more recognition in global affairs because of their economic success. However, 
once again on the aspect of the appointment of IFI leadership, Ghani agrees that 
“there should be no monopoly of an American heading the World Bank or European 
leading the IMF, the position should be meritorious” (BBC, September 25, 2007). 
                                            
5
 Tajudeen Rahmann is Deputy Director of the UN Millennium Campaign in Africa, General Secretary - Pan-African Movement 
and Director - Justice Africa. 
6
 Shraf Ghani is Chancellor of Kabul University and former Minister of Finance in Afghanistan 
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However, in a counter argument, proffered by Paul Skinner7 (2007) concerning 
weighted votes, he argues that, since the World Bank and IMF are not just lending 
organisations, then other member states should have more representation.  
 
To summarize these debates, Bhagwati and Ghani put emphasis on the need for 
sustained growth and economic change prior to democratic changes in relations 
between the developing countries and the IFIs. Other academics (such as Morales-
Gómez 1999), however, and institutions like UNRISD (1972) and UNDP (1990) have 
argued that economic change should occur simultaneously with other elements of 
change, which should include factors such as an increase in the representation of 
developing countries in global affairs. While this debate continues, we should also 
perhaps bear in mind some of the debates about governance and development 
considered in the earlier parts of this chapter and in particular those perspectives 
which suggest that real development is a function of the relative participation of the 
marginalized and powerless groups in socio-economic and political processes. One 
of the primary aims of development is to empower and free these marginalized 
groups from all forms of cultural, socio-economic and political dependency and 
create the capacity for ordinary people to be self-reliant and good governance is 
supposed to allow this to occur. Therefore, the mobilization and representation of the 
poor and their participation in socio-economic and political processes of making 
decisions that particularly affect them surely becomes an important feature of these 
debates about national development policy and development institutions which might 
also apply at a broader scale to global development institutions (Lucian 1966). 
 
Against this background, it is also worth noting that the world has fundamentally 
changed since 1944 when the Bretton Woods institutions were first established. At 
that time, many developing countries were still under the formal colonial rule of that 
Era, since then they have become independent and are now members of the World 
Bank and the IMF and some have become very important players in the global 
economy. It is to be imagined, therefore, that there might be a need to make 
changes in these institutions to reflect the nature of the global economy in the twenty 
first century. There is reasonably widespread recognition of this case. Tim Adams, 
                                            
7
 Chairman of Rio Tinto, one of the world‟s largest mining companies and previously managing director of The "Shell" Transport 
and Trading Company plc and Group Managing Director of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies 
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for example, a US Treasury Official, argued in 2005 that weighted votes in the IFIs 
should be altered to reflect the growing economic strength of Asian countries in the 
global economy (Adams 2005).  
 
Tito Mboweni, the former Governor of South Africa‟s Central Bank also made the 
case for fundamental reform of the governance of the IFIs to give developing 
countries a greater voice in decision making. Mboweni berated the highhanded 
“know-It-all approach” and patronising attitude of the institutions towards developing 
countries (Mboweni 2006). Arguing along the same lines, Paul Skinner suggests 
that, although there might be some political significance to arguments relating 
decision-making processes to how the IFIs are funded, since the major aim is to 
eradicate poverty, more representation for third world countries may help to provide 
a better decision-making process, particularly when the outcomes of such policy 
decisions affect those countries the most. He does, however, concede, regarding the 
leadership of the IFIs, that the best people should be allowed to lead, as efficiency in 
the management of the IFIs is also important. This position was also supported by 
Pradha8 (2007), who suggests that, since the IMF and World Bank promote 
meritocratic recruitment and promotion based on transparency and accountability 
within the civil services of developing countries, the IMF and World Bank should hold 
themselves accountable to those policies as well.  
 
Having explored the various debates concerning the governance and structure of the 
IFIs, the next section will move on to discuss governance and underdevelopment in 
the African context, before moving on to explore the specific issue of corruption in 
the next chapter. 
 
1.7 Governance and African Underdevelopment 
 
Despite its vast natural resources and despite decades of policy conceptualisation 
and formulation and the implementation of various types of macro-economic 
programmes and development strategies, the African economy remains in many 
senses underdeveloped. Average per capita income in many African countries is 
                                            
8
 The Director, Public Sector Governance for the World Bank, and also responsible for providing the strategic direction for the 
Bank‟s work on improving public sector governance and combating corruption 
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lower than it was at the end of the 1960s (see: World Bank 2000 and Gallop\ 2011). 
Scholars and political commentators have blamed these circumstances on external 
factors such as the impacts of colonial legacies and the influence of the international 
agencies, as well as other internal factors like high rates of population growth, 
adverse climate and leadership failures in many African countries. 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, development actors like the World Bank, have 
increasingly over recent decades put the blame for Africa‟s underdevelopment on 
bad leadership and poor governance. They and other critics have argued that a 
culture of leadership, developed over several decades, where African leaders 
arbitrarily govern their countries like personal businesses, may have been one of the 
factors responsible for African underdevelopment, suggesting that the crisis on the 
continent is a crisis of governance. This crisis encompasses such issues as: the 
extensive personalisation of power, the denial of fundamental human rights, 
widespread corruption and the prevalence of unelected and unaccountable 
government. This type of analysis has lain behind the calls for liberalisation and 
democratisation which have dominated international pronouncements about Africa 
over recent decades. It appears ever more glaring why good governance, particularly 
as defined by the UNDP (1997) (i.e. a definition which emphasizes the mechanisms, 
processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their 
interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their 
differences: see Section 1.2), is such a necessary instrument for finally tackling the 
intractable economic problems of so many countries in the African continent. 
 
Not everyone, however, is convinced by these arguments and some scholars (Khor 
2005, Guest 2004: 111) point to a range of other external factors (such as the 
impacts of colonial legacies, the limited assumptions and recessive impacts of 
structural adjustment programmes, major imbalances in international trade and 
foreign exchange speculation caused by aid conditionality etc: See Section 1.4) 
which they claim have both externally impacted upon Africa and interacted with and 
transformed Africa‟s internal political structures and cultures. Thus, frequently African 
leaders and scholars (Mbeki 2005: 3, Ayittey 1998: 31-32, Obadan 2001: 146) blame 
the continent‟s poor economic and social performance on the colonial legacy and 
post-colonial policies, as well as natural impediments and international market 
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mechanisms. In the 1980s, for example, many developing country leaders were 
heavily critical of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, citing the 
apparent failure of structural adjustment reforms as the cause of continued or even 
intensified economic failure. Colonialism clearly also had profound impacts on the 
political map and the economic development of Africa. It involved the export of 
human beings into slavery, and the colonial exploitation of the continent's vast 
natural resources and led to Africa‟s disadvantageous incorporation into the global 
economy (as described within dependency analyses).9 Along this line of argument, 
the former director of policy and research at the Commission for Africa, Nicholas 
Stern, noted that, “in Africa, it would be fair to say that the colonial system was 
particularly focused on exploiting and extracting the continent's natural resources 
and that infrastructure was built to export copper, timber, oil and gold among others” 
(Nicholas, 2005: 1). 
 
Many scholars and social commentators (see, for example: Mbeki 2005: 3, 
Sandbrook 1985: 42, Easterly and Levine 1997: 1214) also argue that during this 
period, troublesome artificial boundaries and new states were created without 
regards for long-established traditional political systems, economic structures and 
linguistic and ethnic differences, which subsequently became some of the main 
factors underlying war and inter-ethnic conflicts with deadly consequences since 
independence. According to Guest (2004: 111), the inter-ethnic conflicts in many 
African countries took “roots in manipulation of tribal loyalties by the colonial 
administrators.” In order to facilitate effective control over large populations with high 
levels of diversity, the “divide and rule” policy (which favoured one particular ethnic 
group over the others, making them allies in the colonial administration), which was 
employed by the colonial authorities at that time, created a lot of envy, bitterness and 
hatred in the continent. After the period of independence, these divisions were 
allowed to continue and have manifested themselves into bitter struggles for power 
and control over resources (See: Mohiddin 2000, Heleta 2007). 
                                            
9
 Dependency has been described as a situation in which the economic development of certain countries is influenced by the 
expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected (Santos, 1970). Other scholars have also described 
dependency as the theoretical independence and sovereignty of a state, while in principle its economic, social and political 
theory are subject to neo-colonial influence (Nkruman, 1968). This situation is frequently used in describing the type of relations 
between underdeveloped countries and the developed world, which appears to suggest that the development and expansion of 
dominant countries have negative impacts on the economic development of underdeveloped countries. 
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Clearly, then, the colonial rule that occurred in most parts of the developing world 
and did not end in many cases until about 50 years ago left a legacy of a series of 
social scars. It set precedents for dictatorial rule, and it left troublesome artificial 
national boundaries. It also, however, had established a considerable modern 
infrastructure of roads, railroads, medical clinics and laws among others. However, 
most analysts have argued, that whatever one might claim about the infrastructure 
and institutional improvements that were created in Africa during the colonial era, 
colonial relationships were ultimately exploitative in nature, and not developmental. 
According to Guest, the European slave shipments were particularly "cruel and 
rapacious" (Guest 2004: 113). 
 
As already discussed extensively in the earlier part of this chapter, another factor 
which may have been responsible for contemporary Africa's predicament is the 
imbalance in the global financial and trade system, which has seen the continued 
marginalization of African states in terms of trading relationships. A former Kenyan 
member of parliament, David Karanja noted that “Foreign aid has done more harm 
than good to Africa” (Ayittey 1998: 275). It has led to a situation where Africa has 
been unable to set its own pace and direct its own development free from external 
influence. Currently, many would argue that Africa‟s development policies are 
initiated thousands of miles away in the corridors of the IMF and World Bank (Ayittey 
1998) by „experts‟ who often are completely out of touch with the local reality on the 
ground in Africa.  
 
However, whilst the effects of colonialism and imperialism have undoubtedly played 
a key role in African‟s leadership structure and political systems, and the level of 
underdevelopment and socio-economic crisis in the continent, it is important to make 
a balanced argument. According to Guest (2004a), even in 2004 over 70 per cent of 
Africans were born after their nations became independent. One curious question 
that comes to mind when blame is being apportioned on the colonial legacy and the 
effects of imperialism, is for how long African leaders will continue to blame their 
socio-economic predicaments on the colonial legacy and the influence of the 
international financial institutions. Colonial rule, which ended about half a century 
ago can surely no longer be used as an excuse or justification of the leadership 
failure in many African countries, although it clearly continues to have an influence. 
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Paradoxically, there are many examples of newly independent states outside Africa 
that have not been held back by the colonial legacy. Korea, Taiwan, and the Asian 
tiger states are classic cases. Against this back drop, the former South African 
president, Nelson Mandela, has argued, that “Africa is beyond bemoaning the past 
for its problems. The task of undoing that past is on the shoulders of African leaders 
themselves, with the support of those willing to join in a continental renewal. We 
have a new generation of leaders who know that Africa must take responsibility for 
its own destiny, that Africa will uplift itself only by its own efforts in partnership with 
those who wish her well" (Ennings 2007: 37) 
Africa still scores poorly on most international surveys of economic and social 
development, and early progress after independence has since turned to decline in 
many countries, with even some reversal of initial gains. In contrast, the East Asian 
countries which had similar characteristics to many African countries in terms of the 
colonial legacy and socio-economic development in the early 1960s when the 
majority of the third world countries became independent have seen much more 
rapid developmental progress. By the early 1990s, there was glaring evidence that 
most Southeast Asian countries, under the leadership of Singapore, followed by 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Hong Kong and Taiwan and South Korea further 
north, have all made tremendous progress in terms of socio-economic development. 
During the period of economic boom of the Asian tigers, the reverse was the case in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Easterly and Levine1995), with the average per capita income 
falling at a rate above one per cent in a year during the 'lost decade' of the 1980s 
(Stein 1995).  
 
Some critics have expressed reservations over the relevance of the Asian 
experience to the African predicament, pointing to the contrast in terms of historical 
circumstances, geographical constraints, and political cultures between the two 
continents. But a counter argument proffered by Lindauer and Roemer (1994) 
suggests that Southeast Asia offers realistic policy lessons for many African 
countries. In a similar vein, they argue that the achievements of Asian countries was 
neither automatic nor inevitable but that each country had to overcome major 
barriers to growth, including war, revolution, political instability, ethnic competition, 
corrupt regimes, and grinding poverty (Lindauer and Roemer 1994). In the light of 
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the above arguments, as discussed in the preceding sections of this chapter, African 
leaders can no longer only cite the colonial legacy as the cause of their economic 
woes, but rather, they must also recognise the impacts of the irresponsible 
behaviours of many African leaders in producing poor governance, irresponsible 
social-economic policies and perhaps most importantly endemic corruption. 
This is a view which is backed up by the former United Nations Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan, who suggests that the time has come for Africans to hold their political 
leaders and not colonialism responsible for the civil wars and economic failures that 
ravage the lives of the ordinary people on the continent. In a report to the Security 
Council, the Secretary General said a „winner-take-all‟ attitude within Africa‟s style of 
politics had led to inequalities of patronage and wealth. “Where there is insufficient 
accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and 
balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or 
replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control become 
excessively important and the stakes become dangerously high" (Crossette 1998). 
Finally, according to Guest, summarizing several years of extensive research into 
understanding the major causes of poverty in Africa, “Africa is a shackled continent 
because of the abuse of power by 'vampire states' authoritarian governments that 
have failed their people comprehensively” (Guest 2004a). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has discussed the various debates concerning the conflicting concept of 
good governance. The definition appears to change with each person or institution 
that uses the concept and there is no single clear-cut meaning. Actors concerned 
with governance issues, such as scholars, governments and development 
assistance agencies (both regional and international) seem to confront such 
challenges by defining and analyzing the terms within their interests and scope of 
work. However, although important differences prevail in the opinion, there is a 
consensus among all actors on certain characteristics that should constitute the term 
good governance. This was followed by an overview of the historical evolution of the 
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concept of good governance. The concept gained pre-eminence in the early 1990s, 
following the end of the cold war and failure of structural adjustment programmes in 
developing countries in the 1980s. Since then, a series of good governance 
programmes and indicators (IDM, PRSP, CAS etc) have been designed and applied 
by the IFIs for strengthening the institutional framework of governments (by 
increasing the rule of law, political participation, transparency and accountability in 
the management of public resources). Some important methodological and 
conceptual challenges to the promotion of this ideal across the globe were 
addressed, some of which relate to the controversial nature of the concept itself. 
 
Concerns over conditionality within the IFIs operation were thoroughly debated, 
although it was concluded that aid without some sort of conditionality is unrealistic 
and politically impossible, as donor governments must account for the use of their 
taxpayer‟s money. Therefore, conditionality is an integral part of concessional 
lending. Nevertheless, it was also pointed out that while the principle of conditionality 
does not lack legitimate arguments, it may perhaps be opened to criticism as to the 
way it is applied and its impact in countries where they operate. A case was also 
made for transforming the governing structure of the IFIs themselves in order to 
reflect the fundamental changes which have occurred over the years and more 
effectively confront the current global socio-economic challenges. An effective 
transformation of the governing structure of the IFIs that fits 21st century challenges 
is imperative. Since the IMF and World Bank promote meritocratic recruitment and 
promotion in the civil service that is based in transparency and accountability, the 
IMF and World Bank should hold themselves to those policies as well. 
 
Finally, the chapter explored the pattern of poor governance and underdevelopment 
in Africa. It was argued that Africa remains underdeveloped despite its vast natural 
resources and decades of policy formulation and implementation. While 
development actors such as the World Bank, have increasingly over recent decades 
blamed these circumstances on bad leadership and poor governance in many 
African countries, many African leaders and scholars have blamed the pattern of 
authoritarianism, ethnic conflict, political instability and poor economic performance 
on external factors such as the colonial legacy and neo-colonial policies, as well as 
natural impediments and international market mechanisms. It was argued that while 
31 
 
this argument continues to hold sway, the colonial rule (which ended about halve a 
century ago) and other external influences like the IFIs macro- economic policies can 
no longer be used as an excuse for justifying leadership failure in Africa. 
Paradoxically, there are many examples of newly independent states outside of 
Africa that have not been held back by these external influences.  
 
As this chapter has hopefully illustrated, the call for good governance is an all 
pervasive theme in writings and policy prescriptions for Africa and yet governance is 
an extremely broad phenomenon with competing definitions and emphases. It lies 
beyond the scope of a single thesis to do justice to all of the different aspects of the 
good governance agenda, even in terms of its dynamics and outcomes in a single 
country such as Nigeria. Accordingly, I have narrowed down my attention to one 
element of the good governance agenda that has attracted an inordinate amount of 
international attention, although it is also an issue which is frequently raised in 
specific relation to Nigeria. This is the issue of corruption and the anti-corruption 
programmes which, as discussed earlier in this chapter, have become integral 
components of good governance initiatives. It is to these issues that we turn in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: Corruption: Key Debates and Issues 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter has constructively engaged with the various debates 
surrounding the governance agenda and economic development and poverty 
alleviation in Africa. This chapter builds on this by focussing on those elements of the 
broader discussions over governance which relate specifically to corruption, the 
exploration of which will form the major conceptual focus of the thesis. Specifically, 
the first part of this chapter begins by analysing the definition of the term corruption 
as provided by different development actors and academic school of thoughts. The 
second part highlights the various forms of corruption and its measurement, whilst 
the third part then moves on to provide critical assessments of the contemporary 
discussions that relate to the causes and effects of corruption on economic 
development. The final part of the chapter examines the various regional and 
international Anti-Corruption Initiatives as a prelude to exploring the nature and 
impacts of the anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria which forms one of the empirical 
foci of later chapters of the thesis. Together the discussions of these issues help 
create the conceptual background for outlining the specific research themes of the 
thesis.  
 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon. It  is an ancient phenomenon which can be 
traced back to pre-biblical times and according to writers from those societies it was 
widespread in the ancient civilizations of China, Greece, India and Rom (Lipset and 
Lenz 2000:112-113). Arguably, corruption could be said to be both a major cause 
and result of poverty. Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon which occurs in 
developed and developing countries alike. However its manifestations vary 
considerably from country to country according to the level and style of governance 
and economic development and a myriad of other factors. Attitudes toward 
corruption also differ considerably from one culture to another. The nature and 
dynamics of corruption have also changed over time, with recent manifestations 
being connected to the influence of factors like liberalisation and globalisation, the 
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use of new information technologies and the increasing role of multinational 
corporations in rapidly evolving political and economic contexts. The past few years 
have seen growing public recognition and discussion of the problem of corruption. In 
the mid 1990s, several major international bodies like the United Nations, the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation of American States, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) like Transparency International, all took turns in denouncing 
corruption and outlining steps that might be taken to combat it. 
 
However, before discussing these kinds of initiatives in more detail, we first turn to 
the difficult dilemma of attempting to define corruption. A task which has proved 
extremely complex due to the ambiguity in the meaning of the term and its 
measurement in different contexts. 
 
2.2 Definitions 
 
Defining corruption is clearly one of the major challenges of scholars and other 
stakeholders like the international development agencies that are interested in the 
anti-corruption discussion. There is no single, comprehensive and universally 
accepted definition of what constitutes a corrupt behaviour, this to a large extent, 
may be attributed to the ambiguous nature of what is encompassed under the term. 
This is particularly so because the sensitivity of public perceptions about behaviour 
that is corrupt varies considerably from one country to another and in different 
cultures. Thus, a particular behaviour that is considered corrupt in one cultural 
setting may not be labelled as corrupt in another. Furthermore, the complexity of this 
phenomenon is also underlined by the difficulties involved in gathering data which in 
most cases are unreliable and disjointed. 
 
Consequently, due to the complexity surrounding what could be defined as a corrupt 
behaviour, it is often even more challenging to agree on the necessary punishment 
for a corrupt act. For instance, while those in authority and popular opinion may 
unanimously condemn and call for punishments to be enacted against certain acts of 
corruption, there are also other acts of corruption that the authorities may want to 
punish but segments of public opinion may not object to. On the other hand, public 
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opinion may condemn certain corrupt behaviours which are condoned by the 
authorities. This scenario makes the process of prosecution and conviction a 
daunting task. 
 
However, despite the array of controversies surrounding the phenomenon, 
corruption has been defined and classified in different forms and sub-forms as 
different authors and agencies have attempted to operationalise the term for 
practical analyses and actions. Against this backdrop, the attempts of these 
individual authors and institutions to provide workable definitions of corruption within 
the context of their understanding of what constitutes a corrupt behaviour have not 
been without their problems. 
 
Some scholars have defined corruption as behaviour by public officials that deviates 
from the public interest (Morris 1991), others have conceptualised corruption, based 
on deviation from moral standards (Brooks 1970). Similarly, Morris defines corruption 
as behaviour that deviates from serving the common good, suggesting that it is an 
embodiment of a state‟s original norms and legitimising ideology (Morris 2008). The 
lack of specificity, however, of the public interest centred definitions of corruption has 
continued to generate a lot of criticism from some quarters. For instance, one of the 
probing questions concerns who defines what is in the public interest? As Theobald 
suggests, complex societies have a wide range of publics, each with their own 
interests (Theobald 1990: 6). This can be illustrated, for example, through some of 
the problems associated with the politicisation of Nigeria‟s anti-corruption crusade, 
where it has become difficult to bring corrupt political officials to justice as a result of 
the ways in which politicians have been able to turn the country‟s multi-ethnic divides 
to their favour by promoting their regional and ethnic interest. In the same vein, Peter 
and Welch (1978) contend that almost any act could be said to be in some sense of 
public benefit. 
 
However, there is another group of scholars that have attempted to define corruption 
in a narrower sense. These definitions of corruption have had a greater emphasis 
upon the legal and moral aspects. For instance, Nye (1967: 416) defines corruption 
as “behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role” because of private 
interests or status gains. In a similar vein, Khan (1996: 12) defines corruption as 
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behaviour that deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of 
someone in a position of public authority. Thus, “corrupt behaviour in this view 
involves the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit” (Sen 1999: 
275). This legalistic definition of corruption is often referred to as public-centred 
corruption. One of the problems with these kinds of definitions of corruption is that 
frequently what is popularly considered to constitute corrupt behaviour is also found 
beyond the public sector and may not involve any direct sense of monetary benefit – 
factors which lay outside a lot of the focus of attention in the dominant anti-corruption 
literatures. The “efforts to secure wealth or power through illegal means for private 
gain at the public expense” whether or not the perpetrator works in the public sector 
according to Lipset and Lenz (2000: 12-14), could also be classified as corrupt 
behaviour. This is an issue that will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
sections. 
 
Other scholars have attempted to define corruption in relation to particular state-
society relationships and a distinction has been made between grand (political) and 
petty (bureaucratic) corruption (see: Doig and Theobald 2000: 13). According to 
Robinson (1998: 3), a distinction can also be drawn between (1) incidental 
corruption, that is the individual behaviours of politicians and public office holders, (2) 
institutional corruption, where institutional cultures of corruption may have grown up 
around an entire institution and (3) systemic corruption, representing the idea of the 
embedding of corrupt practices as a way of life within a whole society.  
 
The most prominent definition of corruption, however, is the one used by the World 
Bank and this is worth exploring in a little more detail given how prominent it has 
been within discussion of corruption within the „development‟ context. The World 
Bank defines corruption as the “abuse of public office for private gain” (World Bank 
1997). This definition is also used by Transparency International (TI). Although, this 
definition may be useful, it is rather too narrow and simplistic, as argued above 
corruption is also prevalent in the private sector. Thus, for example, in the Asian 
Development Bank‟s (ADB) judgement, the definition provided by the World Bank 
does not give adequate attention to the problem of corruption in the private sector or 
the role of the private sphere in fostering corruption in the public sector. Thus, the 
ADB define corruption as the abuse of public or private office for personal gain (ADB 
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1998). In consonance with the ADB‟s judgement, therefore, I would argue that 
corrupt practices do not only occur in the public sector, but they also occur within 
and between private business and individuals in society, with or without the 
involvement of public officials. For instance, domestic firms, multinational 
corporations and banks have often been implicated for corrupt behaviour. However, 
because of the huge economic and political implications of public sector corruption, 
more emphasis is often placed on public sector corruption. 
 
Brown and Cloke (2004) point out some further limitations of the World Bank‟s 
definition of corruption. They argue that private individuals‟ gains from corruption are 
not limited to purely personal and monetary interests and that the abuse of political 
position (political corruption) to subvert, super-impose, or pursue a particular 
ideological agenda for personal interest, against the will of the majority of the people, 
is not adequately considered in the Bank‟s definition of corruption. Bearing in mind 
these critiques and the important role of the Bank in developing policy frameworks 
for addressing corruption worldwide it is worth taking a critical look at World Bank 
policy in this area in a little more detail in the next section.  
 
2.3 Neo-liberalism and Corruption 
 
As initially discussed in Chapter One, the good governance agenda as promoted by 
the World Bank was a partial reaction to the failures of structural adjustment 
programmes in developing countries in the 1980s. Similarly, as argued in the 
previous chapter, however, the World Bank‟s market reform policies have been 
heavily criticised by different scholars and development experts. For instance, in the 
views of Stiglitz (himself a former senior vice president of the Bank), advocates of 
privatization may have overestimated the benefits of privatization and 
underestimated the costs, particularly the political costs of the process itself and the 
impediments it has posed to further reform (Stiglitz 1998). For our purposes, even 
more interestingly, the head of the World Bank's Asia-Pacific branch, Jean Michel, 
has also argued that infrastructural privatisation in that region was a failure, because 
of the high level of corruption that characterised the process (Hawley 2000). The 
failure was particularly blamed on the lack of local ownership and the short-term 
policy framework of the IMF and World Bank. State institutions have tended to be 
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privatised without enough time to establish workable frameworks for proper 
regulation. 
 
The World Bank‟s position on corruption is that the introduction of free markets will 
remedy problems associated with the introduction of market distortions by the state 
which create incentives for corrupt activities; this according to Kruegar (1974) is 
centred on the “rent seeking” activities of public office holders. Consequently, 
specific anti-corruption measures were not considered to be of particular importance 
in combating corruption. Brown and Cloke (2004) consider the assumptions about 
the beneficial effects of reducing state intervention as a logical error. A view which is 
supported by Hatchroff (1997), who argues that even if markets are distorted by rent 
seeking activities as a result of state intervention, it does not mean that if state 
intervention is removed rents would be allocated as if markets were perfectly 
competitive.  
 
However, as discussed in chapter one, the Bank in the mid 1990s, as part of its good 
governance initiatives, began to rethink their anti-state sloganeering of the 1980s 
and early 1990s, by recognising the strategic role that the state can play in 
development. This has led to an emphasis upon the strengthening of public 
institutions, their transformation to become more transparent, open and accountable, 
a strengthening of electoral laws and judicial systems and a focus upon the role of 
civil society in combating corruption. Nevertheless, at the same time that the Bank 
has begun to pay attention to these issues, it has continued to promote the dominant 
neoliberal agenda of economic liberalization, privatisation and the further reduction 
of the role of the state (World Bank 1997). For instance, according to Brown and 
Cloke (2004), some important limitations of neo-liberal policies is that the ability of 
the state to function effectively have been curtailed by the successive years of 
cutting state spending such that the cost of economic reforms have become an 
obstacle to meeting the basic needs of the people. In addition, in a similar vein, it is 
important to add that the adoption of neo-liberal reforms will not automatically 
translate into a reduction in corrupt practices (particularly in states with weak 
bureaucratic institutions and poor criminal justice systems), this is because these 
types of policy reforms often create incentives for other forms of corruption to thrive. 
In the case of Nigeria for instance, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the 
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privatisation exercise of recent years has been characterised by corruption. In 2006, 
the former Nigerian Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, who was the chairman of the 
Bureau of Public Enterprises (PBE), was reported to have abused his position by 
using the privatization process to transfer the ownership of many public institutions to 
his political associates and other vested interest groups. Prominent amongst 
Nigeria‟s privatisation corruption scandals are the controversies surrounding the 
sales of African Petroleum, the Pentascope saga and the Ajakuta steel company 
(see: Onyeka-Ben 2006).   
 
Kaufmann contends, however, that whilst poorly designed and inadequately 
implemented market reforms could actually increase the incidence of corruption, 
properly designed and executed market reforms do not increase corruption. He 
further argues that avoiding economic reforms such as privatisation may increase 
avenues for corrupt practices because political elites often tend to promote personal 
interest above the common good by accumulating financial wealth through 
monopolistic structures. This “war chest" according to Kaufmann becomes a major 
weapon to impede or distort reforms. In a similar vein, he also maintains that limited 
regulatory and state interventions in the market, as well as a stable macroeconomic 
environment and simple tax regimes with limited discretion will reduce corruption 
(Kaufmann, 1997). 
 
Whilst up until a few years ago it seemed to be largely agreed that, whatever the 
social impacts of neoliberalism, institutional reforms had promoted economic 
development and modernization, contemporary events, specifically the current 
financial crisis which started in the US and then turned into a global financial and 
economic crisis, have raised a lot of questions about the effectiveness and reliability 
of neo-liberal policy reforms and the validity of Kaufman‟s perspective on these 
issues. Although there may have been several technical explanations as to what led 
to the recent financial crisis, most critics (Stiglitz 2008) believe that the problem was 
not unconnected to certain failures in the highly liberalized American financial 
system. The crisis can be partly blamed on professional irresponsibility and the 
greed of the financial system on Wall Street. There have been mounting criticisms of 
how Chief Executive Officers have been lavishly rewarded with millions of dollar in 
bonuses at the slightest appearance of profit, even if it later turns out to have been 
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an illusion. For instance Paul Krugman has argued that, at the crudest level, those 
profits and bonuses as declared by CEOs on Wall Street, are ill-gotten gains and 
that corrupt corporate capitalists have perfected the act of leveraging their 
connections in government for their own personal interests (Krugman 2008). 
Similarly, Joseph Stiglitz contends that hypocrisy and dishonesty in the finance 
sector led to the financial crisis (Stiglitz 2008). Against this back drop, the recent 
financial crisis has opened another chapter as to how the 21st century might be 
governed in a fair and just manner, and raised some serious questions about the 
relationship between state, markets, finance and corruption. 
 
To conclude this section, while disagreeing with the notion that neo-liberal reforms 
offer a „cure‟ for the phenomenon of corruption, it is also important to state here that 
more state-centred approaches may also be far from the solution. The problem of 
corruption may not be directly related to notions of the size of the state, but rather, to 
the manner in which the state operates and executes its functions (including how it 
relates to the private sector) which is far more significant than the size of public 
sector activity alone (Tanzi 1995). Thus, an effectively regulated capitalist economy 
that subscribes to the proper oversight functions of an effective state may perhaps 
represent the most viable goal in 21st century ant-corruption campaigns exercises. 
Having engaged extensively with the various debates concerning the definition of 
corruption and how it relates to the broader debates over institutional reform, 
governance and neoliberalism, the next section will focus on the global dimensions 
of corruption before then moving on to discuss the measurement of corruption, which 
is an area of enquiry which has been just as controversial as the definition of 
corruption.  
 
2.4 Corruption, a Global Problem   
 
While agreeing with the argument that corruption embodies a major challenge for 
developing and transiting economies and that the effect of corruption on their 
economic and political viability can be substantial, it is worth recalling, as suggested 
in the discussion of the financial crisis above, that the phenomenon also exists in the 
industrialized countries. Corruption represents a challenge, therefore, not only for 
developing and emerging economies but also for most countries of the rich world. 
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Thus, it is not a phenomenon which is peculiar to any continent, region or ethnic 
group. It cuts across faiths, religious denominations and political systems and affects 
both young and old, man and woman alike. However, this does not suggest that its 
magnitude is equal in every society, as overall levels of corruption (however defined) 
vary considerably. Nevertheless, this is an extremely difficult phenomenon to 
measure and the controversies that continue to trail the definition of corruption, also 
often come to the fore in the debate about its measurement.  
 
When comparing corruption levels in different countries (for example through 
Transparency International‟s10 indexes and rankings or other studies conducted by 
international development organisations like the World Bank and IMF), the South is 
often presented as being more corrupt than the North (leading to the focus on poor 
governance and weak state institutions in Southern countries discussed in chapter 
one). It is important, however, to consider the ways in which corruption in North and 
South are inter-twined. Some authors such as Neild (2002) argue that Northern 
countries and their agencies (e.g. TNCs etc.) have long been accomplices in 
corruption in the South, encouraging it by their actions, rather than impeding it (Neild, 
2002). Much is also made of the role of the colonial legacy in the instigation and 
dynamics of corrupt practices within Southern countries.  
 
It may be useful here to explore some less traditional definitions of corruption which 
deal with phenomenon which might not be considered illegal and would frequently 
not be dealt with under the dominant definitions peddled by the international 
agencies. Returning to issues discussed in the previous chapter, it is interesting to 
reflect on the relative silence within the corruption literature on the Cold War 
„corruption‟ that supported dictatorships, destabilised democracies and funded 
political opposition in sovereign states against international law in pursuit of selfish 
interests (Slater 2007). The impacts of the actions of the United States in particular 
in destabilizing democratic governments for pursuing anti-American interests is not 
often a key talking point in global anti-corruption discussions. For instance, in the 
                                            
10
 Transparency International is the leading international Anti-Corruption Non-governmental Organisation, which mobilises 
people together from across the world to curtail the adverse effects of corruption on men, women and children throughout the 
globe. The TI was founded in 1993, and ever since, it has been playing a leading role in raising awareness and diminishes 
apathy and tolerance of corruption, by working with relevant players in government, civil society, business and the media to 
promote transparency different government sectors like elections, public administration, procurement and in business 
(http://www.transparency.org). 
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year 1953, a CIA backed coup in Iran restored the Shah to power in place of the 
democratically elected government of Mossadeh, because of the latter‟s support for 
the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil company, which was later restored to 
foreign Anglo-American ownership. This resulted in a 25 year period of severe 
repression and corruption (see: Kolko 1988). Similarly, in 1954, as a result of the 
concerns of the US-owned United Fruit Company over the land reform plans of the 
Arbenz‟ government, a CIA-supported coup in Guatemala overthrew the 
democratically elected government of Arbenz. This led to the consolidation of a 
military regime which led to a 40 year period of state terror, corruption, death 
squads, torture, disappearances and execution (see: Cullather 1999). Furthermore, it 
is surely not too big a step to see the US and British justifications for the invasion of 
Iraq as corrupt. The world was made to believe that Saddam Hussein possessed a 
highly dangerous body of weapons of mass destruction, some of which when fired 
could bring about appalling devastation within 45 minutes, and that Iraq had a 
relationship with Al Quaeda and shared responsibility for the atrocity of September 
11, 2001 attack on the United States. Although these events may have generated a 
lot of concern and criticism from around the world, they clearly illustrate how 
powerful countries interfere with the political affairs of other sovereign nations. The 
point that I am seeking to make here, however, is that these forms of political 
corruption may have accounted for the death of several hundreds of thousands of 
innocent lives, including women and children in some cases, but are seldom 
criminalised or given serious attention within the anti-corruption debate. 
 
In a similar vein, the role played by multinational firms, which is often classified as 
cross-border corruption, suggests that corruption is a two way street, involving both 
multinational firms from advanced countries and public officials in developing 
countries. Despite the passage of the US Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA), 
which came into force about thirty years ago and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
act, a significant change in overseas bribery practices by Northern multinational firms 
is yet to be seen. For instance, a survey conducted by the World Bank Institute, 
confirmed that the behaviour of OECD firms abroad remained extensively corrupt, 
shortly after the act came into force (Hellman et al, 2002). Thus, to suggest that the 
North is more corrupt than the South or the other way round may perhaps be related 
to what different authors understand as being constituted under the term corruption. 
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As Michael Johnston suggests, comparisons of corruption among different societies 
must inevitably encounter the problem of contrasting standards (Johnston 1996). 
Despite the ambiguity surrounding the definition of corruption, attempts to classify 
different incidences of corruption, as a way of comparing experiences, for example, 
are still worth examining in a little more detail. This is attempted within the next 
section.  
 
2.5 Types of Corruption 
 
As discussed in preceding sections, there are various types of activity which have 
been labelled as corrupt and are used to identify different forms of corruption. Some, 
for example, may have been categorised on the basis of the sector within which the 
activity occurs (e.g. the identification of forms of public, private and political sector 
corruption). As shown in Table 2.1, the range of different corrupt practices which 
have been identified is considerably wider than this might suggest. These include but 
are not limited to: bribery, graft, extortion and robbery, patronage, nepotism, and 
cronyism, embezzlement and kickbacks amongst others. It is interesting to note, of 
course, that many of these terms themselves are subject to intense definitional 
debate. 
 
In some treatments, the various forms of corruption discussed above are classified 
under broad depictions of grand as opposed to petty corruption. Grand corruption 
could be described as the abuse of power to promote personal interests (UN 2004). 
This type of corruption also known as political corruption is common at the highest 
levels of government. It is sometimes classified as “state capture” when external 
vested interests are believed to be illegally meddling with the highest organs of a 
political system to advance their private interests, which often results in the erosion 
of the rule of law, economic stability and confidence in good governance. Petty 
corruption (day-to-day administrative corruption) on the other hand, often involves 
small amounts of money, such as a civil servant collecting £40 pounds in bribes to 
process a file (UN 2004). 
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Table 2.1: Forms of corruption 
 
Classification 
 
 
Description 
Bribery 
 
It takes two participants for a bribe to take place, the giver and taker 
of the bribe. The bribe is usually monetary in nature and is used to 
procure services or gain influence illegally. Other terms used to 
describe a bribe include: kickbacks, gratuities, pay-off, sweeteners, 
greasing palms, etc. (Bayart etal 1997, p.11) 
 
Graft 
 
While bribery is a form of corruption that takes place between the 
giver and taker of the bribe, graft is a little bit different in that it 
involves the acquisition of money or power by dishonest or unfair 
means by an individual without any necessary participation by 
others. This form of corruption occurs most commonly among 
government officials who take advantage of a position of trust 
(Collins, 2005). 
 
Extortion and Robbery 
 
This type of corruption is characterised by the use of coercion, force 
or the threat of violence to take something from someone illegally. 
Payment may be demanded by a corrupt official, a police officer, for 
instance, who may intimidate an individual by the illegitimate use of 
state force to inflict harm or pervert the course of justice. This type 
of activity is generally held to be more common in developing 
countries (Bayart et al, 1997,p.11)  
 
Patronage 
 
In politics, the practice of making appointments or granting contracts 
could be regarded as an act of patronage which could be legitimate 
in most cases. However, this could be seen as corruption when 
incompetent persons are considered or selected before more able 
ones (or only people with particular political connections or ethnic 
identities are considered) in return for support for the regime. The 
Sunni Arabs during Saddam Hussein‟s regime in Iraq, the 
Nomenklatura in the Soviet Union, Junkers in Imperial Germany are 
all examples of this type of corruption (see: Bearfield 2009). 
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Nepotism and 
Cronyism 
 
While Nepotism could be regarded as favouritism shown to relatives 
or close friends by those with power or influence, cronyism is the 
practice of appointing friends to high level office regardless of their 
suitability for such a position. Other examples include the exemption 
of kinfolk and family members from the application of certain laws or 
regulations or giving them undue preference in the allocation of 
scarce resources (see: Amundsen, 1997 and Girling 1997). North 
Korea or Syria are examples of public sector corruption, where the 
entire state appears to be inherited. This is also common in the 
private sector, for instance a Bank appointing new member of staff 
with the intention of persuading depositors for patronage. 
 
Embezzlement, Theft 
and Fraud 
 
Embezzlement and fraud could be described as stealing by an 
individual taking advantage of his or her official capacity (UN 2004). 
In particular, embezzlement involves the outright theft of entrusted 
funds. It is a misappropriation of property. This form of corruption is 
common in both public and private sectors and occurs when 
individuals illegitimately convert money or property entrusted to 
them fraudulently for their own use (Collins, 2005).  
 
Additionally, fraud could be specifically described as some kind of 
trickery, swindle or deceit, such as counterfeiting, racketing, 
smuggling or forgery. It generally involves the use of false or 
misleading information to influence the rightful owner of property, to 
voluntarily part with it (UN 2004). For instance, a bank or an 
insurance official who induces an individual (customer) to subscribe 
to a loan package or an insurance policy by misrepresenting certain 
facts and conditions which apply to the policy, could be described 
as committing fraud. However, the regular description of theft is 
probably outside the scale of any definition of corruption. For 
instance, a poor and hungry individual who steals a loaf of bread 
from a truck could be described as having committed theft, but may 
not be considered within the common definitions of corruption. 
 
On the other hand, embezzlement could be classified within the 
common definition of corruption and may attract with it a breach of 
fiduciary duty, irrespective of the place it occurred. 
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This type of corruption also known as political corruption is common at the highest 
levels of government. It is sometimes classified as “state capture” when external 
vested interests are believed to be illegally meddling with the highest organs of a 
political system to advance their private interests, which often results in the erosion 
of the rule of law, economic stability and confidence in good governance. Petty 
corruption (day-to-day administrative corruption) on the other hand, often involves 
small amounts of money, such as a civil servant collecting £40 pounds in bribes to 
process a file (UN 2004). The various forms of corruption as discussed above are 
common in most parts of the world (UN 2004) but some types of corruption seem to 
be more common in some parts of the world, or more prevalent amongst specific 
sectors and social groups in society. Some forms of corruption like extortion and 
robbery for instance, are perhaps possibly more common in the South, with some 
scholars (such as Uslaner 2008 and Tanzi 1998) drawing a link between these 
phenomena and poverty, which, as we shall see in later discussions, has been 
argued to be a major cause and consequence of corruption. In fact, it is the 
consequences of corruption that have continued to generate a lot of controversy, 
although increasingly, there appears to be consensus amongst governments and 
development practitioners that corruption, not only undermines good governance, 
but also exacerbates poverty and inequality (see: Adebanwi and Obadare 2011). 
The debates surrounding the consequences of corruption are explored in a little 
more detail in the next section.  
 
2.6 The Effects of Corruption  
 
There is no predetermined state or fixed correlation between any particular level of 
economic development and the incidence of corruption. Corruption can be prevalent 
in countries with low, medium and high levels of economic development. According 
to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2009), for example, 
the incidence of corruption in Italy is higher than it is in Botswana and the incidence 
of corruption is higher in the US than in Hong Kong. Although corruption is definitely 
significant in all contexts, it can be damaging in a myriad of different ways related to 
the type of corrupt activity and the nature of the society concerned (e.g. levels of 
inequality, poverty, level of support for democratic institutions etc). Perhaps the most 
important point about the impacts of corruption is that its negative effects often seem 
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to hit the poorest and most marginalised sectors of society the hardest and its 
impacts are more devastating in those societies where resources are most scarce 
(Perry 1997: 22). According to Transparency International (nd), for example, 
endemic corruption can reduce the growth rate of a country to 0.5 to 1.0 percent 
point lower than a similar country with less corruption, although there are plenty of 
analysts who would dispute these figures. Corruption can breed cynicism, criminality 
and distrust; it also undermines effective democratic reform and popular participation 
in a political system of governance (Alatas 1993: 199).  
 
The extent and severity of the effect of corruption on economic development, to 
some extent, is a function of the developmental stages of the various socio-political 
institutions in a particular country, thus highlighting the connection between 
corruption and the broader issues of governance discussed in the preceding chapter. 
A convincing argument can be made to suggest that the detrimental effect of 
corruption on economic development is more severe in developing and transiting 
economies than in the industrialised countries where social and economic institutions 
are better developed and proceeds that are derived illegally are more likely to be re-
invested locally. Conversely, in many developing and transiting economies, illegally 
acquired proceeds are kept in foreign bank accounts. According to Ayittey (2005), for 
example, capital flight from the African continent accounts for over $20 billion per 
year. Similarly, the United Nations has estimated that, “$200 billion, representing 90 
percent of the sub-Saharan part of the African continent‟s gross domestic product, 
was shipped to foreign banks in 1991 alone” (Ayittey 2005). Despite these 
arguments, there are also clearly instances where corruption and mismanagement in 
the industrialised countries like the US appears to have led to economic hardships. 
For instance, as argued in the preceding section, Transparency International point 
out that the global financial crisis, which started from the US, was caused by the 
“enormous mismanagement of funds entrusted to financial institutions by the public” 
and Hugutte Labelle, TI Chair, further states that the crisis has resulted in broad 
detrimental economic and humanitarian impacts (TI 2008).  
 
Corruption is also said to undermine political development and it can weaken the 
political will needed for effective governance reforms (Knack and Keefer 1995). The 
negative effects of corruption upon economic and political development can also 
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make externally funded projects ineffective, discouraging the efforts of aid donors 
and international organisations (IMF, 1995, Isham, Kaufman, and Pritchett, 1995, 
Rauch 1995). For example, according to Eigen (1996), corruption wastes resources 
when government policies are distorted against the interest of people-oriented 
projects and turns the energies and efforts of public officials and citizens towards 
easy money instead of more productive exercises. Similar arguments suggest that 
corruption could hamper the growth of competitiveness, frustrate efforts to alleviate 
poverty and generate apathy and cynicism (UNDP, nd). 
 
By contrast, however, others have held the view that corruption may not necessarily 
lead to underdevelopment and at times may even promote economic development. 
For example, Nathaniel Leff of Columbia University in the 1970s, asserted that 
"corruption may create opportunities for a more competitive environment into what is 
otherwise a comfortably monopolistic system of administration, where payments of 
the highest bribes, becomes a major condition for allocation, thereby introducing 
efficiency into the system” (Kaufmann 1997: 114-131). This notion, which inspired 
sophisticated academic models and also legitimized the behaviour of private 
companies that offer bribes to get contracts, failed to consider the enormous 
discretionary powers that are available to politicians and bureaucrats over the 
creation and interpretation of counterproductive regulations. Contrary to the notion 
that corruption is the grease that lubricates the squeaky wheels of rigid 
administration, others have argued strongly that it promotes the increase of 
excessive and discretionary regulations (see: Kaufmann 1998).   
 
Lui (1985) has also argued that there are some beneficial effects to corruption; for 
example, those related to the effects of corruption on efficiency and time issues. 
When bureaucrats are allocating business licenses to firms they are often bribed into 
speeding up administrative procedures. Beck and Macher (1986) and Lien (1986) 
also argue along these lines, they assert that the most efficient firms are often those 
who can afford the highest bribe in bidding processes, thus promoting efficiency. 
However, Tanzi (1998: 582) and Aidt (2003: 634-35), establish effective counter 
arguments to these assertions. They argue that private firms who pay high bribes are 
not necessarily economically competitive firms and that when potentially talented 
individuals engage in corrupt activities instead of more productive activities, there is 
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a misuse of human capital which may lead to a damage in macroeconomic growth. 
Furthermore, Myrdal (1968) contends that, because corrupt officials know that bribes 
are used to facilitate the speeding up of administrative procedures, bureaucrats may 
then further slow down the administrative procedure by deliberately imposing more 
rigidities to create more opportunities for extracting bribes. Thus, one of the 
deficiencies of this notion of "speed money" is the assumption that there will be no 
circumvention and that both parties will automatically stick with the deal and that 
there will be no further demands for bribes. Moreover, as argued earlier in this 
section, corruption represents a theft of public resources as bribes and 
embezzlement; for example, effectively divert funds from public treasury revenues, 
which undermine macroeconomic stability, particularly in developing countries where 
bribes are laundered into overseas accounts, thereby negating any potentially 
productive use of such looted funds in the country.  
 
Since there is a cloud of ambiguity surrounding the meaning of corruption, in many 
ways it is not that surprising that this ambiguity is also clearly expressed in 
discussions over the effects of corruption on economic development. These debates 
have resurfaced again most recently in relation to the cases of some Asian 
economies, particularly China, for combining the phenomena of economic growth 
and high levels of corruption. In reality, however, analysts suggest that the direct and 
indirect costs of corruption in China are enormous. Corruption in China has, for 
example, arguably further widened the gap between the rich and poor. According to 
Pei (2007), the economic loss due to corruption in China is estimated at roughly 3 
percent of its GDP per year, which represents a large transfer of wealth to a tiny 
group of elites. Furthermore, at the local level, instances of corruption have 
frequently led to riots, violence and collective protests undermining social stability 
and therefore necessitating extra spending on internal security (see: Pei 2007). 
Corruption in China is also said to have contributed to serious environmental 
degradation, the high cost of health care, education and the provision of social 
services. For instance, following an earthquake in Sichuan province in 2008, which 
left more than 86,000 dead or missing and millions homeless, there was a strong 
protest and allegations of corruption. The uproar came as a result of allegations that 
the bribery of local officials had resulted in the construction of shoddy buildings, 
including several thousand classrooms which had crumbled in face of the 
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earthquake (Wong 2008). Similarly, after the earthquake, there were widespread 
reports that local government officials had diverted aid funds that were meant for 
victims of the earthquake, which further stoked the flames of public discontent (Don 
2008). Thus, whilst, on the one hand, China may have experienced relatively high 
economic growth despite rampant corruption, on the other hand, had China been 
less corrupt, its economic growth would have possibly been of a higher quality, with 
much less damage to the environment, economic efficiency, public health, and social 
stability. 
 
From the above arguments, it could be said that under certain circumstances, 
corruption may be seen to promote efficiency in the process of doing business, 
thereby promoting growth in the short term. But in the long run, corruption itself is 
inimical to sustainable economic development. According to Lui, “corruption has two 
side effects” a positive effect on allocative efficiency which is short term, and a 
negative effect on sustainable economic development for the common good in the 
long run (Lui 1996; 28). Thus, the suggested positive impact is highly controversial, it 
exacerbates socio-economic inequality between the enriched few (bureaucrats and 
corrupt private officials) at the expense of ordinary citizens and income distribution 
becomes highly skewed among many other side effects. The controversies trailing 
discussions of the effects of corruption are also reflected in discussions over the 
major causes of different types of corruption and this will be treated in more detail in 
the following section. 
 
2.7 Causes of Corruption 
 
Clearly, the debates surrounding the multiple definitions of corruption and those 
concerning its measurement and impacts are also closely related to questions about 
the causes of corruption, since any individual author‟s understanding of the nature of 
corruption will greatly influence what they see as its major causes. This section, 
therefore, explores the debates over the causes of corruption in more detail. This 
section explores the broader theoretical debates concerning the causes of 
corruption, which will set the foundation for contextualising the discussions of the 
major causes of corruption within the context of Nigeria in subsequent chapters. This 
debate is complex because some of the effects of corruption may, in effect, also 
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perhaps constitute its causes. Poverty, inflation and inequality for instance, have all 
been discussed as major consequences of corruption in the literature, but they are 
also discussed as major causes.  
 
As suggested at the start of this discussion, the controversies over the meaning and 
effects of corruption often come to the fore in discussions concerning the cause of 
corruption. Thus, as discussed in the previous section, some development actors like 
the World Bank, frequently seem to attribute the degree of corruption to the size of 
the public sector within a country. In a similar vein, Tanzi (1994) asserts that 
corruption tends to increase with the size of a state and the degree of intervention 
within the economy, because it is argued that larger states are difficult to monitor and 
manage in a transparent and accountable manner, while excessive state intervention 
also creates greater avenues for corruption to flourish. Nevertheless, critics such as 
Montinola and Jackman (2002), disagree with this assertion, and argue that, the size 
of government does not systematically affect corruption. Furthermore, available 
evidence from the Transparency International corruption perception index, suggest 
that some of the least corrupt countries like Denmark, Finland, Canada, Sweden, 
Botswana, and the Netherlands, have some of the largest public sectors in the world. 
There are then, a whole host of factors which may have an influence on the levels of 
corruption in a given country at a given time. These include: regulatory barriers to 
market entry, excessive government control and regulations, low competition 
amongst private firms, recruitment not based on meritocracy, poor working condition 
and wages, lack of free media, unethical leadership and nepotism towards family 
and friends amongst others (Lambsdorff 2005; Hope and Chikulo 2000: 13; Hope in 
Hope and Chikulo 2000: 20; Senior 2006: 127-159; Montinola and Jackman 2002; 
Mbaku 2007: 64-68).  
 
From the institutional perspective, corruption can definitely be related to the quality of 
governance, which constitutes a major thrust of this research. Weak state 
institutions, characterised by inadequate capacity to manage society, through a 
framework of social, judicial, political and economic checks and balances, creates a 
breeding ground for corruption to flourish. In those places, like many African states, 
where the social stigma attached to corruption is lower, bureaucrats frequently see a 
position in government as avenue to advance their personal interests and those of 
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their immediate families (Apter 1963), as there are often hardly any effective 
transparent mechanisms in place to promote checks and balances. In the case of 
Nigeria for instance, China Achebe (1984) suggested that Nigerians are corrupt 
because the system under which they live today makes corruption easy and 
profitable and they will cease to be corrupt when corruption is made difficult and 
inconvenient. In many African cultures, extended family assistance and high levels of 
community spirit are other factors, which compel the rich and the employed to render 
financial assistance and other support to relatives and other members of their 
community. As a politician, the degree of prestige and influence and political support 
is determined by the degree of financial status and the level of financial support they 
are able to supply towards sustaining the needy, as well as donations made toward 
public projects. 
 
Conflicts of interest may be another factor responsible for the high levels of 
corruption in Nigeria; for example, conflicts of interest among high level and low level 
personnel, between ethnic groups, and between local communities, which could 
result from disagreements over public office appointments and promotions. There is 
a suggestion that Africans frequently give political support on the basis of ethnic 
allegiance (Nwosu 1977). As a result, citizens frequently do not condemn corruption 
if it is carried out by their relatives or someone of the same ethnic background (the 
specifics of the Nigerian case are discussed in detail in the next chapter).  
 
The causes of corruption vary considerably from one country to another and 
unsurprisingly difficulties often exist in trying to single out the major factors causing 
corruption. Similarly, the clouds of ambiguity surrounding the debates over the 
meaning of corruption are often encountered in discussions over the causes of 
corruption. There is, however, no question over the fact that a combination of a 
range of connected and integrated factors could perhaps reinforce one another to 
result in higher levels of corruption. Having discussed extensively, various debates 
concerning the definitions of corruption, the various forms and measurements, and 
its effects, as well as it major causes, attention in the final part of this chapter will 
now turn to how the regional and international community have responded to tackling 
the problem of corruption. 
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2.8 International Anti-Corruption Campaign 
 
The criminalisation of corruption is relatively new in the global development agenda. 
In fact, as recently as the 1970s and 1980s corruption and anticorruption discussions 
was not a major focus of development co-operation or within academic studies of 
development. Furthermore, corruption was frequently condoned in international 
business transactions particularly when doing business transactions with developing 
countries (see: UNODC 2007). The phenomenon was often perceived as a 
necessary business expense and tax deductible expenditure in some cases (see: 
Pujas 2000: 11).  
 
The seeming reluctance towards tackling the problem of corruption by the 
international community is related to the complexity surrounding the definition of 
corruption. Prior to the early 1980s, corruption was perceived as a crime, unethical 
behaviour or immoral activity that should be handled by the police at the national 
level (UNODC 2007). This may suggest why there were no specific international law 
and treaties on corruption until the early 1990s.  
 
However, since the mid 1990s, there has been a dramatic increase of international 
interest in corruption, both in terms of exposing the degree to which corruption exists 
and in formulating measures by which it could be curtailed (Brown and Cloke 2004). 
It is the combination of a range of interconnected factors, like the demise of the Cold 
War era, the expansion of democracy, the increasing free media, the growth in 
economic and financial globalization, and the spread of free-market economics that 
seems to have significantly influenced the increasing international interest in anti-
corruption activities.  
 
Presently, many national and international organizations are taking steps in trying to 
combat corruption and build more transparent and effective institutions. Nationally, in 
country after country, efforts are being made to encourage the development of a free 
press and independent judiciary with more effective criminal justice systems that can 
investigate and prosecute corrupt individuals and organizations alike. As part of the 
Good Governance reforms discussed in the previous chapter, over recent years 
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developing countries have been encouraged to create effective auditor general 
offices and more transparent and accountable revenue collection systems. These 
reforms have been accompanied by civil service reform and the spread of more 
transparent public procurement processes. However, while these international efforts 
in curbing corruption may be commendable, many governments and political officials 
in developing countries have become increasingly defensive over the global anti-
corruption debate, because of a widespread perceived sense of imbalance that 
surrounds the development of these campaigns. 
 
Specifically, critics have argued that the international anti-corruption campaigns 
appear to have focused more on public and political officials‟ bribery in developing 
countries and transiting countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, while bribe 
givers from the North appear to remain unchallenged. Contemporary scandals of 
corruption involving some multinational co-operations suggest that an important 
segment of private domestic and multinational co-operations are involved in bribery 
(see: Agbo 2009). Many multinationals, for example, as discussed in the preceding 
sections, pay bribes for public procurement contracts in emerging economies. Cases 
of undue influence peddling by vested interests and attempts at capturing state 
institutions and regulations by a few powerful corporate entities are numerous (see: 
section 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 below for more details).  
 
It is important, therefore, according to Tanzi (1995), to recognize that the starting 
point for any anti-corruption campaign must be to recognise that corruption is a two 
way street, that is, those who demand bribes and those who pay the bribe (Tanzi 
1995). This suggests the importance of both the demand and supply side of 
corruption, with both sides conspiring to secure their vested interests. Nevertheless, 
just as much is being done presently to address the demand side of corruption 
through various anti-corruption reforms already mentioned above, more attention is 
now also being focused in tackling the supply side of corruption through various 
international anti-corruption law and treaties. Apart from the United States, which in 
1977 passed a law that made it a criminal offence for a company to pay bribes 
abroad (even if it has led to few legal cases being brought), other international ant-
corruption instruments designed to primarily address the supply side of corruption 
since the mid 1990s, have included but are not limited to the United Nations 
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Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the 
African Convention against corruption and the Council of Europe‟s Corruption Law 
Conventions. 
 
Furthermore, a host of other donor agencies (United Nations Development 
Programme, United State Agency for International Development, United Kingdom 
Department for International, Asia Development Bank, World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund) are increasingly incorporating various anti-corruption policy reforms 
in different levels of development cooperation. 
 
Transparency International is the most notable non-governmental organisation that 
has initiated various tools to tackling the problem of corruption. Although it has no 
legal powers to criminalise bribery and corrupt behaviours, Transparency 
International, which came into existence in 1993, is one of the most important anti-
corruption organisations, particularly through the publication of its annual corruption 
perceptions index (Galtung and Pope 1999). The CPI is a poll of polls, which reflects 
the perception of different experts and businesses over the degree of public sector 
corruption in selected countries across the globe. However, as respected as TI may 
have become, its activities have not been spared from criticism for a number of 
reasons. For example, TI have been criticised for basing their assessments not on 
detailed independent research, but rather on the opinions of a narrow group of 
respondents, who are mainly comprised of international and regional business elites, 
with some countries reports being based on the opinions of a very limited number of 
individuals (Heywood 1997: 25). Given the notorious difficulties associated with 
conducting research on corruption, particularly with regards to its definition and 
measurement, a more thorough and broadly-based investigation into the subject in 
each country would perhaps help create more confidence in TI‟s approach. TI‟s CPI 
has also been criticised on the grounds that it is predicated upon the perceived level 
of public sector corruption within a given country which means that its approach 
tends to be very state-centred and supply-focused. However, in response to criticism 
of this nature, the TI is increasingly attempting to draw attention to private sector 
corruption. For instance, in 2009, the TI produced a Global Corruption Report 
documenting details of several corruption risks for businesses ranging from small 
businesses in Sub-Saharan Africa to multinationals across Asia, Europe and North 
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America (see: TI 2009).  Despite some of the limitations discussed here, the TI has 
certainly drawn significant international attention to corruption and its measurement. 
 
In the wake of the impacts of TI‟s initiatives in raising the profile of tackling corruption 
on the international stage, other anti-corruption instruments have gradually emerged. 
In particular the measures taken to criminalise the bribery of foreign public officials 
by western multinationals (the supply side of corruption) as discussed above. For the 
purpose of assessing the degree of enforcement and impact of these anti-corruption 
initiatives, it is worth discussing in a little more detail the specifics of some of the 
major anti-corruption initiatives that have emerged over this period.     
 
2.8.1 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which was established in 1997, has been 
adopted by 30 OECD member countries and eight non-member countries, including 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Slovenia and South Africa (Daley 
1997). The convention is a legally binding standard, which criminalises bribery of 
foreign public officials. Since it was initially introduced over a decade ago, the 
Convention has made some degree of progress, both in terms of enforcement and in 
publicising the international anti-corruption campaigns (Dunne 2000). Parties to the 
Convention can be classified into three categories: those states with active 
enforcement, moderate enforcement, and little or no enforcement (see: Heimann and 
Dell 2010: 6). Currently, with the inclusion of Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom, 
which previously were in the moderate category, the membership of the active 
enforcement category has increased from four to seven, representing a positive 
development. The moderate enforcement category is currently constituted of 9 
OECD countries with the recent inclusion of Argentina. Furthermore, about 20 OECD 
countries including G8 members like Canada, have recorded little or no enforcement. 
However, this perhaps is not very impressive, because the countries in this category, 
which represent about 13 per cent of world exports, have shown little or no change in 
enforcement over the last five years, as many companies in these countries do not 
even seem to know about the existence of the Convention (Heimann and Dell, 
2010).   
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The convention has also been criticised on a number of grounds. These include: the 
non prohibition of foreign political parties funding, non prosecution of parent 
companies for their subsidiary and agent corrupt practices and the non 
criminalisation of non cash bribery such as shares amongst others (see: Hawley 
2000). 
 
However, despite these limitations, the convention has had some important impacts 
in the global anti-corruption campaign. For instance, the UK government which was 
initially reluctant to pass a law forbidding bribery of foreign officials has successfully 
prosecuted about seven cases involving the bribery of foreign officials. The first 
conviction was concluded in September 2009, involving a UK construction firm, 
Mabey and Johnson, for bribing politicians, ministers and public officials in Ghana, 
Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, Bangladesh, and Jamaica (see: Peel 2010). 
 
2.8.2 United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
 
Having recognised the need for an international legal framework for combating 
corruption, the United Nations, in 2001, established an ad hoc committee to 
negotiate such an instrument (Rajesh 2007). After a series of negotiating sessions, 
the Ad Hoc Committee, between January 2002 and October 2003, approved the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which was eventually 
adopted by the General Assembly on 31 October 2003 (UN 2004). Since the 
convention was adopted, over 129 member nations have signed it. It represents the 
most extensive international anti-corruption instrument designed to tackle the 
complex issue of cross border corruption. The Convention is designed to rest on four 
cardinal points, which include corruption prevention, the criminalization of corrupt 
practices, galvanising international cooperation and asset recovery.  
 
However, the Convention is not without its own limitations. Firstly, since the UNCAC, 
was first conceived in 2003, many aspects of its originally envisaged articles have 
been altered and new propositions made by the Ad Hoc Committee through the 
process of drafting the convention from start to finish (Rajesh 2007). In this process, 
a number of very crucial aspects of the provisions have either been excluded or 
substantially watered down to accommodate the divergent opinions of member 
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states. For instance, the original provision for legislative and policy changes, which 
called for the funding of political parties in a transparent and accountable manner, 
was instead replaced by a weaker optional alternative (Rajesh 2007). Similarly, the 
provision compelling states to criminalize bribery in the private sector was made 
optional. Unfortunately, the blanket of ambiguity surrounding some aspects of the 
provisions could potentially result in policy inconsistencies and miss-interpretation of 
the requirements. Admittedly, a degree of ambiguity may be necessary, to create 
room for flexibility amongst member states in implementing the obligations as 
provided by the convention, but the possible abuse of ambiguous language in some 
vital aspects of the provisions of the Convention cannot be ruled out, which could 
significantly undermine the original purpose of the anti-corruption convention.  
 
In addition, despite the convention‟s potential to combat corruption, particularly with 
regards to mobilising and facilitating broad based international action against 
corruption, there is no transparent review mechanism for the effective 
implementation and monitoring of its obligations, which perhaps is its most 
fundamental shortcoming (Heimann and Dell, 2009). An effective mechanism for 
monitoring the implementation of the provisions as provided by the convention may 
be desirable for establishing the level of compliance by member states.  
 
In addition to these major international Conventions (the OECD Anti-Corruption 
Convention and UN Convention Against Corruption), there are other regional anti-
corruption instruments like the African Convention against corruption, the Council of 
Europe‟s Corruption Law and the US Foreign Corruption Practices Act (FCPA) 
already mentioned above. The most prominent amongst them is the FCPA, which 
was established in the wake of the Lockheed scandal and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) report over three decades ago (CBUA, 1976). 
According to the report, illegal payments to foreign officials and foreign politicians 
were common practice in US corporations, which included companies from the 
chemical, aerospace, pharmaceuticals and oil and gas sectors. Although the act 
recommends stiff penalties, until recently, not much had been achieved since the act 
was first passed into law. Critics have argued that, instead of curbing corrupt 
practices, what has mainly changed is the way US companies engage in corruption. 
Nonetheless, there have been some achievements in more recent times, particularly 
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in terms of the number of foreign bribery cases that have been investigated. 
Currently, there are about 30 pending cases, 138 concluded, 100 under investigation 
and 25 allegations (Heimann and Dell 2010). In October 2009 there was a major trial 
involving four individuals, which included a former US Congress member. Similarly, 
there were some settlements in 2009 and 2010 respectively, involving Halliburton 
and its subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root LLC to resolve charges of corruption 
scandals involving top Nigerian government officials over a period of about ten 
years. About $800 million was alleged to have been paid in bribes to the executive 
arm of the Nigerian government and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) officials. These bribes were meant to facilitate the award of government 
contracts relating to the construction of the Bonny Island liquid natural gas facility in 
Nigeria, estimated to be valued at $6 billion. Against this back drop, while KBR and 
Halliburton agreed to the payment of $177 million settlement charges, Kellogg Brown 
& Root LLC also agreed to pay a $402 million fine for the settlement of criminal 
charges by the US Department of Justice (see: U.S. Security and Exchange 
Commission 2009).  
 
Similarly, a host of donor agencies as already indicated within earlier discussions are 
adopting various anti-corruption reform policies in their development co-operation. 
Many of these mainstream anti-corruption initiatives have come under heavy 
criticism for their treatment of corruption as an issue requiring essentially technical 
solutions and the universalising of Western norms and values without adequate 
recognition for the complexity over the definition of corruption (see: Brown and Cloke 
2004). The following section focuses on the economic and institutional reforms of the 
major international financial institutions and their attempts to reduce corruption in the 
developing world.    
 
2.8.3 World Bank and IMF Anti-Corruption Campaigns 
 
Up until the mid 1990s, corruption and anti-corruption were not specifically seen as 
part of the IFIs development agenda. It was considered a political issue outside of 
the mandate of the IFIs (see: Collingwood 2002). However, as described elsewhere 
within this chapter, since the late 1990s, the IFIs have taken several measures to 
reduce corruption. Borrowing countries have been made to adopt various 
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governance and anti-corruption reforms. As discussed in chapter One, these policies 
evolved in response to the increasingly popular belief that the lack of good 
governance, misplaced economic policies and endemic corruption were largely 
responsible for the lack of aid effectiveness. For example, speaking at an anti-
corruption conference in 1999, the former World Bank president, James Wolfensohn, 
contended that the industrialised countries were becoming increasingly reluctant to 
give money for development assistance that might end up in offshore bank accounts 
(Sweeney 1999). 
 
According to Huther and Shah (2000), the World Bank‟s multi-pronged approach for 
tackling corruption is anchored in four dimensions which consist of: (i) enhancing 
transparency and accountability within the organisation itself (ii) preventing fraud and 
corruption in the programmes and projects it finances (iii) supporting international 
and regional initiatives to curb corruption and (iv) helping individual countries 
develop policies and procedures to combat corruption. 
 
While the first and second dimensions focus on ensuring zero tolerance to corruption 
within the Bank as an organisation, the third and fourth are concerned with 
corruption as a general policy issue. Since the Bank‟s primary responsibility is to 
promote economic development and reduce poverty in client countries, tackling the 
issue of corruption as part of its broader framework on governance is central to this 
effort. The Bank‟s anti-corruption strategy is multi-pronged, but is rooted in its 
programme of underlying economic and institutional reform (World Bank 2000: 21). 
Recently, it has made efforts to move beyond the traditional institutional and 
administrative approach to encompass recognition of the importance of broader 
issues like civil society and state relationships, the importance of political culture and 
traditions and state-private sector relationships. Figure 2:1 shows the World Bank‟s 
entry point to governance reforms. 
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Figure 2. 1: World Bank Anti-Corruption Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank Anti Corruption Website (accessed 31/08/2010) 
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The Bank believes that an effective anti-corruption strategy will rest on five key 
elements: 
1. A Competitive Environment in the Private Sector 
 
 This relates to the degree to which state policy and decision making can be 
influenced and subverted by powerful elites. The Bank argues that in ensuring 
a competitive and transparent public sector, key policies like liberalisation, 
corporate governance and the application of regulatory reforms can constrain 
the ability of powerful interest groups to capture state policies (World Bank 
2007). 
 
2. Political Accountability  
 
 Strengthening political accountability involves the establishment of effective 
mechanisms for constraining and sanctioning erring public officials. This is 
achieved by enhancing greater competition in politics (vibrant political 
opposition), monitoring political campaign finance and increasing 
transparency and accountability in the provision of government information 
(World Bank 2007). 
 
3. Civil Society Participation 
 
Over recent years the Bank has argued that the role of civil society is integral 
in promoting good governance and anti-corruption campaigns. Civil society 
organizations can play a unique role in mediating between the government 
and the public. Since corruption is an element which occurs in secret, through 
diagnostic surveys and investigative journalism by the media, civil society 
organizations can increase public understanding of the magnitude and pattern 
of corruption, which could form a useful reference point for decision makers. 
However, since they themselves are not immune to corruption, it is important 
that they are subjected to public scrutiny for transparency and accountability 
purposes (World Bank 2007).  
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4. Institutional Restraints on Power 
 
 This issue refers to the ways in which the structural setting of a state can 
influence the degree of corruption. A well structured institutional set of 
restraints and effective anti-corruption mechanisms like an independent and 
effective judiciary, legislative oversight, enactment of ant-corruption 
legislature, and effective auditing can promote checks and balances, thus 
reducing the incentives for corrupt practices (World Bank 2007). 
 
5. Public Sector Management 
 
 This primarily consists of reforms that enhance the effective use of public 
resources and administrative management thereby reducing incentives for 
corrupt practices, by ensuring professionalism in the civil service; it is 
frequently connected to decentralisation and transparency and accountability 
initiatives (World Bank 2007).   
 
These policy reform areas may be useful, particularly in terms of trying to ensure 
more effective management of public resources and administration but they are not 
without their own limitations both in terms of formulation and implementation (some 
of which have been well discussed in the preceding sections). For example, Brown 
and Cloke (2011) argue that despite the potential benefits of some of these 
initiatives, the problem is that they are firmly located within a „„development‟‟ 
mainstream which continues to prescribe deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation 
despite the overwhelming evidence suggesting that, at the very least in some cases, 
these policies actually increase opportunities for corruption. 
    
It is also important to consider that a more broad based anti-corruption strategy and 
long-term implementation framework may prove more effective than narrow sets of 
specific initiatives targeted at selected institutions (see: UNDP 2004: 6, DAC 2003: 7, 
World Bank 2000a: 1, USAID 2005: 12). In a similar vein, Tanzi, argues that “the 
greatest mistake that can be made is to rely on a strategy that depends excessively 
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on actions in a single area, such as increasing the salaries of the public sector 
employees; or increasing penalties and expect results quickly” (Tanzi 1998: 30).  
 
Increasingly, there is more recognition amongst development practitioners that 
generalised economic, legal and institutional reform programmes may not represent 
the best approach to reducing corruption. According to the UNDP (2004: 6), while 
considering the usefulness of best practice (decentralization, wage increases for 
public officials, stiffer penalties etc) in providing guidance, the applicability of these 
reforms may not necessarily fit with all circumstances, thus there cannot be 
established transferable models for fighting corruption. Similarly, as Brown and 
Cloke (2004) have argued, corruption is not limited to rent-seeking and economic 
advantage, it encompasses a set of much more complex socio-cultural and political 
issues, suggesting the need for a more comprehensive evaluation of the 
complexities surrounding the social, political, cultural and economic settings of 
various countries to fully understand the manifestation of corruption in different 
contexts (UNDP 2004: 8) 
 
Additionally, many of the dominant anti-corruption reforms have also been criticised 
for working mainly with the executive arm of government and specific anti-corruption 
government institutions, while failing to adequately address the integral role of civil 
society, despite the World Bank‟s rhetorical shifts in this direction (UNODCCP 1999: 
9). Anti-corruption reforms cannot hope to be successful without involving other 
segments of society. Critics have, for example, used the neo-patrimonial analytical 
framework, designed by French political scientists working on Africa, to provide an 
assessment of the political will for implementing reforms (Blundo and Olivier 2006; 
Bayart et al 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Their assessment is that corruption (rent 
seeking) is endemic and deeply rooted amongst many of the dominant elite groups 
in Africa. Their view is that since these groups benefit from corruption, they often 
lack the moral and political will to implement effective anti-corruption reforms. Others 
(such as Ruggie 2003), arguing from different conceptual premises, also argue that 
reforms are often manipulated to promote the political and economic interest of 
certain elites. Clearly, however, this has developed differently in diverse political 
settings, evident in the ways in which interventions have been much more effective 
in some places than others.  
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The lack of political will to implement anti-corruption reforms, underscores the need 
to encourage greater participation of civil society groups, political opposition and 
think tanks within anti-corruption campaigns. This is, as argued above, increasingly 
being articulated within the World Bank‟s good governance and anti-corruption 
strategies, although it remains to be seen how far these changes in emphasis will go 
(Webb 2007: 34). This issue is explored in a little more detail in the next section. 
 
2.8.4 The Role of Civil Society in the Global Anti-Corruption Crusade 
 
The concept of civil society as an agent of change is relatively new in the global 
development landscape. While a number of community groups like churches and 
religious groups, the media and political interest groups, may have played an integral 
role in shaping local and national policies and development for decades, the non-
governmental organisation has only over the past decade or so become more 
proactively involved in national and international development affairs.    
 
Although there is no easy definition of the concept in the global arena, due to 
differences in forms of social organisation, culture and political tradition, civil society 
is commonly referred to as a collection of social relations that exist at the interface 
between the state and private sector (see: Catherine 2005). It is constituted by such 
entities as membership-based community organisations, advocacy groups, NGOs, 
private sector philanthropic associations and also includes religious groups, 
academic and professional organizations. According to Eigen‟s (1996) description of 
the interrelationships amongst the three sectors, civil society mediates between the 
government and the people (grassroots), particularly where the government is not 
able to reach and where the private sectors sometime operate with unwanted 
results. Furthermore, he asserts that civil society acts as critic, catalyst, facilitator 
and advocates of unrepresented or under repented interests. Relating to this, Khan 
(1998) argues that one of the most effective ways to advance the fight against 
corruption is to consider its socio-cultural and political significance, thus further 
emphasizing the strategic role of civil society in anti-corruption initiatives.  
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In no small measure, a vibrant civil society, representing the third sector in the 
development arena could potentially play a key role in the fight against corruption 
when it partners with the government and private sector. For instance, in relation to 
some of the limitations and constraints facing the implementation and monitoring of 
the UN anti-corruption convention, the involvement of civil society, according to TI 
(2006) could help in a number of ways: (i) civil society organisations can play a key 
role in encouraging the development and effectiveness of anti-corruption 
conventions, from initial negotiation process to follow-up reviews, (ii) civil society 
groups can put pressure on their governments for the ratification and implementation 
of the relevant international anti-corruption conventions, through research, analyses 
and advocacy, (iii) they can also help in translating into common languages, legal 
terminology of conventions and create public awareness of the importance of these 
conventions for the fight against corruption, (iv) they can play a key role in monitoring 
the performance of their government and making it public (Dell 2006), thus, serving 
as an independent assessor of their government‟s progress and in coalition with 
other stakeholders, they can campaign for tackling particular manifestations of 
corruption in their country.  
 
History also provides some illustrative examples of how corruption has been 
curtailed by the increasing interest and ability of people and groups to engage with 
the system against official abuses and move against unfair advantages of others. For 
example, in England during the 17th century, as a result of a long struggle with the 
Crown over issues concerning taxation, religion, and crown patronage, Parliament 
was better able to curtail royal abuses of power (Roberts 1980; Johnston 1993). 
Although, while this does not represent a standard model for curbing endemic 
corruption and official abuses to be adopted by various societies across the world, 
particularly due to the significance of differences in historical and cultural values, it 
does draw attention to the key role civil society can play in the fight against 
corruption. 
 
However, it is important to also consider the undemocratic structure of civil society 
itself, issues of accountability, transparency, good ethical judgments and compliance 
with established rules within civil society itself are critical elements that could 
enhance the legitimacy of greater involvement of civil society within anti-corruption 
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activities. Some civil societies, for example, are clearly established to simply 
advance the political and economic interests of founders and core staff (see: 
Iftekharuzzaman 2009). Despite their important role in the development arena, 
however noble these roles may seems, this does not suggest that civil society 
organizations are immune to corruption. Without international mechanisms to 
promote transparency and accountability and monitoring and scrutiny by donors and 
state institutions, civil society may itself also be susceptible to embezzlement of 
funds, false claims over the execution of ghost social and infrastructure projects, 
involvement in partisan campaigns during elections, mobilising and contributing to 
election campaign finance and so on.  
 
Overall, despite the increase in regional and international interest in corruption and 
anti-corruption, apart from the World Bank and a number of other non–governmental 
organisations that are now making more efforts in encouraging the active 
involvement of civil society in their anti-corruption programmes, the majority of other 
international anti-corruption initiatives, like the UN Convention against corruption for 
instance, have not done well enough in encouraging people and groups within 
society to mobilize and act against corruption in ways that may be sustained by their 
own lasting interests.  
 
Conclusions: 
 
This final section of this chapter draws together the major themes that have emerged 
from the review of the literatures on governance and corruption which have been 
presented in the first two chapters and explains how the insights gleaned will be 
used to explore the complexities surrounding governance and corruption in the 
Nigerian context in the chapters which follow. We turn first, however, to quickly 
summarise some of the major themes that have emerged from the discussion of 
corruption in this chapter. This chapter has dealt extensively with debates relating to 
how to define and measure corruption, together with the intricate debates over its 
causation and impacts and perhaps most importantly how it might best be combated. 
The growing public recognition and discussion of the problem of corruption over 
recent years was recognized but it was pointed out that there still remains a dilemma 
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in attempting to define the phenomenon because of the ambiguity in the meaning 
and measurement of corruption in different contexts. 
 
Particular attention was focused on to the various debates surrounding the adoption 
of the Bank‟s free market oriented reforms, which have promoted the ideal of 
downsizing the role of the state as a tool for combating corruption since the early 
1980s. It was augured in the chapter that such reforms cannot automatically offer a 
cure to corruption. Indeed, Harriss-White and White (1996) argue, that, in fact, in the 
wake of neoliberal economic reforms, what has emerged is a new type of corruption, 
“rooted in the logic of economic and political liberalisation, reflecting the activity of 
rapacious social elites” (Harris-White and White, 1996: 4). Whilst disagreeing with 
the notion that neoliberal reforms offer a cure to the debilitating effects of corruption 
on economic development, the chapter also acknowledged that more interventionist 
policies could compound the problem as well. Thus, it was suggested that the most 
important issue is that a capitalist economy is effectively regulated via proper 
oversight functions by an effective state.  
 
Chapter two also presented a detailed discussion of the growing international 
engagement with corruption since the 1990s, both in terms of exposing the degree to 
which corruption exists and in formulating measures by which it could be curtailed.  
Although, the international anti-corruption campaign may have had some positive 
impacts, as Szeftel (1998) argues, despite the enormous amount of financial 
resources, which have been invested into the anti-corruption initiatives across the 
South, clear indications of their success remain few and far between. 
 
The international anti-corruption campaign has also been criticised for seemingly 
appearing to focus more on public and political official‟s bribery in Southern countries 
(the demand side of corruption), which has put many governments and public 
officials in developing countries on the defensive against those promoting anti-
corruption initiatives. In response to this type of criticism however, many international 
organisations have started taking active steps to address the supply side of 
corruption, by introducing various anti-corruption conventions and treaties but, given 
the enormous amount of financial resources which have been ploughed into this 
exercise; clear indications of their success remain few and far between. Explanations 
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for the lack of demonstrable success of both supply-side and demand-side 
interventions are varied but one of the major themes revolves around the somewhat 
neglected role of civil society within many of these schemes. Discussions over this 
issue provided the major focus for the final section of this chapter which suggested 
that the current global war against corruption may need the much more active 
involvement of civil society groups.  
 
Drawing the strands of the discussion together, the first two chapters of this thesis 
have outlined some of the complex academic and political debates surrounding the 
relationship between governance and economic development with a specific 
emphasis upon those elements of those debates which relate specifically to 
corruption. Some of the limitations of the dominant approaches to both governance 
and corruption have been explored, with a particular emphasis upon the over-
simplifications inherent in much writing on the subject and the need for more 
nuanced treatments of such issues as: the evolution of particular political cultures 
within particular places, the impacts of culture on the definitions, causes and impacts 
of corruption, the impacts of market reforms on the opportunities for corrupt activity 
and the potential role of civil society in rendering anti-corruption interventions more 
effective. 
 
Nigeria offers an interesting case study for exploring these issues in more detail. It is 
a country where corruption has clearly been a major issue. It has regularly featured 
at the bottom end of Transparency International‟s corruption perception ranking 
tables and is often presented as one of the most intransigent instances of a „corrupt 
culture‟ – the archetypal poorly governed third world state as it were. But how 
accurate are these depictions of Nigeria? When one digs deeper under the easy 
headlines, slogans and TI tables, what light can the Nigerian experience shed upon 
the broad debates about the complex meanings, causes and patterns of poor 
governance in Africa, the role of corruption in embedding and moulding those 
governance structures and about the applicability or otherwise of the dominant 
international prescriptions for producing good governance and dealing with 
corruption.  
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The overall intention of this thesis is, therefore, to explore the light that the Nigerian 
experience can shed upon the complex relationships between governance and 
economic development in Africa. Clearly, such a broad aim is beyond the scope of a 
single thesis therefore the thesis addresses this question through the specific lens of 
debates surrounding corruption (and anti-corruption initiatives) in Nigeria.  
 
Specific Objectives 
 
1. To provide a historical overview on competing perspectives on the relationship 
between Governance, Corruption and Economic Development in the Nigerian 
context. 
 
2. To analyse the different interpretations of major stakeholders over the perceived 
degree of corruption in Nigeria, its major causes and its effects on Nigeria‟s 
economic development trajectory. 
 
3. To assess the perceived effectiveness of the Nigerian government‟s anti-
corruption initiatives and institutions, as expressed by major stakeholders. 
 
4. To examine the role of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in promoting 
the idea of good governance and anti-corruption strategies in Nigeria. 
 
Such objectives are closely entwined with the broad international debate about 
governance and corruption (explored in the first two chapters). Therefore, the thesis 
builds on some of those debates in the following chapter, to examining the historical 
overview of the relationship between governance, corruption and economic 
development in the Nigerian context, before moving on to consider in greater details 
some of these and other pertinent issues in the subsequent chapters.    
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Chapter 3: Contextualising Governance and Corruption in Nigeria 
 
This chapter builds upon the broad international discussions about governance and 
corruption which were outlined in the first two chapters of the thesis respectively to 
explore the general historical background to governance issues in Nigeria. It begins 
by briefly highlighting the general economic and development experience of Nigeria 
since attaining independence in 1960 and explores the economic performance and 
poverty reduction impacts of various economic development strategies for the 1962-
1986, 1987-1999 and 1999 to 2007 periods. The second section examines the 
dynamics and patterns of governance in Nigeria by exploring the nature of military 
and civilian governments in Nigeria‟s post-independence period from 1960 when 
Nigeria became independent from colonial rule. The third section then moves on to 
examine the historical roots of the complexities surrounding governance and 
development within Nigeria by exploring academic treatments of the significant issue 
of the impacts of the colonial legacy, which has been connected by some to the 
apparent lack of national identity in Nigeria and the strong impacts of ethnic 
sentiment (or attachment to ethnic identity) on the nature of the Nigerian state. 
 
The second part of this chapter then focuses on introducing the specific issue of 
corruption in the Nigerian context, by first outlining the scope and magnitude of the 
problem of corruption and then exploring the theoretical discussions over the 
connections between the character of the Nigerian state and political corruption in 
Nigeria. As discussed in the preceding section, in analysing issues pertaining to poor 
governance in Nigeria it is important to consider the significant issues of the socio-
cultural and political character of the Nigerian state. According to Osaghae (1988: 
298), the role and character of the state is central to any analysis of corruption in 
Africa and Nigeria is no exception to this. Thus, the section explores some academic 
treatments of corruption via Peter Eken‟s (1975) famous theory of “two publics” for 
understanding Africa‟s governance and development problems, and more 
importantly the problem of endemic corruption in Nigeria. 
 
The chapter concludes by exploring some of the recent attempts made to tackle 
corruption in Nigeria through the formation of organizations such as the Economic 
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and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and programmes of international 
cooperation in governance and anti-corruption affairs.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Nigeria‟s governance and development experience since it became independent in 
1960 remains a paradox that continues to defy conventional wisdom. In the midst of 
fabulous oil wealth, mass poverty, economic stagnation, endemic corruption, political 
instability, weak public institutions, insecurity, and social conflict are common 
features that have characterised the Nigerian state. Nigeria prides itself as the 13th  
largest oil producing country in the world and sixth amongst members of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with oil providing about 
eighty percent of government revenue and ninety percent of export earnings (OPEC, 
2009: 29-30), but this has led to over-dependence on this single commodity. 
Although oil was initially discovered in the year 1958, we can use 1970 as a bench 
mark for the emergence of the Nigerian oil economy as this was the year when it 
became an exported commodity on a large scale. It is estimated that the Nigerian 
government have received revenue in excess of US$500 billion from oil exports 
between 1971 and 200511, but whilst oil has provided a limitless source of 
independent wealth for the political elite, the majority of Nigeria‟s population are 
poorer today than they were at independence in 1960 (see: International Crisis 
Group Africa Report 2006).  
 
At the time of political independence, Nigeria was a major exporter of agricultural 
products including groundnuts, palm oil, cocoa, cotton, beans, timber, and hides and 
skins. Then, during the oil boom period of the nineteen seventies, Nigeria made 
headlines as a result of its new oil wealth. With a per capita income in excess of 
$1100 during the late 1970s, Nigeria was regarded as the fastest growing economy 
in sub-Saharan Africa. During this period, however, agriculture, which used to be the 
primary source of hard currency earnings, was neglected and today Nigeria  imports 
food to the extent that it now accounts for a sixth of the trade bill (Nicholas 
2005:315). This gives credence to Bevan, Collier and Gunning‟s (1999) assertion, 
                                            
11
 Exports and revenues are calculated from the Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (various 
years). 
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that while Indonesia, for example, equally endowed with fabulous oil wealth, focused 
on the development of their agricultural sector and improved the conditions of the 
poor in general in the 1970s, Nigeria on the other hand relegated agriculture to the 
back burner in favour of easy money from oil exploitation.  
 
Comparing Nigeria with Indonesia, an equally heavily populated and ethnically 
diverse country, is worth a little further exploration here. Both nations have suffered 
military rule and massive bloodshed in their recent history. At independence, the 
majority of the population of both nations were subsistence farmers. They both 
discovered oil and earn considerable hard currency from oil exports but here the 
parallels cease. While Indonesia has not exactly been a model of good governance, 
average income has nonetheless been rising, from under $200 in 1974, for example, 
to $680 in 2001, despite the Asian financial crisis of 1997 (see: Guest 2004: 124). 
Nigeria, on the other hand, currently finds itself at the bottom of many human 
development indicator indexes. For instance, in 2002 Nigerians were more than 
twice as likely as Indonesians to be illiterate or die by the age of forty (UNDP 
2002:151 and 158-9).   
 
Nigeria is classified as one of the world‟s 20 poorest countries, with the majority of its 
teeming population unable to achieve a certain minimal standard of living. The 
country has some of the worst social indicators in the world. For example, according 
to DFID (2007), one in five children die before the age of five and over seven million 
children do not go to school and about 3 million people are living with HIV or Aids.   
Similarly, since 2003, over 70.8% of Nigerians have been estimated to be living 
below the poverty line of $1 per day and about 92.4% are living below $2 per day 
(UN 2003, World Bank 2006, and Watts 2007). 
  
Clearly, the discussion thus far presents a not very impressive picture about 
Nigeria‟s development experience. The intention here, however, is not to portray 
Nigeria in a negative light, but rather this chapter seeks to elucidate the historical 
complexities surrounding these problematic economic and development 
experiences, via discussions of the role of poor governance and corruption in 
producing these developmental outcomes in Nigeria. One of the pertinent questions 
that readily come to mind in analysing Nigeria‟s economic performance is: why has 
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Nigeria failed to develop effectively and equitably, despite the abundance of natural 
and human resources that could have been channelled towards attaining sustainable 
economic development? In what follows, I begin by exploring the dominant economic 
development strategies between 1962 and 2007 to determine the varying degrees to 
which they have impacted on economic growth and poverty reduction in general.  
 
3.2 Nigeria’s Economic Development Policies Between 1962 and 2007 
 
Following discussions in Chapter One, good governance, institutional efficiency and 
the quality of economic policies are increasingly being identified as crucial elements 
for achieving sustainable economic development. This section will examine various 
impacts of leadership, institutional and economic policy reforms between 1962 and 
2007 periods. During this period, there have been 8 development policies and these 
could be grouped into three phases: The first phase is between 1962 and 1986, 
representing the pre-liberalisation period (the state is the major player in this period), 
while the second period was characterized by strong economic liberalisation 
(structural adjustment which entails the rolling back of the state and pushing forward 
market reforms as initiated by the World Bank) and covers the 1987-1999 period. 
The last period is represented by policies centred on a more results-oriented human 
development strategy (1999- 2007).  
      
The First National Development Plan (1962-1968)  
 The first development plan was designed to promote economic growth, 
employment opportunities and better infrastructural services. It was chiefly 
targeted at increasing and sustaining high standards of living through public 
support and awareness creation of existing potentials and the required 
sacrifice needed to achieve this objective. The plan sought to expand 
Nigeria‟s economic base and reduce the risk of over dependence on foreign 
trade (Okigbo 1989). Thus, there were emphases on internal revenue 
generation projects with more priority giving to agriculture, manufacturing and 
technical education. However, the 1966 military coup interrupted the plans 
before they came to fruition. 
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Second Development Plan (1970-1974)  
 Following the military coup in 1966, a second development plan (1970-1974) 
was initiated by the Gowon administration, which focused on five primary 
objectives comprised of: (i) a just and egalitarian society (ii) a free democratic 
society (iii) a great and dynamic economy (iv) prospect of equal opportunity 
for all citizens and (v) a united and self-reliant economy. The plan was chiefly 
designed to accelerate the indigenisation of Nigeria‟s economy, providing 
government the necessary laws for acquiring a greater share and proportion 
of the productive assets of the economy. The plan placed emphasis on 
agricultural output, quality education for all and the provision of social 
infrastructures (UN, 2009). 
Third Development Plan (1975-1980)  
 This was initiated following the crude oil boom in 1973. Retaining major 
aspects of the second development plan‟s objectives, it was primarily 
designed to promote rapid increases in the overall standard of living. In 
addition, the plan also included some specific objectives which ranged from 
increasing per capita income, achieving a more balanced allocation of 
national resources, vigorous employment generation, increases in highly 
skilled manpower supply, economic diversification to support indigenisation of 
economic opportunities (UN 2009).   
Fourth National Development Plan (1981-1985) 
 This plan was initiated in the wake of the falling oil price on the international 
market, which constituted a major decrease in the major source of 
government revenue and foreign exchange earnings. Specifically designed to 
consolidate national resources for development, thus increasing the living 
standards of all citizens, like previous development plans, it sought to 
accelerate grass-root development through increasing income, achieving 
more balanced development and allocation of national resources, increasing 
employment and highly skilled manpower, diversification of the economy, 
technological development, greater discipline through national orientation 
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programmes, improving attitudes to work and improving the environment (UN 
2009). 
It is obvious that the attainment of rapid growth in productive capacity, thus, 
improving the living standards of citizens, constituted the major thrust of these 
various development plans. Although some of the programmes may have had some 
beneficial impacts on economic growth and hence indirectly upon poverty levels 
Mark (2006), they were not specifically designed to address the problem of poverty.  
Furthermore, certain factors like the successive military interventions emanating from 
various coups, inconsistencies in policy formulation and implementation, lack of 
sustained political will and commitment, and non active involvement and participation 
of most segments of society, together had serious impacts on the successful 
implementation of these plans (CBN 1999: 68-73).  
 
For example, the implementation of the first development plan was undermined by 
political instability and was foiled by the regionalised and sectional politics that 
characterised the first republic, and this later led to the military takeover in 1966 and 
a devastating 30 month civil war that took over 1 million lives (1967 to 1970) 
(Obikeze and Obi 2004). However, in the second national development plan (1970-
1974), efforts were made to address some of the limitations contained in the first 
development plan, thus there was broad-based consultation with various segments 
of Nigerian society (ranging from government agencies like the National Manpower 
Board and the Federal Office of Statistics, to academics, trade unions and the 
private sector). As highlighted above, although the five major objectives under this 
plan were enshrined in the 1979 constitution, their implementation was not legally 
enforceable. Therefore, according to Abasili (2004: 94), the lack of legal 
enforceability of this plan (for example compelling state governors to honour their 
obligations as provided in the plan document) rendered these objectives 
constitutionally insignificant. Furthermore, he argues that the ambiguity surrounding 
the plan‟s interpretation seriously constrained its successful implementation. He also 
highlighted factors such as a lack of political will and commitment to the plan, 
corruption and over dependence on oil as major impediments.  
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However, the third and the fourth national development plans, on the other hand, can 
perhaps be most criticized for their over reliance on one single commodity (oil) which 
constituted about 90% of the national income at that period. The third plan was 
initiated during the crude oil boom in 1973 and oil accounted for about 90% in total 
exports. The plan did little to address this. This period witnessed a sharp reduction in 
exchange controls while import payment restrictions were abandoned. Similarly, 
there was a sharp increase in public expenditure and the value of the Naira 
appreciated, but agricultural competitiveness was eroded (UN, 2009). In the wake of 
major fluctuations and the subsequent decrease in international oil prices in the early 
1980s, the limitations of the previous development plans became sharply exposed. 
For example, Nigeria had become a net food importer, while agriculture accounted 
for only less than 10% of exports. To conclude this discussion for this period Figure 
3.1 shows economic structure and manufacturing output in Nigeria and selected 
comparator countries for the period 1965 to 2003. 
 
Figure 3.1: Economic Structure and Manufacturing Output in Nigeria and Selected  
Comparator Countries (1965-2003) 
(Percentage, millions of dollars) 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database. 
Notes: Oil production is accounted for in “industry”. 
 
The figure shows that the cumulative effect of these economic programmes failed to 
impact on Nigeria‟s structural transformation compared with other developing 
countries within this period. For instance, manufacturing output is low compared to 
the other countries in the figure. In fact it is still only 4% of national output in Nigeria 
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in relation to 14% on average for other sub-Saharan African countries (World Bank 
2007).  
 
Following the end of the oil boom in 1982, there was a severe economic crisis, 
consisting of internal (recession, inflation, high rate of unemployment etc.), and 
external (chronic current account and balance-of-payments deficits and increasing 
external debt and heavy debt servicing commitments) problems. Furthermore, 
according to Okojie (2002: 362), “at the end of the fourth plan period, the foundation 
for sustainable growth and development was yet to be laid. The productive base of 
the economy and sources of government revenue were yet to be diversified. The 
economy did not have its own driving force and was therefore highly susceptible to 
external shocks” (Okojie 2002: 362). 
 
3.2.1 Economic Liberalisation Period (1986-1999) 
 
In order to reposition the Nigerian economy and address the external shocks of the 
early 1980s global recession, between 1982 and 1985, the government initiated 
various austerity measures and stabilisation initiatives. These, however proved 
unsuccessful, as a result of the fundamental nature of the economic and financial 
dis-equilibriums the economy was experiencing (Iyoha 2008). In response, under the 
influence of the international financial institutions, a strategy was developed to 
combine short-term austerity measures with longer-term structural adjustment of the 
Nigerian economy. The situation became critical in early 1986 when the international 
oil market fell and the price of oil was reduced significantly by about 50%. For 
example, while Nigeria‟s earnings from oil were in excess of $25 billion in 1980, they 
had come down to only $6.4 billion in 1986, when this was combined with 
accumulated trade arrears, and abysmally weak lines of international credit, this led 
the nation‟s economy to the verge of collapse.  
 
Consequently, in 1986, the government adopted its first Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP), the brain child of the IFIs to address the nation‟s economic crisis. 
The major components of Nigeria‟s SAP consisted of: reductions in government 
workforce and wages, removal of non-statutory allocation to state governments, 
privatisation of public institutions, market liberalisation, abolition of government 
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subsidies on social services, ending of the dual exchange system, naira devaluation 
(by about 66%) and the dismantling of import licensing schemes (see: Okigbo 1993: 
78).  However, critics have argued that the potential beneficial impacts of economic 
liberalisation were undermined by policy inconsistencies, haphazardness in policy 
implementation, weak institutions and the syndrome of regional redistribution 
mechanisms, characterised by ethnic and religious sentiments, sectional politics and 
elite networks (CBN, 1999:68-73). According to Iyoha (2008) despite the tremendous 
amount of resources (human and financial) expended in the programme, it achieved 
very little, particularly in terms of economic growth, which barely exceeded that of the 
pre-liberalized period.  
 
In the early 1990s, there was a significant increase in the fiscal deficit, poverty rates 
increased (see: table. 3.1) and public discontent boiled over resulting in a series of 
anti-SAP protest and riots. During this period, the austerity measures meant that 
there was a major cut of expenditure on social services, which further worsened the 
poverty situation, whilst SAP economic policy (for example measures that favoured 
the export sector) reduced capacity utilisation in industry, from the average rate of 
53.1% per year, between 1981 and 1985 to only 39.8% between 1986 and 1993 
(Iyoha 2008). The manufacturing sector performance was abysmally low during this 
period as a result of poor domestic demand for locally manufactured products due to 
price and quality competition from imports and the impacts of rising poverty.  
 
Additionally, in contrast to the World Bank‟s position on neo-liberal reforms, as 
discussed extensively in chapter Two, that the introduction of free markets reduces 
incentives for corrupt activities, in Nigeria‟s experience, according to Lewis (2003) 
following the adoption of structural adjustment reforms, what emerged instead were 
other forms of rent-seeking and political control over public resources and personal 
wealth accumulation particularly amongst the political elites. For instance, the 
deregulation exercise of the banking sector was heavily characterised by state 
capture, as applications for licences must first pass through the office of the 
president and federal executive council for approval. Under this scenario, powerful 
politicians, particularly military generals were instrumental in the establishment of 
new banks, with many of them on the management boards of the newly formed 
banks. This helped foster a new form of private accumulation, racketeering, 
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patronage and clientelism, sustained through a regulated exchange scheme. 
According to Lewis (2003), the failure of Nigeria‟s banking deregulation is not 
unconnected with political and institutional problems associated with the reform 
exercise. The Nigerian experience underscores our earlier argument in chapter Two, 
which emphasised the need to complement mainstream economic reforms with 
sufficient consideration for various political, socio-cultural and institutional elements 
in different contexts. 
 
3.2.2 Economic Development Plan in the Fourth Republic: 1999-2009 
 
Following the return to democratic rule in 1999, the new administration initiated a 
four year medium term development plan (National Economic Direction 1999-2003). 
Primarily, it sought to pursue strong and dynamic broadly-based economic policies 
with the capacity to withstand external shocks. According to Donli (2004: 69), the 
plan was designed to develop a more competitive economy that would be responsive 
to incentives, highly diversified, private sector-driven and open market oriented that 
relies on internal momentum for growth. In many respects, the programme‟s aims 
and direction were not that different from the ones implanted since the introduction of 
the SAP. Amidst high hopes of a development revolution, the nation‟s economy 
continued to perform abysmally poorly (see: table 3.1) and it became obvious there 
was an urgent need for a more vigorous economic policy to move the nation forward. 
Thus in 2001, the government embarked on a process of information gathering to 
determine the most pressing needs of citizens, which initially led to drafting of an 
Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper that later served as the basis for 
introducing a supposedly home-grown economic policy known as the National 
Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS)12 in 2004. 
 
The NEEDS was a four year medium term development plan initiated by the Nigerian 
government in collaboration with State governors (State Economic Empowerment 
and Development Strategy) and Local governments (Local Government Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy) as well as other stakeholders like the 
private sector and civil society groups. It was a centrally coordinated policy 
                                            
12
 The introduction of NEEDS policies is also a reflection of the global period of transition from SAP towards PRSPs and so the 
Nigerian experience as well as reflecting these internal political transformations also reflected these wider global changes in the 
policies and strategies of the IFIs. 
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framework, which is presented by those who initiated it to be a completely home-
grown poverty reduction strategy (PRSP). It primary goal is to work with all segments 
of society to achieve sustainable economic development, through four key strategies 
consisting of wealth creation, employment generation, poverty reduction and value 
reorientation. Figure: 3.2 show this policy‟s major aims and objectives. 
 
Figure: 3. 2: National Economic and Empowerment and Development Strategy 
 
Source: National Economic and Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), (2005: 5). 
 
The policy framework also embodied key structural reforms targeted at promoting 
transparency and accountability in the public sector. According to Nigeria‟s former 
minister of finance, Okonjo-Iweala, the NEEDS was chiefly designed “to reduce 
poverty and create wealth by relying on the private sector to provide jobs and 
economic growth, while the public sector is meant to create enabling environment for 
development” (Okonjo-Iweala 2005). The NEEDS does differ considerably from 
previous economic policies in many respects. Its general framework is generally 
regarded to be more comprehensive, realistic and efficiently coordinated than 
previous strategies and seems to reflect the input of various segments of Nigerian 
society (see: Marcellus 2009). Within NEEDS there also appears to be a structural 
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framework designed to address problems associated with rent-seeking and endemic 
corruption, based on specific analyses of the economic situation in Nigeria. In its first 
phase (2003-2007), NEEDS was expected to provide an enabling environment for 
business and foreign investment through the promotion of partnership between the 
public and private sectors. In particular, the policy focused on the provision of basic 
infrastructural services and citizen empowerment to reduce poverty in a more private 
sector driven economy. Citizen‟s empowerment in the programme was designed to 
generate about 7 million jobs, increase access to health care and education, provide 
a cleaner environment, rural development, housing, gender mainstreaming and 
youth development. Since 2003, the implementation of the NEEDS programme has 
been organized in four key areas consisting of Macroeconomic Reform, Structural 
Reform, Governance and Institutional Reform and Public Sector Reform.  
 
There appear to have been some varying degrees of improvement in Nigeria‟s 
recent microeconomic indicators since the implementation of this policy direction 
began. Part of this stemmed from accompanying developments internationally, due 
to the impressive performance and favourable reception of the NEEDS programme 
by international actors. For instance, in 2004, Nigeria‟s huge external debt profile 
was significantly reduced, largely due to the debt relief agreement with the Paris 
Club group of creditors (while Nigeria‟s external debt had stood at $35.9 billion in 
2004, it fell to about $5.5 billion in 2005, following a comprehensive debt relief 
agreement over the sum of $30.4 billion it owes the Paris club). This agreement was 
reached after payments of outstanding arrears ($6.4 billion) and a debt write-off 
($6.4 billion), as well as a debt buy back ($6 billion) (Okonjo-Iweala, Osafo-Kwaako    
2007: 11). 
 
However, despite the official euphoria over debt relief, increasing levels of economic 
growth (See: table 3.1) and bank consolidation, the implementation of the plan by 
Obasanjo‟s administration generated mixed feelings and reactions amongst 
Nigerians. While the proponents of the plan claim that the economic policies are 
providing freedom and prosperity through institutional changes and the creation of a 
more conducive environment for economic growth, those critical of the plan are 
sceptical about the market reforms and their depth and stability. In fact, some have 
further asserted that instead of reducing the level of poverty, poverty has been on 
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the increase since the implementation of the policy. For example, according to the 
chairman of the Northern Socialist Front, Malam Shehu Sani, “Obasanjo‟s economic 
policies have not provided any significant result, but have further impoverished 
Nigeria and plunged us into the wilderness of hopelessness and illusion” (Guardian 
Newspaper, 8/7/2006). In a similar vein, Nigeria‟s former military president, 
Mohammadu Buhari, suggested that these policy reforms have actually aggravated 
the degree of poverty by failing to deliver basic needs for poor and vulnerable 
Nigerians. Contained in a letter he sent to Nigerian senators in 2007 during his 
presidential campaign, Buhari expressed his views over Obasanjo‟s economic 
reforms in the following way:  
 
“Today, given the rapid deterioration in the general living condition of our people, 
despite the huge financial resources this current administration have spent in an 
unsustainable manner, over the last seven years, we have never had it so bad in the 
history of this country. The wealth and economic growth performance that this 
administration talk about, has not led to better standards of living for ordinary 
Nigerians in any fundamental way, not only in terms of literacy, health and 
employment, but also in term of physical security” (Ajani and Aziken, Vanguard, July 
20, 2006:2).  
 
There appears to be some evidence in support of Buhari‟s position (see: figure 3.3 
and table 3.1), while the implementation of Obasanjo‟s administration‟s economic 
development plan (NEEDS) may have led to increases in economic growth, the 
degree of its impact on Nigeria‟s abysmal poverty appears to have been 
depressingly limited.  
 
To conclude this brief trawl through Nigeria‟s economic trajectory, despite the range 
of different strategies which have been employed, the evidence suggests that the 
performance of Nigeria‟s economy has been abysmally poor over the years. 
Between 1960 and 2000, for example, growth in per capital income was merely 
0.43% per annum at constant domestic prices (see: figure 3.3). The resultant effects 
of several decades of economic stagnation have surely been a major factor behind 
the increases in poverty in absolute numbers and share of the overall population 
over this period (Iyoha 2006). 
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Nigeria was classified as a poor country in 1960. However, between 1960 and the 
mid 1970s, growth in per capita income was actually quite impressive, with a brief 
interruption shortly before and during the civil war (1967-70). The mid-1970s 
witnessed a minor fluctuation in per capita income, before then falling significantly in 
the early 1980s amidst acute economic crises. In particular, from 1981 to 1984, real 
output plummeted at an average rate of 6% per annum, although there was a 
temporary relief in 1986 after the introduction of the SAP, as annual real growth rose 
to 5% between 1988 and 1990. The 1990s, however, was particularly distressing as 
the Nigerian economy witnessed almost complete stagnation with average income 
growth per year of less than half of one percent. Figure 3.3 and table 3.1 shows 
Nigeria‟s long-run economic performance and demonstrate acutely the problems of 
short-to medium-run volatility.  
 
Returning to the discussions over the impacts of the NEEDS programme, table 3.1, 
shows that while growth in real per capita income between 1960 and 2000 averaged 
0.43%, between 2001 and 2006 it rose to an average of 4.0 %. However, despite this 
4.0% average growth rate, its impact on poverty levels appears to have been limited. 
Nigeria‟s human development ranking as assessed by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) is interesting for reflecting upon Nigeria‟s poverty 
levels since 1990, when the Human Development Report was first introduced.    
 
Since then, Nigeria has consistently remained in the UNDP‟s low human 
development index (HDI) category. It represents the only oil producing country in this 
category. Between 1990 and 2010 its ranking has not seen any significant 
improvement, but rather has become worse in some cases. This situation has cast a 
serious doubt, for example, in Nigeria‟s ability to realise the Millennium Development 
Goals. Several other large oil producing countries like Indonesia, Venezuela and 
Algeria have performed significantly better than Nigeria in the UNDP rankings. 
Table.3.2 illustrates Nigeria‟s human development rankings from 1990 to 2010.  
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Figure 3.3:  Nigeria: Real GDP per capita (1960-2000) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Iyoha (2006), on the basis of data from World Bank (2006) 
 
 
Table 3. 1: Nigeria: Per Capita Real Income and Growth Rate (US Dollars)  
 
 
 
Source: Iyoha (2006), on the basis of data from World Bank (2006) 
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Table 3.2: Nigeria‟s Human Development ranking (1990/2009) 
 
YEAR TOTAL HDI BANK HDI VALUE CATEGORY 
1990 130 107 0.322 LOW 
1991 160 129 0.242 LOW 
1992 160 128 0.241 LOW 
1993 173 142 0.246 LOW 
1994 173 139 0.348 LOW 
1995 
 
174 141 0.406 LOW 
1996 174 137 0.400 LOW 
1997 175 141 0.393 LOW 
1998 174 142 0.391 LOW 
1999 174 146 0.456 LOW 
2000 174 151 0.439 LOW 
2001 162 136 0.455 LOW 
2002 173 148 0.462 LOW 
2003 175 152 0.463 LOW 
2004 177 151 0.466 LOW 
2005 177 158 0.453 LOW 
2006 177 159 0.448 LOW 
2007/2008 177 158 0.470 LOW 
2009 
 
177 159 0.473 LOW 
2010 
 
177 142 0.423 LOW 
 
Source:  Compiled by the author from UNDP Human Development Report 1990-2009 
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At the heart of the litany of Nigeria‟s development problems is a fundamental crisis of 
governance. Poor governance, as we saw in chapter one, has been presented as 
one of the major factors underlying the poor developmental performance of many 
African nations, and our discussion of Nigeria‟s economic trajectory would seem to 
suggest that it has been a particularly problematic issue for Nigeria. Clearly during 
the period since independence, the Nigerian state has not acted as an effective 
political and institutional centre or served as a principal agent for economic change. 
According to Lewis, (2007: 279-279) historically, Nigeria's elites and political leaders 
have often been divided along communal and factional lines, which have failed to 
create a stable political regime as insecure leaders have frequently employed 
patronage and ethnic cooptation as a basis of rule. Most Nigerians still accord more 
loyalty to tribal and ethnic sentiments than to the nation state of which they are 
citizens. Because ethnic loyalties are so strong, politicians have often taken 
advantage by stirring up conflicts between ethnic groups as means of consolidating 
their hold on power. Once in power, many Nigerian politicians have tended to favour 
as many people as possible from their own group, either by awarding contracts or 
offering them government employment (see: Guest 2004).   
 
The successive military interventions in government have frequently cited political 
instability and endemic corruption as reasons for overthrowing democratic 
governments and ruling directly. Nevertheless, the various periods of military rule in 
Nigeria were also characterised by poor economic management and Nigeria‟s 
economy was stagnant for long periods of time during these periods amidst rapid 
population growth, which resulted in rising poverty and continued decline in the 
quality of public institutions. It is to the influence of the tendency towards military 
government in Nigeria‟s post-independence trajectory and its role in the patterns of 
poor governance and corruption that have emerged that we now turn in a little more 
detail. The next section, therefore, explores the historical pattern of military 
dictatorships and civilian government in Nigeria over the years from 1960 when 
Nigeria became independent from colonial rule.  
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3.3 Dictatorship and Civilian Government in Nigeria since 1960 
 
The phenomenon of governmental corruption is hardly a new development in Nigeria 
(Pierce 2006). The colonial authorities complained about high level governmental 
corruption prior to independence in 1960 (e.g Lugard 1906: ch 5 and Temple 1918), 
it is Nigeria‟s post-independence history, however, that has particularly been 
characterised as consisting of a series of corrupt, abusive, and unaccountable 
governments. From independence in 1960 to 1999, Nigeria had only two civilian 
governments and both were overthrown in military coups before completing a 
second term in office; this means that the Nigerian military ruled the country for 
nearly 30 of its first 40 years of independence (Eghosa 1998: 21). 
 
The first post-independence government, led by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, 
conducted general and regional elections in 1964 and 1965 respectively. Although 
the polls returned the government to a second term in office, they were characterized 
by widespread complaints of electoral irregularities and fraud, violence and 
intimidation, which resulted in the loss of over 200 lives (Eghosa 1998:31-54). The 
government was also accused of wide spread corruption and mismanagement 
(Osoba 1996: 371-386), which was the major reason cited by the military for 
overthrowing the government in 1966 (Joseph 1987: 71-72). In January 1966, in the 
context of a lingering post-election crisis, a group of five army majors executed the 
first attempted coup d‟etat in Nigeria. Although the coup was unsuccessful and the 
lead plotters were arrested, the prime minister and other major government 
personalities were murdered in the attempt (Human Rights Watch, 2007). 
Consequently, General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, of the Igbo ethnic group, became the 
first Nigerian military head of state and the military then ruled from 1966 until 1979. 
The new regime was characterised by political instability and violence. Less than 
seven months in office, Ironsi was murdered in a successful coup executed by a 
group of northern military officers, resulting in ethnic rioting across Nigeria that 
helped precipitate Nigeria‟s horrific Biafran civil war that took over one million lives 
from the south east geopolitical zone (See: Osaghe 1998: 54-64).  
 
In 1970, after the civil war ended, Nigeria witnessed yet another overthrow of a head 
of state in a coup and a third murdered in an attempted coup (Human Rights Watch 
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2007). Finally, in 1979, another civilian government under President Shehu Shagari 
was elected to office but lasted for only four years. Shagari‟s administration was 
heavily criticised for widespread corruption at both the federal and state levels, the 
administration oversaw a deepening of the level of poverty (see: table 3.1) and was 
characterised by a lack of focus and strategic direction in government policies and 
implementation (Richard 1987). In 1983, Shagari was re-elected through 
controversial circumstances. The election attracted a wide array of criticism which 
claimed that there had been massive rigging in favour of Shagari and his National 
Party of Nigeria. The government was accused of colluding with the Federal Election 
Commission and the security forces to rig the elections, which were also marked by 
violence, intimidation and human rights abuses by hired political thugs (Joseph 
1987:151-185). It is therefore not surprising that poor governance, characterised by 
burgeoning corruption, and its negative effects on economic development was the 
primary reason given by the military when it staged a coup four months after the 
1983 elections. This coup was under the leadership of General Muhammadu Buhari, 
who took control for another two years (Human Rights Watch 2007).  In a national 
broadcast on 31st December 1983, General Buhari described the Shagari regime as 
“inept and corrupt.” He stated further that:  
 
“Our economy has been hopelessly mismanaged. We have become a debtor and 
beggar-nation. There is inadequacy of food at reasonable prices for the Nigerian 
people who no longer want the endless announcements of importation of foodstuffs. 
Health services are in a state of comatose as hospitals have been reduced to mere 
consulting clinics, with no drugs, water and basic facilities. The standard of our 
educational system has falling beyond imaginable proportion. The soaring 
unemployment rates, including the graduates, have reached an embarrassing, 
unacceptable and unprecedented proportion. In some states, workers are being 
owed salary arrears of eight to 12 months, and in others there are threats of salary 
cuts, yet  our leaders revel in squandermania, corruption and indiscipline, continue to 
proliferate public appointments in complete disregard of our stark economic realities” 
(Buhari 1983 cited in Falola & Ihonvbere 1985: 229-230). 
 
Whatever one‟s feelings about the military coup, it is important to note that Buhari‟s 
administration was remarkable for the tough stance it took against corruption and 
bribery. His „War Against Indiscipline and Corruption‟ exercise, as it was popularly 
89 
 
called then, continues to live in the minds of many Nigerians. While this underscores 
the need for active involvement of civil society in anti-corruption campaigns as 
discussed in chapter Two, his anti-corruption policies were not only targeted at top 
government officials but also more generally to instil attitudinally changes within the 
wider Nigeria society. Buhari‟s anti-corruption exercise led to the indictment of 
several members of the political elite for corruption related offences and many were 
subsequently sent to prison with their accounts frozen and assets forfeited to the 
state. 
 
However, despite the advances under Buhari‟s administration, Nigeria quickly 
returned to business as usual (the vicious circle of mismanagement and corruption) 
when General Ibrahim Babangida, through a military coup, took control of the 
government from 1985 to 1992 (Maier 2000).  Upon assuming office, one of the first 
steps his administration took was to release most of the indicted political elites who 
had been sent to prison under the Buhari government. This period proved disastrous 
for Nigeria, unlike the previous administration, Babangida‟s regime seems to have 
further deepened and institutionalized corruption and human rights abuses at all 
levels of government. Popularly known as the Nigerian Maradona for his gimmicks 
and fraudulent disposition, Babagida took corruption in Nigeria to an unprecedented 
height, as he blatantly encouraged and promoted corruption and bribery in all 
segments of society. Babangida was widely accused of institutionalizing corruption 
as a tool for political control and over US$12.2 billion in oil revenues simply 
“disappeared” under his watch (Lewis 1992: 3-4).  
 
In 1993, Babangida organized a general election that was meant to install power 
back to civilian government. Most commentators suggest that the 1993 polls were 
the most free and fair in Nigerian history (see: Dowden 1993). However, the poll 
which ultimately produced a winning candidate, Moshood Abiola, was eventually 
annulled by Babagida‟s administration under controversial circumstances. Abiola 
was sent to prison for daring to declare himself the winner and subsequently died 
behind bars. Babagida was succeeded from 1993 to 1998, by Abacha after he 
successfully forced Babangida out of office. According to the former Nigerian 
president, Olusegun Obasanjo, “Abacha did direct looting” (Guest 2004: 121).  He 
used to send trucks round to the central bank with orders that they be filled with 
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banknotes. After he died reportedly of Viagra in a mysterious circumstance involving 
three Indian prostitutes, the records show that he and his associates stole over $5 
billion, representing about three million dollars for every day he was in office 
including weekends (Guest 2004: 121). Most of these looted funds were chanelled 
into personal foreign bank accounts. In 2000 for example, an estimated $800 million 
of Abacha‟s funds was discovered in peronal bank accounts with Swiss banks. Huge 
deposits in the name of Abacha and his associates have also been traced to several 
banks in Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon (McFerson 2009: 1542). His 
administration was also marked by widespread abuses including intimidation, 
arbitrary detention, and allegations of series of murders (BBC News Online 2001). 
 
Following Abacha‟s death, General Abdulsalami Abubakar ruled for just over one 
year. He organized elections, which whilst marred by widespread electoral fraud, 
according to both national and international observers, did lead to the end of military 
rule and the establishment of retired General Olusegun Obasanjo as the first civilian 
president of Nigeria‟s fourth Republic in May 1999 (see: Dagne 2005). The 2003 
elections that brought Obasanjo into office for a second term were adjudged by 
observers (Eboh 2007) to be worse than the fraudulent election of 1999. One would 
have thought, given that Nigeria had been ruled for four years under a democratic 
setting, that the 2003 polls should have been an improvement. Instead the polls were 
an abject failure (see: Human Rights Watch 2004). Nevertheless, in relation to the 
administrations which came before, some progress was made during Obasanjo‟s 
administration in relation to questions of corruption, transparency and governance 
(these will be explored in more detail in subsequent chapters). 
 
As we saw in earlier discussion of the NEEDS programme in the preceding section 
(3.3), there remain sharp debates about the reality and sustainability of the economic 
improvements under Obasanjo‟s administration. Whatever one‟s view of his 
economic programme, however, Obasanjo‟s administration certainly recorded some 
successes in re-establishing a certain level of trust in the political system, particularly 
via his embarking upon a vigorous anti-corruption campaign (discussed in greater 
detail later on in this chapter) which managed to significantly enhance Nigeria‟s 
bartered image, both locally and abroad. Given this, the notoriously fraudulent 
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elections he helped conduct in 2007 that ushered Yar‟Adua into power, was even 
more surprising and unwelcome.     
 
3.4 Nigeria’s First Successful Transition from One Civilian Government to 
Another 
 
In May 2007 Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was sworn in as President with his Vice 
President Goodluck Jonathan. The inauguration represented the first successful 
transition from one civilian administration to another since the country became 
independent in 1960. However, the 2007 election that brought them to power was 
classified as being fundamentally flawed by both national and international observers 
(see: National Democratic Institute, 2007) a position even President Yar‟Adua 
agreed with after he was sworn into office (Eboh 2007). Yet again, the polls clearly 
represented a dramatic step backwards, even when measured against the abysmal 
standard set by the 2003 election.  
 
Government officials, both elected and appointed, conspired with the security and 
other government agencies in charge of conducting credible polls, to reduce the 
elections to a violent and fraud-riddled farce. In many parts of the country, armed 
gangs and thugs engaged by the politicians, perpetuated violence, raided polling 
stations and snatched ballot boxes. The fraudulent election resulted in at least 300 
deaths, including some politically motivated killings. Although all political parties that 
participated in the polls were involved in the electoral misconduct, it was widely 
reported by observers that most of the violations were executed by the ruling PDP 
rather than other political parties. The seriously compromised electoral officials 
recorded massive turnout figures in places where no voting took place at all. In many 
parts of the country, there was open and massive ballot box stuffing and the 
fabrication of elections results (Human Rights Watch 2007).  
 
The massively compromised but supposedly independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) reported a landslide victory for the ruling party (PDP) (Human 
Rights Watch 2007). The final results were, however, at variance with the reports of 
all credible election observers, both national and international. Many critics classified 
the 2007 polls as the worst in Nigerian history (Human Rights Watch 2007) and 
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some invited foreign observers ranked them amongst the worst to have been 
conducted in recent times anywhere in the world (The Economist 2007). According 
to the Head of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) “The 
polling procedures were often not sufficiently followed and the secrecy of the vote 
was not guaranteed in the majority of polling stations” (Hill 2000:1171). The EU 
Observation Mission also found numerous cases of fraud, multiple voting, under age 
voting, intimidation of voters by state security agents, alteration of official results 
forms and vote buying. Thus, in its final report, EUEOM concluded that “given the 
lack of transparency and evidence of fraud, there can be no confidence in the results 
of these elections” (Eboh 2007). Similarly, the US-based National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) claimed that the electoral process, “failed the Nigerian people” 
(National Democratic Institute, April 23 2007).   Clearly such blatant electoral fraud 
sits uneasily with the institutional reforms which had been implemented over the 
preceding years and raises serious question marks over their validity and the 
durability of any moves in the direction of better governance in Nigeria. As discussed 
in chapter 2, political corruption undermines effective democratic reform and popular 
participation in a political system of governance.  
 
This section has discussed Nigeria‟s poor governance experience (which it has been 
argued has largely been characterised by wide spread corruption and 
mismanagement, successive military intervention in government, political instability, 
electoral irregularities and fraud) extensively. We now move on to reflect in more 
detail upon the causation of these phenomena. One of the major themes which have 
been debated within academic discussions of these issues revolves around the 
historical roots of the Nigerian state and the colonial legacy it was founded upon and 
this will be discussed in detail in the section that follows. 
 
3.5 Colonial Legacy and Character of the Nigeria State 
 
Discussion in Chapter One identified the issue of poor governance as a major factor 
undermining Africa‟s development trajectory since Independence in the 1960s. In the 
case of Nigeria in particular, poor leadership, political instability, electoral fraud, 
mismanagement and endemic corruption have featured prominently in the preceding 
sections as major constraints associated with the underdevelopment crisis of the 
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Nigerian state. However, rather than just presenting this as some kind of question of 
a need for political and institutional modernization, it is also important to explore the 
historical roots of questions of governance within Nigeria. Thus, for example, some 
African scholars (such as Idemudia et al 2010) have linked discussions of poor 
governance to the colonial legacy of the creation of troublesome artificial boundaries. 
The artificial and arbitrary nature of national and international administrative 
boundaries has been connected to the tendency of individual ethnic groups to 
promote their own individual interests over those of any national agenda. Nigeria, for 
example, consists of 36 states with the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. In particular, 
the country is comprised of twelve Southern states, (dominated by Yoruba, Igbo, and 
Ijaw), twelve northern states of Muslim emirates and twelve Middle Belt states that 
are characterised by minority groups. Nigeria is one of the world‟s most ethnically 
diverse societies with over 250 different ethno-linguistic groups. These ethno-
linguistic groups were amalgamated into a single political unit under the imposition of 
indirect rule in the year 1914 (Africa Report N°113, 19 July 2006). However, the 
colonial administration failed to create a legitimate social contract among the various 
constituent groups. Not only are they divided along lines of ethnicity, language and 
regional dialect, there are also major religious divisions which amongst other factors 
have made Nigeria a difficult country to govern under normal circumstances. 
According to one of the founding fathers of the Nigerian nation, Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo, “Nigeria is merely a geographical expression” that lumped as one an 
arbitrary collection of disparate groups following colonial rule (Awolowo 1947: p.47-
8). In other words, the entity called Nigeria is a by-product of a fraudulent social 
contract, which failed to negotiate with its constituent parts. This underlines the 
persistent ethnic and religious violence and intolerance, as well as political instability 
that have deepened the wide-spread divisions and enduring dilemmas of national 
cohesion and identity in the Nigerian state. Some scholars have argued that this 
forceful and fraudulent consolidation of diverse peoples from different socio-cultural 
backgrounds without their formal consents to co-exist as a nation created horizontal 
and polarized primordial loyalties that continue to pose great obstacles to the 
challenge of national integration. Ajetumobi (1991), and scholars like Agagu (2005) 
have further blamed the current negative and poor state of governance and 
development in Nigeria, at least partly on this phenomenon. They argue that the 
foundation for ethnic solidarity and loyalty, the evolution of sectional politics and 
94 
 
political power blocks constituting various interests were established by the colonial 
politics of divide and rule and its strategy of regionalism (Agagu 2005). According to 
Willaim (1980), this was designed to avoid the possible political consequences that 
could have emerged from changes in political structure, thus dominant status 
groups, contesting for favour were enlisted in a subordinating and dependency-
fashioned alliance with the colonial administrators. Governors and village heads 
were accepted through loyalty and dependence upon the state, while public dissent 
was strictly prohibited and the state bureaucracy, police and army effectively served 
as tools for maintaining power and control (Ajetumobi 1991). 
 
Accordingly, Ajetumobi (1991) argues that at independence the inherited militarised 
administrative structure, characterised by domination, patronage of state offices and 
sectional politics was allowed to remain unchanged and has continued to foster a 
crisis of nation building and cohesion, as well as a bitter struggle for hegemony and 
control by various interest groups. In the period preceding independence, ethnicity 
and regionalism were major features underlining the formation of political parties, 
while the period after independence has been characterised by disputes over 
revenue allocation, power and administrative opportunities in government and claims 
of marginalisation and agitations for cessation which eventually led to the civil war. 
However, the aftermath of the civil war led to more favourable terms of engagement 
in the allocation of resources between the north and the south. For instance, the 
introduction of the federal character principle and the quota system was meant to 
promote national unity and equality in the distribution of national resources. The 
federal character principle and quota system are government policies that were 
designed to ensure that the allocation of government resources and opportunities 
(like financial allocation, university admission, appointment and promotion into public 
offices) must reflect the diverse ethnic and geo-political groups in Nigeria (see: 
Suberu 2001).  
 
Although this policy has remained ever since, its implementation has been 
characterised by lopsidedness, particularly during the military era. Appointments to 
national offices and the award of government contracts amongst others have been 
marked by controversies. This is clearly not good for the quality of Nigerian public 
service. Nigerian public institutions could be best described as what Chinua Achebe 
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calls a “cult of mediocrity”. In Nigeria, he says, “it would be difficult to point to one 
important job held by the most competent person we have” (Osaghae 1998: 21). The 
weak and ineffective bureaucratic system has been complicated by the national 
federal system, which appoints individuals into national government position by the 
quota system. For instance, in federal ministries and agencies, because of the quota 
system, less qualified and inexperienced Nigerians from a particular ethnic group 
may be appointed to head certain positions, while better qualified and experienced 
Nigerians from another ethnic background whose views in most cases may not be 
respected in the process of decision making, may be offered a lower ranking in 
government appointments. This type of practice is possibly one of the factors that 
may have been responsible for the weakness, inefficiencies and endemic corruption 
that have characterised the various Nigerian ministries and parastatals. The section 
that follows will extend this discussion by focusing primarily on corruption.   
 
3.6 Corruption in Nigeria: Major Features and Influences 
 
Building upon the preceding description of the governance problems facing Nigeria 
and the ensuing discussion of the evolution of Nigeria‟s political system, this section 
moves on to consider the issue of corruption more directly, firstly via some general 
discussions of the extent of the phenomenon and secondly via discussion of some of 
the characteristics of Nigeria‟s political culture postulated as being amongst the 
major influences upon the embedding of corruption within Nigeria‟s political system 
before finally moving on to consider some of the recent attempts made to tackle 
corruption through the formation of organizations such as the EFCC and 
programmes of international cooperation. 
 
As we have gleaned from the discussions presented in the previous sections of this 
chapter, one of the major elements of Nigeria‟s experience of poor governance is the 
lack of confidence of the Nigerian people in the transparency of the country‟s 
electoral system and the robustness of its judicial systems and processes. Except 
from the general elections conducted by General Babangida in 1992, which were 
adjudged to be free and fair by most observers, for example, all other elections held 
in the country have been perceived, albeit it to differing degrees, to have been highly 
fraudulent. Whilst it is perhaps the more directly financial aspects of corruption that 
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have attracted most attention within discussions of Nigeria‟s experience of 
corruption, in some ways it is these political aspects to corruption which are the most 
debilitating. Corruption frequently becomes prevalent when people are not 
empowered to participate in the political process and have no means to hold political 
leaders and their administrations accountable for their decisions and actions (this is 
part of the aftermath effect of prolonged military rule in Nigeria) (see: Ilufoye 2009). 
When political leaders do not honour their role as public trustees, do not adhere to 
the rule of law, and are not ready to account for their stewardship, they provide a 
fertile ground for corruption. In such environments, the weakness in public 
administration provides public servants the opportunities to engage in corrupt 
practices. 
 
According to the famous Nigerian writer China Achebe (1985) “There is nothing 
wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or air or anything else and to suggest that 
Nigerians are fundamentally different from any other people in the world is unlikely. 
Nigerians are corrupt because the system under which they live today makes 
corruption easy and profitable and they will cease to be corrupt when corruption is 
made difficult and inconvenient, thus the Nigeria problem is the unwillingness and 
inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of leadership by 
example” (Achebe 1985: 75-7). This statement clearly describes one of the key 
factors explaining why corruption is endemic in Nigeria. Since independence, 
successive Nigerian leaders have failed their people. As this chapter has argued, 
their governments with few exceptions could be characterised as blatantly predatory 
in nature, thriving under a long established culture of impunity. It has been estimated 
by Nigeria‟s major anti-corruption body (Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission) in collaboration with the World Bank that from independence in 1960 to 
1999, Nigerian public officials had looted or wasted more than $440 billion of public 
resources. This amount is equivalent to all the western aid given to Africa in almost 
four decades and also equivalent to 300 years of British aid for the continent. It is 
also said to be six times the American help given to post-war Europe under the 
Marshall plan for the reconstruction of a devastated Europe in the aftermath of the 
Second World War (see: Ribadu 2009: 2 and Blair 2005).  
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As a result, successive Nigerian governments have failed to provide any kind of 
effective institutional framework for government or systems of governance. This has 
facilitated the maintenance of avenues for political elites to extract rents and loot 
public funds into private accounts. This development has further created a situation 
whereby almost every Nigerian wants to be in political office, as the acquisition of 
political power has seemingly become the fastest route to riches and affluence in 
Nigeria (The Economist 2007).  
 
The visit of Hillary Clinton to Nigeria as part of a seven African country tour in 2009 
provides an interesting illustration of the ways in which Nigerian corruption has been 
viewed by external actors and how this has played out within internal political 
debates within Nigeria itself. During the visit, Hillary Clinton bemoaned the 
embarrassing paradox of extreme poverty in the midst of plenty (see: BBC News 
2010). Interestingly, however, whilst acknowledging the impact of the colonial legacy, 
the devastating civil war and other external factors, which perhaps may have been 
partly responsible for Nigeria‟s continued developmental struggles, she specifically 
identified corruption and lack of government capacity or mismanagement as the 
most serious obstacle facing the country. According to Clinton, governance has 
failed in Nigeria: 
 
"The most immediate source of disconnect between Nigeria's wealth and its poverty 
is a failure of governance at the federal, state and local levels. The lack of 
transparency and accountability that has eroded the legitimacy of the government 
has contributed to the increase in group violence and agitations against state 
authority. The fabulous natural resources, the daily exploration of 2 million barrels of 
oil and the over 300 billion dollars of looted funds are all staggering figures. But they 
do not tell how many hospitals and roads that could have been built. They do not tell 
how many schools that could have opened, or how many more Nigerians could have 
attended college, or how many mothers might have survived childbirth if that money 
had been spent differently. Despite having the 7th largest oil reserve in the world, 
according to the UN, over the last 13 years, Nigeria‟s poverty rate has increased from 
46% to 76%. The increase in religious extremism, militancy and criminality in Nigeria 
are all problems associated with the degree of social exclusion and the key to lasting 
solution are effective governance, service delivery and social inclusion” (BBC News 
2010). 
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However, Clinton‟s remark sparked an array of criticism from the ruling Nigerian 
political party and particularly the president of the senate at the time, David Mark. 
According to the Party‟s National Publicity Secretary, Rufai Ahmed Alkali, Clinton‟s 
remarks, which stated that millions of Nigerians continues to suffer because of 
leadership failure “does not reflect the current realities in the Nigeria state where a 
committed leadership, operating within the realm of the rule of law" hold sway 
(Ologun 2009). Furthermore, he accused Clinton of "taking her briefs from individuals 
or groups and other failed politicians who have an axe to grind with the government 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria." Similarly, the Senate President, David Mark, also 
asserted that Hillary cannot dictate to the Nigerian government how it should run 
state affairs since Nigeria is a sovereign nation. According to Mark, “Nigeria belongs 
to Nigerians and we will decide for ourselves, the way we want to move ourselves 
forward” (Ologun 2009). However, several other notable Nigerians like the Nigeria 
Bar Association President, Oluwarotimi Akeredolu, agreed with Clinton‟s position, 
that corruption and failure of leadership have ruined Nigeria, arguing that the failures 
of Nigerian leadership could be seen everywhere, from the extreme poverty of over 
70 per cent of the people, the dilapidated state of public infrastructures, to the 
unprecedented high rate of youth unemployment in the country.  
 
3.7 Major Influences upon Corruption in Nigeria 
 
Amongst existing writings on corruption in Nigeria, one of major factors frequently 
presented as fostering and sustaining the culture of endemic corruption in Nigeria is 
not unconnected to what Ilufoye (2009) has described as the struggle over the 
“national cake” otherwise known as national resources. This primarily involves 
struggles to control national wealth between the various ethnic groups and 
constituencies in Nigeria dominating over any attempts to build a strong, united and 
egalitarian society. This situation has effectively provided a convenient environment 
for a few powerful political elites to plunder state resources with impunity. Many 
scholars have argued that this phenomenon signals the problems of national identity 
and citizenship. Most Nigerians complain about corruption as a vice holding down 
economic progress, but they easily forget or forgive or even celebrate the 
perpetrators if they come from their own tribe. Chalal and Daloz (1999) described the 
significance of such solidarity networks via a famous African proverb: “whoever does 
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not rob the state robs his kith and kin” (Smith 2010: 247). In a similar vein, Eghosa 
Osaghae, a political historian, has also described this phenomenon in the following 
way: “it is a popular Nigerian saying, which took root under the colonial rule, that 
government business is no man‟s businesses. There was thus nothing seriously 
wrong with stealing state funds, especially if they were used to benefit not only the 
individuals but also members of his community” (Osaghae 1998: 21).  
 
This phenomenon can effectively be illustrated by referring to theoretical discussions 
over linkages between the nature and character of the Nigerian state and political 
corruption. According to Osaghae (1988: 298) the role and character of the state is 
central to any analysis of corruption in Africa and Nigeria in particular. Peter Ekeh, 
(1975, 1985) succinctly provided a theory of “two publics” (instead of one public, 
when compared with many countries in the west) for understanding Africa‟s 
governance and development problems, and more importantly the problem of 
endemic corruption in Nigeria. He argued that this phenomenon is rooted in the 
cultural system, implying that individuals in many African countries including Nigeria 
function within “two publics”: the primordial and civic publics (see: Ekeh 1975). In the 
case of Nigeria, he argued that the former public operates on the morality of society 
and is committed to the private realm, while the later public is amoral and lacks any 
claim to morality. Accordingly, while individuals in Nigeria see corruption as evil in 
the primordial public realm and try to discourage it at that level, in the civic public 
realm corrupt practices are generally encouraged. This is against the backdrop of the 
general belief that the state belongs to no one, thus individuals are justified when the 
looting of state resources is used to benefit their people from the primordial public. 
This divisive and unpatriotic tendency towards state affairs, engendered by a lack of 
national identity or any sense of a united centre, is also often exploited by powerful 
elites in politicising anti-corruption campaign exercises in Nigeria. For instance, when 
certain elites are prosecuted for corruptly enriching themselves with public funds, it is 
common practise in Nigeria to associate such anti-corruption exercises to ethnic 
politics, a situation that has continued to pose a serious challenge for effective anti-
corruption reform in Nigeria. 
 
In Nigeria, there is strong evidence that powerful political elites have exploited social 
identities like ethnicity to promote their own personal interest. According to Dudley 
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(1973) and Osaghae (1995) ethnicity and regionalism have often been deployed by a 
few powerful elites to access political power at the state level, thus providing them 
political and economic control over the management and allocation of state 
resources. The maintenance of this state of affairs can be connected to what some 
have termed Nigeria‟s oligarchic (a social system ruled by few people)13 political 
structure. For USAID (2006), these oligarchs are constituted by self-serving 
politicians, businesspersons, political fixers, “godfathers”, former military officers, and 
elite bureaucrats with vested interests in holding onto power (USAID 2006). There 
are wide ranging academic debates about how to characterize these oligarchies and 
from where their power and influence derives (and over whether the term oligarchy is 
the most appropriate). Some interpretations stress their connections to the influence 
of the colonial administration (Ekeh 1975, 1985). Osaghae (1988), for example, 
explores the impacts of indirect rule that left governance in the hands of a series of 
traditional local networks, which had the effect of encouraging patronage and 
decentralising authority as already discussed in previous sections.  
 
Others however question the fact that the same systems of colonial dominance did 
not lead to the same outcomes in other African states and see factors such as the 
long period of military rule which followed independence and the particular issues of 
the ethnic and religious divisions within Nigerian society as having greater influence 
on the oligarchic systems which have developed (see: Adeyemo 2004 and USAID 
2006). Nevertheless, from Nigeria‟s democratic experience (as discussed in the 
previous section) of the second republic and particularly since the return to 
democracy in 1999, this phenomenon has not been limited to a particular regime 
type; rather it appears to be inherent in the character of the Nigerian state. Nigeria‟s 
oligarchies have managed to arrogate power and influence around themselves by 
claiming to represent various regions, ethnic constituencies and professional bodies. 
Nigeria‟s oligarchic structure is sustained and reproduced through a kind of informer 
network of power based upon friendships, financial deals and pragmatic alliances, 
monopolisation of information and distribution of patronage (see: Ayoade 2006: 85-
95). These systems have allowed the development of a political culture which has 
                                            
13
 Oligarchy can be defined as a type of government or political system where political power rests with a few elite segments of 
a society (often distinguished by power, royalty, wealth, military strength, and ruthlessness). The term oligarchy connotes the 
Greek words for, “few” (oligos) and “rule” (arkhe) (http://sociologyindex.com/oligarchy.htm, Sociology Book (2009). 
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been predicated on the abuse of national resources and resulted in endemic 
corruption through which the oligarchies have accumulated unjustifiable wealth that 
would have been impossible via legal earnings. This illegally acquired wealth is then 
used in turn to further monopolise financial and political power by fixing elections, 
organising political violence and ensuring against the formation of effective 
oppositional political parties (Adeyemo 2004).  
 
In addition to the theft and mismanagement of public funds, there is also evidence 
that Nigeria‟s oligarchs also sponsor the services and weapons behind the endemic 
political violence in the country. This has made entering into political competition a 
very expensive endeavour in the country, a significant number of political officials are 
far more accountable to the powerful and violent political godfathers (or oligarchs) 
who sponsor them into political offices than they are to their constituencies. 
 
Against this backdrop, a remarkable example of the godfather phenomenon in 
Nigeria could best be illustrated by the activities of a wealthy member of the powerful 
Uba political family, Chris Uba (Human Rights Watch 2004). A detailed study by 
Human Rights Watch (2004) illustrates how as a strong member of the ruling political 
party (PDP) Board of Trustees during the 2003 elections, Uba single-handedly 
sponsored the majority of PDP candidates and rigged their election to office across 
Anambra state. After that election, he publicly claimed to be the “greatest godfather 
in Nigeria‟s history,” for single headedly installing his loyalists into all political offices 
in Anambra state (Human Rights Watch 2004).  One of the biggest beneficiaries he 
sponsored in the 2003 elections was the ruling political party (PDP) gubernatorial 
candidate Chris Ngige, who later fell out with Uba for allegedly refusing to divert a 
substantial amount of state funds into his sponsor‟s personal pocket. His refusal to 
meet with the mutual agreements, signed prior to his appointment as the governor, 
triggered a very serious political crisis in the state that almost crippled economic 
activities for over six months. The terms of their agreements were explicitly spelt out 
in form of a written contract and a declaration of loyalty that was signed by Ngige, 
prior to the election. In defence of his actions, which resulted in serious violence in 
the state, leading to the deaths of several hundreds of innocent people, Chris Uba 
provided a copy of this document to bolster his contention that Ngige had reneged 
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on the terms of their agreement. Below is a copy of the agreement signed by Chris 
Uba and Chris Ngige prior to the election.  
 
The Uba and Ngige case clearly illustrates the type of notoriously corrupt and 
predatory oligarchic political networks that have come to dominate Nigerian 
geopolitical space. It is the entrenched nature of these networks which is said to 
have helped to explain the perseverance of the problems of poor governance and 
endemic corruption which have been described in this chapter and which have made 
national and international efforts at combating corruption and improving governance 
so complex and problematic. 
 
 Figure 3. 5: Declaration of Loyalty 
 
 
 
Source: Human Right Watch (2004:114) 
 
This has caused many to believe that the historic and contemporary pattern of poor 
governance, characterised by mismanagement and corruption is underpinned by this 
network.   
 
The final part of this chapter will now move on to discuss the emergence of a major 
drive towards addressing poor governance and corruption in Nigeria. This is primarily 
focused on the anti-corruption activities of the fourth republic, from when former 
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president Obasanjo was elected to office (1999-2007), as this period is widely 
believed to have witnessed a significant success in its anti-corruption reform 
exercise unlike the past administrations. 
 
3.8 Anti-Corruption Activities in Nigeria: (1999-2007) 
 
Since they provide one of the main empirical foci of this thesis, subsequent chapters 
will contain a detailed analysis of public attitudes towards all of the various Nigerian 
governments‟ anti-corruption campaign exercises since 1960 when Nigeria became 
independent. Here however, this section will limit itself to a brief introductory 
discussion of the implementation of a series of anti-corruption activities between 
1999 and 2007 since it is this period which forms the major focus of the primary 
research conducted in Nigeria for this thesis. Here, we provide a very introductory 
discussion of this period as a means of establishing the context for the more detailed 
primary research presented in later chapters. This period marked a turning point in 
the history of Nigeria‟s anti-corruption campaigns. Specifically, following his election 
in 1999, former president Olusegun Obasanjo, initiated certain policy reforms that 
were specifically targeted at tackling corruption. Subsequently, two major anti-
corruption bodies were established, the Independent Corrupt Practices And Other 
Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC) in 2000 and 2003 respectively. The pioneer headship of the 
ICPC was a retired judge of the Appeal Court and that of the EFCC was a senior 
police officer. While the former appeared to be more deliberate in its approach to 
fighting corruption, the later was more aggressive and proactive and thus gained as 
much popularity as notoriety (see: Adebanwi and Obadare 2011). The establishment 
of the EFCC in 2003 was a response to the perceived inefficiencies of the ICPC, 
although in many ways their responsibility appears to be the same. Over the years 
since then, for virtually the first time in Nigerian history, these anti-corruption 
agencies have successfully prosecuted corrupt powerful government officials. They 
have identified and recovered ill-gotten wealth from prominent Nigerian officials and 
have prosecuted and removed about five former ministers and former governors 
from office. 
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From its initial establishment, the EFCC under the leadership of Nuhu Ribadu quickly 
emerged as an arrow-head in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. The EFCC was 
given a broad mandate to prevent, investigate and prosecute a series of financial 
crimes in both the public and private sectors, including internet fraud, oil bunkering, 
terrorist financing, money launderings and government corruption (Economic and 
Financial Crimes Establishment Act 2004). The EFCC initially started with the 
clamping down on Nigerian‟s internet fraudsters and recovering of former president 
Abacha‟s loot. Ribadu, a police officer himself was redeployed from the Nigerian 
Police Force (a notoriously corrupt public institution) to head the new anti-corruption 
commission. Public expectations of the new institution were initially low, given the 
Nigerian government‟s past track record of politicising and not being steadfast in 
implementing its previous anti-corruption programmes (Lawson 2009). However, in 
October 2005, the EFCC‟s credibility and public acceptance received a boost, when 
it recorded an unprecedented breakthrough in the nation‟s history of anti-corruption 
campaigns, by securing the conviction of Nigeria‟s former police chief himself, Tafa 
Balogun. He was forced into early retirement when the EFCC found $52 million 
hidden in a network of fifteen bank accounts. However, he was eventually sentenced 
to a mere six-month imprisonment (see: Transparency for Nigeria 2005). Over the 
following years, apart from the over $5 billion in stolen assets the institution helped to 
recover from corrupt officials and the securing of over 400 convictions, investigations 
by the EFCC led to the removal from office and prosecution of a Senate President, 
five governors, ministers, national assemblymen, bank executives and many other 
key personalities, who prior to its establishment were regarded as sacred cows 
(Byrne, et al 2010: 2).  
 
Despite these achievements, the EFCC under Obasanjo‟s administration was also 
heavily criticised for having been selective in its anti-corruption drive. For example, 
former president Obasanjo, in 2005, in his own quest to hang on to power, attempted 
to alter the constitution, to pave way for his return to office for a third time. 
Accordingly, huge amount of bribes, estimated at over 50m Naira (£260,000), were 
offered to each legislator to lobby for a change in the 1999 constitution (Adegoroye 
2006). Following his failure to amend the constitution, thus effectively blocking his 
chances of running for a third term in office, a political crisis ensued between him 
and his Vice President, Abubakar Abubaka, which later resulted in the forceful 
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eviction of the latter from the ruling PDP political party. His perceived loyalists were 
also not spared, as the EFCC, which is under the direct control of the president, 
became a veritable tool for witch-hunting and knocking out political opponents from 
the presidential race by bringing charges of corruption against them, which 
eventually led to the impeachment of five state governors (Lawson 2009: 47). In a 
similar vein, following the announcement that the sum of about $709 million and 
another $144 million had been recovered from the late President Abacha‟s family 
and his henchmen, there had been a reawakening of hope that the country was 
finally addressing its deep-seated financial irregularities. Nonetheless, this had been 
short-lived, as the recovered loot itself was discovered to have been quickly re-
looted, when the Senate Public Accounts Committee found that only $6.8 million and 
$2.8 million of the recovered amounts were still in the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(Ayittey 2009: 92). 
 
In the light of these developments, different interpretations and criticisms of the 
sincerity of the administration‟s anti-corruption drive came from different quarters. In 
particular debates have raged over why there were so many impeachments within 
such a short time. On the one hand, supporters of the EFCC‟s work argued that 
Ribadu focused on those cases with sufficient evidence for prosecution, while 
building up information on the others to be used at the end of Obasanjo‟s tenure 
(Lawson 2009). On the other hand, others (such as the International Crisis Group 
2007) suggested that the exercise was designed to systematically marginalise 
Abubakar‟s supporters, thus creating a soft landing for Obasanjo‟s handpicked 
political successors. In answer, Ribadu contended that he took advantage of the 
opportunity created by the removal of immunity (related to the impeachment of the 
state governors), while building up the case files on others to be used when they 
were no longer „protected‟ by immunity (Lawson 2009).  
 
However, whatever the controversies that may have ensued from this particular 
process, whilst it cannot be entirely denied that the series of impeachments may 
have been politically motivated, it remains obvious that most of the convicted 
governors had in their possessions state funds running into several millions of 
dollars. For instance, the former Plateau State Governor, Joshua Dariye (PDP), who 
was the first to be removed from office in 2004, was found to have been operating 
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several secret accounts in foreign banks. He was later arrested for money laundering 
in London.  Although he managed to skip bail in the UK and returned to Nigeria, he 
was eventually impeached by the state legislatures. He was accused of diverting 
N1.1 billion (over $90 million) into his private bank accounts. Before his 
impeachment, he was brought before a Federal High Court in Kaduna by the EFCC, 
however, according to Section 308 of the Nigerian Constitution, which protects sitting 
governors from criminal prosecution, Justice Abdullahi Liman ruled in December 
2004, that although Dariye was a principal actor in the case, the immunity clause 
protected him from further prosecution while still in office (Ayittey 2009: 91).  Whilst 
Section 308, which protects a sitting president, vice-president and governors from 
criminal prosecutions, may have been enacted to protect executive heads of 
government from unnecessary distractions when still in office, the immunity clause is 
seen by many as a major constrain militating against effective anti-corruption 
initiatives, because of the common knowledge that political leaders at various levels 
of government are often susceptible to misappropriating public funds.  A large part of 
the funds looted by Dariye has since been returned to the Nigerian government by 
the UK government. 
 
After the Dariye saga, the second governor to be prosecuted by the EFCC was the 
Governor of the oil rich Nigerian state of Bayelsa, Governor Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha, who was also arrested on money laundering charges in London.  A 
few days later, appearing before a UK court, he was charged with laundering £1.8 
million ($3.2 million) which was found in cash inside his London apartment and in 
seven London bank accounts that were traced to him. Alams, as he is popularly 
called, reportedly made his escape from the UK dressing as a woman (see: Akinbajo 
2011). He was subsequently impeached in 2005, and later charged by the EFCC in 
December. While these represent just a few cases of corrupt practices involving 
some of Nigeria‟s state governors and public officials, who looted their state treasury 
with impunity, the lack of independence of the anti-graft agency could perhaps make 
it vulnerable to political interference by the presidency, who ultimately oversees its 
activities. For the purposes of this thesis what is important to stress is that for all of 
its limitations and short-comings, the anti-corruption activities embarked upon by the 
EFCC during this period did succeed in putting the questions of probity, transparency 
and achieving real breakthrough in the struggle against corruption firmly at the centre 
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of the national political agenda. What is also clear is that the profile of the EFCC was 
also greatly enhanced by the support that it received from the international 
community. The next section, therefore, moves on to briefly discuss international 
involvement in anti-corruption activities under Obasanjo‟s administration. 
 
3.9 International Support for Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Campaign Exercise 
 
As discussed in detail in chapter two, since the 1990s there has been a dramatic 
increase of international interest in curbing corruption, both in terms of exposing the 
degree to which corruption exists and in formulating measures by which it might be 
curtailed. Many countries, particularly developing countries, have been influenced or 
even compelled to take steps in curbing corruption via the provision of assistance 
(both financial and technical) in, for example, building more transparent and effective 
institutions, creating or sustaining an environment where a free press and an 
independent judiciary are prioritized, and strengthening a criminal justice system that 
can investigate and prosecute corrupt individuals and organizations alike. To this 
end, during the government of Obasanjo, when the EFCC was initially established, 
various financial ties were established with international partners, which helped to 
increase its institutional capacity. The international community helped support, for 
example, the creation of a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to kick-start 
necessary reforms, which provided the EFCC with a model for building a strong 
national reform program, needed to clean up the financial institutions and bring to 
justice those who sought to undermine them. This eventually led to the capitalisation 
and consolidation of the banking sector, which saw about 100 Nigerian banks 
merging into just 25 banks after the exercise. More specifically, the EFCC‟s efforts 
under Ribadu were supported by various international institutions like the United 
Nations, regional agencies, and many bilateral institutions like the US Secret 
Service, the FBI, the US Postal Service, and the Department of Justice (Ribadu 
2006). 
 
To give more specific detail, the EFCC received a total of $32 million in donations 
from the European Union between 2004 and 2008, representing 85% of its foreign 
support (Adebanwi and Obadare 2011). Apart from the EU, the EFCC also received 
smaller amounts from other individual European governments, the World Bank and 
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the United Nations Development Program (Thomas-Greenfield 2006: 11). Most of 
these funds were channelled toward infrastructure, which included the construction 
of an EFCC Training and Research Institute and a Data Centre at EFCC 
headquarters. Similarly, the US provided support in terms of capacity development, 
by training over 800 prosecutors, valued at an additional $1 million (EFCC 2006). 
Additionally, Ribadu established ties with other law enforcement agencies across the 
world including: the UK Metropolitan Police, the US FBI, the Canadian Mounted 
Police and the South African „Scorpions‟, giving the EFCC a leverage in the anti 
corruption campaign to other parts of the globe, including those countries where 
most of the resources appropriated through corruption are to be found (Ribadu 2006: 
30).  
 
As suggested in the previous section, by 2007 the EFCC had secured convictions in 
over 400 of the near 1000 cases in the courts. These convictions marked the very 
first time high‐ranking officials, like the Nigerian Police chief, a number of state 
governors, ministers, legislators and top bureaucrats had been prosecuted for 
corrupt practices. Jonathan Rush, an official of the Fraud Prevention Section of the 
US Department of Justice affirmed the EFCC‟s achievements under Ribadu in the 
following way: 
 
"I understand how substantial the problem of corruption is in Nigeria but I also see 
how EFCC is making very serious efforts to deal with it and change the climate that 
has made corruption very tolerable. Again we have been very satisfied with the 
workings of EFCC; we have ongoing contacts on corruption as well as fraud issues 
with them" (EFCC, 2006). 
 
To a large degree, this impressive achievement signals the importance of political 
will (from top) and sustained commitment (by anti-graft agencies), as well as 
intentional-cooperation towards the successful implementation of anti–corruption 
reforms.  
 
Nonetheless, having spent five years in building Nigeria‟s EFCC into a world‐class 
crime‐fighting agency, which earned Ribadu trust amongst his international partners, 
the situation, like many of the other reform efforts in the country, have changed 
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considerably since the beginning of Yar‟Adua‟s administration in 2007. A year after 
Yar‟Adua became the president; Ribadu was removed from office under 
controversial circumstances and was forced to go into exile in the UK for fear of 
assassination, whilst many of the indicted political elites during Obasanjo‟s 
administration, like the former governor of Delta state, James Ibori, became 
prominent figures within the ruling party (PDP) and Yar‟Adua‟s administration. The 
EFCC‟s international credibility under Yar‟Adua‟s administration plummeted, partly 
due to his lack of political will in bringing indicted political officials to justice and the 
perceived protection and overwhelming influence that notable corrupt elements 
exhibited under his administration, while those who had championed the anti-
corruption struggle during Obasanja‟s administration found themselves under 
investigation or harassment from the state. 
 
Unlike Obasanjo‟s government, which encouraged cooperation with various 
international anti-corruption institutions in prosecuting indicted officials, Yar‟Adua‟s 
administration failed to cooperate in the same way. For example, whilst the 
controversial former minister of justice and attorney general Michael Aondoakaa, 
used all the „right‟ rhetoric about defending the rule of law in the corruption cases 
involving certain public officials (particularly former governors) perceived to be core 
supporters of Yar‟Adua‟s government, in reality he worked to frustrate the efforts of 
the international community in prosecuting a number of powerful Nigerian politicians 
who were involved in some high profile international corruption cases (see: Ribadu 
2009). For example, in September 2009, Aondoakaa failed to cooperate with UK 
metropolitan police in the trial involving former Delta state governor Jamse Ibori. In 
consonance with the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between Nigeria and 
the UK government, which is aimed at facilitating the prosecution of trans-border 
criminal cases, Britain had through the Crown Court and Metropolitan Police, 
requested from Nigeria, through the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC), 25 officers with the commission as witnesses in the trial in London. But the 
Minister being the chief law prosecution officer, refused to agree to this request. 
According to Aondoakaa, he could not grant the request for assistance from Britain 
on the prosecution of the former governor and some of his relatives for money 
laundering at a Southwark Crown Court, because Nigeria being a sovereign state, is 
not answerable to any country as complying with such a request would amount to an 
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indictment on the country‟s security and judicial system (Nigeria Tribune 2009). 
Although Aondoakaa may have scored some political points by his argument in this 
case, particularly with regards to issues surrounding sovereignty, his consistent 
attempts to protect indicted notoriously corrupt government officials suggest that he 
was manipulating technicalities and constitutional and legal loop holes in the defence 
and protection of his political allies. Other examples of this lack of cooperation with 
international efforts in tackling trans-border cases of corruption involving high profile 
Nigerian politicians come from the Willbro (an American engineering company which 
was fined over $32 million in addition to the forfeiture of its assets to the US 
Government), Siemens and Halliburton bribery scandals (see: chapter 2.8.2 for 
details over the Halliburton bribery Scandals). In all of these cases, which occurred 
between 2007 and 2010, while these multinationals and their officials have been 
charged and prosecuted for the giving of bribes to key public officials in Nigeria, 
Yar‟Adua‟s government has failed to take any action against the Nigerian public 
officials who benefitted from the transactions (see:Olorunyomi and Mojeed 2009). 
 
Accordingly, perhaps it is fair to say that our discussion of Yar‟Adua‟s administration 
provides us with a different perspective on the nature of the arguments surrounding 
cross-border anti-corruption campaigns which were discussed in Chapter Two. It will 
be recalled that many critics have argued that the international anti-corruption 
campaigns appear to have focused much more on public officials‟ acceptance and 
demanding of bribes in developing countries and transiting countries in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, while multinational businesses and banks from the North 
appear to remain unchallenged due to a lack of commitment on the part of Northern 
governments. Despite these limitations, the Nigerian case, however, within these 
contexts, does seem to suggest that while there appears to be some serious and 
committed efforts on the part of Northern agencies such as the London metropolitan 
police and the American law enforcement agencies to contribute to cross-border 
anti-corruption campaigns, it has actually been in these case, the Nigerian 
authorities that have failed to cooperate.  
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the existing literature on governance and 
corruption in Nigeria, in the process providing an historical and conceptual context 
for the more detailed discussions that follow in the ensuing chapters. The 
discussions in this chapter were considered within two sections. The first part of the 
chapter began by presenting a brief outline of Nigeria‟s economic and development 
experience..  Clearly, from the analysis of various administrations‟ development 
policies for the periods between 1960 and 2000 and 2001 to 2007, Nigeria‟s 
paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty cannot be ascribed to lack of development 
polices. But rather, the role of factors such as the prolonged military rule, 
inconsistencies in policy formulation and implementation, mismanagement and 
endemic corruption, lack of sustained political will and commitment, and non active 
involvement and participation of large segments of society, seem to have played a 
major role in limiting the successful implementation of these plans (CBN 1998).  
 
Politically, the country has been governed by the military for over 29 years of its  
over 50 years of statehood since 1960. Successive military regimes subdued the 
rule of law, while governance was subject to draconian rules, which facilitated the 
wanton looting of the public treasury, dilapidated public institutions and lack of free 
speech and instituted secret and opaque culture in the running of government 
business. This situation is not that different from Nigeria‟s civilian rule experience, 
which has been characterised by massive electoral fraud and sectional politics, 
foiled by ethnic and religious sentiments. The result is total insecurity, poor 
economic management, and extreme poverty, dilapidated infrastructure, the abuse 
of human rights, ethnic conflicts and capital flight (Ribadu 2009: 30). Rather than 
treating these issues at the mere surface level or as one that requires a prescription 
of orthodox economic policy reforms to addressing the poor governance and 
economic crisis in Nigeria, the chapter postulates that a thorough understanding of 
the intricate issues surrounding the historical, cultural and socio-political context of 
problems of governance and corruption need to be considered more critically. Thus, 
the first part the chapter concluded via discussions concerning the role of colonial 
legacy of the creation of troublesome artificial boundaries in shaping the character of 
the Nigeria state.  
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The second part of the chapter then moved on to examine the specific question of 
corruption, thus setting the border context for understanding the complexities 
surrounding the endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria. Beginning with discussions 
over the scope and magnitude of the phenomenon in Nigeria, the chapter examined 
major factors frequently presented as fostering and sustaining the culture of 
endemic corruption in Nigeria. Prominent amongst these factors is the lack of 
national loyalty, as various ethnic groups and constituencies deplore ethnic 
sentiments and religion in struggles over control of national wealth, the influence of 
the colonial legacy and the role of so-called oligarchs in Nigerian political culture 
(Osaghae 1998: 21).  
 
The chapter also examined national and international efforts at combating corruption. 
Focusing on former president Olusegun Obasanjo‟s administration (1999-2007), two 
major anti-corruption institutions (ICPC, EFCC) established under Obasanjo‟s 
administration were discussed. During this period, the EFCC stood out as the most 
effective ant-corruption body in Nigerian history (Lawson 2009). Although, the anti-
corruption body was accused of selectivity in its activities toward the end of 
Obasanjo‟s administration (see: Lawson 2009:47), it remains obvious that the 
EFCC‟s anti-corruption exercise under Ribadu was by far the most effective in 
Nigeria‟s history, as key political and public officials who prior to its establishment 
were regarded as sacred cows, were convicted and prosecuted for corruption related 
offences.  
 
To some degree, the impressive performance of the EFCC under the leadership of 
Ribadu, can be attributed to the support it received from the international partners. 
However, this progress was reversed during the yar‟Adua‟s administration. There 
was general lack of cooperation with international partners in prosecuting indicted 
public officials. This highlights the significance of political will (from top) in promoting 
and sustaining the fight against corruption. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
The previous chapters have dealt with the general outlines and most significant 
interconnections in the thematic development of the thesis and culminated in the 
elaboration of the research questions which have oriented the development of the 
thesis throughout. We now move on to look at the methodological techniques which 
have been employed to tackle the issues posed by the research questions. . The 
chapter also explores how the data produced through these techniques were 
analyzed. Finally, there is a discussion of questions of positionality and ethics in 
research and how such issues have been addressed within this research project: 
factors which took on even greater significance within the contexts of the notorious 
ethical, legal and methodological difficulties associated with the study of corruption.  
 
In pursuit of the research objectives outlined in  chapter 2, a combination of research 
techniques, incorporating a range of forms of primary (including questionnaires and 
interviews) and secondary research were conducted which included an extended 
period of field work in Nigeria during the second year of the research. The underlying 
rationale for the approach adopted is outlined in detail in the subsequent sections. 
 
4.1 Methodological Techniques 
 
The type of methodological techniques that a researcher employs are informed by 
the research problem that is being investigated and the nature of the information that 
the researcher seeks to generate. Different research methods provide an 
understanding of different observable circumstances and are used for different 
reasons (Deetz 1996).Thus, the choice of methodology employed must be suitable 
to the specific phenomenon of interest. By concentrating on the subject under 
investigation, rather than the research method, more appropriate methodologies can 
be selected (Falconer & Mackay 1999). In the case of this research, a combination of 
methodological techniques was utilised for investigating the research questions and 
generating the required data.  In particular, the triangulation of research methods 
was adopted, as this represents one way to maximise the validity, strength and 
interpretative potential of the research by drawing upon different sources, methods 
and perspectives, rather than choosing one single method to generate data, thus 
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hopefully decreasing investigator‟s biases (Denzin 1970). Denzin identified four basic 
types of triangulations and these have been presented in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1: Types of Triangulation 
 
 Data triangulation: this is the process of gathering data through the combination of 
several sampling methods (including gathering layers of data at different times, in 
different social settings and from different people). 
 
 Investigators triangulation: this involves the use of multiple researchers in an 
investigation.  
 
 Theoretical triangulation: this involves the use of more than one theoretical scheme 
in interpreting data. 
 
 Methodological triangulation: this refers to the use of more than one method (like 
interviews, observations, questionnaires, and documents) for gathering data.  
 
Source: Denzin 1970 
 
In the case of this study, the fourth of these methods was utilised in addressing the 
research objectives. In particular, the combined use of qualitative and quantitative 
research methods was adopted, the specifics of which are discussed in the following 
section. 
 
Quantitative vs. Qualitative Research Methods 
 
Before attempting to make further justification for using a combination of methods for 
this study, a general discussion concerning the strengths and weaknesses of 
quantitative and qualitative methods shall be highlighted briefly. On the one hand, 
quantitative research are best known as logical positivism and post-positivism, based 
on the notion that true objectivity as an external observer is possible (see: Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980 and Ospina 2004). It emphasises the view that data and its 
analysis are value free and argues that data do not change because they are being 
observed. Quantitative research methods tend to produce studies concerned with 
the counting and measuring of events and the analysis of causal relationships 
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between variables in terms of numerical data (Smith, 1988). Qualitative methods, on 
the other hand, are based around the theoretical assumptions of the interpretative 
and constructivist paradigms, which argue that social reality is constructed and 
sustained through the subjective experience of people in social settings (Morgan, 
1980). Qualitative research involves the process of accurately describing, decoding, 
interpreting and assigning meaning to phenomena in their natural social contexts 
(Fryer 1991). The interpretative paradigm is primarily concerned with investigating 
the complexity, authenticity, contextualisation and shared objectivity of the 
investigator and investigated (Fryer 1991). Figure 4.2 provides a brief description of 
major strengths and weaknesses of both research methods. 
 
When conducting qualitative research, the investigator seeks to gain a  holistic 
picture of the issue under investigation. According to Stainback and Stainback 
(1988), an elaborate account of events, processes, and philosophies occurring in 
natural settings is often required to make accurate situational decisions. Unlike 
quantitative research methods, qualitative methods of research are mainly 
concerned with the reasons behind the various spheres of human behavior. 
Specifically, the why and how of decision making, as compared to the what, where, 
and when of quantitative research methods.  
 
Despite these differences between qualitative and quantitative methods, according to 
Van (1983) they should not be seen as polar opposites. The combined use of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods provides a richer contextual basis for 
interpreting and validating research findings than the use of either alone (Cook and 
Reichardt 1979; Light and Pillemer 1982; Maxwell et al, 1986, Van Maanen et al, 
1982; 1983). As Maxwell et al (1986) argue, the combined use of both approaches 
introduces both testability and context into research. The decision to use a 
combination of approaches for this study was informed by the view that the collection 
of different kinds of data by different methods from different sources provides a 
broader coverage and more holistic understanding of the subject under investigation, 
which perhaps may be difficult to achieve through one single method (Bonoma 
1985). 
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Figure 4.2: Strengths and Limitations of Quantitative and Qualitative methods  
 
Strengths and Limitations of Quantitative Methods 
Strengths 
 Accuracy via quantitative and reliable measurements. 
 Through sampling and design there tends to be greater control of the research process. 
 Through the use of controlled experiments, causality statements can be produced.  
 Robust analyses through statistical techniques. 
 Replicable. 
Limitations 
 Due to the complexities surrounding human experience, the control of all variables tends to be difficult. 
 The interpretations of individuals‟ unique experiences and construction of meanings, as well as actions, are 
not adequately accounted for. 
 Due to restrictions and controlling of variables, quantitative approaches can tend to produce trivial results of 
little consequence.  
 There remain questions over issues of objectivity, because the investigator is subjectively involved in the 
formulation of research questions and in the interpretation of the results.  
Strengths and Limitations of Qualitative methods 
Strengths 
 The researcher gains an insider‟s view of the field, as a result of close involvement, thus permitting access 
to subtleties and complexities that are often missed. 
 Qualitative methods provide the means for describing possible relationships, causes, effects and dynamic 
processes. 
 The use of a more descriptive and narrative method of qualitative research encourages the exploration and 
identification of other types of knowledge that might otherwise be unavailable.   
Limitations 
 There are criticisms over difficulties in utilising conventional standards, reliability and validity resulting from 
the subjective nature of qualitative data and its origin within single contexts.  
 The data collection, analysis and interpretation process is often time consuming. 
 The investigator‟s presence and involvement in the subject of investigation often has a profound effect. 
 The process of selecting findings often encounters problems relating to anonymity and confidentiality 
issues.  
 
 
Source: Burns (2000: 9-14)    
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Despite these differences between qualitative and quantitative methods, according to 
Van (1983) they should not be seen as polar opposites. The combined use of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods provides a richer contextual basis for 
interpreting and validating research findings than the use of either alone (Cook and 
Reichardt 1979; Light and Pillemer 1982; Maxwell et al, 1986, Van Maanen et al, 
1982; 1983). As Maxwell et al (1986) argue, the combined use of both approaches 
introduces both testability and context into research. The decision to use a 
combination of approaches for this study was informed by the view that the collection 
of different kinds of data by different methods from different sources provides a 
broader coverage and more holistic understanding of the subject under investigation, 
which perhaps may be difficult to achieve through one single method (Bonoma 
1985). It also helped in managing certain challenges posed by cultural, linguistic, 
business practise, and communication differences of respondents and interviewees 
and the particular challenges involved in conducting research into such a sensitive 
issue as corruption.  
 
4.2 Primary Data Collection 
 
The primary research for this thesis was conducted in two different stages. The first 
stage involved the use of a questionnaire. The use of a questionnaire is a convenient 
way of gathering information from a target population. It consists of open ended and 
closed questions and can take many forms and can be conducted through a variety 
of methods including face to face, telephone, postal and via the internet. Unlike other 
more time-consuming research methods like interviews, the use of questionnaires is 
very cost effective (Bachrack and Scoble 1967; Benson 1946; Hochstim and 
Athanasopoulos 1970; Moser and Kalton 1971) because of the costs associated with 
travel time, particularly for studies involving large geographic areas (Clausen and 
Ford 1947; Goode and Hatt 1962; Ruckmick 1930) and the length of time involved 
per respondent. 
 
In the particular case of this research study the internet method was utilised, through 
the design and administration of a sizable electronic survey of respondents‟ attitude 
towards governance, corruption and economic development over different periods of 
Nigerian history. This survey was conducted between August 2007 and December 
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2007.  Over 200 respondents from all walks of Nigerian life (including some currently 
living abroad) participated in the exercise. The online survey was considered 
appropriate for achieving broad-based research outcomes, by providing an 
opportunity for major Nigerian stakeholders from different sectors (e.g. 
National/State or Local Government, Civil service, international businesses, Nigerian 
businesses, trade unions, non-governmental organisations, churches, universities 
etc.) to participate in the exercise. The decision to conduct this initial electronic 
survey was related to a range of factors. Cost and time factors were important. It 
would have been useful to have spent time in Nigeria during the first year of the 
research to more effectively contextualize the wide reading of the extensive 
academic and policy literatures which were drawn upon extensively in chapters one 
to three but this was not feasible. The next best thing was to conduct a preliminary 
electronic survey to complement the literature review that was conducted prior to the 
field work exercise in Nigeria. This was aimed at ascertaining the degree to which 
issues raised in the literature and the points of views explored there illustrated the 
range of viewpoints on corruption held across the range of political and economic 
sectors in Nigeria. Similarly, the survey was used to provide a framework for the 
development of both the sampling strategy and the major themes to be explored 
within the interviews which followed during the research conducted in Nigeria itself 
during the second year of the research. The primary objectives of the online 
questionnaire were to determine the degree to which corruption is perceived as a 
major problem militating against economic development in Nigeria, to indentify the 
perceived level of effectiveness of the major anti-corruption institutions and to get a 
sense of which historical regimes and regions of Nigeria respondents thought of as 
the most and least corrupt. However, it is important to emphasise that this survey 
does not make any claims to statistical representativeness and it is not in any sense 
comparable to the much broader surveys of Nigerian political opinion conducted by 
other organizations which will be referred to in later chapters. The online 
questionnaire was mainly administered through targeting a broad range of 
individuals drawn from the sectors described above through their email addresses 
(obtained via official websites etc.) and occasionally facebook pages. In addition, in 
order to achieve a broad-based result from the process, the questionnaire was 
publicized on a popular Nigerian owned online media site 
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(http://www.saharareporters.com), which provided an opportunity for a number of 
Nigerian respondents currently living abroad to participate in the exercise.  
 
There are certainly disadvantages to using an online survey especially if one wishes 
to make any more generizable inferences from the results.  Scholars have argued, 
for example, that particularly in the early years of its inception, the younger (under 
35) male category dominated those using the internet in Northern countries, while 
lower income earners, poorly educated people and those from rural settings were 
seriously underrepresented in Southern countries (Curasi 2001; Kaye and Johnson 
1999; Mann and Stewart 2000). Clearly, internet access is still not equitably 
distributed both socially and spatially (Janelle and Hodge 2000; Warf 2001). 
However, there is also an argument that the use of computers and the internet is 
rapidly moving beyond a select group of people to encompass a vast and diverse 
section of the general population across the world. According to Dodd (1998, 63), the 
Internet has become increasingly broad in scope and may actually be helping to 
improve representativeness, as large and diverse population groups that may be 
difficult to reach physically can now be accessed through online surveys. The use of 
online surveys, as demonstrated by in this study, allows an investigator to 
communicate with geographically dispersed groups and also to internationalise their 
research. They also serve as a useful medium for researching and discussing 
sensitive issues (such as corruption) and embarrassing research topics that require 
anonymity. Moreover, the quality of responses achieved by the use of online surveys 
for gathering research data, according to Denscombe (2003, 51), is pretty much the 
same as the ones produced by the use of other traditional methods. An overview of 
the administered questionnaire has been presented in the appendix. 
 
Following the electronic survey, the research moved on to preparations for the most 
important part of the investigation – the conducting of a series of semi-structured 
interviews which were conducted in Nigeria between March and October 2008. The 
following section discusses in more detail the use of interviews within the research. 
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4.3 Interview Approach  
 
Interviews are the most commonly used method of qualitative research (Kitchin and 
Tate 2000), unlike questionnaires they allow an investigator to produce a rich and 
varied set of data in a less formal setting. They allow for a more thorough 
examination of feelings, aspirations, experience and opinions that questionnaires 
cannot capture (Valentine 2005). Interviews can be conducted in many different 
forms, ranging from structured, semi-structured and unstructured14. Against this 
background, semi-structured interviews were decided upon as the most appropriate 
methodology for addressing the research questions.    
 
4.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
The use of semi-structured interviews for this study provided ample opportunity for 
participants, in terms of time and scope, to express their views and discuss their 
experiences of governance and corruption in Nigeria. Semi-Structured interviews 
provide rich description and detailed accounts of participants‟ experiences and 
perspectives (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006). The interviews were comprised of 
a set of open-ended questions that encouraged spontaneous responses from a total 
of 129 interviewees. The choice of this research method was informed by the need 
to understand and explore the respondents‟ points of view (relating to their specific 
roles and expertise) rather than trying to generate generalized assumptions on the 
subject. These types of research methods have in more recent years constituted a 
major part of investigations by geographers, representing a broadened geographical 
focus of the research away from the spatial science agenda of the 1960s (Robinson, 
1998). 
 
Prospective interviewees were contacted and asked if they were able to participate 
in the study. When they agreed, appointments were then scheduled for interviews in 
                                            
14
  A structured interview is described as a set or series of pre-established questions with a limited set of response categories 
for gathering precise data of a codeable nature for explaining behaviours within pre-established categories (Fontana and Frey 
2005, 706). A semi-structured interview is where the investigator takes responsibility for the topics and issues for the interview 
while leaving open the exact way that the question will be asked (Diamond 1999, 87). This is suitable for understanding the 
complex behaviour of people in a given social setting and limiting any priori categorisation of research investigation (Fontana 
and Frey 2005, 706).  Unstructured interviews are where the direction of the questioning is determined by the nature of the 
conversation. According to Diamond (1999, 86), the questions for this type of interview often emerge after initial exchanges with 
the respondent. 
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their preferred locations. Within each interview, I attempted to build a good line of 
communication with the respondent and the interviews were conducted as „a 
conversation with a purpose.‟ This conversation was comprised of a set of open-
ended questions (contained in a schedule of questions consisting of similar 
questions for members of the same interview groups) aimed at capturing the 
required information for addressing the research questions, but questions that 
occurred to me during the interview (arising out of responses from the interviewees), 
were also asked when I felt it was necessary. Each of the interviews lasted on an 
average of 1 hour. Due to the significant issues of anonymity, many of the 
participants (particularly those from the public sectors and businesses) declined from 
having their interviews tape recorded, a clear case of the notorious difficulties 
associated with studying a sensitive subject like corruption in Nigeria. In addressing 
the problems posed by concerns over anonymity, participants were provided with 
three options consisting of tape recording, writing down direct quotes and note taking 
of responses relevant to the research, which were further developed within 24 hours 
after each interview. Interestingly, even some of those who did not want to have their 
interviews recorded were happy to be quoted directly through the verbatim recording 
of specific observations during the interview, whilst others requested (and were 
obviously granted) anonymity. 
 
In order to address the research questions effectively it was important to combine 
interviews with key national-level figures with interviews at state and local levels (one 
state was selected from each of the five states identified by respondents in the 
electronic survey as being the most corrupt or the least corrupt states and another 
state was selected from the remaining states). At the national level, interviews were 
sought with key policymakers. These ranged from representatives of major 
international agencies (UNDP, USAID) to civil servants, financial institutions, 
research groups, NGOs/religious bodies, political parties and the anti-corruption 
bodies themselves. Those that were interviewed at the state level included state 
governors, state commissioners, local government chiefs, members of religious 
bodies and important regional businesses etc. Additionally, interviews were 
conducted at the local level with community groups, community leaders, youth and 
women associations. The rest of this section presents a summary of the interviews 
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conducted in Nigeria (more detailed information about the interviews can be found in 
Table 4.1.). 
 
4.3.2 Sectors that were interviewed at the National Level 
 
 International Agencies 
 
Although there were some difficulties in accessing key officials of major international 
development agencies in Nigeria, a few were interviewed and their responses 
proved to be very useful. One of the officials with the UNDP provided some useful 
insights into the organization‟s programmes and activities in Nigeria, particularly in 
relation to good governance and community development initiatives and how 
Nigeria‟s experience of governance and the problems of corruption are perceived 
within his organization. In a similar vein, a Programme Officer with the US 
Department of State/USAID, and the Nigerian country representative of DFID 
provided additional international perspectives on Nigeria‟s anti-corruption campaigns 
and poverty reduction exercises.   
 
 Nigerian Government 
 
Some of the country‟s governance and anti-corruption policy reforms are initiated 
and executed at the national level. Thus the views of key officials in Nigeria‟s 
national government were considered essential for this analysis. They were 
interviewed because of their internal knowledge of the Nigerian government 
experience. Four key government officials at the presidency were interviewed. These 
included: Two Special Advisers to the Nigerian Government, and two cabinet 
Ministers under the presidency. Owning to their experience and peculiar positions in 
the Nigerian government, a firsthand perspective over the debates of governance 
and corruption in Nigeria were able to be accessed.  
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Table 4.1: Sectors That Were Interviewed  
 
No. Interviewee / Sector Date 
 National Government / Presidency  
1 Special Adviser to the President 11th April 2008 
2 Special Adviser to the President 10th April 2008 
3 Federal Minister 1
st
 April 2008 
4 Federal Minister 3th April 2008 
 Ministry/Parastater/Agency/ and Commission  
6 Former Permanent Secretary (Nigerian Goverment)  25th March 2008 
7 Director (Ministry of Finance) 27
th
 March 2008 
8 Director (Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria) 12 April 2008 
9 Director (National Assembly Commission)  13th April 2008 
10 Director (Ministry of Education) 15th April 2008 
11 Director (Federal Ministry of Health)  16th April 2008 
12 Director (National Assembly Commission) 17
th
 April 2008 
13 Civil Servant (National Assembly Commission)  18th April 2008 
14 EX-Director (National Orientation Agency)  21st April 2008 
15 Civil Servant (Federal Ministry of Justice)  28th April 2008 
16 Civil Servant (National Orientation Agency)  5th May 2008 
17 Director (Federal Ministry of Justice) 12
th
 May 2008 
18 Director (Ministry of Women Affairs and Youth development)  14th May 2008 
19 Ex-Director (Ministry of Women Affairs and Youth Development 14
th
 May 2008 
20 Civil Servant (National Orientation Agency) 18
th
 May 2008 
21 Director (National Planning commission)  27th May 2008 
22 Civil Servant (National Planning commission)  27th May 2008 
23 Civil Servant (Ministry of Information and Communication)  28th May 2008 
24 Director (Ministry of Information and Communication)  28th May 2008 
25 Prosecutor (Economic and Financial Crimes Commission)  30th May 2008 
26 Director (Code of Conduct Bureau)  31th May 2008 
27 Investigation Officer (EFCC)  June 7 2008 
28 Senior Investigation officer (Economic and Financial Crime Commission)  24 July 2008 
29 Ex-Director (Nigeria Rail Way Cooperation)  03 September 2008 
30 Director (National Orientation Agency)  18th October 2008 
31 Director (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)  28th October 2008 
32 Director (National Population Commission) 30
th
 October 2008 
 National and International Non Governmental Organizations  
33 Programme Officer (Leading International Development Agency)  18th March 2008 
34 Country‟s Representative (Leading International Development Agency)  2th June 2008 
35 Programme Officer (Leading International Development Agency)  17th June 2008 
36 Director (Nigerian Non Governmental Organization)  21th March 2008 
37 Country Director (International Development Agency)  24th March 2008 
38 Director (Nigerian Non Governmental Organization)  3th June 2008 
39 Director (Nigerian Non Governmental Organization)  3th June 2008 
40 Director (Nigerian Non Governmental Organization)  
 
4th June 2008 
124 
 
   
41 Director (Nigerian Non Governmental Organization)  14th March 2008 
42 Prominent Lawyer and Human Rights Advocate  31th July 2008 
43 Director (Nigerian Non Governmental Organization)  5th June 2008 
44 Project coordinator (Nigerian Non Governmental Organization)  5th June 2008 
45 Project Officer (Nigerian Non Governmental Organization)  7th June 2008 
46 Coordinator (Nigerian Non Governmental Organization)  9th June 2008 
47 Former President (Nigeria Bar Association)  9th June 2008 
48 Human rights advocate and anti-corruption activist  15,th June 2008 
 Media  
49 Director (African Independent Television)  29 July 2008 
50 Operations Manager (leading Nigerian newspaper)  30th April 2008 
51 Senior Editor (leading Nigerian newspaper)  6th June 2008 
52 Senior Editor (leading Nigerian newspaper)  7th June 2008 
53 Senior Editor (leading Nigerian newspaper)  16th June 2008 
54 Chief Editor (leading Nigerian newspaper)  18th June 2008 
55 Editor in Chief (leading Nigerian newspaper)  21th June 2008 
56 Director (African Independent Television)  23th June 2008 
 Nigerian Business  
57 Chairman (of an investment company)  28 June 2008 
58 Manager (Union Bank Plc)  17th March 2008 
59 Operations Manager (Guaranty Trust Bank Plc)  29 March 2008 
60 Executive Director (of an investment company)  07th April 2008 
61 Director (of an investment company)  19th June 2008 
62 General Manger (Oceanic Bank Plc)  25th June 2008 
63 CEO (of an investment company)  25th June 2008 
64 Car dealer and auto mobile engineer in Lagos 13 July 2008 
65 Managing Director (Diamond Bank PLC)  8th September 2008 
 Religious Body  
66 Pastor (Redeemed Christian Church of God)  16th of March 
67 Pastor (Living Faith)  30th March 2008 
68 Parish Pastor (Mountain of Fire)  12th April 2008 
69 Parish Pastor (Mountain of Fire ) 13th April 2008 
70 Pastor (Living Hope of Glory)  4th May 2008 
71 Pastor (Family Worship Centre)  1st June 2008 
 Academics  
72 Senior Lecturer (University of Lagos)  16th June 2008 
73 Senior Lecturer (University of Lagos)  16thJune 2008 
74 Senior Lecturer (University of Lagos)  17th June 2008 
75 Senior Lecturer (University of Abuja)  20th June 2008 
76 Senior Lecturer (University of Abuja)  June 9 2008 
77 Senior Lecturer (University of Lagos)  16th June 2008 
 National Legislators  
78 Senator (National House of Senate)  14th April 2008 
79 Senator (National House of Senate)  29th April 2008 
80 Rep (National House of Representatives)  6th June 2008 
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81 Rep, (Federal House of Representatives, Abuja)   7th June 2008 
82 Former Senate President (EX-Law Maker)  11th June 2008 
 Political Parties  
83 Chairman (Nigerian Political Party)
  30th June 2008 
84 Chairman (Nigerian Political Party)  2nd July 2008 
85 Chairman (Nigerian Political Party)  7th July 2008 
86 Chairman (Nigerian Political Party)  17th July2008 
 State Government  
87 Secretary (of a Nigerian State Government)  20th March 2008 
88 Commissioner (State Government)  20th March 2008 
89 Head of Service (of a Nigerian State Government)  24th March 2008 
90 Attorney-Gen& Commissioner for Justice (of a Nigerian State Government)  26th March 2008 
91 Secretary (of a Nigerian State Government)  26th March 2008 
92 Secretary (of a Nigerian State Government)  08th May 2008 
93 Head of Service (of a Nigerian State Government)  17th May 2008 
 State Legislators  
94 Minority Leader (State Legislature)  21st March 2008 
95 Deputy Speaker (State Legislature)  22nd March 2008 
96 Majority Leader (State Legislature)  23th March 2008 
97 Legislator (State Legislature)  6th April 2008 
 Local Governments  
99 Chairman (Local Government)  4th August 2008 
100 Counsellor (Local Government)  4thAugust 2008 
101 Counsellor (Local Government)  5th August 2008 
102 Chairman (Local Government)  7th August 2008 
103 Counsellor (Local Government)  11th August 2008 
104 Counsellor (Local Government)  11th August 2008 
105 Counsellor (Local Government)  12th August 2008 
 Focus Group  
106 Traditional Ruler (Ora – Epken, Sabongidda Ora, Owan-West, Edo State)  9 July 2008 
107 Traditional Ruler (Ora – Epken, Sabongidda Ora, Owan-West, Edo State)  9 July 2008 
108 Traditional Ruler (Ora – Epken, Sabongidda Ora, Owan-West, Edo State)  9 July 2008 
109 Student (University of Lagos)  22nd May 2008 
110 Student (University of Lagos)  22nd May 2008 
111 Student (University of Lagos)  22nd May 2008 
112 Student (University of Lagos)  22nd May 2008 
113 Student (University of Lagos)  22ndMay 2008 
114 Student (University of Lagos)  22nd May 2008 
115 Student (University of Lagos)  22nd May 2008 
116 Student (University of Lagos)  22nd May 2008 
117 Student (University of Lagos)  22nd May 2008 
118 Retired Civil Servant (Benin City Edo State)  12th July 2008 
119 Retired Civil Servant (Benin City Edo State)  12th July 20088 
120 Retired Civil Servant (Benin City Edo State)  12th July 2008 
121 Retired Civil Servant (Benin City Edo State)  12th July 2008 
122 Retired Civil Servant (Benin City Edo State)  12th July 2008 
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123 Market woman (Festact Town Lagos State)  26th July 2008 
124 Market woman (Festact Town Lagos State)  26th July 2008 
125 Market woman (Festact Town Lagos State)  26th July 2008 
126 Market woman (Festact Town Lagos State)  26th July 2008 
127 Unemployed Graduate (Abuja)  13th August 2008 
128 Unemployed Graduate (Abuja)  13th August 2008 
129 Unemployed Graduate (Abuja)  13th August 2008 
 
 
To get a detailed understanding of how the issue of governance and corruption is 
perceived within the government institutions, it was also considered necessary to 
interview key civil servants at various ministries and agencies of government. 
 
 Ministry/Agency/ and Commission 
 
Unlike the politicians, who come into government and then leave when their tenure 
expires, civil servants can serve in the government for as long as 35 to 40 years 
before retirement. This puts them in a unique position of influence and they embody 
a wealth of information about the bureaucratic and administrative system in Nigeria. 
To this end, one director, an ex-director and two civil servants were interviewed at 
the National Orientation Agency. In a similar vein, one ex-director of the national 
population commission and the failed national rail cooperation were interviewed 
respectively, to gain an insight of their understanding of the changing experience of 
governance and corruption issues within state institutions over several decades.  
 
The ministry of finance is also integral to the debates surrounding Nigeria‟s anti-
corruption experience. Thus, the ministry‟s highest public officials were also 
interviewed.  One director of the cocoa research institute of Nigeria also participated 
in the survey. Amongst the ministries that were also targeted for interview were the 
health and education ministries. These ministries are key factors in assessing the 
relationship between governance, corruption and economic or social-infrastructural 
development. 
 
In addition, officials (two directors and one civil servant) of the National Assembly 
Service Commission were interviewed. This government institution has emerged as 
one of the most controversial institutions in recent times due to the frequent cases of 
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corruption and misappropriation of public resources that has continued to rock the 
commission. Interviews were further conducted at different times with officials of 
foreign affairs ministry (one director), federal ministry of justice (one director and one 
lower level civil servant), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (two 
investigative officers) and a director of Code of Conduct Bureau. In order to capture 
the mood of women and youth organizations across the country about governance 
and anti-corruption initiatives of successive governments, one director and one ex-
director of Nigeria‟s Ministry of Women Affairs were interviewed. Also interviewed at 
this level are one director and one lower level civil servant with the National Planning 
Commission (NPC). The NPC is an important national institution that is responsibility 
for economic and infrastructural planning for Nigeria. In a similar vein, one director 
and a lower level civil servant of the ministry for information and Communication 
were amongst those interviewed in this category.  
 
The officials of the Ministry for Information, which is often classified as the 
government‟s mouth piece, were a little bit diplomatic in their responses and perhaps 
over-amplified the efforts and successes of government policy reforms in certain 
areas that will be discussed further in subsequent chapters. However, interviews with 
these individuals were able to clarify government perspectives on its governance and 
anti-corruption initiatives, thus providing a broader perspective to critically ponder.   
 
 Nongovernmental Organizations/ Religious Bodies 
 
Although, as acknowledged in the preceding chapters, Nigerian civil society and 
NGO‟s played a major role in forcing the military out of government, since the advent 
of democracy in Nigeria they have not had much success in their efforts to 
consolidate the new democracy. Their ability to engage with and influence 
government policies, particularly in areas like electoral reforms, rule of law and the 
establishment of transparency and accountability mechanisms in national, state and 
local governments system has not been substantially strengthened. This, to some 
extent, is due to intimidation by the Nigerian government and a lack of independent 
sources of funding. In order to represent the views of the civil society in the research, 
representatives from non-governmental organizations and civil society groups were 
interviewed. As these groups of people are not directly serving in the Nigerian 
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government, they were able to provide potentially more objective alternative 
opinions.  
 
 Media 
 
One of the most influential sectors in Nigeria is the press and the media more 
generally. They play a very important role in anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria. 
Many political officials have been indicted or removed from office due in large part to 
the influence of press and media investigative reports. However, while it is 
acknowledged that they have a substantial degree of influence in shaping people‟s 
opinions, the researcher was however careful to be critical of information received 
from interviewees in this sector. This is against the back drop of the fact that, the 
majority of the media and press organizations are owned by key political figures in 
past and present administrations in Nigeria.  For instance, the Guardian Newspaper, 
This Day, Daily Sun and Daily Independent are owned by key politicians, who have 
served or are still serving in the Nigerian government. Nevertheless, very useful 
information and opinions were collected from this group of people.   
 
 Nigerian Businesses 
 
In the business sector, selected executive directors and managers of key Nigerian 
businesses participated in the interview exercise. Prominent amongst these were 
four interviewees from Nigerian banks. The managing directors and managers of the 
four banks were considered for interview because of the wealth of experience they 
have in the banking sector and the fact that they deal with lots of people from all 
walks of Nigerian life on a daily basis. The Nigerian Banking sector has also been in 
the spotlight over cases relating to corruption scandals in recent times and there 
have been a series of accusations about bank staff conspiring with political officials 
to loot public funds. These factors meant that it was particularly interesting to seek 
the views of those working in this sector regarding these issues and because of their 
understanding of Nigeria‟s business and political climates.  
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 Academics  
 
The academic sector has always been very relevant in nation building and 
development across the world. Through research and analyses academia embodies 
a wide spectrum of knowledge and information which helps in understanding and 
providing new ways (policy reforms) for addressing major contemporary challenges 
facing the Nigeria state. In order to have a sense of how this sector may have 
perceived Nigeria‟s governance and corruption experience since 1960, six senior 
lecturers (distinguished authorities in the subject under investigation) from the 
universities of Lagos and Abuja were interviewed. 
 
National Legislators  
 
The opinion of this group is very important to the research, since they represent 
various Nigerian constituencies at the National assembly. This was one of the most 
difficult groups to reach for interview. Several appointments to meet with some of the 
legislators were either canceled or postponed. Nevertheless, the researcher 
managed to interview five legislators including a former Nigerian Senate president.  
 
 Political Parties 
 
Interviews with the over fifty political parties in Nigeria were also difficult to secure 
but eventually representatives from four were interviewed. The opinion of the group 
was also very important to the research, because of the need to access a wide range 
of political viewpoints and to access their extensive knowledge of the historical 
complexities surrounding Nigeria‟s political space. 
 
4.3.3 State Level Interviews 
 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the purpose of state and local level 
interviews was aimed at deepening the scope of the research. One state was 
selected from each of the five states identified by respondents in the electronic 
survey as being the most and least corrupt (see chapter 5) and another state was 
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selected from the remaining states. The selected states were: Edo (ranked as most 
corrupt), Katsina (ranked as least corrupt) and Imo (not mentioned as either most 
corrupt or least corrupt).  
 
 State Government 
 
Three state government secretaries, heads of state civil service and four state 
commissioners were interviewed across the three states (Edo, Katsina and Imo). 
Whilst these interviews touched on the general state of affairs in Nigeria relating to 
governance and corruption issues, the main intention of these interviews was to 
explore those issues in relation to the specific circumstances of the state concerned. 
One of the difficulties encountered within these interviews was a tendency, perhaps 
understandable, for these public officials to strongly defend the record of their 
administration on these issues.  
 
State Legislators 
 
Similarly, four state legislators (State House of Assembly Members) from Edo, 
Katsina, Imo and Lagos were interviewed. This group was interviewed because they 
represent their various local constituencies at the state level.  
 
4.3.4 Local Level Interviews 
 
In addition to conducting research at the national and state levels, interviews were 
also carried out within specific local government areas. This local level research 
included: one Local government in Lagos state, two in Edo state and two in Abuja. 
These local governments were selected because of logistics and security reasons 
(limited financial resources and time available to me and knowledge of the security 
situation within different areas of the country). The intention was to deepen the 
scope of the research by securing the views of those involved in local government at 
this scale.  
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 Local Governments 
 
Interviews were conducted in 5 local government areas (within Edo, Lagos and 
Abuja). Those interviewed included two local government chairmen and five 
counsellors. The local government interviews were conducted because of the need 
to have a well grounded research project that is rooted in a wide array of opinions 
from different spatial levels across Nigerian society – that is it was intended to 
ground broader discussions about national and state-level policy-making within more 
focussed discussions about how those policies were played out in specific locations. 
 
 Focus Group 
 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews described in the preceding pages, it was 
also decided to carry out focus group interviews to explore the issues raised in the 
research with a somewhat wider range of Nigerian citizens. This was deemed 
necessary since the majority of the research involves interviews with key actors and 
stakeholders in government and other nongovernmental sectors. Thus, whilst the 
research could not hope to conduct a detailed exploration of the views of the wider 
Nigerian society on these issues, it is at the local level where I tried to broaden the 
approach to encompass the views of a wider range of social groups through the 
conducting of a number of focus groups with key sectors. The focus group method 
involves a small group of people in an informal setting discussing a topic or issue 
defined by the researcher. Interaction between members of the group is a key 
characteristic of the research method (see: Rubin and Babbie, 2010:  221); one 
comment for instance can trigger a chain of responses. For example, in a focus 
group at the community level with village heads, the discussion may shift from 
experiences of governance and corruption in Nigeria in general, to the specific role of 
individual leaders, at the state and local levels. 
 
Accordingly, five different focus groups were conducted within the three states. 
These included a focus group with three Traditional Rulers15 (these came from 
Sabongidda Ora, Owan-West in Edo State), another with four market women in 
                                            
15
 A traditional ruler could also be referred to as a community or village leader, who oversees certain customary rights and 
community issues in accordance with laid down traditional regulations (Soyingbe 2010).  
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Festact Town in Lagos State, one with nine University Students from the University 
of Lagos, another with five retired civil servants in Benin city, Edo State) and a final 
one bringing together unemployed university graduates in Abuja.  
 
The traditional rulers were selected because of their peculiar position as village 
heads and their role in local government as the mediator between the local people 
and political officials in the local council. They often voice the needs and concerns of 
the local communities (or at least their interpretation of them) under their control to 
the local government council officials for appropriate attention. Similarly, the market 
women were also selected because of their social disposition. They interact with lots 
of people, which cut across different age brackets, sex and social status on a daily 
basis. In the case of the University students, they were approached to gain a sense 
of how Nigerian youth and future leaders perceive questions of Nigeria‟s governance 
and corruption. The retired civil servants were particularly useful in shedding some 
light on the historical context of Nigeria‟s governance and corruption experience and 
some important changes that have occurred over time. The choice of the 
unemployed was informed by the need to represent their feelings, views and 
experiences. Furthermore, these particular locations were selected for logistical 
reasons (as explained previously) and to broaden the scope of the research 
outcomes. For example, in addition to minimising cost and concerns over personal 
security and safety, Lagos was selected to represent the south western part of the 
country, while Edo and Abuja represented Niger Delta and the Northern part of the 
country respectively.  
 
4.4 Overview of Primary Research Experience  
 
Although the interview research can generally be considered to have been a 
successful exercise, some problems were encountered in the field. For example, it 
was impossible to interview any of the state governors and some other top public 
officials, I was either told they were too busy or out of office on official assignments 
each time I showed up for a meeting, thus every effort to reach them was 
unsuccessful. In addition to difficulties associated with the limited funds available to 
finance the exercise, concerns over personal security and safety (the high rate of 
kidnappings, for example, across a range of local government areas in Nigeria, apart 
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from Lagos and Abuja) meant that some of the local governments that were initially 
scheduled for interviews could not be accessed.   
 
4.5 Secondary Data Sources 
 
This research study also utilized a wide range of secondary data sets which included 
a thorough review of the academic literature on Nigeria (international and Nigerian 
academic books, journals and articles), the reporting of corruption scandals in 
Nigerian and international newspapers, a broad range of relevant papers from 
institutions in Nigeria ranging from the various anticorruption bodies (like the 
Independent Corrupt Practices Commission and Economic Financial Crimes 
Commission), the National Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank of Nigeria among others. Corruption is a major issue internationally and 
Nigeria has been the focus of a lot of international and local studies and there have 
been a good number of contemporary peer-reviewed articles published on 
governance and corruption themes in Nigeria. There is also, however, a vast quantity 
of data on the World Wide Web which relates to the study, this includes important 
and useful sources such as documents from national and local government as well 
as other national and international institutions but it also includes a variety of online 
journals, blogs and reports which are largely unregulated. Almost any kind of 
information can be put on the web without checks or verification by independent or 
neutral parties (see: Flanagin and Metzger 2001). Therefore, despite the fact that the 
World Wide Web is a valuable resource which gives access to a wealth of data like 
policy information and opinions, not all materials available on the web are „quality 
assured‟ and a large number of them may be very partisan and biased. For instance, 
online journals are often peer-reviewed and international organisations host 
documents that are generally vetted for their content. However, on the other hand, 
materials posted on the internet by other group like NGOs and newspapers, perhaps 
for various ideological and political reasons may sometimes be biased, particularly 
when they are owned by politicians. This does not mean that they are not useful for 
the researcher, indeed they can be very revealing sources for a study of this nature, 
but they need to be treated with caution. Against this backdrop, researchers are 
expected to be able to identify, exercise caution and possess a substantial degree of 
knowledge and understanding of the various debates surrounding the issue under 
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investigation. These factors were taken into full consideration in sifting through and 
analyzing the wealth of this type of material which was drawn upon for this study. 
 
4.6 Data Analysis 
 
The data interpretation and analysis process began shortly after all the interviews 
had been transcribed, numbered, named and dated. This was executed through the 
technique known as open coding. It is a systematic method which creates an avenue 
for the researcher to familiarise themselves with their research materials by building 
up interpretations through a series of stages (see: Crang 2005). Open coding is a 
preliminary stage of analysis which involves a meticulous sifting through interview 
transcripts, that is, one sentence at a time whilst also interpreting the meaning of 
each sentence and what each interviewee is trying to say. It is a process that 
involves the coding of a series of labels, and in particular the jotting down of words 
and/or phrases for subsequent analysis (Crang 2005). In a similar vein, Jackson 
(2001: 201) explains that “the system of coding often involve the highlighting of 
individual words or phrases or annotating sections of the transcript with interpretative 
codes”.  
 
Along these lines, after reading the transcripts several times, with key words and 
sentences being marked and ideas related to the topics in the material developed 
alongside, it then became possible to identify specific and relevant themes (or 
codes) from the interview texts. This process of thorough analysis of the transcripts, 
represented a systematic way of avoiding arriving at pre-determined or foregone 
conclusions and a way of addressing the contention that “qualitative researchers 
simply elect a few unrepresentative quotes to support their initial prejudices” 
(Jackson 2001: 202).   
 
The interviews that were conducted at national, state and local levels were analysed 
together and themes were generated accordingly. As the themes were becoming 
clearly more defined, the transcripts were read through again and any sentence 
which specifically relates to a particular theme was marked with a separate colour. 
This process of categorisation, according to Crang, (2005: 225) helps to organise the 
materials for the purpose of identifying interesting relationships. Furthermore, this 
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process also creates an avenue for all themes and implications of the materials to be 
drawn out. Accordingly, these themes were put into a table format in separate 
columns and then key information and quotes were placed in these columns 
according to the theme they belonged to. As a way of conceptually organising the 
material, this process was carried out with all interviews. Once the themes had been 
generated it was then possible to decide the shape and structure of the thesis across 
the chapters.   
 
4.7 Ethical issues: Positionality and Reflexivity 
 
The personal nature of any research interview experience tends to underline the 
importance of ethical issues in research undertaken in this way (Patton 1990). 
Feminist theorists such as Hartsock (1987) and Harding (1991), who are interested 
in examining how relationships of power between researchers and respondents 
influence the way knowledge is produced, interpreted and presented have critically 
questioned the notion of research being objective and value free (see: Mullings 
1999: 337). In a similar vein, Haraway (1991) has further argued that prior to any 
research study; all investigators have a pre-conceived notion of their research area, 
which she described as “map of consciousness,” shaped by the researcher‟s 
positionality. In other words, this implies that their perspectives are influenced by 
factors such as the researcher‟s mix of class, gender, nationality and other identities.  
 
Given these issues, many social and behavioural investigators have addressed the 
issue of positionality by attempting to clarify their personal motivation and role for 
their research, through reflexivity (see Creswell 1994, Crotty 1998, Etherington 2004, 
Patton 2002). In the process of clarifying their role in the research, investigators 
often position themselves as either “insiders” or “outsiders” in relation to their 
research environment (Bonner and Tolhurst 2002). In general terms, the insider 
investigator is someone with certain familiarities or similarities (gender, race, class, 
sexual orientation etc) with the group being researched, while the outsider 
investigator has no prior or intimate knowledge of the group being researched 
(Griffith 1998: 361). However, it has also been argued that “individuals have a set of 
statuses, rather than a single status, thus identities can often be relative, cross cut 
by other differences, situated and conditional” (DeVault 1996: 35). Thus many 
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scholars, such as Anderson and Jones (2000) and Merton (1972), disagree with the 
insider and outsider dichotomy. For example, as Merton (1972) has argued, the 
limits between the insider and the outsider tend to often overlap, suggesting that we 
are a continuous series of insiders and outsiders because “as circumstances 
involving different values arise, different statuses are activated and the lines of 
separation shift” (Merton 1972: 28).  
 
While certain attributes of the investigator‟s identity (gender, ethnicity and sexual 
orientation) are innate and unchanging, other attributes like age are innate but 
always changing. These attributes only represent one aspect of the insider vs. 
outsider dichotomy. Other aspects are influenced by the time and place of the 
research, the type of power relationships between the researchers and researched, 
the researcher‟s personality and that of participants and the specific topic under 
investigation. 
 
In the case of my field experience for instance, the unique combination of my status 
as an insider researcher (a Nigerian), but also a young male researcher from a 
foreign university, meant that the way that I was responded to altered in my 
interactions with different people in different circumstances in a variety of ways. My 
status as a local researcher allowed me easy access to diverse groups of 
participants within some of the local and state levels, because I (and members of my 
family) are well-known to many of the respondents who participated at this level. On 
the other hand, this was not the case at the national level. Apart from the fact that 
most of my informants at this level had never met with me before the interview, other 
factors like personality differences, and the sensitive nature of my specific topic 
(corruption) meant that I very much assumed the role of an outsider at this level. 
Prior to my field work experience, I had thought that my status as an insider would 
provide me an unfettered access to participants across various sectors, but this was 
not the case, as many key political officials (like State governors for example) that 
were initially scheduled for interviews could not be accessed.  
 
The difficulties associated with researching such a sensitive topic as corruption also 
meant that I was also viewed as some kind of suspicious insider by some 
respondents, particularly those in government. Through the use of self-reflectivity, 
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some of these challenges were resolved with varying degree of successes. For 
example, respondents were told in detail from the outset about the purpose of the 
research to encourage participation. Similarly, interviewees were not asked to talk 
about anything which obviously made them uncomfortable and the issue of 
confidentiality was regarded as very important to every aspect of the research, that 
is, interviewees who wanted to remain anonymous were treated as such and any 
reference to details through which they might be identified was removed.   
 
From my experience in the field, I would argue that the insider/outsider dichotomy is 
far more complicated than suggested in most academic literatures. As dynamics 
change with context, so the insider/outsider dichotomy gets increasingly blurred. 
According to Domosh (2003), there is no equality across all researchers and 
participants, as research respondents could also go through conflicting identities 
during the research process. Thus, constant negotiation of differences in power, 
know ledges and truth claims are necessary for research respondents to have 
meaningful roles in research processes. As Sultana (2007) has argued, knowledge is 
produced within the context of our inter-subjectivities and the place we occupy at that 
moment.16 Sultana further argues that knowledge is always partial and 
representations of knowledges produced through field research are developed 
through power relations that the researcher needs to recognize in seeking to 
undertake ethical research. Knowledge is produced through the research process 
and it contains within it broader social relations that locates the researcher and their 
respondents in different locations. Thus, it is important to acknowledge that the 
research findings of this thesis are both partial and interpretive, but also that they 
engage in telling a story that may not otherwise have been told about corruption in 
Nigeria based on the information shared by the research respondents and the 
broader patterns revealed that may or may not be constant over time and space. 
  
                                            
16
 either physically, spatially, socially, politically and institutionally 
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Chapter 5: Corruption in Nigeria: Perceived Scope and Magnitude  
 
This chapter builds upon the literature reviews conducted in earlier chapters to 
explore in more detail questions surrounding the perceived magnitude and scope of 
poor governance and corruption in Nigeria. Drawing primarily upon primary data 
(questionnaires and research interviews undertaken for this study), and relevant 
secondary data sources, (such as a thirty year run of Transparency International 
(TI)‟s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the World Bank‟s diagnostic governance 
and corruption survey which was undertaken in 2001, and the Business Survey on 
Crime and Corruption conducted by the National Bureau for Statistics (NBS) in 
partnership with Nigeria‟s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 
2007), the chapter analyses in detail the perception of key stakeholders in Nigeria 
and beyond (in the case of the TI CPI) regarding the extent and scope of poor 
governance and corruption within the Nigerian context. These discussions, in turn, 
set the foundations for the following two chapters, which will examine in more detail 
the perceived major causes and impacts of corruption in Nigeria and the dynamics 
and impacts of the anti-corruption measures adopted by successive Nigerian 
administrations (as well as the impacts of international cooperation in tackling 
corruption in Nigeria).  
 
As shown in previous chapters, the phenomenon of corruption has featured 
prominently across the various debates on Nigeria‟s governance experience and 
Nigeria is frequently presented as being notoriously corrupt. Nigeria‟s present 
development challenges are frequently related to the history of poor governance, 
fuelled by corruption, social injustice and political instability, stretching back over 
several decades (see: chapter three, section 3.2 and 3.3). Elizabeth Donnelly, 
Coordinator of the Africa Programme, Chatham House, in an interview conducted by 
Transparency Watch (TW) in 2007, described Nigeria‟s corruption experience and its 
significance in the following way. 
  
“I think most visitors to Nigeria come away with stories of their experience of 
corruption – whether it is being asked to pay an “entry fee” at the airport, or to pay to 
pass a police roadblock. I think the most obvious way in which corruption is evident in 
Nigeria is the clearly staggering wealth of a handful of people in the face of the 
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poverty of the majority. It manifests itself in other ways also – the regular power cuts 
and lack of infrastructure and basic services. Billions of naira is ploughed into 
promised improvements on roads, power supply and so on, but the tangible changes 
that these promises would deliver are often very slow in coming. The effects of 
corruption in Nigeria are considerable. Of course Nigeria faces great challenges to its 
development, but the biggest hurdle is the corruption. Nigeria is not a poor country; it 
is not aid dependent and has all the components necessary to be more developed 
and more successful. Yet an estimated 70 million Nigerians live below the poverty 
line. There are however even more profound effects than those physical ones such 
as lack of basic healthcare and education. I‟m thinking here about the impact 
corruption and unaccountable government have on the psyche of a nation. 
Corruption breaks trust and destroys faith in the state; it creates cynicism and 
muddles expectations. So in Nigeria corruption is in fact strengthened by the fact that 
people come to expect less and less from the state the more they are disappointed 
by it. This presents problems for Nigeria‟s democratic transition” (Sidwell 2008, nd) 
 
Donnelly‟s views on corruption represent an external international perspective upon 
Nigeria‟s experience of the paradox of poverty in the midst of fabulous oil wealth 
which will be familiar from the discussions in previous chapters. Certainly, as she 
suggests, there can be no sustainable development in a country where citizens are 
so grossly unequal in wealth. The disparity in the Nigerian case certainly seems to 
be particularly extreme. For example, according to recent World Bank estimates, 
approximately 80% of Nigeria‟s oil wealth is concentrated in the hands of 1% of the 
population (mainly public officials and business elites), while over 70 percent of the 
population live below the poverty line (see: Unicef 2003 and World Bank 2006). 
Rather than enhance good governance through transparency, accountability and 
equity in the distribution of resources, chapter three suggested that Nigeria‟s 
governance and democratic experience has been strongly characterised by 
widespread corruption at all levels of government, which, it has been suggested, 
continues to pose a major threat to the achievement of sustainable development and 
poverty reduction in Nigeria. 
 
 A brief perusal of the evidence unearthed in a continual stream of corruption 
scandals in the political history of Nigeria in recent decades does paint a picture of a 
country that has been particularly riddled with corruption at a staggering level, 
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particularly when considering the substantial scale of the funds involved. For 
instance, according to Mbachu (1993), US$1.5 billion of public funds from oil exports 
and another US$5 billion proceeds from crude oil sales were reported to have 
disappeared from the public treasury in 1990; in 1991, a further US$1 billion from the 
sale of equity in a joint venture with Shell went missing from the public treasury (see: 
Akindele 2005).17 
 
More recently, in 1999 the Financial Times estimated that the size of the looted 
funds kept by individual Nigerians in foreign bank accounts at that time exceeded the 
national debt, which, at that time prior to external debt forgiveness in 2005 stood at 
about US$33 billion dollars (Ofeimum 1993). Table 5.1 presents a summary of that 
data. 
 
Clearly, the staggering figures involved in these looted funds only represent a 
fraction of what has actually been stolen over this period. In apparent frustration over 
the alarming rates of corruption in Nigeria at that time, former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, in one of his monthly media conferences in 2000, acknowledged the 
extent and magnitude of the problem in Nigeria. “There was corruption! Corruption! 
And corruption! Everywhere and all the time! Corruption was not only rampart, but 
had eaten so deeply into the marrow of our existence that looters and fraudsters had 
become our heroes, and it seemed we could no longer place any faith in honesty 
and decency and hard work” (Felix 2000, np). Since then, however, the country has 
continued to be characterized by high numbers of corruption scandals. Table 5.2 for 
example, shows some selected high profile corruption court cases in Nigeria over the 
past five years and the amounts involved.  
 
Table 5.2 represents only a selected few of Nigerian‟s federal high court cases 
involving key public officials. These are high profile court cases bordering on the 
misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds which were established by the  
EFCC (for full discussions of the activities of the EFCC see discussions in chapter 
seven). Some of them have been granted bail by the court with their assets frozen, 
while others have being convicted and sentenced to several years of imprisonment.  
 
 
                                            
17
 The negative impact of these levels of capital flight is discussed in detail in the next Chapter. 
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Table 5.1: Major Cases of Looting of Nigerian Funds 
 
Names Amount 
in 
London 
Amount 
in Swiss 
Deposit 
in USA 
Deposit in 
Germany 
Total Naira (F) 
Equivalent (1999 
Exchange Rate) 
1.Gen Babangida £6.256b $7.416 $2.00b Dm9,00b N 2.4635 Trillion 
2. Gen Abubakar £1.131b $2.33b $8000b Dm16 N 0.4938 Trillion 
3. Mike Akhigbe £1.24b $2.426b $671b DM9,00 N 0.8059 Trillion 
4. Jerry Useni £3.04b $2.01b $1.03b Dm900m N 0.059 Trillion 
5. Ismaila Gowon £1.03b $2.00b $1.03b Dm700m N 0.50176 Trillion 
6. Umaru Dikko £4.4b $1.46b $700m Dm345m N 0.89465 Trillion 
7. Paul Ogwuma £300m $1.42b $200m Dm500m N 35 Billion 
8. Sani Abacha £300m $1.09b $800m Dm3.01m N 1.2107 Trillion 
9. Mohammed Abacha £300m $1.2b $150m Dm417m N 1.2107 Trillion 
10. Abdu Abacha £700m $1.21b $900m Dm417m N 0.3384 Trillion 
11. Wada Nas £300m $1.32b - Dm300m N 0.2374 Trillion 
12. Tom Ikimi £400m $1.39b $153m Dm371m N 0.252553 
Trillion 
13. Dan Etete £1.12b $1.03b $400m Dm1.72b N O32743 Trillion 
14. Don Etiebet £2.5b $1.06 $700m Dm361m N 0.56747 Trillion 
15. Majial Mustapha £600m $1.001b - Dm210 N 0.199793 
Trillion 
16. Bashiru Dalhatu £2.9b $1.09b $360m Dm1.66b N 0.68895 Trillion 
17. Wushishi £32.3b $1.1001b $161m Dm1.43b N 0.1305 Trillion 
18. Hassan Adamu £300m $200m $700m - N 0.1305 Trillion 
19. T.V. Adanjuma £1.36b $1.02b $300m Dm1990m N 0.3427 Trillion 
20. Ishaya Bamayi £120m $800m - - N94.0 Billion 
 
Source: The Financial Times of London – 23 July 1999, cited in the Nigerian Comentator – Vol 2, No 
4 1999 
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Table 5.2: Selected High Profile Nigerian Corruption Cases 
 
No Name Trial Court Case Status Amount 
involved 
Statues of 
Suspect 
Remark 
1 Ayo Fayose 
(Former Governor 
of Ekiti State) 
Fed. High 
Court, Lagos.  
Arraigned on 51 
state counts. 
N1.2 Billion 
(£5.781 
Million) 
granted bail 
by court 
since 2007 
Inherited 
Case filed since 
17th Dec.2006 
2 AdenikeGrange  
(Former Minister 
of Health)  
FCT. High 
Court  
Maitama  
Arraigned on 56 
state counts. 
N300 million  
(£1.343 
Million) 
granted bail 
by court 
since 2008  
Inherited  
Case filed since  
2April 
3 Joshua Dariye 
(Former Governor 
Plateau State)  
FCT High Court  
Gudu  
Arraigned on 23 
state counts.  
 
N700 Million  
(£3.109 
Million) 
granted bail 
by court 
since 2007  
Inherited  
Case filed since  
13July 2007  
4 Saminu Turaki 
(Former Senator) 
FCT High Court  Arraigned on 32 
state counts.  
N36 Billion  
(£153.00 
million) 
granted bail 
by court 
since 2007  
Inherited  
Case filed since  
5 Orji Uzor Kalu  
(Former 
Governor, Abia 
State)  
Fed. High 
Court  
Maitama  
Arraigned on 107 
state counts.  
N5 Billion  
(£27.143 
Million) 
granted bail 
by court 
since 2008  
Inherited  
Case filed since  
11
 
June 2007  
6 James Ibori 
(Former Governor 
Delta State) 
Federal High 
Court  
Asaba 
Arraigned on 170 
state count 
N9.2 Billion 
(£43.824 
Million)  
granted bail 
by court 
since 2008  
Inherited  
In August 2009  
 
7 IyaboObasanjo-
Bello  
(Senator) 
FCT High 
Court, Maitama  
Arraigned on 56 
state counts. 
N10 Million  
(£43.908 
thousand) 
granted bail 
by court 
since 2008  
Inherited  
Case filed since  
April 2 2008  
8 Lucky Igbinedion  
(Former Governor 
of Edo State)  
Fed. High 
Court, Enugu  
Arraigned on 191 
state counts.  
N4.3 Billion  
(£22.262 
Million) 
Case 
determined 
2008  
Inherited  
Case filed on  
23
rd 
Jan.2008  
9 Chimaroke 
Nnamani  
(Former Governor 
of Enugu State)  
Fed. High Court, 
Lagos  
Arraigned on 105 
state counts  
N5.3 Billion  
(£28.286 
Million) 
granted bail 
by court 
since 2007  
Inherited  
Case filed since  
11
th 
Dec.2007  
10 Roland Iyayi 
(Former 
Managing 
Director of FAAN)  
FCT High 
Court, Maitama  
Arraigned on 11 
state counts  
N5.6 Billion  
(£29.108 
Million) 
granted bail 
by court 
since 2008  
Commenced by  
Waziri in June  
2008  
11 Bode George 
(Chieftain of the 
ruling party, PDP)  
Fed. High 
Court.  
Lagos  
Arraigned on 68 
state counts  
N100 Billion  
(£408.132 
Million) 
Has been in 
jail after 
conviction in 
Oct 2009.  
Commenced by  
Waziri in 
Dec.08  
12  Rasheed Ladoja 
(Former Governor 
of Oyo State)  
 
Fed. High 
Court,  
Lagos  
Arraigned on 33 
state counts.  
N6 Billion 
(£32.086 
Million)  
granted bail 
by court 
since 2008  
Commenced by  
Waziri  
13  Sen. Nicholas 
Ugbane,(Serving 
Senator)  
 
FCT High Court 
Abuja  
Arraigned on 158 
state counts  
N5.2 Billion  
(£27.074 
Million) 
Has been in 
jail after 
conviction in 
Oct 2009. 
Commenced by  
Waziri in May  
2009  
14  Raymond 
Obieri,(Fmr 
Chairman,Interco
ntinental Bank 
PLC  
FHC, Ikoyi, 
Lagos. Justice 
Dan Abutu  
Arraigned on 18 
state counts  
N131.8 
Billion 
(£528 .093 
Million) 
Suspects 
jailed  
l on 14/9/09  
Commenced by  
Waziri on Aug  
31 2009  
15  SebastianAdigwe, 
Peter Ololo, 
Falcon Securities 
Ltd  
 
FHC, Ikoyi, 
Lagos.  
 
Arraigned on 36 
state counts.  
N277.3 
Billion  
(£1.102 
Billion) 
Suspects 
remanded in 
Prison.  
 
Commenced by  
Waziri on Aug  
31 2009  
16 DrBartholomew(F
mr CEO,Union 
Bank PLC)  
FHC, Ikoyi, 
Lagos.  
 
Arraigned on 28 
state counts.  
N187.1 
Billion  
(3800.021 
Million) 
Suspects 
Jailed  
2008 
Commenced by  
Waziri on Aug  
31 2009  
 
 
Source: Compiled from Economic and Financial Crimes Commission: 2010 
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Nevertheless, in spite of the number of cases reported or the total amount of funds 
involved in judicial decisions and reported cases of corruption, the phenomenon is a 
notoriously difficult subject to measure, compare and investigate. How extreme is the 
situation in Nigeria, for example, in comparison to other countries and is the problem 
getting worse or better? There is, for instance, a major challenge involved in merely 
defining what to measure, because as discussed in chapter 2, corruption is a very 
complex phenomenon with many different dimensions covering a wide range of 
practices and behaviours. There are also important methodological difficulties and 
limitations associated with collecting evidence on incidences of corruption and its 
evolution over time, particularly if it is desired to make cross-national comparisons. 
Empirical data on funds discovered through legal cases or other mechanisms can 
only ever be a partial or limited proxy for measuring the overall level of corruption in 
different settings, not least because data on the number of court cases and reported 
cases of corruption may not necessarily reflect the overall levels of corruption (TI, 
October 2010). Since corruption often leaves no paper trail (due to its secretive 
nature) the number of judicial decisions and reported cases of corruption may 
represent a small fragment of corrupt incidents because not all corrupt behaviours 
are prosecuted or reported (moreover not all corrupt actions are necessarily illegal). 
Furthermore, it could also be argued that data of this type merely reflects the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies, the judiciary and the media within 
particular countries at particular times in exposing and prosecuting corruption in a 
country. As a result of these various challenges in measuring corruption, most 
attempts to measure, compare and contrast corruption levels over space and time 
have tended to draw upon a mixture of objective indicators where they exist and the 
experience and perceptions of those actors deemed to be most directly confronted 
with the realities of corruption in each country (TI October 2010). 
 
One mechanism frequently used as a proxy for measuring the extent of corruption in 
individual countries is Transparency International‟s Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI), as discussed in chapter two. For our purposes, it is interesting to note that 
Nigeria has consistently featured as one of the most corrupt countries in TI‟s survey 
(Ofeimum 1993). Therefore, the section that follows focuses in exploring what the TI 
indexes have had to say about the perceived extent of corruption in both the military 
and democratic regimes in Nigeria over the 30 year period from 1980 to 2009. 
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5.1 Analysing the Perceived Extent of Corruption in Nigeria: TI CPI 1980-2009 
 
The TI-Corruption Ranking, as discussed in chapter two, is a yearly publication 
produced jointly by Transparency International and Göttingen University18. The index 
is a “poll of polls” which draws on different sources. A final figure is assigned to each 
country which is termed its overall integrity ranking (out of 10). A ten represents an 
entirely clean country, while zero indicates a country that is entirely corrupt. The 
starting point for assembling the first TI ranking was in 1995. This first survey, rather 
than just being a snap-shot of perceptions in 1995 itself also drew upon „expert‟ 
assessments of historical data bordering on corruption perceptions between 1980 
and 1995. The historical sources used in producing the 1995 ranking included 
reports produced by Business International (1980), World Competitiveness 
Reporting (1992) and Political and Economic Risk Consultant Ltd (1992). 41 
countries were considered for this first exercise. In the discussion that follows, we 
shall look at the three separate periods (1980-85,1988-92 and 1993-96) considered 
in the 1996 CPI data, before moving on to consider Nigeria‟s performance on the TI 
index for 1997/2009 period. Table 5.3 shows Nigeria‟s performance in the first CPI 
conducted in 1996. According to this study, Nigeria was perceived by business 
people as the most corrupt amongst the countries included in the survey at that time.  
 
Table 5.3: Corruption Perceptions Index:  Historical Data: 1980 – 1996  
RANK‟9
6 
COUN
TRY 
SCORE 
1993-
1996 
(MAX. 
10) 
NUMBER 
OF 
SURVEYS 
USED 
SCORE 
1988-
1992 
(MAX.1
0) 
NUMBER 
OF 
SURVEYS 
USED 
SCORE 
1980-
1985 
(MAX.1
0) 
NUMBER 
OF 
SURVEYS 
USED 
54/54 
(Most 
corrupt) 
Nigeria 0.69 4 0.63 2 0.99 2 
 
The table shows two figures for each period. The first is the average score and the second represents 
the number of surveys available. Each period covers a comparative score from previous years.   
 
Source: Compiled from Transparency International‟s web site (1996) 
 
                                            
18
. The major operational work is conducted by Dr. Johann Graf Lambsdorff and his research team at Göttingen University. It 
consists of a composite index based on corruption related data given by a variety of independent and reputable institutions (TI, 
2009).   
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The table shows that Nigeria recorded 0.99 between 1980 and 1985, 0.63 between 
1988 and 1992 and 0.69 between 1993 and 1996. The 1980-1996 data spans three 
years of Shagari‟s civilian government, three years of Buhari‟s military regime, eight 
years of Babangida‟s military regime and ends three years into Abacha‟s military 
administration. Although Shagari‟s regime was a democracy, as discussed in chapter 
three, his administration was characterised by endemic corruption and the 
mismanagement of public resources (Joseph 1987:151-185). In fact, it was argued in 
chapter 3 that the lack of political will shown by Shagari‟s regime in controlling the 
phenomenon was the main reason cited by Buhari‟s administration for taking over 
power in 1983. Buhari took a tougher stand against corruption when he came into 
power, but after three years in office, his administration was prematurely terminated 
by Babangida, who is widely perceived to have further institutionalised corruption 
during his eight years rule as a dictator (see: chapter 3, section 3.3, where these 
issues were discussed more extensively). Similarly, the survey reflected the initial 
three years of Abacha‟s regime, which has also been characterised as a particularly 
corrupt period of Nigerian history (see: Guest 2004: 121). The TI index for this period 
appears to support the historical characterisations of the extent of corruption under 
the regimes of this period. However, the historical data must be treated with some 
caution because it is not really detailed enough to reflect the specific extent of 
corruption perceptions in each regime of the period under consideration (e.g. It failed 
to capture the supposed improvement under Buhari‟s regime as explored in chapter 
3).  
        
Table 5.4 presents the data from TI‟s CPI surveys for the years from 1997 to 2009. 
From 1997 Nigeria began to witness a marginal improvement in its CPI scores, 
scoring 1.76 in 1997, as against 0.99, 0.66 and 0.69 from the previous year‟s‟ 
historical data19. Nevertheless, of the 52 countries that were considered for the 
survey in 1997, Nigeria still remained at the bottom of the list and therefore 
continued to be perceived as the most corrupt country amongst those analysed for 
the index.  
                                            
19
  This change may have been due to changes in how corruption was perceived as although it could just as easily have related 
to changes in the sample and methodology used by TI. For example, while the 1996 historical data covered a period of several 
years (1980/1996), the 1997/2009 CPI table does not include the scores from previous years (Lambsdorff 2000). 
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Table 5.4: Nigeria‟s Scores/Ranking on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 1997 - 2009 
 
Year  CPI Score Nigeria‟s CPI Remarks 
1997   1.76 52/52 Most Corrupt 
1998   1.6 81/85 2
nd
most Corrupt 
1999   1.6  98/99 2
nd
most Corrupt 
2000   1.2 90/90 Most Corrupt 
2001   1.0  90/91 2
nd
most Corrupt 
2002   1.6  101/102 2
nd
most Corrupt 
2003   1.4  132/133 2
nd
most Corrupt 
2004   1.6 144/146 2
nd
most Corrupt 
2005   1.9  152/159 3
rd
most Corrupt 
2006   2.2 142/163 5
th
most Corrupt 
2007   2.2  147/180 9
th
most Corrupt 
2008   2.7 121/180 59
th
most Corrupt 
2009   2.5 130/180 44
th
 most Corrupt 
 
The result from the 1997/2009 CPI table is based upon the assessment of each year‟s index of the 
sum of all credible sources available at that time. It does not include the scores from previous years.  
 
Sources: Compiled from Transparency international Website (2010) 
 
As explained previously, the CPI surveys since 1997 relate to the perceived degree 
of corruption as measured by business people, academics and risk analysts (TI 
2009). During this period, the number of countries considered in TI‟s index 
dramatically increased from 52 in 1997 to 180 in 2009. The most notable issue for 
our purposes is that Nigeria‟s TI‟s CPI score improved in absolute terms from 1.76 to 
2.5 during this period.  
 
Looking at the data in more detail is instructive. Nigeria‟s performance in the CPI, 
both in terms of its scores and ranking were not very impressive between 1997 and 
2004. During this period, Nigeria was consistently ranked as either the most corrupt 
or second most corrupt amongst the countries included in the survey. However, 
between 2004 and 2009, Nigeria‟s CPI scores steadily improved from 1.9 in 2005 to 
2.5 by 2009. At the same time, Nigeria‟s ranking also improved from the third most 
corrupt in 2005 to the forty fourth most corrupt country by 2009. This suggests a 
considerable improvement in Nigeria‟s corruption perception over this period. The 
1997/2009 period covers about one year of Abacha's military rule, eight years of the 
civilian rule of Olusegun Obasanjo and over two years of Yar‟Adua„s administration. 
Table 5.4 shows that Nigeria‟s improvement in the CPI ranking begins shortly after 
the EFCC was established in 2003 under the second tenure of President Olusegun 
Obasanjo‟s government. As will be considered more extensively in chapter 7, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that Nigeria‟s dramatic improvement in TI‟s index 
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between 2005 and 2009 is probably connected to the vigorous ant-corruption 
crusade promoted by the EFCC, under the supervision of Nigeria‟s anti-corruption 
chief at the time Nuhu Rebadu.  
 
As mentioned in the preceding section, although Transparency International‟s CPI 
may have played an important role in focusing international attention on corruption 
issues, its survey is based primarily on external „experts‟ opinions rather than the 
perceptions of ordinary  Nigerians (the experience of the poor, women and informal 
businesses are particularly under-represented). Against this back drop, it is important 
to complement study of any trends in the TI data with any measures of domestic 
perceptions of the extent of corruption in Nigeria that may be available. The section 
that follows utilises a combination of data from a 2001 World Bank diagnostic survey 
which was conducted in collaboration with a number of research institutions in 
Nigeria to measure households, public officials and business experiences of 
corruption in Nigeria at the time. 
 
5.2 Exploring the Perceived Degree of Poor Governance and Corruption in 
Nigeria 
 
Concerned about Nigerian‟s poor international image (as illustrated by its poor 
performances in the TI‟s corruption perception index), soon after the inception of 
former President Olusegun Obansajo‟s administration in 1999, the government 
requested assistance from the World Bank in undertaking a major governance and 
corruption diagnostic survey in Nigeria (World Bank 2001: 7)20. The Bank in turn 
collaborated with a number of Nigerian institutions in conducting the survey in 2001. 
The Institute for Development Research of Ahmadu Bello University was appointed 
as the lead partner for the Nigerian research and institutions that participated in the 
exercise included: the Centre for Development Studies (CDS) of the University of 
Jos, the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) of the University of Enugu, the 
Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER) in Ibadan, the Nigerian 
Centre for Economic Management and Administration (NCEMA) in Ibadan and the 
Department of Economics of the University of Port Harcourt.  
                                            
20
 The World Bank were very open to this due to the growth of interest in governance and anti-corruption reforms at that time, 
following the end of the Cold War (see: earlier discussions in chapters 1.2, 2.8 and 3.9 for more details) 
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The study adopted three survey instruments which were randomly applied to 
selected households, public officials and business organizations in Nigeria 
respectively. This national survey was designed through a multi-stage area 
sampling, which cut across two states in each of the six geopolitical zones due to the 
multi-ethnic diversity of Nigeria‟s geopolitical space. Overall, a total of 5,000 
randomly selected respondents participated in the survey. More specifically, the 
number of households sampled was 2,500, while a total of 1,500 respondents across 
the three tiers of government participated in the public officials sample and 1,000 
respondents were interviewed in the Business enterprises survey. The three surveys 
were undertaken in 2001, and were intended to provide an understanding into the 
perception of the major problems militating against development in Nigeria. The 
surveys identified endemic corruption as one of the major problems to have 
significantly shaped the level of social-economic development in Nigeria. For 
example, in one of the surveys, households were asked to identify the degree of 
seriousness of each of the problems indicated in table 5.5.  
 
The respondents identified unemployment (15.2%) as the most serious problem 
facing Nigeria, followed closely by corruption in the public sector (13.1%) and the 
high cost of living (11.4%), suggesting that corruption is perceived by respondents as 
a serious problem militating against economic development. In a similar vein, 
households were interviewed to capture their perceptions of the degree of corruption 
in Nigeria, as illustrated in figure 5.1. The figure shows that 80.1% of the 
respondents believed that corruption is a very serious problem in Nigeria, while only 
5.4% thought that it was not so serious. Furthermore, public officials were also asked 
in the survey to measure the extent of corruption in Nigeria and the survey results 
showed that public officials also believed that corruption was endemic (see: Figure 
5.2). 
 
According to Figure 5.2, 71% of public officials believed that corruption was 
prevalent/extremely prevalent in Nigeria, while 22.2% indicated that they thought that 
corruption was modest. Only 1% of those interviewed thought that corruption was 
nonexistent in Nigeria in 2001. 
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Table 5.5: Major Obstacles Militating Against Sustainable Development in Nigeria  
(Households)   
 
Problems  
 
Very 
Minor 
% 
Minor 
% 
 
Moderate 
% 
 
Major 
% 
 
Vary 
Major 
% 
High Cost of Living  
 
2.0  4.3  10.3  28.5  53.3 
Unemployment  
 
1.0  2.4  4.9  28.2  62.1 
Inflation  
 
1.3  4.4  14.0  32.8  45.4 
Safety Concerns/Crime  
 
3.4  7.5  16.8  32.5  37.3 
Drug abuse/traffic  
 
6.0  15.9  26.8  29.4  18.6 
Political instability  
 
4.6  13.4  24.1  29.8  25.8 
Lack of leadership  
 
4.7  11.3  18.9  29.8  33.4 
Corruption in the public 
sector  
1.5  3.7  7.8  23.8  60.8 
Corruption in the private 
sector  
4.0  13. 9 25.1  27.1  27.4 
Low quality of education  2.6  
 
8.9  25.0  34.5  27.2 
High cost of education  1.9  
 
7.5 23.7  34.7  30.0 
High cost of health care  
 
2.4  7.2. 20.9  37.3  ??? 
Low quality of health 
care  
2.3  
 
7.8  24.4  37.7  26.1 
Housing shortage  
 
6.4  10.2  
 
19.0  31.9  30.4 
Ethnic conflict  8.4  9.6  14.5  26.4  39.1 
 
Religious conflict  
 
11.6  9.5  12.1  24.1 40.6 
Communal conflict  14.5  15.8  
 
20.4  24.0  22.6 
Community/multinational 
clashes 
 
22.2  19.9  17.8  19.2  15.2 
 
Source: Nigeria Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Study (World Bank 2001, 11) 
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Figure 5.1: Assessment of the degree of corruption in Nigeria (Households) 
 
 
 
 Sources: Nigeria Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Study (World Bank 2001, 37) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Assessment of the Degree of Corruption in Nigeria expressed by 
 Public Sector respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nigeria Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Study (World Bank, 2001: 40) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Non-Existent       Rare      Modest     Prevalent      Extremely Prevalent 
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When asked to reflect on the levels of corruption three years before the date of the 
survey (1998), 79.4% of the public official respondents indicated that they believed 
that corruption had been prevalent/extremely prevalent, while only 13.4% indicated 
that it had been moderate, although 1.1% of those surveyed had indicated that they 
thought that there had been no corruption three years ago. These figures suggest 
that public officials‟ perception was that generally the extent of corruption in Nigeria 
had declined considerably over the three years to 2001 when the survey was 
conducted. Interestingly, when asked about the level of corruption in their own 
organisations, 32.3% of those interviewed indicated that corruption was 
prevalent/extremely prevalent, while 38.2% believed it was modest and 21.5% 
thought it rare, suggesting that public officials were less critical of their own 
organisations. Once again, however, there was a perception that the situation was 
improving (47.2% had believed that corruption was prevalent/extremely prevalent in 
their own organization three years previously). Nevertheless even this figure is 
relatively low in comparison to the general figures.  
 
To get a further sense of perceptions of the degree of corruption in Nigeria‟s public 
sector, representatives from private enterprises were asked to indicate how often 
their organisations needed to give bribes to public officials for access to the basic 
services presented in Table 5.6.   
 
Table 5.6 shows that in 2001 the respondents indicated that they frequently had to 
bribe public officials to get access to services or that they paid bribes to influence the 
political process. The highest levels indicated were in relation to payments designed 
to access government contracts. 33.2% admitted that they always gave bribes to 
public officials when tendering for government contracts; whilst a combined total of 
69.4% of the enterprises interviewed acknowledged that they always, mostly or 
frequently gave bribes to officials in order to access government contracts. Only 
6.8% of those surveyed claimed that they seldom/never had to give bribes to access 
government contracts. In a similar vein, enterprises that were interviewed indicated 
that they gave bribes to access basic public services like electricity and telephone. 
22.8% admitted to always paying bribes to get connected to these services, while a 
combined total of 59.6% acknowledged that they always/mostly/frequently had to  
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Table 5.6: The Extent of Various Acts of Corruption in Nigeria‟s Public Sector 
 (Businesses enterprises respondents) 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Nigeria Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Study (World Bank 2001, 53) 
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give bribes and only 6.5% claimed that they seldom/never had to give bribes to 
access these services. The survey also showed that the level of corrupt practices in 
dealing with the customs service was high. 27.4% of business enterprises always 
gave bribes when dealing with the customs service, while a total of 61.3% indicated 
that they always/mostly/frequently have to give bribes, with only 7.2% seldom or 
never having to give bribes to access such services. These analyses suggest that in 
2001 it was almost inconceivable to do business in Nigeria without having to offer 
bribes (the specifics of the perceived extent of corruption within various public 
institutions will be extensively discussed in subsequent sections of the thesis).  
 
Endemic corruption and pervasive rates of crime are often cited by businesses as 
one of the major obstacle to doing business in Nigeria and further studies have been 
done more recently which have tried to explore attitudes towards these issues in 
more detail. For instance, as mentioned earlier in the introductory part of this 
chapter, in 2007, with the support of the European Union and the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, the National Bureau for Statistics (NBS) in partnership 
with Nigeria‟s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) conducted a 
Business Survey on Crime and Corruption with the intention of understanding the 
perceptions and experiences of businesses in relation to the extent of corruption and 
the effectiveness of the Nigerian government‟s anticorruption exercise. The survey 
sample size included over 2,200 businesses across various sectors in Nigeria. The 
major findings of the survey indicated that pervasive crime and corruption continued 
to be major obstacles to doing business in Nigeria. In contrast, other factors such as 
tax regulation and business regulations procedures were considered less of an 
obstacle to doing business in Nigeria (see: Table 5.7). 
 
As shown in the table, 76% of business (executives) that were interviewed identified 
crime as the major obstacle to doing business in Nigeria, while 71% of them 
indicated corruption as a major obstacle to business. Inflation and political instability 
were also rated fairly highly as obstacles (59.9% and 54.1% respectively). This 
suggests that pervasive crime and endemic corruption were still considered to be 
amongst the most problematic factors for doing business in Nigeria by Nigerian 
businesses in 2007.  
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Table 5.7: Perceptions of Corruption as an obstacle to doing business in Nigeria 
 
Source: NBS/EFCC Business Survey Report (2007, 43) 
 
The World Bank study and the later analysis of the views of Nigerian businesses 
conducted by the EFCC are instructive in providing a more detailed understanding of 
how Nigerians in various sectors perceive of corruption in their country. The World 
Bank study was, however, conducted nearly ten years ago and well before the 
emergence of the EFCC and the improvements in the external perception of 
corruption picked up by the annual CPI indexes and the EFCC survey of businesses. 
As a result, it was decided to conduct further primary research into these issues, 
both to provide an up-to-date exploration of some of the issues explored in the World 
Bank governance and corruption diagnostic survey and to introduce a new focus that 
more explicitly examined the extent of corruption within particular institutions and 
introduced a further assessment of the levels of corruption under particular 
governments. The subsequent sections of the chapter will draw heavily on the 
primary research data to explore issues raised by the research questions in more 
detail.    
 
5.3 Nigeria’s Major Development Problems   
 
Figure 5.3 shows the perceptions of those who completed the electronic survey in 
relation to what they viewed as the most serious problem militating against 
sustainable economic development in Nigeria. Respondents were asked to rank from 
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1 (Most Serious) to 7 (Least Serious) several of the major problems that Nigeria 
currently faces. Overall scores based on the rankings of all respondents were then 
calculated for each factor. Thus the lower the overall score calculated for any 
particular „problem,‟ the more seriously the problem was viewed by the respondents, 
while the higher the score the less seriously the problem was judged by the 
respondents. 
 
Figure 5.3: Ranking of the Major Problems Nigeria Faces today as Perceived by Respondents 
 
 
Source: Electronic Survey Conducted for this Research 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.3, the score for corruption from this ranking exercise was 
2.46, meaning that corruption was perceived by respondents as the most serious 
problem Nigeria faces (or at least of those listed in the exercise). Following this were 
poverty and unemployment, whose scores were 3.04 and 3.54 respectively. The 
scores for the other „problems‟ were as follows:  poor infrastructure and public 
services (3.81), poor education (4.14), poor personal security (4.34) and 
ethnic/religious conflict (5.11). The results of this exercise clearly relate to our earlier 
discussions and confirm the trends revealed in other surveys21 undertaken by other 
                                            
21
See the results from the 2001 World Bank survey (table 5.5 and fig. 5.1 in particular), for example in table 5.5, while 
unemployment was considered as the most serious problem militating against economic development, corruption was rated as 
the second most serious problem. Similarly, figure 5.1 revealed that 80.1% of the respondents believed that corruption was a 
very serious problem in Nigeria. In addition, the NBS/EFCC Business Survey (table 5.7) also revealed that, while 76% of 
business executives identified high rates in crime as the most serious obstacle to doing business in Nigeria, 71% of them also 
ranked corruption as the second most serious obstacle. 
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organisations. Whilst the findings from the electronic survey and the previous 
surveys provide useful information about the seriousness with which corruption is 
viewed by Nigerians, at best they merely present a snapshot of views at a particular 
point in time.  I wanted, however, to get respondents to reflect more historically upon 
their views of the relative levels of corruption under different political administrations 
(albeit with the benefit of hindsight). Thus, the section that follows will build upon 
these discussions by analysing the perceived degree of corruption under various 
government regimes in Nigeria based on the primary data conducted for this study22.    
 
 5.4 The Perceived Level of Corruption during Different Government 
Administrations in Nigeria: 1976-2007 
 
Clearly, as illustrated by TI‟s historical data in the preceding section (table 5.3 and 
table 5.4 respectively), the levels of corruption in Nigeria have consistently been 
perceived to be amongst the highest in the world (at least amongst the list of 
countries covered in the surveys), particularly during the military governments 
between 1983 and 2003 and before the EFCC was established under the democratic 
government of Obasanjo. One Director with a Nigerian Non Governmental 
Organization (an ex- Nigerian military officer himself) reflected upon the role of the 
military in fomenting a patrimonial pattern of looting and mismanagement of the 
public treasury in Nigeria under the successive military regimes in the following way.  
 
“As an ex- military official, I know the characteristics of the Nigerian military very well. 
When we captured a territory during the war, like the Biafra case for example, the 
Ibos were slaughtered and their properties were looted by military officials who fought 
in the civil war. In a similar vein, whenever the Nigeria military take over government, 
they use the opportunity to massively loot as much as they can, because they know 
that their incursion in government is a temporary exercise” (research interview with 
One Director with a Nigerian Non Governmental Organization, 14 March 2008). 
 
The above interview extract illustrates some of the reasons why corruption may 
appear to have been endemic during the successive military regimes.23 However, as 
                                            
22
  It is important to acknowledge here however that, the primary research data is not without its own limitations (e.g.  not all 
respondents will easily remember issues that occurred about thirty years ago) 
23
 Apart from the Buhari‟s regime, which was noted for its remarkable War Against corruption and Indiscipline 
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pointed out in the earlier discussion of Nigeria‟s performance in TI‟s CPI rankings, 
Nigeria began to record some progress in reducing corruption perceptions, both in 
terms of scores and ranking, from 2004, coinciding with the establishment of the 
EFCC, under the democratic government of Olusegun Obasanjo. It was these 
periodic improvements in corruption perceptions which elements of the electronic 
survey were designed to explore with respondents in further detail (these were also 
issues which figured prominently in the research interviews). One of the questions in 
the survey asked respondents to reflect on their views over the degree of corruption 
across various government regimes between 1976 and 2007. Evaluating the views 
of individuals for a period that covers several decades can be misleading so the 
results must be interpreted with considerable caution. Nevertheless, the exercise did 
produce some interesting findings. The respondents were asked to rank the last 
seven administrations from 1 (MOST CORRUPT) to 7 (LEAST CORRUPT)   
according to their view of the levels of corruption within each administration. This 
then produced a composite score for each administration, the results of which are 
presented in Figure 5.424. 
 
Figure 5.4: Ranking of the Perceived Degree of Corruption within selected Nigerian governments 
(1976/2007) 
 
 
 
Source: Electronic Survey Conducted for this Research 
 
                                            
24
 The lower the overall score calculated for any particular „administration,‟ the more corrupt the administration was viewed by 
the respondents, thus, the higher the score the less corrupt the administration was judged by the respondents 
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According to the respondents, Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB)‟s dictatorship 
regime (1985 -1993) was the most corrupt government since 1976, followed by the 
Abacha military government, which was ranked as the second most corrupt. 
Interestingly, the recent civilian government of Umaru Musa Yar,Adua, was ranked 
as the third most corrupt government. Despite being a democracy, Yar‟Adua‟s 
administration was perceived to be corrupt for various reasons which range from its 
perceived protection of indicted corrupt political officials and the controversial role of 
his former minister of justice and attorney general (Michael Aondoakaa) to the 
weakening and apparent inefficiencies of the anti-corruption institutions like the 
EFCC under his government (see: Chapter 3, section 3.9). Shagari‟s regime (1979 to 
1983), another civilian government, was perceived as the fourth most corrupt. This 
can be connected to the apparent lack of political will of his administration to control 
the incidence of corruption; which was the chief reason cited by the military when his 
government was overthrown in 1983 (see: chapter 3, section 3.3 where this issue 
was discussed in more details). Following Shagari were the military and civilian 
governments of Olusegun Obasanjo (1967/1969 and 1999/2007 respectively), which 
were ranked as the fifth and sixth most corrupt administrations. However, perhaps 
most interestingly, it was the military government of Buhari and Idiagbon which 
endured from 1983 to 1985 which was identified by respondents as the least corrupt 
Nigerian government over the period. Buhari‟s regime may have been perceived to 
be less corrupt because of his tough stance against corruption as gleaned from 
earlier discussion of Nigeria‟s governance experience explored in chapter 3. 
Interestingly, as pointed out previously, the progress made by Buhari‟s government 
in controlling corruption or at least highlighting its impacts was not captured in the 
historical data used in the initial CPI indexes.  
 
One of the other questions asked in the electronic survey sought to explore the 
respondents‟ attitudes towards the levels of corruption in different parts of the 
country. Respondents were asked to assess the extent of corruption across the 36 
states which constitute Nigeria including the federal capital territory (Abuja), by 
identifying the 5 states which they perceived to have the highest levels of corruption 
and the five they perceived to be least corrupt.  As shown in Figure 5.5, respondents 
ranked Delta, Edo, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Abia as the 5 most corrupt states in Nigeria.  
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Figure 5.5: Nigerian States: Corruption Perception Index 2008 Results 
 
 
 
 
Nigerian map of the 2008 corruption perception index shows “the degree to which corruption is 
perceived to exist across the various states”. Low numbers (yellow) indicate less perception of 
corruption, while higher numbers (brown) indicate higher perception of corruption.  
 
 Source: Electronic Survey conducted for this research 
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Interestingly, these five states are all located in the Niger Delta region (and are 
frequently characterised as oil rich states) and this raises an interesting question 
about the geography of corruption perceptions in Nigeria. Relating this to earlier 
discussion in chapter 3, it should be recalled that some of the governors of these five 
states were investigated and prosecuted for corruption related charges between 
2003 and 2007, while others25 are still on trial for money laundering charges. For 
instance, the former governor of Bayelsa state, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, was 
arrested on money laundering charges in London and was subsequently charged 
with laundering $3.2 million which was found in cash inside his London apartment 
and in seven London bank accounts that were traced to him in 2005. He reportedly 
made his escape from the UK by dressing as a woman (see: Letitia 2009 and Ayittey 
2009: 92). On the other hand, the survey revealed that Cross River, Katsina, Niger, 
Lagos and Jigawa states were perceived as the least corrupt states in Nigeria. 
Although it is not particularly clear why these states were generally perceived as less 
corrupt, but one of the potentially important features about these five states was that, 
their governors26 have generally been perceived as less corrupt. 
 
Apart from the geographical differences underlining the perceived extent of 
corruption across the various states in Nigeria, the survey also focussed on the 
perceived extent of corruption within various public institutions in Nigeria. This will be 
explored in more detail in the section that follows, before moving on to analyse what 
the survey revealed about the perceived degree of corruption in Nigeria‟s electoral 
system.  
  
5.5 The Perceived Degree of Corruption in Nigeria’s Public Sector 
 
In earlier discussion over the nature of corruption in chapter 2, it was stressed that 
corrupt practices are not limited to the public sector, but could also be prevalent 
within and between private business and individuals in society, without public 
                                            
25 Former Delta State Governor, James Ibori, is currently on trial in a UK court over criminal offenses bordering on corruption 
charges. He reportedly diverted over $ 3 billion of Delta state government money during his eight years in office (1999-2007) 
(Ibekwe, 2011).   
 
26
 Donald Duke for example was perceived as one of the outstanding governors between 1999 and 2006 and probably one of 
the least corrupt (see: Martins, 2011).  
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officials‟ involvement and also that the private sector was frequently embroiled in 
instances of corruption within the public sector. However, public sector corruption 
was singled out for analysis in the other surveys discussed in the earlier parts of this 
chapter and the interview research conducted for this study also looked in detail at 
corruption within the public sector.  Accordingly, whilst bearing in mind the fact that it 
must not be treated in isolation from private sector corruption, this section will focus 
on analysing perceptions specifically regarding public sector corruption in Nigeria.   
 
When one asks people to talk about corruption in Nigeria, it is invariably public sector 
corruption that is first mentioned, whether it is in its grand or petty forms. As 
suggested earlier in the thesis, it is common practice for public officials in Nigeria to 
ask for or collect bribes (for the award of government contracts, for the issuance of 
passports and visa to applicants, for granting permits and licenses to multinational 
organisations, for allowing the free passage of goods at the sea or air port to 
businesses, and worse still may enact regulations designed to create artificial 
scarcity for private gain: Emmanuel, 2010). In Nigeria, appointment into public office 
has become increasingly seen as the easiest and the fastest way to accumulate 
wealth. Businesses and individuals with resources to buy over the state have been 
able to influence state policies and actions for their personal interest. For instance, in 
referring back to the World Bank diagnostic survey (table 5.6), 69.4 percent of 
business enterprises that were interviewed indicated that they 
always/mostly/frequently had to give bribes to access government contracts in the 
public sector. It was suggested in discussing the results presented in that table that it 
has become almost inconceivable to do business in Nigeria without having to offer 
bribes.  
 
However, it is insufficient to simply say that all state institutions are corrupt, but 
rather it is important to illustrate that different institutions have different cultures and 
different reputations. The NBS and EFCC Business Survey on Crime and Corruption 
mentioned earlier, attempted to get a sense of the reputations for corrupt practices of 
selected institutions in Nigeria. The responses of those who completed the survey 
revealed considerable differences in reputation across the various institutions 
surveyed (see: figure 5.6 below).  
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Figure 5.6: Opinion of Businesses on the performance and integrity of selected institutions in Nigeria 
 
 
 
Source: NBS/EFCC Business Survey Report (2007: 9) 
 
The survey responses show that political parties, the Nigerian Electric Power 
Authority, the Nigerian Police Force, and Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd were all 
rated very low (both in terms of the degree to which they are perceived as honest 
and in terms of the quality of the services that they deliver). On the other hand, the 
EFCC, the Nigerian Media, NGOs and the Nigerian Courts were rated by businesses 
as very honest and amongst the best performing sectors in Nigeria. The perception 
of the EFCC as the most honest and best performing public institution in this survey, 
appears to support the earlier argument made in chapter 3, which suggested that 
despite the limitations of the EFCC that have been pointed out by its critics, the anti-
corruption activities embarked upon by the former EFCC chief, Nuhu Ribadu 
(2003/2008) did succeed in putting the questions of probity and transparency on the 
political agenda in Nigeria and achieved a real breakthrough in the struggle in 
Nigeria. This was also reflected in our earlier discussions of the TI CPI rankings in 
the preceding section. Shortly after the EFCC was established in 2003, Nigeria‟s 
corruption perception in the CPI improved dramatically between 2005 and 2009 (see: 
section 5.1).  
  
The Nigerian Police Force and the Nigerian Electric Power Authority have 
consistently emerged as amongst the most corrupt public institutions in Nigeria in 
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several other surveys, with the NPF27 ranking constantly as the most corrupt in 
various surveys undertaking by other organisations (see: Amnesty International 2009 
and Independent Advocacy Project, 2007; see also discussions in chapter six). The 
perception of political parties as one of the least effectively performing institutions in 
the country seems to support earlier discussions of Nigeria‟s poor governance 
experience in chapter 3, which demonstrated that there is a general lack of public 
confidence in the transparency and effectiveness of Nigeria‟s political culture or 
indeed in the ability of Nigeria‟s electoral system to organise free and fair elections in 
Nigeria. This is explored in more detail in the next section.  
 
5.6 The Nigerian Electoral System and Political Parties 
 
Chapter 3.3 discussed the pattern of electoral fraud in Nigeria, focussing on the first 
post-independent government, led by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, in 1964 and 
1965, the fraudulent elections of 2007 and the role of government institutions like the 
Independent National Electoral Commission and other vested interest groups (e.g. 
godfathers) in shaping Nigeria‟s democratic space.  
 
Historically, Nigeria‟s turbulent political system has been a major source of political 
instability. During elections there is generally little discussion of political ideology 
pertaining to specific policy issues like the provision of better health care services, 
efficient electricity generation, better educational system, job creation and 
government obligations versus individual rights. Instead, there are furious debates 
over which particular ethnic group is occupying or should be appointed to certain 
government positions perceived to be lucrative. Over time, this practice of deploying 
ethnic sentiments in gaining political power at the centre, cultivated and nurtured a 
culture of impunity and endemic corruption that perverts every strata of Nigerian 
society. As extensively discussed in chapter 3, it is therefore not surprising that the 
successive military regimes have always cited endemic corruption, political instability 
and the fraudulent political system, characterised by massive vote rigging and 
violence, as major justifications for taking over power (Human Rights Watch 2007).  
                                            
27
 The problem of corruption within the Nigeria police force is explored extensively in chapter 7 
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In recent times, particularly since after the 2003 and 2007 elections, the integrity and 
credibility of the electoral system has been seriously undermined by the 
controversies surrounding the conduct of elections in Nigeria, which consequently 
has undermined its legitimacy and a substantial degree of public confidence in the 
electoral system (see: Human Rights Watch 2007, National Democratic Institute, 
April 23 2007, BBC News 2007).  A former senator of the federal republic of Nigeria 
described the degree of partiality and corrupt practices within Nigeria‟s electoral 
system in the following manner.   
 
“I sincerely believe that one of the major obstacles to Nigeria‟s economic 
development is the weak electoral system. From the way the electoral body (INEC) is 
currently constituted, the lack of ideological structure of the over 50 political parties, 
to the ideal of money politics which is nurtured and sustained by an environment that 
has been infested by endemic corruption are the major challenges that need to be 
resolved. To say that the electoral system is infested with corruption will be an 
understatement. In Nigeria, unlike the case in advanced democracies, if one must 
win an election; you must have a lot of money to dole out for bribe. Many people with 
questionable wealth are the ones ruling us today because they have lots of money to 
bribe the INEC officials, security agents, party delegates and every other key 
stakeholders including thugs and gangsters in the election process. But then the 
ruling party has the final say since they control the INEC. Many politicians take bank 
loan to run for election because money is the only language most poor and 
uneducated people at the grass roots understands (Research interview with a former 
Senator - National House of Senate - 14th April 2008). 
 
The extract above illustrates effectively the perceived magnitude of corruption in 
Nigeria‟s electoral system (see also Lewis 2003). Apart from the just concluded April 
2011 general elections which according to most observers marked an improvement 
when compared to previously held elections in Nigeria (see: European Union report 
2011), Nigerian‟s election experience (particularly the 2003 and 2007 elections) has 
been characterised by vote rigging, intimidation and violence and most importantly 
wide spread corruption (see: discussions in chapter 3.4) for further details). 
According to Weingrod (1977), Nigeria‟s political parties are what he describes as 
factional machines for the distribution of patronage. Since Nigeria returned to 
electoral politics in 1999, Nigeria‟s political parties have been seriously criticised by 
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the media, academics, local and international observers and the electorate for the 
enshrined culture of corruption and rent-seeking amongst political party officials.      
 
In the World Bank governance and corruption diagnostic survey already mentioned 
in the previous sections, respondents also ranked political parties as amongst the 
most corrupt institutions in Nigeria. The responses in relation to this issue are shown 
in figure 5.7.  
3.3 Dictatorship and Civilian Government in Nigeria since 1960 
Figure 5. 7: Assessment of the Integrity of Political Parties in Nigeria According to Group Surveyed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nigeria Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Study (World Bank 2001, 21) 
 
The figure reveals that households were more critical about the perceived level of 
dishonesty in the political parties than enterprises and public officials. While 72.6% of 
households believed that political parties are very dishonest/somewhat dishonest, 
only 64.0% of enterprises thought likewise and 58.95 of public officials made a 
similar assessment.  
 
The dominant political parties today in Nigeria are the ruling People Democratic 
Party (PDP), with the Action Congress (AC) and All Nigeria People‟s Party (ANPP) 
representing the only prominent opposition parties. For example, since the return to 
democracy in 1999, the nation‟s number one office (presidency) has always been 
occupied by a member of the PDP and about 27 of the 36 states in Nigeria are 
presently controlled by the party (see: INEC nd). The party is dominated by both 
   Very Dishonest       Dishonest        Neither Honest nor Dishonest      
 
  Honest                      Very Honest       Don‟t Known                             
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serving and formal military officials, who were in government during the military era 
and a number of civilians. According to a director with the National Assembly 
Commission, the only factor connecting the various interest groups in the PDP is 
money.  
 
“The PDP as a party has failed the Nigerian people. Apart from the fact that there is 
no ideological background that is bringing this people together, it is not a secret that 
everyone including members of the opposition, who are all defecting to the PDP in 
their droves, are doing  so because of the culture of impunity and opportunities 
members enjoy in looting of public funds for personal gain. For example, during party 
meetings, when the name of PDP is echoed, people respond by simply saying “share 
the money”, because it is all about sharing the loot” (research interview with a 
Director - National Assembly Commission - 13th April 2008). 
 
The only visible opposition is the AC, which managed to win a couple of states 
(mainly in the South-Western part of Nigeria) in 2007 and again during the recent 
April 2011 general elections, this has included electoral victories through favourable 
judgements by the electoral tribunals following allegations of corruption. However, 
some of these Judgements (with regards to the 2007 general elections) were not 
finally delivered until a couple of years after the 2007 general elections (see: Ojo 
2010). In the case of the Osun State gubernatorial election petition, for example, it 
took over three years and seven months for the AC governorship candidate, Rauf 
Aregbesola, to be declared the legitimate winner of the April 2007 general elections 
(see: Ayanbimpe 2010), a situation that has permitted political officials with 
questionable electoral victories to remain indefinitely in power until the court proves 
otherwise.  A Senior Lecturer with the University of Lagos raised this issue in a 
research interview in the following way:  
 
“The electoral system is very ineffective. Why fraudulent politicians with questionable 
mandate should be allowed to enjoy the benefit of office, when they were not duly 
elected by the people. In the case of Peter Obi vs. Dr Chris Ngige, for example, it 
took about three years before a final decision could be handed down by the Court of 
Appeal. The Edo state governor, Adams Oshiomole vs. Osunbor‟s case took about 
two years before a final judgement could be reached as well. These are some 
obvious limitations of our electoral system, which has created avenues for bribing 
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corrupt tribunal judges, a situation that has led to the technical denial of the rights of 
the people” (Research interview with a Senior Lecturer - University of Lagos 16th 
June 2008).  
 
The extract above is an illustration of some of the problems associated with the late 
determination of electoral petitions at the tribunal. Despite several calls from many 
critics and members of civil society groups for the need to establish the electoral 
offences tribunal to ensure that violence and rigging during elections were addressed 
more decisively, such calls have consistently been rebuffed by the ruling political 
elite, which insist on maintaining the status quo. This negative trend in delays 
associated with the hearing of election petitions, may perhaps result in some 
negative consequences in term of effective governance. However, at the centre of 
the debate surrounding the problems and perceived extent of corruption in Nigeria‟s 
democratic experience is the role of the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) and the role of godfatherism in its political affairs. According to the chief 
editor with a leading Nigerian newspaper, questions surrounding the independence 
and capacity of Nigeria‟s electoral commission (INEC) to conduct a free and fair 
election are a reflection of the systemic nature of corruption in Nigeria. He describes 
the extent of corruption at the electoral body in the following way.   
 
“The INEC is an extension of the PDP. The so called political godfathers like Tony 
Anenih, who we all know as the Mr. fix it, derive their relevance from their ability to 
manipulate these state institutions to rig elections for the ruling party. The INEC, the 
executive and majority of the legislators, worked with other law enforcement 
agencies to rig elections. Government funds are shared amongst returning officers in 
the INEC, police and state security service, to secure their cooperation in rigging 
election results in various constituencies. For example, a day before the last 2007 
election, the sum of N250 million naira ($175, million) was allegedly offered as a 
bribe to members of the INEC by the ruling party, for election rigging. However, it 
turned out that one of the INEC officials, who collected the money that was meant for 
the whole group absconded with the money. What we were told was that, the matter 
is being investigated by the police, but as we talk, nothing has come out from that 
scandal after over one year since the last election was held ”  (Research interview 
with  the  Chief Editor of a leading Nigerian newspaper -  18th June 2008). 
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The substantial number of cases relating to electoral frauds that were received by 
the election tribunals across the country after the 2007 election is a clear illustration, 
that the INEC did a shoddy job. This also justified comments by national and 
international observers over the 2007 elections, which unanimously decried the 
weaknesses in the Nigerian electoral system. Interestingly, as discussed in chapter 
three, the remarkable thing about these reports, is the similarity of conclusions on 
the electoral problems and particularly the difficulties of INEC in terms of lack of 
independence, inadequate funding, ineffective organization and lack of managerial 
capacities.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter began by presenting some media reports and selected high profile court 
cases involving the misappropriation and embezzlement of funds by public officials 
and businesses to get something of a sense of the extent of corruption in Nigeria. 
Due to the notorious difficulties associated with measuring and investigating 
corruption, a mixture of objective indicators and the experience and perceptions of 
those who are most directly confronted with the realities of corruption were employed 
in measuring the perceived extent of corruption in Nigeria as crude legal or financial 
data (relating to the number or magnitude of corruption based on media reports or 
court cases) may only reflect the successes of  an effective judicial system and the 
media in exposing and prosecuting corruption in a country.  
 
In the light of this, the chapter then turned attention towards analysing the perceived 
degree of corruption in Nigeria, using the TI‟s CPI (1980-2009). The TI‟s historical 
data shows that, between 1980 and 1996, Nigeria was perceived as the most corrupt 
country amongst the 52 countries considered in the survey. However, between 2004 
and 2009, Nigeria‟s performance in the TI index improved both in terms of its ranking 
and scores. This supports the conclusions drawn from the review of academic 
literatures in chapter 3 which suggested that Nigeria‟s corruption perception 
improved as a result of the creation and effectiveness of the ant-corruption activities 
of the EFCC, specifically under the supervision of the former Nigeria‟s anti-corruption 
chief Nuhu Ribadu.  
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In order to capture domestic experience and perceptions concerning the extent of 
corruption in Nigeria, the chapter also explored the 2001 World Bank governance 
and corruption diagnostic survey and the 2007 NBS/EFCC Business Survey Report, 
to better understand the perceptions of different groups about the extent and impacts 
of corruption in Nigeria. These insights were then developed and extended through 
further explorations of the perceptions of key stakeholders in Nigeria regarding poor 
governance and corruption through the combined use of primary research interviews 
and an initial electronic survey. One of the questions asked in the survey explored 
what respondents felt was the most serious problem facing Nigeria where corruption 
was singled out as the most important issue. Interestingly, in reflecting upon the 
analyses of the various surveys conducted by other organisations (both external and 
internal perceptions: TI CPI, World Bank Report, EFCC Business Survey Report), 
and the research conducted for this study, there appears to be a common agreement 
that corruption is perceived as a major problem in Nigeria. 
 
Following this, the chapter then turned attention to analysing the perceived level of 
corruption in relation to the different Nigerian administrations over the period from 
1967 to 2007 using the electronic survey. The survey revealed that respondents 
rated Ibrahim Babangida‟s dictatorship regime (1985-1993), as the most corrupt 
government over this period. This supports the argument made in chapter 3.4, where 
it was suggested by Lewis (1992: 3-4) that Babangida‟s administration had 
institutionalised corruption in Nigeria. Abacha‟s military government (1993-98) was 
identified as the second most corrupt regime (reflecting discussions in chapter 3 over 
the extent of corruption under Abacha). The survey results also, however, revealed 
that civilian governments were not always judged as being less corrupt than their 
military counterparts by respondents. As shown in the survey, the civilian 
governments of Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua (2007-08) and Shehu Shagari (1979-83) 
were perceived as the third and fourth most corrupt governments respectively, while 
Buhari‟s military regime (1983-85) was perceived as having been the least corrupt of 
the administration‟s assessed. The fact that Buhari‟s government was perceived as 
the least corrupt in the survey, despite being a military dictatorship regime, 
underscores the significance in terms of public attitudes towards corruption and anti-
corruption exercises of evidence of strong political will (from the highest levels of 
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government) in efforts designed to strengthen transparent and accountable 
government (see: chapter 3.3).  
 
The chapter then moved on to explore which states respondents thought of as the 
top 5 most corrupt and least corrupt (via the electronic survey). Interestingly, five 
(Delta, Edo, Bayelsa, Rivers, and Abia state) out of the nine oil rich states in the 
Niger Delta region were rated as the 5 most corrupt states in Nigeria, while Cross 
River, Katsina, Niger, Lagos and Jigawa states (apart from Cross River state, these 
states are non oil producing states) on the other hand were perceived as the 5 least 
corrupt states in Nigeria. This raises an interesting question about the geography of 
corruption perceptions in Nigeria which it would be interesting to explore in more 
detail in future research. 
 
The chapter concluded by examining Nigerians perceptions of the extent of 
corruption in the public institutions with particular emphases on the Nigerian electoral 
system/political parties. The INEC, which respondents perceived to be highly corrupt, 
was judged by many interviewees to have become a major tool deployed by the 
godfathers in rigging elections. The following chapter builds upon these discussions 
over the variety of views on the extent of corruption in Nigeria to explore the 
perspectives of different stakeholders in Nigeria over the major impacts of corruption 
in Nigeria and the competing explanations over its causation.  
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Chapter 6: Corruption in Nigeria: Perceived Major Impacts and Causes 
 
This chapter moves the debate on from the complexities of the various ways in which 
the extent of corruption has been perceived in Nigeria that were the focus of the 
previous chapter to consider the variety of views held on its socio-economic and 
institutional impacts and causation amongst key stakeholders in Nigeria. The chapter 
draws primarily upon the wide-ranging research interviews that were undertaken for 
this study in 2008, although the themes emerging from those interviews relating to 
major impacts of corruption are contextualized via reference to the World Bank‟s 
diagnostic governance and corruption survey from 2001 (see: section 5.3), as well as 
the preliminary electronic survey carried out for this study and a wide variety of 
academic sources. Throughout the chapter, the themes emerging from the primary 
research interviews are used to reflect in more detail upon the issues raised in 
chapter 2 and chapter 3 regarding the varied discourses that have been developed 
around the causation of poor governance and high levels of corruption in Nigeria and 
how they have been articulated and contested.  
 
The chapter consists of two main parts. The first is devoted to exploring the ways in 
which key Nigerian stakeholders perceive of the impacts of corruption. It begins by 
exploring the views of households, businesses and public officials as expressed 
through their responses to the 2001 World Bank survey, before  then moving on to 
explore key themes relating to the perceived impacts of corruption derived from the 
analysis of the research interviews conducted for this project.  The second part of the 
chapter then moves on to shift focus from the impacts of corruption to exploring 
different interpretations of the major causes of corruption in Nigeria. This part of the 
chapter draws primarily upon interview data. It offers a detailed analysis of the major 
themes on the causation of corruption. Finally, the chapter concludes by exploring 
the implications of the findings of the chapter for understanding how corruption is 
understood and interpreted amongst key stakeholders and the implications of this for 
the design and success of anti-corruption initiatives within Nigeria, which is the focus 
of the next chapter.  
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6.1 Perceived Impacts of Corruption in Nigeria 
 
The scale of the problem posed by the levels of corruption in Nigeria (however 
measured) is clearly significant. As Karbgo, (2006) suggests, the impact of 
corruption cannot be limited to the size of the monetary terms involved, but also 
disproportionately affects other socio-economic, political and institutional aspects. 
Perhaps, as argued by Perry (1997: 22), one of the most important consequences of 
corruption is that its impacts often appear to hit the poorest and most marginalised 
sectors of society the hardest and can cause a reduction in scarce public resources 
that could be channelled into more productive aspects of the economy for the 
common good.  
 
 However, the cloud of ambiguity over the meaning and measurement of corruption 
has also clearly been expressed in discussions over the impacts of corruption. As 
explored in more general terms in chapter 2 for instance, it appears that there is no 
fixed correlation between a particular level of social-economic development and the 
incidence of corruption in a given country. In fact, some scholars have argued further 
that corruption may not necessarily result in underdevelopment or economic under-
performance but, in some cases, can result in enhancing social-economic 
development (see: Kaufmann 1997: 114-131). Clearly, there are difficulties 
associated with determining the specific impacts of corruption in a particular 
geographical setting because there are such a massive variety of socio-economic, 
political, institutional and other variables which may account for the level of socio-
economic development in a country and discussions over the impacts of corruption 
are often extremely complex due to the interplay between direct and indirect 
consequences. Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, insight gleaned from reviews 
of the main strands of academic literature (See: Ayittey 2005, Alatas 1993: 199, 
Perry 1997a: 22, Eigen 1998,  IMF 1995, Isham et al 1995, Rauch 1995, Knack and 
Keefer 1995) discussed in preceding chapters and the primary research that was 
undertaken for this study, does suggest that there are reasonably strong arguments 
that, certainly in the Nigerian case, corruption has had significant impacts upon the 
levels, nature and dynamics of social-economic development. Against this 
background, the section that follows will explore the perceived impacts of corruption 
in Nigeria by briefly highlighting the range of views of households, enterprises and 
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public officials on the impacts of corruption as revealed via their responses to the 
large-scale 2001 World Bank governance and corruption diagnostic survey, before 
moving on to analyse the issues which emerged from that survey and other sources 
within the context of the much broader themes regarding the perceived socio-
economic and developmental impacts of corruption in Nigeria which arose from the 
research interviews conducted for this project.  
 
6.1.1 Corruption in Nigeria: Perceived Socio-Economic and Development 
Impact 
 
As discussed in the preceding section of this chapter, the socio-economic and 
development impacts of corruption are difficult to measure directly. Corruption tends, 
for example, to be more frequent within weak and ineffective institutions, thus 
making it a difficult task to separate out the impacts of corruption from other 
variables because corruption seems to be both a cause and consequence of 
inefficient and unaccountable institutions.  Nevertheless, when considered along with 
other forms of institutional weakness, corruption can clearly have significant impacts 
on socio-economic development (see: A4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, nd)  
Evidence from the 2001 World Bank survey clearly shows that a wide range of 
Nigerians have very strong views about the impacts of corruption in their country. For 
example, we have already seen in Section 5.2 that households and businesses 
identified corruption in the public sector as one of the major problems facing Nigeria 
or, in the case of businesses, their business activities. Table 6.1 presents data from 
the same survey showing how households evaluated the extent to which a variety of 
corrupt practices impacted on their well being. 
 
The table shows that approximately 50 to 60% of the householders surveyed 
believed that each of the various acts of corruption (mainly relating to public sector 
corruption) listed had significant/very significant negative impacts on their socio-
economic wellbeing. 
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Table 6.1: Perception of Effects of various forms of Corruption on Households 
 
1 No impact 2: Minor impact 3: Significant impact 4: Very significant impact 5: don‟t know 6: Not 
applicable (Percentages) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
The Central Bank mishandling of funds 10.7 10.4 20.5 33.6 15.5 5.4 
Bribe for parliamentary votes on legislations 
to suit private interest 
9.0 12.2 24.4 34.4 12.5 5.6 
Bribe for presidential decisions on private 
interest 
9.8 11.2 22.5 35.0 13.1 5.9 
Bribe for decisions of courts in criminal cases 11.2 9.6 23.0 36.5 11.2 6.0 
Bribe to influence court decisions to litigants 12.1 11.4 22.2 32.7 12.2 6.7 
Bribes to public officials to avoid taxes and 
regulations 
9.0 12.8 24.2 36.2 9.6 5.5 
Patronage (public officials hiring their friends 
and relatives into official positions 
7.4 10.9 21.7 43.5 10.1 3.8 
Contributions by private interests to political 
parties and election campaigns 
11.8 12.8 20.7 29.1 11.9 6.9 
 
Source: Nigeria Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Study (World Bank, 2001: 96) 
 
 
More specifically, the table shows that patronage28 was perceived by households as 
the most serious of the types of corruption listed (with 65.2% of respondents 
indicating they thought that it had very significant or significant impacts on their 
socio-economic wellbeing), followed closely by the paying of bribes to public officials 
to avoid taxes and regulations which 60.4% assessed as having very 
significant/significant impacts. The survey also shows that householders felt that 
bribery to influence court decisions in criminal cases was another issue that directly 
affected them (59% rated it as having very significant/significant impacts). On the 
other hand, the contributions made by private interests to political parties and 
election campaigns was considered to be the issue listed which had the least 
significant impact upon respondents (the percentage suggesting that this issue has 
very significant/significant impacts on them, however, was still as high as 49.4%). 
The overall impression from the responses to this question is that in 2001 when the 
survey was conducted the householders surveyed were generally significantly 
concerned about the impacts of the various acts of corruption29 listed on their well 
being. 
 
                                            
28
  Involving the act of hiring friends and relations into official positions by public servants 
29
 The World Bank study explains that „impact‟ as measured here relates to how individuals feel impacted when, for example, 
other people have paid bribes and gained advantage over them. 
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In addition, to have a sense of the impact of corruption on business activity, during 
the same World Bank project, Nigerian enterprises were asked to assess the 
impacts of the same forms of corruption as listed in Table 6.1 on their activities. Their 
responses are detailed in Table 6.2. Interestingly, the results indicate a lower 
percentage with very negative perception of the impacts of corruption when 
compared with the results from the household survey.  
 
Table 6.2: Perception of Effects of various forms of Corruption by Businesses 
 
1 No impact 2: Minor impact 3: Significant impact 4: Very significant impact 5: don‟t know 6: Not 
applicable (Percentages) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
The Central Bank mishandling of funds 22.6 13.9 17.4 17.3 12.6 10.0 
Bribe for parliamentary votes on legislations 
to suit private interest 
19.3 13.5 20.7 14.1 15.0 12.7 
Bribe for presidential decisions on private 
interest 
17.7 14,4 17.8 16.4 16.5 13.0 
Bribe for decisions of courts in criminal cases 18.6 11.8 18.8 18.7 14.3 13.0 
Bribe to influence court decisions to litigants 18.9 12.5 19.8 15.3 13.6 14.0 
Bribes to public officials to avoid taxes and 
regulations 
17.5 12.5 22.0 22.7 10.7 9.5 
Patronage (public officials hiring their friends 
and relatives into official positions 
18.8 12.1 15.9 26.2 10.6 11.1 
Contributions by private interests to political 
parties and election campaigns 
18.1 13.6 16.7 16.9 12.5 15.9 
 
Source: Nigeria Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Study (World Bank, 2001: 98) 
 
 
Whilst the overall responses indicate lower levels of impact than those expressed in 
the household survey, Table 6.2 shows that businesses were still concerned about 
the impact of the bribery of public officials for avoiding taxes and regulations on their 
businesses (42.7% rated this as having very significant/significant impacts on their 
businesses)30 as well as the impacts of patronage (42.1% rated this as very 
significant or significant) and bribery in court decisions on criminal cases (37.5% 
rated this as very significant or significant). As was the case in the household survey, 
the table also shows that bribery in relation to political parties and election 
campaigns was considered as having the least significant impacts on businesses by 
the respondents (33.5% rated this as having very significant or significant impacts). 
 
                                            
30
 This is however different from the NBS/EFCC Business Survey Report discussed in chapter 5 table (5.7), where tax 
regulations were perceived by businesses as the least serious impact of corruption on their activities, although the NBS/EFCC 
Business Survey Report was based on a totally different set of indicators. 
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The World Bank survey also asked public officials to assess the impact of these 
same forms of corruption, to provide an understanding of the extent to which public 
officials perceive that corruption affects Nigeria‟s economic development. The 
findings are presented in Table 6.3.  
 
Table 6.3: Perception of various forms of Corruption by Public Officials 
  
1 No impact 2: Minor impact 3: Significant impact 4: Very significant impact 5: don‟t know 
 6: Not applicable (Percentages) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
The Central Bank mishandling of funds 3.4 5.8 22.0 54.0 10.0 2.2 
Bribe for parliamentary votes on legislations 
to suit private interest 
3.4 15.1 31.7 36.8 9.0 1.4 
Bribe for presidential decisions on private 
interest 
2.3 9.0 28.6 43.8 12.3 1.8 
Bribe for decisions of courts in criminal cases 3.6 11.1 28.2 45.6 8.3 1.5 
Bribe to influence court decisions to litigants 3.7 11.7 31.6 38.1 11.0 1.8 
Bribes to public officials to avoid taxes and 
regulations 
2.3 8.0 27.6 51.4 7.3 1.1 
Patronage (public officials hiring their friends 
and relatives into official positions 
2.5 9.3 31.3 45.2 8.3 1.6 
Contributions by private interests to political 
parties and election campaigns 
3.4 11.9 28.2 38.5 14.0 2.7 
 
Source: Nigeria Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Study (World Bank, 2001: 99) 
 
The table shows that public officials were very critical of the impacts of the various 
acts of corruption on the Nigerian economy. The paying of bribes to public officials to 
avoid taxes and regulations was identified as having the most significant impact 
(78.9% viewed that as having a very significant/significant impact) on Nigeria‟s 
economy, followed by patronage and the Central Bank mishandling of funds (viewed 
as very significant/significant by 76.5% and 76% of respondents respectively). Even 
factors considered as having less impact, however, such as contributions by private 
interests to political parties and election campaigns (66.7%) and bribes in return for 
parliamentary votes (seen as very significant or significant by 66.7% and 67.7% 
respectively) by public officials were clearly viewed extremely seriously by this group 
of respondents. 
 
Reviewing the range of survey responses to these questions, it is clear that bribing 
public officials to avoid taxes and regulations was considered as having the most 
serious impact by businesses and public officials and as the second most serious 
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issue by households, suggesting the importance with which it was viewed across all 
groups of respondents. Similarly, patronage (the hiring of friends and relations into 
official positions by public servant) was perceived as the most serious issue by 
households and as the second most serious by businesses and public officials, 
suggesting that patronage is also generally considered to be a major feature of 
corruption in Nigeria and one that has significant impacts. This supports 
observations in chapter 3, which drew upon Ajetumobi‟s (1991) assertion that the 
role of patronage in the distribution of state offices and sectional politics in general 
remain major development challenges for Nigeria, as fragmented groups struggle 
over control of power and resources at the centre31  (this will be discussed in more 
detail in subsequent sections).  
 
The results from the World Bank survey of the business sector can be related to 
findings from the NBS/EFCC Business Survey (2007) where 71% of businesses 
surveyed identified corruption as a major obstacle to their business activity and the 
electronic survey undertaken for this study where corruption was identified by 
respondents as the most serious problem militating against economic development 
in Nigeria). Although these surveys are useful in providing an overview of the 
perceived impact of corruption in Nigeria (especially with regards to World Bank 
survey which was undertaken ten years ago in 2001), it is insufficient to merely 
highlight these quite limited survey results without exploring various socio-political 
and economic complexities surrounding this issue. Thus, the sections that follow will 
develop this initial snapshot by turning attention to exploring the different 
interpretations of the impacts of corruption held by major stakeholders (as revealed 
in the research interviews conducted for this project) and how they are inter-related. 
 
6.1.2 Reduction In and Misuse of Scarce Public Revenues  
 
As discussed in chapter 2.5, one of the major arguments relating to the detrimental 
impacts of corruption is that it produces waste in public resources which acts to 
further reduce the capacity of government to provide basic services for the common 
good. As far back as 1985, Achebe argued that “knowledgeable 
observers…estimated that as much as 60 percent of the wealth of the nation was 
                                            
31
 A clear demonstration of the impacts of the divide and rule strategies of the colonial period and their legacy. 
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regularly consumed by corruption” (Achebe 1985: 40). Twenty years later (2004), the 
former chairman of the EFCC, Nuhu Ribadu, claimed that over 70 percent of the 
nation‟s income was wasted due to corruption and over 70% of these funds were 
kept outside Nigeria (see: EFCC 2006, Khakee 2008). During a research interview 
for this project conducted in June 2008, a senior lecturer at the University of Abuja, 
described the degree of leakages in Nigeria‟s public revenue and the attendant effect 
of capital flight caused by Nigeria‟s experience of corruption in the following way. 
 
“Corruption has taken over the entire engine of Nigeria‟s government. The extent of 
waste and leakages of public revenue is staggering. For example, one of the former 
state governors whose annual budget stood at over $1 billion dollars reportedly took 
over 75 percent of the money from the state government when he was in office. The 
worst part of it is that these stolen funds often end up in personal bank accounts 
overseas, which further result in the phenomenon of capital flight” (research interview 
with  a senior lecturer at the University of Lagos32– June 9 2008). 
 
Within this context, Nigeria‟s experience of the phenomenon of capital flight resulting 
from corruption appears to further illustrate, at least in the Nigerian context, the 
claims made by the United Nations that capital flight from the African continent in 
1991 alone accounted for over $200 billion (see: Ayittey 2005). Nigeria‟s experience 
has been that corruption has been associated with the failure of Nigeria‟s 
government to provide basic infrastructures and social services. This is certainly a 
widely-held view in Nigeria. For example, one of the Commissioners within the Edo 
state Government expresses his views on this situation in the following way. 
 
“Endemic corruption has crippled the government‟s capacity to provide basic service 
and infrastructure for the common good. Take the case of Edo state for example; 
Luck Igbinedion (former governor of Edo state) reportedly took over 75 percent of the 
public money throughout the eight years that he was in office (1999/2007). While 
most of the stolen funds were invested in establishing personal businesses and 
buying expensive properties in the US, Canada and South Africa, our roads, schools 
and hospitals received little or no attention” (Research interview with one of the 
Commissioners in Edo state Government- 24th March 2008) 
                                            
32
  Senior lecturer- Department of Political Science - University of Abuja, Nigeria. His area of specialisation includes Political 
Economy of Development and Local government Administration. 
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These kinds of views lend weight to the arguments of external commentators such 
as Hillary Clinton, as referred to in chapter 3, which suggested that leadership 
failures due to corruption and mismanagement has seriously undermined the 
capacity of government to provide infrastructures and social services for the common 
good in Nigeria. In some ways, the salience of these issues is perhaps best 
illustrated through specific instances of looting which have been uncovered. The 
case of Abacha is particularly illustrative of the ways in which corruption-facilitated 
capital flight can undermine a government‟s capacity to provide basic services. In 
2002, parts of Abacha‟s looted funds ($600 million) were refunded to the Nigerian 
public treasury from Switzerland. These funds were re-invested in the power sector, 
road construction, health care and basic secondary education, as well as the water 
and sanitation sector. These repatriated funds, which approximately equalled the 
amount that Nigeria‟s government had budgeted for its 2003 MDG (Millennium 
Development Goal) expenditure, assisted in facilitating a huge increase in the 2004 
MDG budget capital expenditure, after it was reinvested into the aforementioned 
sectors above. As a result of the continuing use of the repatriated funds, there was 
also a sustained trend of expansive government budget spending in the five sectors 
mentioned above in its 2005 budget (see: World Bank 2006). Figure 6.1 illustrates 
the difference between the 2003 and 2004 budgets and how the trend was sustained 
in to 2005. The first bar for 2004 represents spending in the five mentioned MDG 
sectors incorporating the Abacha funds whilst the second 2004 bar reflects how the 
expenditure stood without the funds. Similarly, Table 6.4 shows how the fund was 
allocated to the various MDG Sectors.  
 
The Abacha example is a great illustration of how theft of government money and 
the phenomenon of capital flight that results from it can reduce government capacity 
to provide basic services for the common good. Another connected common theme 
which emerged from the research interviews revolved around perceptions of the 
impacts of corruption upon the misallocation of public resources.  
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Figure 6.1: Nigeria: Budget Spending in 5 MDG Sectors, 2003-05 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2006: 5) 
 
 
 
Table (6:4):  The allocation of Abacha‟s Repatrated Funds (in billions of Nigerian Naira) 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2006: 6) 
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An illustrative example from the interviews is provided by another senior lecturer at 
the University of Lagos. He argues that in Nigeria government policies have been 
distorted against people-oriented projects such as the provision of schools, health 
care and other infrastructural projects, while a huge chunk of public revenue is often 
misappropriated in a systematic way to enrich those in charge of government.  
 
“The cost of running our government is excessively outrageous. Apart from the huge 
government, the N1.13 trillion bogus annual salaries of all 17,474 political officers, if 
cut by half would build over 500,000 standard classrooms, employ over 500,000 
teachers for our primary and secondary schools. Instead they will rather spend a 
large chunk of the public budget on white elephant projects and their expensive life 
style, leaving the majority of the people marred in extreme poverty” (Interview with a 
Senior Lecturer University of Lagos 16th June 2008)33 
 
Nigerian political officials are arguably amongst the highest paid in the world despite 
the nation‟s poor ranking in UNDP‟s human development index as we have gleaned 
from earlier discussions in chapter 3.2.2. Due to the difficulties in accessing 
government information in Nigeria, the actual remuneration of government officials is 
still shrouded in secrecy. Although according to former Nigerian president, Olusegun 
Obansanjo, in 2007 when he was still in office as the president of Nigeria, over 250 
million naira (about $160,875.17) was spent on the salaries and allowances of each 
member of the legislature per year.34  
 
“We should look closely at the legislatures so that they can be more open and 
transparent in the way they do their work. Nobody knows in detail how much it costs 
to maintain a senator. I believe it is more than 250 million naira per year” (Akogun 
and Nzeshi 2010).  
 
Accordingly, it can be argued that Nigerian legislators earn comparatively several 
times more than an American senator ($174,000 per annum) or UK members of 
Parliament (£65,738), for example, both of which are amongst the 10 largest 
economies in the world (see: United States Senate 2011, House of Commons 2009,  
and Economy Watch 2010). 
                                            
33
  Senior Lecturer at the department of Geography - University of Lagos. His area of specialization is in Political and Economic 
Geography. 
34
 Obasanjo made this disclosure at the Niger state government organised civil servant retreat in 2010. 
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The looting and diversion of public funds into personal foreign bank accounts and the 
allocation of a huge chunk of national budget for officials‟ salaries and allowances 
are only part of the story, as that which remains gets diverted corruptly into non-
productive and spurious activities.  A prominent lawyer and human rights activist in 
Lagos narrates how public officials corruptly misdirect public funds into non 
productive and capital intensive projects that hardly benefit people in the following 
interview extract.     
 
 “The higher part of our budget is often directed towards recurrent expenditure and 
capital intensive projects that have little or no relevance to people‟s wellbeing, but 
they provide unlimited opportunities for public officials to corruptly enrich themselves 
through kick-backs paid by contractors. On the contrary, social services such as 
education, health, water and other pro-poor oriented projects offering limited avenues 
for criminal enrichment often get less attention “(Interview with one prominent lawyer 
and human rights activist in Lagos - 31th July 2008). 
 
His views relate to Eigen‟s (1996) argument, discussed in chapter 2, which linked 
corruption to waste in public resources through the misallocation of public revenues 
to the detriment of people-oriented projects. A more specific example of the ways in 
which public funds can be corruptly diverted into un-productive and spurious 
activities is provided by one senior lecturer at the University of Lagos, in the following 
extract. 
 
“Over 25 percent of the entire national budget is allocated to the National Assembly 
alone and the better part of the money is often consumed by corruption. For 
example, Patricia Etheh, the former speaker of Nigerian‟s national assembly was 
impeached from office in 2007 for corruptly cheating her way to 628 million naira 
(US$5 million) on renovations of two official‟s residences and the purchase of 12 new 
official cars. Without compliance with due process, she also singlehandedly approved 
over 91 million naira (about $500,000) for massage equipment to her office” 
(Research Interview with one senior lecturer - University of Lagos - 16th June 200835). 
 
                                            
35
  Senior lecturer at the Law Faculty of the University of Lagos. His areas of specialisations are constitutional law and human 
rights. 
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Clearly, these incidents reflect how money belonging to the public is often corruptly 
mis-directed toward unproductive projects (see: Chapter 3.1 and World Bank 2006). 
Similarly, the budgetary decisions taken by River State (the state is one of the Niger 
Delta states which receive an extra 13 per cent allocation from the federal 
government account, thus making it one of the richest states in Nigeria) were the 
subject of an exposé by Human Rights Watch in 2006. Due to difficulties associated 
with obtaining government information in Nigeria, detailed information about state 
level spending is hard to come by but in 2006 part of the budget for River State was 
obtained by Human Rights Watch who published the information that they received 
(see Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5: River State Budget – 2006 
No Allocation Amount ($) 
1 Unspecified Grants and Donations $33.2 Million 
2 Security Vote (allocation for Miscellaneous 
expenses)   
$38.5 Million 
3 Unspecified Special Projects $77 Million 
4 Transport and Travels $23.7 Million 
5 Entertainment, Hospitality and Gifts $10 Million 
6 Purchase of Two Helicopters $38.4 Million 
7 Purchase of New Vehicles $11.5 Million 
Total  $232.3 
 Core Project  
8 Health Sector $20.5 Million 
9 River State Development Programme $20 Million 
Total  $40.5 
 
Source: Human Rights Watch (2007, np) 
 
The table shows that a total of $232.3 million was spent on frivolities (such as 
entertainment - $10 million and the purchase of helicopters - $38.4 Million etc) while 
only $40.5 was budgeted for core projects such as health or the provision of 
infrastructures. This represents one of the few cases where there is detailed 
documentary evidence of how public officials in Nigeria frequently miss-allocate and 
squander major chunks of public budgets on frivolities and personal expenses, while 
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basic infrastructural projects (like roads, electricity, health care and the education 
sector) continue to struggle to access sufficient funding. 
 
Whilst some interviewees focused upon the impacts of corruption on the levels and 
direction of public spending, others (particularly understandably those interviewees 
from the private sector) bemoaned the state of the country‟s basic infrastructure and 
connected this to the influence of corruption on the availability of resources for 
infrastructural projects and other basic services. Nigeria‟s productive capacity has 
been seriously undermined by the poor state of public infrastructures and the 
greatest impediment to economic activities in Nigeria is the feeble and erratic power 
supply. According to Robert Guest (2004: 253), the bad state of Nigerian roads, 
frequently manned by bribe-hungry policemen at road blocks and check points, 
make the movement of goods and the provision of services very slow and costly 
even at short distances, a situation that has led to what local businessmen now call 
BYOI “Bring Your Own Infrastructure”. Foreign businesses are now told to bring their 
own infrastructures, before considering doing business in Nigeria, as it has become 
practically impossible to rely on public infrastructures.  The CEO of an investment 
company described the dilapidated state of infrastructure and its adverse effects on 
businesses in the following way. 
 
“The failures of successive governments to provide basic infrastructures such as 
electricity and good roads due to corruption have crippled the capacity of industries 
to promote growth and employment. Particularly, small and medium scale 
enterprises, which also serve as engines for economic growth, are fast giving way. 
For example, many industrialists have now relocated from Nigeria to neighbouring 
countries in the West Coast. They are migrating in droves to set up companies in 
neighbouring countries like Ghana, Togo and other relatively smaller countries. This 
mass movement of industries has largely contributed to the high unemployment rates 
and social tension racking the country” (Research interview with the CEO of an 
investment company, 25th June 2008). 
 
The connection that the CEO makes between corruption, poor infrastructure, the 
haemorrhaging of entrepreneurs and levels of unemployment is interesting and 
reflects connections made by others in the business sector and elsewhere in the 
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interviews. The Executive Director of another investment company also expresses 
similar views in the following extract. 
 
“The good thing about job creation is that it helps to solve many other problems. The 
best way to create jobs and empower our youths quickly is by developing our 
infrastructure. But what we see instead is that our infrastructure continues to decay in 
an extraordinary way. Millions of naira is budgeted for the provision of infrastructures 
on yearly bases but we do not see what they are doing with the money. The 
contracting system is fundamentally corrupt and there is no proper transparency in 
the process” (Research interview with the Executive Director of an investment 
company - 07th April 2008). 
 
The unemployment rate in the country is simply staggering. According to Ribadu 
(2011), many Nigerian youths (those 30 years and below make up 70% of the 
Nigerian population) are unemployed and between 50 to 60 per cent of university 
graduates are not in jobs. In fact, according to a recent World Bank report, over 40 
million (28.57%) people are estimated to be unemployed in Nigeria (Daily Trust 
2009). Hundreds of Nigerian factories and industries, which used to provide 
employment to multitudes of graduates and artisans, have collapsed over the years, 
due to high operational costs. A car dealer and auto mobile engineer in Lagos 
suggests that what most Nigerians require is just basic infrastructures to do 
business. 
 
“We are not asking for the impossible. What we simply need is electricity and good 
roads. Nigerians are hard working people, they need these infrastructures in place to 
do business. Instead of providing conducive environment for businesses to flourish, 
those in position of authority would rather enrich themselves with public money 
meant for the provision of public infrastructures” (Research interview with a car 
dealer and auto mobile engineer in Lagos -13 July 2008). 
 
Many Nigerian businesses are forced to depend on electricity generating sets36 in 
order to survive and those who manage to afford one see their profit seriously 
drained by the high cost of maintaining power plants. A manager at the Oceanic 
                                            
36
 Electricity generating sets are devices that convert mechanical energy to electrical energy. 
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Bank plc also described the connection between corruption and lack of electricity 
and impacts on business in the following way.  
 
“There are many factors that could be responsible for economic hardships such as 
rapid population growth for instance, but the endemic nature of corruption in the 
system is a major factor. The prospect of national wealth creation through small and 
medium scale enterprises has been seriously hampered because of the high cost of 
doing business. Ironically former president Obasanjo spent over 2, 5 trillion naira 
(about $13.30 billion) on electricity without any meaningful result. The money 
reportedly disappeared through corruption” (Research interview with General 
Manager - Oceanic Bank Plc - 25th June 2008). 
 
Clearly, the lack of infrastructural development (such as electricity generation) and 
its attendant effects on economic opportunities (such as business start-ups and job 
creation) are generally perceived by respondents (mainly but not only from the 
business sector) as serious problems caused by corruption in Nigeria and this 
appears to support the arguments of the UNDP (nd) and others discussed in chapter 
2, which suggested, that amongst other things, corruption can frustrate efforts to 
alleviate poverty through wealth creation.  
 
There are yet other groups of interviewees (particularly those from a civil society 
background) who express particular concern about the high rates of crime and 
general insecurity in Nigeria, and have connected these to greed and endemic 
corruption in the Nigerian government. For instance, a Director in one of the leading 
Nigerian Non Governmental Organization provides an interesting view about the 
relationship between corruption, lack of economic opportunities and the general state 
of insecurity in Nigeria in the following way. 
  
Corruption, through bad leadership has almost reduced Nigeria to the status of a 
failed state. About a couple of years ago, people could go about doing their normal 
businesses without any fear. But today the rich cannot sleep because those who are 
hungry are crying. There is kidnapping and other forms of criminalities everywhere, 
because the teaming population of our youths do not have economic opportunities” 
(Research interview with a Director in one of the leading Nigerian Non Governmental 
Organization - 5th June 2008). 
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This sentiment was also reflected in an interview with another Director of a leading 
Nigerian Non Governmental Organization, as expressed in the following lengthy 
interview extract.  
 
“The high rate of crime in our country today is a major issue that requires serious 
attention from the government. Apart from armed robbery and other petty crime 
which has always been there anyway, this recent issue of kidnapping has become a 
very serious problem. Kidnapping started in the Niger Delta, when the aggrieved 
militants take oil workers, who are mainly foreigners, to hostage in return for ransom, 
but today it is widely spread across the entire country and appears to be a war 
between the rich and the poor in our society. A very close friend who is a prominent 
figure in the entertainment industry has been a victim. He was abducted at a public 
function where he was dancing. Instead of demanding ransom they offered him some 
money for passing their message across to those in authority. In fact they put a 
camera before him and he was asked to condemn the greed, the unnecessary 
display of wealth, affluence and corrupt behaviours of those in government. The 
youths are not happy with the government, they believe that the common wealth that 
should have been spent on job creation is being squandered corruptly by a few in 
government” (Research interview with a Director of one of the leading Nigerian Non 
Governmental Organization - 21th March 2008). 
 
Consequently it appears from the available information that, when legitimate 
opportunities to achieve economic success are unavailable, people tend to resort to 
criminalities for survival, thus exacerbating the general levels of insecurity and crime 
rates. This sentiment is also reflected in the findings from the 2001 World Bank 
survey, discussed earlier in chapter 5, where corruption and unemployment were 
indicated by respondents as the most serious obstacle militating against economic 
development in Nigeria and high rates of crime as the most serious obstacle to doing 
business in the NBS/EFCC Business Survey Report. This suggests that there 
appears to be, at least in the view of many Nigerians, a positive correlation between 
corruption, high rates in unemployment and the incidence of crime in Nigeria (see: 
section 5.3 (table 5.5, 5.7 respectively). The high rates in criminal activities (for 
example the incidence of advance fee fraud) when added to the broader context of 
endemic corruption also appears to have played a major role in diminishing Nigeria‟s 
prestige and respect amongst the international community.   
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6.1.3 Perceived Impacts of Corruption in Nigeria: Negative National Image 
 
Another issue which was frequently alluded to in the research interviews was the 
ways in which the levels of corruption in Nigeria have impacted upon the external 
image of Nigeria and Nigerians (illustrated, for example, by Nigeria‟s poor 
performances in the TI‟s corruption perception index as discussed in chapters 3 and 
5). This situation is perceived, for example, to have been a major factor in cases of 
embarrassing and shabby treatment which have been meted out to Nigerians in 
different parts of the world in a dehumanising manner. Dr. Shamsideen Usman, for 
example, the former deputy governor of the Nigeria Central Bank, narrated his 
experience about how he was embarrassed in America, during an international 
forum, when he was asked if he was the original Bank Governor. 
 
“In April 2003, during a trip to the United States, Dr Usman was embarrassed when 
participants at an international forum asked him if he was the real Central Bank 
Governor or the fake one. Another former Central Bank Governor, Dr Joseph Sanusi, 
has been reported to have also experienced similar treatment. This negative image is 
a result of several factors, ranging from the endemic corruption in the system to the 
activities of a number of unscrupulous Nigerians who impersonate top government 
officials to carry out advance fee fraud” (The Anti-Corruption Crusader, Vol. 1, August 
2003).  
 
Many of the interviewees suggested that the negative image that Nigeria suffers from 
could partly be attributed to the unscrupulous activities of Nigeria‟s internet 
fraudsters. According to the 2007 Internet Crime Report37, Nigeria was rated as the 
third highest perpetrator of cybercrime in the world (see: Internet Crime Report, 
2007:9). Some interviewees suggested that this situation has had a significant 
impact on the levels of direct foreign investment in Nigeria. A Director with a Nigerian 
Non Governmental Organisation expresses this view in the following way.  
 
 “Our battered international image was particularly tarnished by Abacha‟s 
monumental looting scandal, following the institutionalization of corruption in the IBB 
era that helped fuel the notoriously dubious activities of the internet fraudsters. Apart 
                                            
37
 Internet Crime Report is produced by National White Collar Crime Centre and FBI 
189 
 
from being a national embarrassment, this image problem has actually cost us a lot 
in terms of foreign direct investment, as most international businesses are reluctant 
to invest in Nigeria as a result of the high risk associated with doing business in 
Nigeria” (Interview with a Director - Nigerian Non Governmental Organisation, 4th 
June 2008). 
 
This negative image problem is then perceived to cost Nigeria significantly in terms 
of the needed foreign investment for economic growth. For instance, in 2004, at a 
public forum in Nigeria, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) reported that Nigeria's negative external image was affecting the inflow of 
foreign investment for economic development. Specifically, according to UNCTAD‟s 
report, Nigeria‟s image problem lay behind a drop in the FDI flow to Nigeria from 
US$1.3 billion to US$1.2 billion from 2002 to 2003 (Nwora 2006). 
 
In summarizing from the discussion so far there appears to be a reasonable 
consensus amongst the various stakeholders consulted within this study that 
corruption has impacted Nigeria and Nigerians seriously in a number of ways as 
detailed in the preceding pages. The issues which have been raised here are only 
those that appeared most frequently within the interview data, observations 
regarding the seriousness with which Nigerian businesses, public officials and 
ordinary householders view public sector corruption such as paying bribes to access 
public services and the role of patronage in the distribution of government posts 
made in previous studies have been reinforced through the prevalence of such 
themes amongst the interviews conducted for this study. Other important themes 
included the impacts of capital flight on the resources available for infrastructural and 
social projects, Nigeria‟s poor international image and its effects on inward 
investment, job creation and the difficult climate for business caused by crime, 
bribery and violence. Clearly, the over-whelming view throughout the different 
positions articulated on the impacts of corruption on Nigeria is that corruption is 
significantly damaging Nigeria‟s prospects for development and needs to be 
addressed urgently. Perhaps the most interesting debates within this context, 
however, concern how the interviewees conceptualised the causation of corruption 
and hence the ways in which it might best be combated. Therefore, the section that 
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follows will now turn attention on exploring stakeholders‟ perceptions of the 
causation of corruption in Nigeria.      
 
6.2 Corruption in Nigeria: Perceived Major Causes of Corruption 
 
This section explores the perceived major causes of corruption in Nigeria.  The 
intention is to explore the perceptions of key stakeholders from a wide range of 
sectors across Nigeria of the major causes of corruption in Nigeria, how these 
causes are interrelated and to assess the degree to which issues raised in the 
academic literatures relate to the range of perceptions on corruption revealed 
through the interviews.  
 
6.2.1 Perceived Causes of Corruption in Nigeria: The Influence of Prolonged 
Military Rule  
 
As we have already gleaned from discussions presented in chapter 3 (section 3.3) 
and chapter 5, the incidence of corruption in Nigeria has not been limited to the 
periods of military government. There is, however, a suggestion, frequently alluded 
to in the research interviews, that the pro-longed military rule (particularly under 
Babangida and Abacha‟s governments and largely excepting Buhari‟s regime), which 
encompassed much (29 years) of Nigeria‟s history since independence in 1960, 
served to institutionalise a culture of impunity and endemic corruption in Nigeria 
through the use of state powers and resources as a tool for acquiring legitimacy and 
political support (see: Joseph 1987: 71-72 and Agedah 1993: 13-15). A senior editor 
with a leading Nigerian newspaper describes some of the ways Babangida‟s regime 
helped to institutionalise corruption in Nigeria in the following extract from a research 
interview. 
 
“General Babangida actually helped to institutionalise corruption in Nigerian society. 
In particular, he was personally involved in the menace of corruption. He encouraged 
it by generously doling out cash gifts to fellow military officers, his cabinet ministers, 
top civil servants, prominent traditional and religious leaders as well as certain 
individuals that where opposed to his government. For instance, in 1992, brand new 
Mercedes Benz popularly known then as “Regular” were given as gifts to religious 
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and traditional rulers and several other elites across the country, in return for political 
support. Similarly, during his regime, internet fraudsters like Fred Adijuwa, openly 
paraded themselves with their ill gotten wealth, without any form of restraint by the 
law enforcement agencies. During this period the dream of every Nigerian youth, 
particularly, young university graduates was to become a fraud star (popularly known 
as 419) after graduation, as hard work and integrity succumbed to easy and 
fraudulent means to affluence and wealth” (Research interviews with –  a senior 
editor with a leading Nigerian newspaper -  6th June, 2008) 
 
This sentiment was also reflected in an interview with a retired civil servant based in 
Benin City Edo State. 
 
“The wide spread and endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria today is rooted in the 
prolonged military rule. However, this does not mean that our experience of civilian 
governments have not been equally very corrupt, but the military distorted our 
constitution and replaced them with decrees, they abolished democratic oversight 
and replaced it with military councils, and they were also repressive to members of 
the civil society and the press and people like Gani Fawemi and Femi Falana that 
were courageous enough to challenge their excesses we incarcerated. They 
personalised state institutions and did direct looting of public funds. For instance, 
Babangida took $12.4 billion of oil windfall and Abacha was rated amongst the ten 
top most corrupt presidents in the world for looting over $5 billion. During the military 
there was a general abuse of the law and due process in government. It was all 
about how connected and how much money you can afford to corruptly bribe your 
way through the system” (Research Interview with a Retired Civil Servant, Benin City 
Edo State - 12th July 2008). 
 
The senior editor and the retired civil servant views are illustrative of how various 
Nigerian commentators have seen Nigeria‟s military regimes, particularly 
Babangida‟s administration, as having helped to deepen corruption in Nigeria. As 
exemplified by Babangida‟s experience, the use of state powers and resources 
perhaps serve as instruments for acquiring legitimacy and political support. This 
phenomenon has been linked to various socio-cultural and political complexities of 
the Nigerian state and, as discussed in chapter three, the aftermath effects of the 
creation of troublesome artificial boundaries that, as suggested by Ajetumobi (1991), 
created conflicts of interest amongst various ethnic groups and communities often 
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result in disagreements over public office appointments and resource allocation (see: 
Mbeki 2005: 3 and Sandbrook 1985: 42). 
 
6.2.2 Corruption in Nigeria: The Role of Ethnic and Religious Sentiments 
 
Several interviewees touched on the role of religious and ethnic identities in their 
interpretations of the factors that had conspired to produce the high levels of 
corruption in Nigeria. Many Nigerians still accord more loyalty to the region that they 
come from than to the nation state of which they are citizens (Guest 2004: 120). As 
discussed in chapter one, religion and inter-ethnic loyalties are frequently stronger 
than loyalty to the state in developing countries and this appears to have been 
particularly evident in Nigeria. Similarly, it was argued in chapter 3, that one of the 
major factors underlining Nigeria‟s experience of poor governance and weak 
economic development has been the heterogeneous and fragmented nature of 
Nigeria‟s society as various fragmented groups have competed for power and control 
over resources at the centre. In that chapter, it was argued that once in positions of 
power, Nigerian public officials have tended to favour as many people as possible 
from their own ethnic backgrounds, either by awarding lucrative contracts or offering 
them government appointments in choice positions, without compliance with the 
legal procedures. Similarly, it was also argued that this ethnic sentiment has also 
frequently been deployed to justify corruption when it is perpetuated by members of 
one‟s own tribe. It seems that Nigerians frequently complain about corruption as a 
vice holding back economic progress, they easily forget or forgive or perhaps even 
celebrate and defend the perpetrators, if they come from their own ethnic 
background.  
 
This was an issue which also featured strongly within the research interviews. For 
example, a Senior Lecturer in the political science department at the University of 
Abuja connected this issue to the dynamics of corruption within state government. 
He describes some of the ways in which ethnic solidarity has been used to justify 
corruption via illustrations of the experience of some state governors and how cases 
of corruption against them where frustrated as a result of tribal sentiments.  
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“when some state governors were charged to court a couple of months ago by the 
EFCC, some of them hired members of their communities, to stage a public protest in 
the court premises, where these cases were been heard. I can recall that when 
James Ibori was being arranged for corruption charges in Kaduna a couple of weeks 
ago, he hired women and youths from his Ogara community to go nude in the public, 
protesting that those corruption charges were politically motivated and as such they 
called for his released. How can you say someone who has stolen more than N100 
billion naira is been prosecuted by Obasanjo, simply because he is from the North or 
Niger Delta. The curious thing is that when the politicians introduces tribal or ethnic 
sentiments to the corrupt allegations against them, nothing has always come out of 
such cases; perhaps because we do not want to go into another civil war (Research 
interview with  a Senior Lecturer at the University of Abuja - 20th June, 200838).      
 
The above extract is only one example of how numerous cases of corruption 
involving key public officials have been politicised by the use of tribal and ethnic 
sentiments (the impact of this on the effectiveness of anti-corruption campaign 
exercises in Nigeria is explored in the next chapter). The James Ibori experience 
clearly relates to earlier discussions in chapter three of the idea of “two publics”, 
which suggested that Nigerians tolerate corruption at the national level when it 
involves members of their community especially if such looted funds are channelled 
into community development projects. However, there is yet another school of 
thought which sees this concept of “two publics” from another perspective. The 
Chairman of an investment company, for example, suggests that Nigeria‟s recent 
democratic experience shows that this notion of “two publics” (Nigerians‟ tolerance 
for corruption at the national level when it involves members of their community) is 
only part of the story, as corruption tends to be pervasive and generally tolerated at 
the regional, state and the local government levels as well.  
 
“All the governors represent their various states of origins; the legislatures represent 
their various constituencies, the local government chairmen represent their various 
local government, the counsellors represent their various wards. Yet there appears to 
be more corruption and general tolerance for it at these levels. Some of them 
reportedly took over 80% of their state and local government money, while their 
people continue to suffer from economic hardships. Legislatures also get over 40 
                                            
38
 Senior Lecturer in political science department at the University of Abuja. He specialises in Citizenship and Nationalism 
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million naira ($265,000) quarterly as a constituency allowance to execute projects in 
their various communities, but the people they claim to represent do not often see 
what they do with the money. I think the issue is that corruption is endemic in the 
system, and people generally tolerate it, whether at the national, state or local level.  
The issue of ethnic division is merely exploited by the political elites to access power 
at the centre” (Research interview with the chairman of an investment company, 
Lagos - 28 June 2008).     
 
His views suggest another perspective to the debates over the relationship between 
ethnic/religious identity and tolerance for corruption. As suggested in the extract 
above, the phenomenon of corruption cuts across every facet of Nigerian society and 
it is generally tolerated across all scales of Nigerian society (national, state and local 
government levels). Examples discussed throughout the thesis illustrate the 
pervasiveness of corruption in government across each of these scales: the most 
well known are those involving presidents, ministers and state governors but there 
are also significant examples at both the local and the ward levels. Therefore it is 
reasonable to suggest that Nigerians tolerate corruption, not only as a result of 
ethnic sentiments, but also because of the inherent character of the Nigerian state, 
which relates to a general belief, as suggested by Osaghae (1998), that government 
business, whether at the national, state or local government levels, does not belong 
to any one (see: Chapter 3.7). This historical belief, which took root during the 
colonial era, has remained largely the same over the years since independence in 
1960. According to some African scholars, the imposition of political authority by the 
colonial administrators and the ways in which power was bequeathed, alienated the 
people from control over their affairs, which subsequently generated protest against 
a “rogue” state (see: Ake 1993, Diamond 1991, Ekeh 1975, Mamdani 2002). 
Therefore, in order to frustrate colonial administration at that time and to also gain 
relevance in the system, people adopted a number of measures to either punish the 
state (by looting state resources) or earning a living from it. This is also an issue that 
arose in an interview conducted for this study with the Coordinator of a leading 
Nigerian Non Government Organization, who described this lack of patriotic sense 
and exploitative tendencies of many Nigerians as having taken root during the 
colonial era in the following way. 
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“In Nigeria, people generally see government office as opportunity for personal 
wealth accumulation and to advance the interest of vested groups. Once people are 
elected or appointed to government office, they are courted by different interest 
groups, particularly members of their own communities, who generally see such a 
call to service as their own turns to use state powers and resources for their selfish 
interest. It is so sad that people cannot differentiate between the colonial days when 
this kind of corrupt and selfish attitudes were general encouraged in our society 
because we wanted the colonial authorities to go and the current Nigeria that we are 
trying to build” (Research Interview with the Coordinator of a leading Nigerian Non 
Governmental Organization- 9th June 2008) 
 
This sentiment was also reflected in an interview held in Benin City with a retired civil 
servant.  This interviewee was even more critical in his evaluation of the role of the 
colonial legacy as a major influence of corruption in Nigeria.     
 
“The colonial administration actually established most of the problems that we face 
today. They made Nigeria to be one nation regardless of our cultural, ethnic and 
religious differences. They governed us through a divide and rule system which I 
think is responsible for most of the ethnic clashes that we are having today across 
various parts the country and the fighting over power and state resources. They 
established the precedence for corruption which is emulated by our leaders. The 
same way Nigeria was exploited by the colonialist through colonial administration; 
many Nigerian leaders see government as an exploitative tool for promoting their 
personal interest” (Research interview with a Retired Civil Servant - Benin City Edo 
State - 12th July 2008). 
 
The retired civil servant and the coordinator‟s sentiments are indicative of the degree 
to which the influence of the colonial legacy on the historical patterns of state 
patronage and pillaging of state resources that have occurred since independence 
are still seen as massively influential by many Nigerians. Another salient perspective 
regarding the causation of corruption which emerged from the interviews (particularly 
with civil society groups) is what was referred to as the general elastic tolerance for 
corruption in Nigerian society. 
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6.2.3 Elastic Tolerance for Corruption in Nigerian Society 
 
There appears to be a common sense of agreement amongst interviewees 
(particularly those from civil society backgrounds) that corruption is prevalent in 
Nigeria because the society tolerates it. According to Enweremadu and Okafor, 
(2009), public officials in Nigeria are often urged on by their kinsmen to “make it” 
(this implies the use of state powers and resources for personal and community 
interest as argued above in the preceding section), and officials who fail to use the 
privileges of office to enrich themselves and members of their communities (in 
particular) are regarded as failures or social outcasts. This is reflected, for example, 
in the following statement attributed to a high ranking Nigerian government official.   
 
 "Those who refuse to be corrupted and are poor are called failures... so what use is 
it to be righteous?" (Diamond, 1991, p. 79) 
 
This is also surely related to a number of other factors (already highlighted in the 
preceding sections of the chapter), such as ethnic and religious sentiments and the 
lack of patriotic disposition of many Nigerians toward the state. According to Kogbara 
(2010: 1), too many Nigerians (whether rich or poor and irrespective of their religious 
inclinations) have indifferent attitudes toward corruption in Nigeria. Kogbara further 
suggests that corruption is widespread and the phenomenon is not only tolerated but 
also admired because of the degree of moral decadence in Nigerian society, where 
success is more valued than integrity and high morals. A lengthy interview with the 
Country Director of one of the leading International development organizations in 
Nigeria further shed some light on the ways in which corruption is generally tolerated 
across various sectors of Nigerian society through an illustrative example of the 
experience of one of Nigeria‟s Pentecostal churches.  
 
“The end justifies the means in Nigeria. It does not matter how you become wealthy, 
so long as you spread the wealth around you are celebrated by almost everyone in 
the society even in our churches. The church has a duty to encourage high moral 
values in society by not tolerating corruption; unfortunately this has not been the case 
in many Nigerian churches. For example, a level twelve public servant was reported 
by the EFCC to have purchased an electric power plant for one of the new 
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generation churches where he also serves as a deacon. The senior poster publicly 
referred to him as one of the biggest charities whose generosity should be emulated 
by all for donating over 360 million naira. The officer subsequently implicated the 
church when he was arrested by the EFCC for looting over 10 billion naira from 
public accounts” (Research Interview with a Director of one of the leading 
International Development Organizations in Nigeria - 24th March 2008). 
 
The director‟s views appear to be shared by a Parish Pastor of the Mountain of Fire 
church. The pastor believes that Nigerian society is much more concerned with the 
level of material and financial wealth of individuals than the means by which wealth 
is acquired.      
 
“We tolerate corruption a lot in this country. The successful and the rich are the most 
recognised in our society. The value of the money or the community project that a big 
man can afford to sponsor determines the level of prestige and respect that they 
enjoy from the people. They sit in the front and the best seats in some of our 
churches; they have several awards and traditional chieftaincy titles bestowed upon 
them in returns for their generosity. They are frequently seen as heroes and role 
models by the youths. The big issue is that no one ever bothers to ask questions 
about their sources of wealth” (Research interview with a Parish Pastor - Mountain of 
Fire - 12th April 2008). 
It is a common experience to see public servants (such as judges and low level civil 
servants) living several times above their income. Many of them send their children 
to the most expensive foreign schools, they buy very expensive properties in 
outstanding locations and openly live ostensible wealthy life styles without any one 
asking questions about their questionable sources of wealth, instead they are 
celebrated and worshiped by many (Kogbara 2010). 
 
6.2.4 Corruption in Nigeria: Influence of Godfatherism in Nigerian Politics 
Chapter 3.7 introduced the idea of the role of godfatherism in Nigerian politics. 
Godfatherism is a broad concept, built on the belief that certain individuals have 
considerable powers to unilaterally determine who gets elected or appointed into 
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government office (see: Gambo, 2006: 88). As the following extract illustrates, 
godfathers are seen as exerting substantial influence in Nigeria politics. They 
perpetuate violence, corruption and intimidation with impunity. They sponsor their 
loyalists into public offices, while in return they maintain control over the functioning 
of government and allocation of state resources.    
 
“The godfather is not in the business of philanthropy …The godfather gives support 
to install the godson often times by devious antidemocratic means… They are 
merchants of fear. They dispense violence freely and fully on those who stand in their 
way. In this they play the additional role of Warlord. They establish, train and 
maintain a standing personal “army” which they ostensibly supplement with a 
sprinkling of the official police detachment. In order to effect electoral change, they 
bribe election officials to deliver the winning election figures. They also bribe the 
police and other security agents to look the other way when they traffic in ballot 
boxes and sack opponents strongholds. The godson, having taken office, returns the 
gesture hundredfold to the point that the godfather becomes an “intractable parasite” 
on government. The initial support given by the godfather then becomes an 
investment with a colossal rate of returns because the godfather becomes the „de 
facto‟ governor” (Ayoade, 2006: 83). 
 
This is clearly connected to the Uba (the key political godfather in Anambra state) 
and Ngige (former governor of Anambra state) experience discussed earlier in 
chapter 3 (section 3.7).  A director with the African Independent Television sheds 
some light on the ways in which the phenomenon of godfatherism in Nigeria‟s 
political space has helped in shaping the pattern of endemic corruption across the 
various levels of governance in Nigeria.  
 
 “Obviously, the godfathers represent their individual‟s interest, rather than the zones 
they claim to be representing. They use ethnicity and religion to access opportunities 
at the national, state, and local levels to corruptly enrich themselves. They consist of 
social network of powerful political elites and their loyalist which is widely spread 
across various levels of Nigerian society. In order to have influence and control over 
state resources and the allocation of opportunities such as appointments into various 
government offices and award of lucrative contracts, they sponsor their loyalist into 
positions in government, particularly during elections and the implementation of 
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Nigeria‟s federal character principle” (Research interview with, a director at the  
African Independent Television, July 29 2008). 
 
Perhaps, it is the entrenched nature of these networks, embellished and facilitated 
by endemic corruption, that may help to explain why the majority of elections in 
Nigeria, ever since the first post-independence general and regional elections in 
1964 and 1965 respectively have (as we saw in chapter 3.3) been characterised by 
widespread electoral irregularities, intimidation and corruption (see: Eboh 2007, 
Joseph, 1987:151-185 and Soyinka 2006). However, the interviews also revealed 
the existence of somewhat different interpretations amongst other interviewees 
(politicians in particular) about the role of godfathers in Nigeria politics. Quite a few 
like a former Local Government Chairman, believes that godfathers have a unique 
role in the maintenance and sustenance of political stability in Nigeria.  
 
“Just like corruption which exists everywhere in the world, Godfatherism is in every 
society. Even in advanced democracies you still have a situation whereby unelected 
key individuals determine how policies are shaped and who gets what in government. 
In the Nigeria case however, godfathers plays a very critical role by helping to keep 
us together as a nation. You know that we are a highly fragmented society and that is 
where the usefulness of godfathers comes in. They help to stabilise our political 
space and also ensure that various fragmented groups are proportionately 
represented at the centre, particularly over the allocation of resources” (Research 
interview with a former Chairman of one of the Local Government Councils in Nigeria 
– Lagos State - 7th August 2008). 
 
In this view, then, the phenomenon of godfatherism is perceived as an important 
element of the complex social cultural and political landscape in Nigerian society. 
Beyond the use of ethnic and religious sentiments to access power and exert control 
over recourses and seize opportunities at the national level, it is suggested that they 
can play an important role in insuring political stability in Nigeria by assuring fairness 
in the allocation of national opportunities across the various zones that they claim to 
represent. In reality, however, it is reasonable to suggest that the pattern of 
allocation of national opportunities merely serve the interests of the various 
godfathers and their political loyalists in the regions that they claim to represent. As 
argued in Chapter 3, their networks are based upon friendships, financial deals and 
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pragmatic alliances, the monopolisation of information and the distribution of 
patronages (Ayoade 2008: 85-95). For example, as argued in chapter 3.5, the 
implementation of the federal character principle policy in Nigeria has been 
characterised by lopsidedness. This policy is meant to promote fairness and equity in 
the allocation of national resources and opportunities base on merit, however, the 
implementation of this policy has become highly political and it appears that 
individual godfathers largely determine who is appointed (or elected and awarded 
lucrative government contracts) to public office. This situation accounts partly for the 
general weakness and the culture of impunity and endemic corruption in the public 
sector in Nigeria. 
 
6.2.5 The Phenomenon of Weak Public Institutions in Nigeria 
 
Discussions in chapter 3 suggested that weak public institutions, characterised by a 
lack of transparency, accountability and effective monitoring control system, 
constitutes one of the major factors responsible for the endemic nature of corruption 
in Nigeria. Clearly, in part this is related to the controversies trailing the 
implementation of Nigeria‟s federal character principle discussed in the previous 
section, where, for example, appointments to public offices and the award of 
government contracts appear to be based on the recommendations of individual 
godfathers. The civil service is widely perceived to be undermined by gross 
inefficiencies and weak mechanisms of checks and balances, and was a frequently 
mentioned issue in the research interviews. In describing the dysfunctional state of 
Nigeria‟s public institutions, for example, a prominent Pastor in one of Nigeria‟s 
leading churches, Living Hope of Glory, related this situation to the lack of political 
will by various governments to sanitise the system. 
 
“Our civil service system is very ineffective. Appointments are based on federal 
character and political interest. There are too many unqualified staff, who do not even 
know their job specifications. All they do is to either gossip from morning till closing 
hours or engage in racketeering and extortion of money from unsuspecting members 
of the public, who patronise government offices for one reason or the other. The lack 
of political will of past and present government regimes to effect attitudinal change in 
the system has further compounded this problem as appointments and allocation of 
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resources are largely based on political and regional interest” (Research interviews 
with  a Senior Pastor of Living Hope of Glory -  4th May, 2008)  
 
Living Hope of Glory church is one of the leading Pentecostal churches in Nigeria. 
The senior pastor currently chairs the church management board (which is 
comprised of over 80 directors including members of Nigeria‟s civil service and a 
number of government ministers). Her extensive knowledge of the Nigeria‟s civil 
service system is informed by her close association with top government 
functionaries which make her views on these issues particularly interesting. 
Corruption in Nigerian public institutions manifests itself in different ways. It includes 
the slow movement of files in offices, while the allocation of contracts and 
appointments rarely passes through a competitive and transparent bidding process 
and public service ethics and laid down procedures are often circumvented. At the 
same time, erring public officials are often hardly sanctioned, even in the face of 
overwhelming evidence that they may have corruptly enriched themselves in office.  
 
Other respondents in considering this issue also raised the importance of factors like 
poverty and poor incentives for public officials as important causes of public sector 
corruption in Nigeria. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the issue of poverty remains 
one of the most complicated factors in the debates about the perceived causes of 
corruption, since it can appear to be both a major cause and consequence of 
corruption. The idea behind this notion is that, when public servants are not 
sufficiently motivated or rewarded (or, perhaps, protected against unforeseen 
circumstances like accident, sudden death, permanent incapacitation due to illness 
or retirement), they are often likely to engage in other means (like corrupt practices 
and misappropriation of public resources) to advance their personal interests. One of 
the interviewees, a former Permanent Secretary with one of the Nigerian Federal 
Ministries sheds some light on the ways in which structural imbalances in wage 
structures and poor conditions of service in the Nigerian civil service have promoted 
corruption in Nigeria. 
 
“The entire system is sick. Civil servants are poorly paid. You can imagine an 
ordinary local government councillor with just a secondary school certificate, without 
working experience, earning far more than a professor. Yet they buy in the same 
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market. Most civil servants below the rank of a director get far less than N50, 
0000.00 per month (£200.00) and by the time they pay their house rent, cost of 
transportation to work, there is virtually nothing left for them and their families. 
Obviously they may want to cut corners even if they do not want to be corrupt. 
Although we still have problem of greed in the system, but the poor condition of 
service has not helped at all. Most of my colleagues, who retired from service less 
than 3 year ago, are faced with serious economic hardship. It is sad that after 
investing 30 to 35 years in the national service, pensioners are not sufficiently 
rewarded” (Research interview with a former Permanent Secretary with one of the 
Nigerian Federal Ministries -  25th March, 2008).     
  
Having served as a civil servant in the Nigerian state for over three decades, 
including serving in the capacity of a permanent secretary (the highest position in the 
Nigerian civil service) before retirement; this interviewee possesses a wealth of 
experience and a depth of perspective on this issue. In their view, many career civil 
servants are „compelled‟ to engage in corrupt practices, due to the trap of economic 
hardship, thus corruption is perceived as an escape route. Transparency 
International has described this as, „petty‟ or „survival‟ corruption, which civil servants 
often engage in because they are grossly underpaid (TI 2007).  
 
However, there are also some different perspectives on this notion of „poor 
conditions of service‟ as a major causation for the general weakness of public 
institutional governance and corruption. Thus, whilst lower ranking civil servants may 
engage in corruption as a result of their poor working conditions and remuneration, 
this does not explain all incidences of civil service corruption. In fact, the poor 
conditions of some in the system may relate directly to the existence of other types 
of corruption amongst the more highly ranked public officials. Thus, numerous top 
ranking public officials like permanent secretaries and ministers have been 
implicated for corrupt behaviours (see: Byrne, et al, 2010: 2), notwithstanding the 
fantastic financial packages and allowances that in some cases have made them 
amongst one of the highest paid public officials in the world (see: Akogun and Nzeshi 
2010). A senior civil servant with the National Assembly Commission shed some 
light on this debate during a research interview. According to this officer, the low 
wages of civil servants are not necessarily the issue, but rather, the poor 
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mechanisms of transparency and accountability of the public sector, which makes it 
easy for public officials at whatever level to corruptly enrich themselves without being 
detected. He argued that, 
 
“I think that the low wages of public officials is not the only reason why corruption is 
pervasive in the system, rather, I think corruption is prevalent because of greed and 
poor accountability in the system. Public officials are more likely to be corrupt when 
the chances of getting caught are slim. The former inspector general of police and 
the 36 state governors accused by the former EFCC chairman to have corruptly 
enriched themselves were amongst the top well paid public officials in the world, yet 
they were heavily corrupt” (Interview with a Senior Civil Servant at the National 
Assembly Commission – 18th April 2008). 
 
While poverty and poor condition of service may perhaps influence public officials to 
engage in corrupt practices (particularly lower ranking public officials), this may be 
different from the experience of top ranking public officials. The greedy tendencies of 
high ranking public officials, encouraged by the poor state of transparent and 
accountable mechanisms in Nigerian‟s public service has been linked to a lack of 
political will (which is perhaps also related to the character of the Nigerian state and 
the role of godfatherism in Nigeria‟s political space explored earlier in the preceding 
sections of this chapter) of various government regimes to fight corruption. As 
discussed in chapter three, apart from the Buhari military regime, until 1999 when 
Obasanjo took over as a civilian president, Nigeria had never witnessed a serious 
and committed political commitment from the highest tiers of government to combat 
corruption. Over the years, those Nigerian government anti-corruption campaign 
exercises which have been implemented have tended to have been grossly 
politicised and highly selective (see: Lawson 2009). A former commissioner of Edo 
State government described the selective application of the law in the following way 
during a research interview.  
 
“Imagine when a poor man steals a loaf of bread because of severe hunger, they call 
it stealing and, if lucky, he will either be arrested and sent to jail or sometimes, if 
unlucky, he will be lynched to death by an angry mob, but when a „Big man‟ in 
government steals billions of naira through his office, they simply call it 
misappropriation or embezzlement and it could be in the news for a little while, after 
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which nothing is heard of the scandal until, after a while, we will suddenly see that 
the corrupt man has either been promoted or has bought a private jet and every one 
will start to worship him as if he is hero. I think everything still comes down to good 
leadership, which we have not been lucky enough to have over the years” (Research 
interview with – a Commissioner in Edo State Government. 20th March, 2008). 
 
These kinds of views on the lack of political will of Nigerian governments to combat 
corruption and the selective application of criminal justice (as high ranking public and 
political officials are perceived to be above the law) were issues which appeared 
quite frequently in the interviews. One major example, discussed in chapter three, 
was the way in which Yar‟Adua‟s government offered protection to political 
associates like James Ibori from prosecution against corruption charges because 
Ibori was a major financier of his political campaign when he was running for 
president. This context, as we will see in the next chapter, is perceived to have also 
significantly reduced the effectiveness of the major anti-corruption agencies such as 
EFCC and the judiciary in the fight against corruption in Nigeria.  
 
6.2.6 Lack of Effectiveness of the Major Anti-corruption Agencies 
 
As discussed in chapter 3, one of the greatest challenges confronting Nigeria‟s anti-
corruption campaign exercise is the lack of independence of the major anti-
corruption agencies. For instance, the EFCC, ICPC, the Nigerian Police Force and 
all other major anti-corruption institutions report to the president. They are funded 
and accountable to the president, suggesting that they are not entirely independent, 
a situation which makes them vulnerable to undue control and influence by certain 
key political figures within the ruling party. The Nigerian judiciary, for instance, is held 
by many to have been seriously infiltrated by the interests of the ruling political elites 
(see: Tobi, 2004). Many Nigerian governments have not been committed to the 
establishment of a strong and independent judiciary, as the judiciary is often 
perceived by them as an extension of the executive body (Oko 2004). Thus, instead 
of providing an effective arena for dispensing justice, many high court judges have 
themselves been implicated for using their position to corruptly enrich themselves 
which has resulted in the sacking of several judges. For instance, about five judges 
were literarily dismissed from office between 1999 and 2004 for corruption and 
205 
 
abuse of official powers39, following investigations by the National Judicial Council40 
(see: Okenwa, 2004). According to Oko (2004) many commentators and eminent 
jurists now openly question the integrity of the judicial system in adjudicating justice, 
particularly for those that do not have the money and social connections to influence 
the outcome of judicial proceedings. Furthermore, he argued that the judiciary which 
used to be effective in discharging its duties during the early post-independence 
period now appear to be weak, inadequate and corrupt. For a former minister in the 
Nigerian government, the Judiciary has not taken a bold step to curtail corruption in 
Nigeria: 
 
“Our judicial system, which used to be very effective, has been grossly incapacitated 
by successive military and corrupt civilian government regimes. Although many of our  
judges are professionally effective, but then this issue of endemic corruption in the 
system, which has also crept into the judiciary, is a major problem (Research 
interview conducted with a former Minister in the Nigerian government – 3th April 
2008). 
 
This sentiment has also aptly been expressed in the following extract ascribed to the 
former EFCC chief, Nuhu Ribadu. Ribadu bemoaned the manner in which corrupt 
judges and lawyers helps the rich to escape accountability. 
 
“Any time we commence full prosecution, lawyers to these 419 kingpins will use the 
court to stall prosecution . . . . It is only the poor that go to prison. It is high time we 
brought the rich who are criminals to justice. They have money and use their money 
to buy their way out. Today, there is no rich man in Nigerian prisons” (Lohor and 
Efeizomor, 2003).   
 
Judicial corruption has resulted in a general lack of public confidence in one of the 
most important mechanisms for enforcing measures designed to fight corruption in 
Nigeria. Clearly, many judges have violated their oath of office by distorting legal 
processes for personal and monetary gains (see: Ayodele 2004 and Ikhariale 1999). 
The poor level of public confidence in the judiciary was discussed in section 6.1 of 
                                            
39
 Amongst them were senior Federal High Court Judges (Justice Samuel Wilson Egbo-Ebgo and C.P.N. Senlong).  Justice 
Egbo-Egbo of the Abuja High court, for instance, issued a series of ex part orders under questionable circumstances and 
without jurisdiction (see Okenwa, 2004).   
40
 The National Judicial Council is the institution charged with enforcing discipline in the judiciary (see Nnaemeka-Agu, 2003). 
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this chapter (see: table 6.1 and 6.2 where bribery regarding decisions in court on 
criminal cases was perceived by households and businesses as the third most 
serious impact of corruption amongst the eight various forms of corruption listed in 
the 2001 World Bank survey). This is certainly not helpful in attempting to build an 
effective anti-corruption exercise, because a strong judicial system that is not only 
effective but also widely perceived to comply strictly to the rule of law can serve as a 
deterrent against corrupt behaviours in society (the specific issue of corruption and 
the effectiveness of the judiciary in Nigeria‟s anti-corruption struggle is extensively 
discussed in the next chapter). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has been constituted in two major parts. The first part of the chapter 
began by briefly highlighting the opinions of households, businesses and public 
officials on the impacts of corruption through their responses to the 2001 World Bank 
survey. The survey showed that patronage and the bribery of public officials to avoid 
tax regulations were considered as the most serious impacts of corruption by each of 
these three groups. The results of this survey can also be closely related to later 
findings in the NBS/EFCC Business survey, as well as the electronic survey that was 
undertaken for this study (discussed in chapter 5) which both revealed views 
suggesting that corruption and crime were some of the major obstacles to 
development and business activities in Nigeria. For the purpose of this research, 
however, attention was then focused on examining the different perceptions and 
interpretations of key stakeholders (from across a wide range of backgrounds) on the 
impacts of corruption in Nigeria for detailed exploration of the various socio-political 
and economic complexities surrounding this issue. 
 
The chapter shows that there appears to be general agreements amongst the 
different stakeholders that corruption has negative impacts on Nigeria and Nigerians 
in a number of ways. Contrary to earlier arguments explored in chapter 2, which 
seemed to suggest that corruption does not necessary result in economic hardship 
because the proceeds from corruption are often re-circulated within the economy of 
a country, thus impacting positively on different sectors in many ways, the Nigerian 
experience does seem to suggest that given the nature of the specificities of the 
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Nigerian state, corruption often results in waste and leakages in public revenue 
because proceeds from corruption (over 70%) are frequently diverted to personal 
foreign bank accounts. Some interviewees (particularly those from the business 
sector), also associated the impact of corruption with a lack of availability of 
resources for infrastructural projects and other basic services. This is believed to 
have affected other important sectors of Nigeria‟s economy such as industrial 
activities, increase in poverty, unemployment and crime rates.  
 
The second part of the chapter explored different perceptions and interpretations of 
the major causes of corruption in Nigeria revealed by the various stakeholders 
interviewed and how they are inter-related. The discussions elaborated in this 
chapter corroborate some of the dominant themes distilled from the academic 
literature on corruption in Nigeria expressed earlier in chapter 3. Prolonged military 
rule, in particular, is perceived by many to have helped in institutionalising corruption 
and a culture of impunity in Nigeria. This underscores earlier arguments that 
suggested that corruption becomes prevalent when people do not have the means to 
hold their leaders accountable for their decisions and actions. In a similar vein, the 
tendency of using state powers and resources as tools for acquiring legitimacy and 
political support have been connected to the socio-cultural and political complexities 
of the Nigerian state (which is related to the colonial legacy of troublesome artificial 
boundaries as was discussed extensively in chapter 3). 
 
This is also related to the concept of “two publics” which was also discussed earlier 
in chapter 3, although the discussions in this chapter have added another 
perspective to the debate over this issue in that the causation of corruption in Nigeria 
is far more complex than suggested by any over-simplified notions of two publics. 
Thus corruption is not only tolerated by Nigerians when it involves theft of 
government revenues at the national level being used to support local needs but, 
rather, corruption is wide spread and generally tolerated across every strata of 
Nigerian society. Other elements explored in the chapter included the role of the 
colonial legacy in installing this broad toleration for corruption amongst the Nigerian 
public, as well as the phenomenon of godfatherism in Nigeria‟s political system. The 
phenomenon of godfatherism was perceived by many respondents as an important 
element in Nigeria‟s political space. Individual godfathers are said to exercise 
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enormous control over appointment opportunities and the management of public 
resources. This phenomenon and other factors such as low salaries and poor 
incentives of public officials have been related by respondents in the chapter to the 
general lack of institutional efficiency, the culture of impunity and endemic corruption 
that have characterised public institutions in Nigeria. Finally, the lack of political will 
of successive government regimes (which to some extent, has also been associated 
with the complexities surrounding the character of the Nigeria state) to tackle this 
phenomenon is also perceived as a major causation of corruption, which has 
seriously undermined the independence and effectiveness of major anti-corruption 
institutions (with particular emphases on the judiciary) in the fight against corruption 
in Nigeria. The chapter that follows develops this analysis further by examining how 
various government regimes have responded to tackling this problem of corruption, 
before moving on to explore the perceived level of effectiveness of major anti-
corruption institutions/interventions and international donor‟s efforts in fighting 
corruption in Nigeria.    
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Chapter 7: Anti-Corruption Initiatives in Nigeria  
 
 
The preceding two chapters (5 and 6) examined different perspectives on the 
magnitude, major causes and consequences of corruption in Nigeria, drawing 
primarily upon the primary research data undertaken for this study and the analysis 
of other relevant secondary data sources. This chapter represents an extension of 
these analyses, which primarily focuses attention on to the various measures and 
strategies adopted by successive Nigerian governments (and the efforts of the 
international organisations which have supported them) in tackling corruption in 
Nigeria. In doing this, the chapter begins by exploring the pattern of anti-corruption 
initiatives during both dictatorship and civilian governments of Nigeria since 1960 
(representing an extension of earlier discussion in chapter 3.3). The chapter then 
moves on to analyse the ways in which major stakeholders perceived the level of 
effectiveness of the major anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria, drawing upon the 
primary research data (the preliminary electronic survey and particularly the in-depth 
interviews undertaken for this research) and other secondary data41. The concluding 
section then goes on to explore the influence of international donors efforts‟ within 
the anti-corruption activities outlined over the preceding pages.  
 
Insights gleaned from the review of academic literatures and the primary and 
secondary data examined in the previous chapters suggest that, whilst corruption is 
notoriously difficult to define, it is clear that Nigeria has been beset by a particularly 
intransigent form of corruption that appears to have had significant impacts upon 
economic development, poverty levels and high crime rates amongst other factors. 
Similarly, as we also saw in previous chapters, the causation of these levels of 
corruption in Nigeria is extremely complex and cannot just be explained by over-
generalized arguments which rail against „the backwardness‟ of African political 
cultures, the impacts of colonialism or „rent-seeking‟ in the public sector etc. Rather, 
Nigerian corruption must be seen as the result of a complex interplay between 
ranges of different factors. 
 
                                            
41
Particularly the 2007 NBS and EFCC Business Survey mentioned earlier in chapter 5.6 
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Over the years, various measures have been taken by governments in Nigeria to 
fight corruption, with varying degree of success and failure. The section that follows 
will examine the pattern of anti-corruption approaches and strategies embarked upon 
by various administrations in Nigeria.   
 
7.1 The Nigerian Government Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
 
Notwithstanding the views strongly articulated in the preceding chapter that one of 
the major causes of corruption in Nigeria has been the long-running lack of political 
will amongst successive Nigerian governments for taking the kinds of actions 
necessary for dealing with the phenomenon, over the years there have been a 
succession of government strategies for combating corruption in the country. These 
strategies can be categorized as legal, institutional or educational in their approach. 
The legal approaches involve the promulgation and enactment of anti-corruption 
instruments such as the Criminal and Penal Code42, Public Officers Decree No 5 
(1966) and the Corrupt Practices and Forfeiture of Assets Decree (1975). Others 
include the Code of Conduct Bureau (1979), Recovery of Property Act (1984) and 
the Code of Conduct Tribunals (1990). The constitutional and institutional measures 
include the establishment of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission (2000) and the Economic Crimes and Financial Crime Commission 
(2003) amongst others.43 Other strategies like the Ethical Revolution Campaign of 
Shagari‟s government, the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) programme of Bahari‟s 
regime, the War Against Indiscipline and Corruption programme of Abacha‟s 
administration and the National Orientation Agency of Obasanjo‟s government were 
each initiated to educate and re-orient Nigerians about the need to build a corruption 
free society or at least to reduce its prevalence (see: Akhiero 2007 and Oko 2002).  
 
Paradoxically, throughout the period since independence despite all of these 
initiatives, corruption, as outlined in the preceding chapters, appears to have largely 
continued unabated and a culture of impunity has remained dominant. The intention 
of this final chapter is to scrutinise why this trend has remained the case, despite all 
of the anti-corruption approaches and strategies developed by different governments 
                                            
42
The Criminal Penal Code was the primary source of law dealing with corruption in Nigeria prior to 1966 when the first military 
regime took over government 
43
 See: Fifth Schedule Part 1 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
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in Nigeria‟s anti-corruption campaigns. The section that follows will explore these 
issues under two sub sections: the military and democratic regimes.  
 
7.1.1 Nigerian Military Regimes and Anti-Corruption Initiatives  
 
As mentioned in chapter 3.3, Nigeria‟s military regimes have often cited endemic 
corruption as a major justification for their incursions in to government and a number 
of civilian or military administrations have been toppled over the years for this 
reason. The usual practice in these cases was to announce to frustrated Nigerian 
citizens their plans to curb corruption and restore probity and transparency in the 
management of public resources. Ironically, as suggested in chapter 5, the military 
have often left the government in a more corrupt state than the regimes they 
originally claimed to have come to correct (Owolabi 2004).  
 
Over the years, the successive military regimes enacted a range of decrees and a 
variety of anti-corruption programmes, which apparently sought to enforce 
punishment against indicted officials and promote a culture of transparency and 
accountability (ECONOMIST 1994: 43-44). At the inception of the first Nigerian 
military regime in 1966, the government promulgated the Public Officers Decree No 
5 (1966), which empowered the government to compel public officers to declare their 
assets. Various tribunals were also established (1966), which were judicially 
empowered to investigate corrupt enrichment by public officers. Disciplinary 
measures and appropriate punishments were enacted against indicted public officers 
based on the findings and recommendations of the tribunals. The punishments 
available to these tribunals included compulsory retirement and outright dismissal 
from the public service. However, the initiative proved very ineffective as most 
corrupt officials were never tried nor sentenced (see: Oko 2002). In a similar vein, 
following the end of General Gowon‟s regime in 1975, General Murtala Mohammed, 
who became the military head of state at that time, initiated several measures to fight 
corruption in Nigeria. Measures like the Assets Investigation Panel and Corrupt 
Practices Decree No 39 (see: Oko 2002) were promulgated and enacted at this time. 
Several key government officials were investigated at this time and indicted officials 
were dismissed from the service (Nwankwo 1999). Mohammed also enacted the 
Corrupt Practices Decrees (1975) which extended the measures to include taking 
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action against corrupt managers of private enterprises, as well as government 
employees (see: TI report 2004). However, the regime was cut short by the 
assassination of General Mohammed (1976), in a coup, which led to the repealing of 
Decree 39 upon his death, thus weakening the fight against corruption (See: 
Nwankwo 1999). The advances under General Mohammed were rolled back under 
the military regime of Obasanjo and the civilian government of Shagari which 
followed (see: discussions in chapter 3.3 and chapter 5.4 which illustrated that the 
periods of Obasanjo‟s military government and Shagari‟s civilian administration were 
perceived amongst the worst periods for corruption) and it was not until the return of 
military rule under Buhari in 1983 that there was a renewed focus upon tackling 
corruption. Following the coup that ushered Buhari and Idiagbon to power in 1983, 
Decree 1984, a Special Military Tribunal was enacted to recover public property 
(Oko 2005). It was enacted because of the belief that draconian anti-corruption 
measures, which included long prison sentences and the forfeiture of assets, might 
deter officials from engaging in corrupt practices and creates greater public 
confidence in the fight against corruption (TI report 2004). Thus, trials were 
conducted by military officials not below the rank of lieutenant colonel or its 
equivalent, as well as serving and retired judges of the High Court as members. The 
system included an opportunity for appeal, which could only be made to the 
Supreme Military Council (SMC), the highest ruling military body of the country. 
Although the special military tribunal‟s approaches and procedures were considered 
to be draconian by observers44 (see: Akande 1987), several high-ranking public 
officials, such as state governors, ministers and presidential advisers were 
sentenced to lengthy jail term after conviction during this period (see: Ugochukwu 
1984). Similarly, as discussed in chapter 3, Buhari‟s administration is famous in 
Nigeria for its remarkable War Against Indiscipline (WAI), which made a significant 
impact in attempting to set a new direction for Nigerians in ethical behaviours in 
public places (Fashakin 2011).  
 
WAI did succeed in instilling a greater sense of discipline in Nigerian society. 
Commentators at the time suggested that it had begun to have an influence on 
encouraging Nigerians to keep their environment clean/tidy and a queuing culture in 
                                            
44
 Trials by tribunals turned out to be perfunctory proceedings (a situation where by defendants were tried straightaway without 
rights to appeal in regular courts and sentenced to lengthy jail terms). 
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public places became an essential part of the national culture during this period (see: 
Nworah 2006, BBC News channel 2003). The degree to which it impacted upon the 
culture of public service in the country is, however, perhaps questioned by how 
easily it seems to have been reversed over the years that followed. The momentum 
of Buhari‟s anti-corruption programme was, however, interrupted by Babangida‟s 
military coup in August 1985 (Oko 2002). His regime released most of the public 
officials who were awaiting trial for corrupt practises. A panel was set up to review 
the cases of officials who had been convicted by Buhari‟s administration and many of 
them were released and their assets restored back to them (TI report 2004), 
representing a turning point away from the vigorous anti-corruption campaigns of the 
Buhari/Idiagbon era.       
 
Despite this, there were some anti-corruption initiatives during this period. In an 
apparent initiative to tackle corruption at the local level, for example, Babangida‟s 
administration introduced the Audit Alarm System (AAS) at the local government 
level. The AAS was meant to promote internal checks of finances within local 
government. The policy was reportedly unsuccessful not least because it was 
impossible to isolate abuses at the local level from the deep-seated and worsening 
state of corruption at the state and national levels at that time (TI report 2004). In 
addition, a national committee on corruption and other economic crimes was also 
established by Babangida‟s government. It was headed by Justice Kayode Esho, a 
retired justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court. The committee carried out a wide-
ranging consultation with different stakeholders including civil society groups and 
NGOs and recommended the need for an independent anti-corruption agency to 
tackle corruption and a national law for dealing with corruption and economic crimes 
(Ikubaje 2002). However, Babangida failed to act on the recommendations of the 
Kayode committee‟s report (see: TI Report 2004). After Abacha took over 
government in 1993, Justice Kayode committee‟s report on anti-corruption was 
published and subsequently sent to the state governments for comments. However, 
again, nothing came out of the report, as no serious action was taken to implement 
the recommendations of the committee‟s report before the end of the regime (Ikubaje 
2002).  
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To summarize this second period of military rule from Buhari‟s to Abacha‟s regimes, 
perhaps the most important observation is that the anti-corruption initiatives of the 
military governments of this period were characterised by draconian provisions (anti-
corruption approaches were exclusively ad hoc, with harsh penalties), a lack of 
sustained political commitment to really tackling corruption (apart from Buhari‟s 
regime) and a lack of preventive mechanisms and strategies to tackle whatever the 
regime perceived as the root causes of corruption (see: Oko 2005 and TI 2004). 
Although these military governments portrayed themselves as tough on corruption, 
apart from Buhari/Idiagbon‟s regime, the anti-corruption measures taken by the 
military regimes before the commencement of the fourth republic in 1999, failed to 
yield positive results (see: Cronje 1984). In the research interviews, when asked to 
reflect about this period, respondents frequently alluded to the lack of commitment 
and seriousness of leaders during this period to eradicating corruption in the country.  
For example, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Lagos, painted a picture of the 
lack of sustained political will that characterized most military government anti-
corruption exercises of that period in the following manner.    
 
“The military came into power under the guise of fighting corruption, thus several ad 
hock anti-corruption measures were put in place to control corruption, but, by the end 
of their tenor, many of them often leave the government far richer than they came. 
For instance, in 1983, when Buhari took over state affairs as the military president, 
he initiated some thorough measures against corruption. However, when IBB came 
into power in 1985, instead of continuing with Buhari‟s anti-corruption measures, the 
entire exercise was reversed and corruption became institutionalised. Although 
Abacha‟s regime was tough on corruption initially, it later derailed as a result of 
obsession for wealth, power, and continued control of the government.” (Research 
interview with a Senior Lecturer, University of Lagos – 16 June, 200845). 
 
This sentiment was also clearly reflected in an interview with a Senior Editor of one 
of the leading Nigerian Newspaper. While Senior Lecturer acknowledged Buhari‟s 
efforts and bemoaned how Buhari‟s anti-corruption measures were reversed by 
Babangida, the Senior Editor believes that in reality the military anti-corruption 
                                            
45
 Senior Lecturer at the department of Geography-University of Lagos. His area of specialization is in Political and Economic 
Geography 
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campaigns were merely initiated to justify their incursion in to government and that 
they often deployed patronage system to silence  opposition groups.          
 
“I will blame the prolonged military rule for the endemic nature of corrupt practise in 
this country. They have always come into government appealing to the people and 
promising to fight corruption by setting up military tribunals and sending some big 
men to jail. But then, they have always conspired with anti-democratic elements in 
our society to loot our common wealth. The military were never serious about fighting 
corruption; the people who were supposed to speak out were corrupted with little 
gifts, while public officials looted state treasury with impunity” (Research interview 
with a Senior Editor –a leading Nigerian Newspaper - 7th June 2008) 
 
This relates to earlier discussions in chapter 6.2.1, where it was suggested that (with 
the exception of Buhari‟s regime), the military regimes helped in institutionalising a 
culture of impunity and endemic corruption by using a patronage system as a tool for 
acquiring legitimacy and political support. As was discussed in both Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 6 this phenomenon is clearly rooted in the character of the Nigeria state, 
which has been characterised by political instability and intense struggle over 
national resources, at least in part as a result of a lack of national identity (see 
Ajetumobi, 1991, Osagae 1999, Mbeki, 2005:3, Sandbrook 1985:42, Easterly and 
Levine 1997: 1214). According to Ayittey (2006), the circumventing of legal 
established practice and procedures, through what is popularly known in Nigeria as 
the “settlement syndrome,” took root during the military regimes, particularly under 
Babangida and Abacha‟s governments. Perhaps it might be appropriate to suggest 
that, the anti-corruption efforts of the various military regimes (apart from Buhari‟s 
regime) were lacking in terms of a genuine commitment to fighting corruption. This is 
a view that was also alluded to in a research interview with a retired civil servant 
(Benin City Edo State).  
 
“The military did little to fight corruption. Although Buhari tried to solve the problem, 
but his anti-corruption war was too extreme and I think that was one of the reasons 
his regime was cut short by Babangida who did the opposite when he came to 
power. In fact he legalised corruption as people openly demanded and payed bribe to 
access public services. Many public servants and business men become rich 
overnight and money was just circulating everywhere. But the result was gross 
inequalities particularly between people in the rural areas and government officials in 
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the cities and the period witnessed numerous cases of abandoned projects.  In 
Abacha‟s case, while his family and his loyalists in government were looting 
massively, his anti-corruption war was used to witch-hunt those he perceived as a 
threat to his government”. (Research Interview with a Retired Civil Servant - Benin 
City Edo State - 12th July 2008). 
 
The lack of commitment and political will to fight corruption can also be distilled from 
analyses of Nigeria‟s performance on the various TI indexes, as discussed in chapter 
5 (see: sections 5.1 and 5.4 respectively), which generally identified the periods of 
military rule as the most corrupt (apart  from Buhari‟s regime). We now move on to 
trace in a similar way the ways in which democratic governments have also taken 
steps to deal with the problem of corruption in Nigeria. 
 
7.1.2 Nigeria’s Democratic Regimes and Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
 
In the first republic (between 1963 and 1966), the government of Tafawa Balewa did 
little to combat corruption. His government failed to initiate any concrete new anti-
corruption laws, apart from the Criminal and Penal Code that existed prior to 
independence (Chikulo and Hope 2000). However, in the second republic, which 
followed the military rule of Obasanjo, some anti-corruption initiatives like the Ethical 
Revolution (ER)46 were initiated under the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari who 
ruled from 1979, (see Ogundiya, 2009: 281- 292). Nevertheless, the Shagari‟ 
administration‟s development of this scheme was not backed up with action on 
individual cases and his period in government, as discussed in previous chapters, is 
generally considered to have been characterised by a lack of political will to take 
action on corruption and weak institutional governance. The reason for this lack of 
political will became apparent with the return of military rule under Buhari, whose 
extensive anti-corruption activities unearthed significant abuses by governors, 
ministers and special assistants under Shagari‟s administration who were convicted 
by Buhari‟s regime for corruption. A house of representative member at the Nigerian 
National assembly, explained the lack of progress in fighting corruption under 
Shagari in the following way: 
                                            
46
 Former president Shehu Shagari inaugurated an Ethical Revolution in 1982 supposedly to educate society about the social 
impact of corruption and to instil discipline in society. 
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Obviously, Shehu Shagari‟s regime failed in terms of fighting corruption. Not much 
effort was made to investigate anyone on grounds of corruption, much less to convict 
and jail any top government official; although, he later made some attempts by 
creating the ethical revolution commission to ethically re-orientate Nigerians. 
However, before we could see any serious action from that exercise, the 
administration was shortened by the military coup that toppled his government on the 
eve of 1984 on allegations of corruption and ineptitude” (Research interview with a 
house of Representative Member - National House Assembly, June 6, 2008). 
 
This lack of political will of Shagari‟s government to combat corruption was also 
clearly expressed in an interview with a retired civil servant (Benin City Edo State). 
 
“Although Shagari‟s government was a constitutional democracy, but I think it was 
more corrupt than Gowon‟s military government. Though Shagari is not corrupt 
himself, but his government was generally weak as he could not control public 
accountability. His government was characterized by serious looting and diversion of 
state resources and properties by public officials because of weak and inefficient 
anti-anticorruption enforcement.” (Research interview with a Retired Civil Servant - 
Benin City Edo State - 12th July 2008)   
 
During Shagari‟s government, public accountability was so weak that, according to 
Agedah (1993: 18), “the lifting of crude oil for instance, was as easy as munching 
meat-pie since all that was required was a note from the presidency or someone up 
there in the corridors of power”. Cases of over-inflated contracts, poorly executed or 
not executed contracts despite receipt of the contract sum, the phenomenon of 10% 
kickbacks and payments of large sums of money belonging to the state to ghost 
workers were common during this period (see: Falola and  Ihonvbere 1985: 107-
108). It is therefore not surprising that despite being a democracy, Shagari‟s regime 
(1979 to 1983) was perceived as one of the most corrupt (fourth, according to the 
electronic survey) Nigerian governments, as outlined in chapter 5.4 (figure 5.4). This 
was, of course, the major reason cited by the military government of Bahari in 
justification of the return to military rule when he took over in 1985. 
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7.1.3 Anti-corruption initiatives of the Fourth Republic 
 
The military government that was ushered in at the time of the overthrow of Shagari 
endured into the 1990s. The elections of June 12th 1992 that would have ushered in 
the third republic were annulled by General Babangida, which paved the way for 
continued military rule until 1999, after which Obasanjo returned as democratic 
president for the fourth republic. As argued in previous chapters, it was under the 
government of Olusegun Obasanjo that some serious and sustained measures in 
tackling the problem of corruption finally began to be implemented in Nigeria. This 
impulse was propelled by a combination of domestic and international influences. At 
the domestic level, Obasanjo‟s anti-corruption activities were strongly influenced by 
growing public demands for a strong and thorough stance against corruption, 
following the highly publicised corruption scandals of his immediate predecessors 
(particularly the Abacha looting scandal, as referred to in discussions in chapters 3 
and 5. See also Eweremadu 2010). This public clamour for action against corruption 
coincided with the changing international attitudes toward corruption.  
 
At the international level, the anti-corruption campaign was driven by a number of 
factors. Firstly, it was propelled by Obasanjo‟s recognition of Nigeria‟s poor 
international image perception; illustrated, for example, by its poor performances in 
TI‟s corruption perception indexes, (see: discussions in chapters 5 section 5.2 and 
6.1.4. see also Enweremadu and Okafor 2009). Secondly, Nigeria‟s anti-corruption 
agenda was also influenced by some fundamental changes within the global 
development arena following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, as questions of 
good governance, democratic reforms, accountability and state reforms (as 
discussed in Chapters 1.3, 2.8 and 3.9) came to dominate the international agenda. 
Consequently, at the inception of Obasanajo‟s government in 1999, his 
administration came under growing international pressure to implement key 
structural reforms targeted at promoting transparency and accountability, particularly 
in the public sector (see: Eweremadu 2010). Certain incentives such as possible 
debt relief (see discussions in Chapter 3.2.2, concerning the eventual debt relief of 
the $30.4 billion it owed the Paris club in 2005) were offered to the Nigerian 
government at this time in return for governance-related policy reforms. 
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As discussed in chapter 3, the first bill Obasanjo sent to the National Assembly was 
for the establishment of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Act (ICPA), which subsequently led to the establishment of the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in 
the year 2000. At the time, the establishment of the ICPC held out hope that the 
issue of corruption would be given serious attention by Obasanjo‟s regime. Following 
two years of inaction, however, citizens became concerned over the sincerity of 
Obasanjo‟s administration in tackling corruption. In recognition of this, however, in 
2003 the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was established. 
Efforts were also made to create an environment of free press and an independent 
judiciary with a more effective criminal justice system that could investigate and 
prosecute corrupt individuals and organizations alike (TI report 2004). Similarly, 
Nigeria‟s government was assisted in establishing an effective auditor general‟s 
office and developing more transparent and accountable revenue collection systems, 
while in 2003 civil service reforms and more transparent public procurement 
processes were initiated (see: TI 2004). Amongst these governance and anti-
corruption reforms, the establishment of the EFCC was perhaps the most important 
step taken (Lawson 2009 47). The commission was headed by Nuhu Ribadu, who, 
as argued elsewhere in the thesis, has become a name that has been seen as 
synonymous with the taking of decisive action in the fight against corruption in 
Nigeria (especially in relation to the prosecution of powerful political elites)..  
 
In a similar vein, the perceptions of the level of corruption in Nigeria assessed within 
the TI‟s CPI improved significantly shortly after the establishment of the EFCC (See: 
Table 5.3 and 5.4), a trend which most commentators have ascribed to the vigorous 
anti-corruption campaigns championed by Obasanjo‟s administration. Daniel 
Kaufman, Director, Global Governance and Anti-Corruption of the World Bank 
Institute (WBI), acknowledged the progress made by Obasanjo‟s administration in 
fighting corruption at this time when he proclaimed that, "Nigeria is changing for the 
better, in fact, if the current momentum is maintained and deepened, the progress 
made in the fight against corruption could become irreversible" (World Bank 2005).47 
 
                                            
47
 Kaufmann made these comments while meeting members of the economic team of the Federal Government. 
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In 2006, this positive assessment of the changes under Obasanjo‟s administration 
was further reinforced by Peter Eigen, the President of Transparency International, in 
the following description of the anti-corruption measures taken under Obasanjo‟s 
government.   
 
“This government has been at work for the last six years and it has done quite a 
number of things that we at Transparency International have recommended to many 
governments of the world – they have taken this holistic approach, they have 
changed the laws, they have strengthened institutions, they have changed policies, 
they have fired some people, they have prosecuted some people” (Peter Eigen, 
President, Transparency International – EFCC 2006). 
 
However, despite these efforts Obasanjo‟s anti-corruption exercise has also been 
criticised for largely having turned the lens of the major anti-corruption agencies onto 
his political opponents. For instance, in 2002, in a letter to Obasanjo written by the 
former Senate President, Pius Anyim, Obasanjo‟s government was accused of using 
the ICPC for taking actions against perceived political opponents.   
 
“I regret to inform you that it is clear to us now that, while we have clear intentions 
that the ICPC should be used to fight corruption, we did not know that the 
presidency's intention is to use ICPC to protect its corrupt members on  one  hand,  
and  to  use  ICPC  to  fight  real  and perceived enemies of  Mr.  President” (The 
Guardian Nigeria, Dec. 24, 2002). 
 
Some scholars like Alexandra Gillies (2007), have also argued that Obasanjo‟s anti- 
corruption reforms were merely initiated to deceive Nigerians (and the international 
community in particular) into believing that his government has zero tolerance for 
corruption, because of the economic benefits like debt relief and other international 
donor‟s incentives that could flow from being perceived as enacting meaningful 
governance and anti-corruption reforms. A prominent lawyer and human rights 
activist in Lagos describes some of the limitations of Obasanjo‟s anti-corruption 
campaign in the following way.  
 
“I will rate Obasanjo poorly on the war against corruption, because I think it was 
merely pursued to deceive Nigerians and our international friends. He attempted to 
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change the constitution to enable him to stay in power beyond his tenure. His anti-
corruption drive was mainly against people who disagreed with him, particularly on 
his tenure elongation. While those who were not in his good books were targeted and 
prosecuted by the anti-corruption agencies, those within his political structure 
remained untouched” (Research interview with  a prominent lawyer and human rights 
activist - 31th July 2008). 
 
This is clearly related to earlier discussions in chapter 3.8, where it was revealed that 
following Obasanjo‟s failure to alter the constitution to ensure that he could remain in 
office for a third term, the anti-corruption agencies appeared to became important 
tools for repressing political opponents (see Lawson 2009: 47). Whatever the validity 
of these suggestions what is clear is that, despite their limitations, the anti-corruption 
activities during this period do appear to have succeeded in making some serious 
impacts (see: EFCC 2009). The next section will analyse the sustainability of the 
changes in direction initiated under Obasanjo by exploring the anti-corruption 
campaign programmes that occurred under Yar‟Adua‟s administration.    
 
7.1.4 Assessing Yar’Adua’s Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
 
Following the end of Obasanjo‟s administration in May 2007, Nigeria‟s anti-corruption 
campaign began to chart a different course under the administration of Yar‟Adua. 
Since 2007, there has been no specific anti-corruption law added to those his 
administration inherited, whilst the activities of existing anti-corruption institutions 
appear to have been seriously undermined (Eweremadu 2010). This situation has 
been aptly described in the following observation by Titi Ogunye, one of the key 
officials of the Civil Liberty organisation: 
 
“Events since May 2007, particularly recent events relating to the EFCC, indicate that 
the fledging anti-corruption crusade handed over to the Yar‟Adua administration is 
facing a reversal of the worst kind. The challenge before the Nigerian people is to 
resist this subversion and build ownership around the anti-corruption effort” (Ogunye, 
2008: 28-29).  
 
The impacts on the work of the EFCC caused by the shift from Obasanjo to Yaradua 
were an issue which was frequently mentioned in the research interviews. For 
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example, one high-ranking officer in the EFCC who has worked with them practically 
since the inception of the organization described the lack of political will and 
insincerity of Yar‟Adua‟s administration in the fight against corruption in the following 
way:  
 
“Since this government came to power, the fight against corruption has been 
rendered ineffective. He came in through fraudulent electoral polls and in attempts to 
buy legitimacy, he announced in his inaugural speech, the commitment of his 
administration to promote the rule of law, which symbolised a departure from 
Obasanjo‟s style of leadership which acted outside of the law in pursuing anti-
corruption cases against his political opponents. However, what we have seen so far 
is the use of the so called rule of law for the protection of corrupt political allies. The 
EFCC, which used to be very efficient under Ribadu, is now sleeping. Because of the 
corrupt attorney general of the federation, the judiciary has been compromised by the 
ruling cabal. It is now business as usual, as the majority of the cases before the 
various courts across the country is being unnecessarily delayed. People like Ibori, 
who were convicted for corruptly enriching themselves, are now the president‟s 
kitchen cabinet members, while people like Rubadu and Erufa are witch hunted” 
(Research interview with EFCC Investigation Officer – EFCC - June 7 2008). 
For this officer and many others of a similar view, the rule of law policy of the 
administration was little more than a case of sloganeering which provided a smoke 
screen for protecting political associates (particularly former governors) from 
prosecutions. As a result, the international credibility of the Yar‟Adua administration 
plummeted due to the perceived lack of political will in prosecuting indicted officials 
as well as the removal of some prominent anti-corruption crusaders (such as Nuhu 
Ribadu) from their positions (as first discussed in Chapter 3.9, see also: Eweremadu, 
2010 and Lawson 2009). This draining of support for anti-corruption activity and the 
perceived corruption of Yar‟Adua‟s government itself were also demonstrated in the 
earlier discussion of the electronic survey in chapter 5.4 (table 5.4) where Yar‟Adua‟s 
government was perceived as the third most corrupt government in Nigeria by 
respondents. 
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In summary, despite all of the anti-corruption measures and strategies that have 
been enacted over the years, the incidence of corruption has continued unabated in 
Nigeria. Successive government regimes (both military and civilian) have initiated 
and implemented various measures to deal with the problem, but insight gleaned 
from the perceptions of key stakeholders in the research interviews seems to 
suggests that certain factors, such as inconsistencies in anti-corruption policy 
implementation (caused, for example, by successive military coups or 
electioneering), a general lack of political will and the lack of sustained commitment 
to combat corruption had meant that these measures were largely unsuccessful in 
addressing the problem. Nevertheless, one important observation that has emerged 
from this section is that some progress was made during the fourth republic when 
Obasanjo became the president (between 1999 and 2007). Progress made in 
combating corruption during Obasanjo‟s government has been credited to the 
vigorous anti-corruption efforts of the ICPC and EFCC (major anti-corruption 
institutions established by Obasanjo). However, as suggested above, Obasanjo‟s 
government was also criticised for turning these anti-corruption institutions against 
political opponents, while his immediate successor, Yar‟Adua, is generally seen as 
having whittled down the effectiveness of these anti-corruption institutions by 
summarily ejecting some key anti-corruption personnel from these agencies as part 
of an effort to protect political associates and friends from prosecutions. 
These reflections over the Obasanjo period and its aftermath raise some serious 
broader questions over the core motive behind the anti-corruption reforms 
implemented by governments across developing countries over recent years and of 
the types of methodologies employed in tackling corruption. As we have gleaned 
from the discussion above, the design and implementation of anti-corruption laws 
and the formation of new institutions may not necessarily reflect genuine efforts and 
commitments to control corruption, but rather, to gain international respectability and 
development assistance from donor agencies. Similarly, anti-corruption reforms can 
also be initiated to appease or deflect criticism from political opponents and the 
media without genuine commitment by governments to enforce them. This reinforces 
the views of Khan (1998), as previously discussed in chapter 2, that concentration on 
purely institutional issues or legal reforms in the struggle against corruption will 
always be insufficient and that effective anti-corruption actions must be much more 
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sensitive to other socio-cultural and political variables and aware of the strategic role 
of an active civil society. This is an issue which will be returned to in later 
discussions. In the next section, however attention is focussed down onto the major 
individual institutions involved in the anti-corruption struggle in Nigeria, the 
perceptions of key stakeholders of the work of these institutions and some of the 
major challenges faced by each.    
 
7.2 Assessing the Effectiveness of Nigeria’s Major Anti-corruption Agencies  
 
Despite the establishment and implementation of various anti-corruption measures 
and the improvements observed over recent years, as we have gleaned from 
discussion in the previous section, corruption still appears to remain a very serious 
problem in Nigeria. Discussions in Chapter 5.5 suggested that many of Nigeria‟s 
public institutions (including the anti-corruption agencies themselves) are still 
perceived as highly corrupt. In a similar vein, the lack of efficiency and effectiveness 
of Nigeria‟s institutions was identified as both a major cause and effect of corruption 
in Chapter 6. Accordingly, drawing extensively from primary research data (the 
preliminary questionnaire and interviews undertaken for this study) as well as 
relevant secondary sources, the discussion over the following pages focuses on 
analysing the extent to which major anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria are 
perceived as effective in tackling the problem of corruption in Nigeria. 
 
Before looking at the cases of the individual institutions, it is worth briefly exploring 
the responses to one of the questions asked in the exploratory online survey 
conducted for this research. Specifically, respondents were asked to rank from 1 
(Most Effective) to 6 (Least Effective) several of the major anti-corruption institutions 
in Nigeria (see: figure 7.1). The total scores based on the rankings of all respondents 
were then calculated for each institution. Here, the lower the average scores the 
more effective the institution is perceived and on the other hand, the higher the 
average scores the less effective the identified institution is perceived.  
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Figure 7.1: Perception of the level of Effectiveness of Nigeria‟s Major Anti-Corruption Institutions  
 
 
 
 
Source: Electronic Survey Conducted for this Research  
 
As shown on figure (7.1), the press was rated as the most effective anti-corruption 
institution in Nigeria (2.14), followed closely by the EFCC which was perceived as 
the second most effective institution (2.22). The Judiciary was ranked third (2.86) 
most effective, while, the ICPC and Code of Conduct Bureau were rated fourth (3.22) 
and fifth (3.30) respectively, the Nigerian Police Force was perceived as the least 
effective anti corruption institution in Nigeria, ranking (3.97). Against the background 
of this snapshot of attitudes towards the institutions, the subsequent sections will 
explore in much more detail the attitudes of key stakeholders towards the 
effectiveness of each of these institutions. The discussion will be ordered 
chronologically, starting with those institutions existing in the pre-independence 
period before moving on to more recently established institutions.   
 
7.2.1 The role of the Nigerian Judiciary 
 
As we have gleaned from discussion in chapter 6.2.6, the Nigerian judiciary which 
used to have a very good reputation during the early year of post-independence now 
appears to show signs of weakness, inadequacy and corruption, and its ability to 
function independently of the control of political elites is being increasingly 
questioned (see: Tobi 2004 and Oko 2005). This is despite the fact that the Nigerian 
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Judiciary is structured as an independent institution and the tenure of its officials is 
guaranteed by the constitution. With a broad judicial power that cuts across the 
government and its agencies, the judiciary has a multi-tier structure with the 
Supreme Court as the apex and the Customary and Sharia courts at the local levels 
(The Nigeria Judiciary, nd). On the advice of the National Judicial Council, subject to 
confirmation by the Senate, the Chief Justice of the Federation, the President of the 
Court of Appeal and the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court are all appointed by 
the President. The President of the Customary Court of Appeal and the Grand Khadi 
of the Sharia Court of Appeals are also appointed by the President. Similarly, at the 
state level, the Chief Justices of each state are appointed by the Governors, on the 
recommendations of the National Judicial Council and confirmation by the State 
Houses of Assembly. These structural arrangements, specifically with regards to the 
appointment of chief Justices at the state level, do not appear to have helped in the 
anti-corruption crusade (see: TI 2004). 
 
During the military era, allegations of undue interference with the courts‟ activities 
were common, as court orders were not obeyed and judges perceived not to be 
working favourably for the government of the day were victimised. In other cases, 
some judges had their policing powers withdrawn for making decisions that were 
perceived to be anti-government (see: Oko 2005). However, it should also be 
pointed out that, in the face of considerable adversity, the Nigeria judiciary 
courageously made a number of landmark judgements against the arbitrary exercise 
of state power and human rights abuses during these periods (TI 2004).  
 
Despite the landmark judgements mentioned above and the advances discussed 
previously during the democratic dispensation of former President Obasanjo, there is 
a widely-held sentiment amongst anti-corruption campaigners that the Nigerian 
judiciary has generally not helped matters as cases alleging serious corruption and 
other economic and financial crimes have frequently been allowed to drag on in the 
courts indefinitely (See Huri-Laws, 2004). For instance, the current EFCC chairman, 
Waziri, has blamed the perceived inefficiencies that have come to characterise the 
present activities of the EFCC on the shortcomings of the Nigerian Judiciary.  
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"The effects of anti-corruption efforts are felt only when a man has been sentenced 
and you see him being taken into prison and he gets to prison and people see it. 
Nigerians' faith in the anti-corruption war can only get a boost when corrupt top public 
officials are sentenced and jailed for criminal offences. In Nigeria top public officials 
facing trial act like political heroes. You see people taken to court and they are 
smiling and waving as if they are political heroes. Meanwhile they are being 
arraigned for criminal cases and they are waving like Mandela. Frivolous injunctions, 
being granted by some courts is inimical to the nation's justice system” (Waziri, 
Shara Reporters, 2009) 
 
The extract above, is an illustration of one of the biggest challenges facing anti-
corruption efforts in Nigeria today. Corrupt government officials, in collaboration with 
their lawyers, appear to have perfected the art of delaying justice by utilising the 
technicalities of procedures of the conventional courts, as provided for by the 
Nigerian constitution (see: Oko 2005: 17). Although, the 1999 constitution contains 
several provisions to curb the abuse of power and combat corruption, some of the 
constitutional provisions have had the effect of protecting some public officials from 
criminal prosecution relating to the practice of corruption (see: U.S. Dep‟t of State, 
Nigeria, 2003). Apart from the immunity provisions of section 308 of the constitution, 
the fundamental rights provisions on due process and fair hearing have been 
employed as defence mechanisms by persons accused of corruption (see: Onakoya, 
2010). Indicted corrupt officials are quick to claim their constitutional rights by 
remaining silent. All of this has made it a difficult task for prosecutors to discharge 
the burden of proving their case beyond reasonable doubt, since the accused is 
presumed innocent until the court determines otherwise.  
 
Similarly, investigations of corrupt cases are being undermined by the frivolous 
expert injunctions being granted to corrupt officials, restraining the anti-corruption 
commissions from even investigating certain individuals and corporate bodies. A civil 
servant with the National Orientation Agency illustrated this situation by referring to 
the experience of former state governors.  
 
“Our Judicial system is replete with corruption. Just like every other top officials in our 
public institutions, the judges are equally so corrupt that they shamelessly abuse 
their official positions to enrich themselves by granting expert injunctions to the 
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wealthy political elites. Peter Odili and Ibori‟s experience are very good examples. 
Before Odili left office in 2007, he corruptly obtained a court injection to stop any form 
of investigation and prosecution against him and up till now no action has been taken 
over various petitions with the EFCC” (Research interview with a Civil Servant - 
National Orientation Agency - 18th May 2008)  
 
It is very hard to understand the legal and moral justification behind the restraining of 
government anti-corruption institutions from carrying out their statutory duties, 
particularly in the face of overwhelming evidence, which suggest that serious acts of 
corruption have been perpetuated. This type of experience lends credence to Oko‟s 
(2005) argument, referred to earlier in chapter 6, that the integrity of the judicial 
system in adjudicating justice is seriously in question in Nigeria because of judicial 
manipulations by the rich and politically connected elites. Nevertheless, the Judiciary 
was ranked as the third most effective anti-corruption institution in Nigeria in the 
survey results presented in Figure 7.1 and earlier discussions of other survey results 
also suggest that whilst there is unease over its role, the standing of the judiciary in 
terms of its efficiency and transparency is not as low as some other public 
institutions. For example in chapter 5.5 (figure 5.6), it was demonstrated that the 
court was perceived by businesses as the eight least honest public institutions 
amongst eleven institutions listed in the NBS and EFCC Business Survey on Crime 
and Corruption, although chapter 6.1 (tables 6.1 and 6.2) revealed that the bribery in 
relation to court decisions on criminal cases was perceived by households and 
businesses as the third most serious impact of corruption amongst the eight forms of 
corruption listed in the 2001 World Bank survey.  
 
7.2.2 The Nigerian Police Force 
 
The Nigerian police force derives its power from the constitution and is headed by 
the Inspector General of Police48. It emerged during the colonial period as the „Royal 
Niger Company‟s Constabulary‟, before becoming known in 1930 as the Nigerian 
Police. Thereafter, it has grown rapidly and now employs over 30,000 regular 
policemen and women officers (see: TI Report 2004). Its duties according to the 
constitution include the preservation of law and order, detection and prevention of 
                                            
48
See: http://www.npf.gov.ng/   
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crimes, and the protection of life and property (see: Alemika and Chukwuma 2000). It 
has a mobile unit, made up of regular policemen specifically trained to prevent and 
control riots. Their duties also include the patrolling of cities and villages to combat 
various crimes and armed robbery in particular. Reviewing the evidence from the 
research interviews and the secondary sources consulted, it appears that the police 
do not enjoy a healthy reputation in Nigeria. Several surveys conducted into the 
perceived degree of corruption amongst government institutions in Nigeria have 
identified the police as amongst the most corrupt institution in the country. For 
instance, as discussed in chapter 5.5 (figure 5.6), the police was rated as one of the 
least honest and worst performing Nigerian public institutions in Nigeria (in the NBS 
and EFCC Business Survey on Crime and Corruption). Similarly, as presented 
earlier on in this chapter, in the results of the electronic survey conducted for this 
research project, the police was perceived to be the least effective Nigerian anti-
corruption institution (see: section 7.2, figure 7.1).  
 
The World Bank governance survey conducted in 2001 also identified the police as 
by far the least honest institution in the country. Table 7.1 shows the perceptions of 
households, businesses, public officials in relation to this issue.  According to the 
survey, the police was identified as the least honest amongst the various 
government institutions listed in the survey. 30.4% of households, 25.7% of business 
enterprises and 32.7% of public officials classified the Police as the least honest 
public institution. This reflects particularly the widespread petty corruption (for 
example the demands for bribes from bus and taxi drivers) which appears to be so 
prevalent amongst the Nigerian police force (see Aremu, et al 2009). A market trader 
(in Festact Town Lagos State) describes the patterns of petty corruption in the 
Nigerian Police force in the following interview extract.  
 
“The most frequently observed form of corruption in Nigeria is in the petty corruption 
that has characterised the daily activities of the Nigerian police force. They openly 
demand bribe from road users at road blocks and check points. For commercial 
vehicles such as buses and taxies, they collect between 100 and 200 naira (about 
$1) at check points, for trucks and other heavy duty vehicles, they often collect 
between 500, and 600 naira (about $3) and those who fail to cooperate are often  
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Table 7.1: Assessment of the Least Honest Public Institution by Household heads, 
 Enterprises and Public Officials (Percentage) 
 
 Households enterprises Public Officials 
Federal/State/LG Executive Council 11.3 7.1 3.8 
Political Party 10.2 6.1 36.3 
Members of National and State 
Assemblies 
4.3 3.8 3.2 
Internal Revenue Board 1.0 2.1 0.8 
Custom Authority 1.6 1.8 2.7 
State  Budget Authority 0.5 0.3 - 
Ministry of Commerce 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Ministry of Works and Transport 0.5 0.2 0.2 
Ministry of Agriculture and National 
Resources 
0.5 0.2 0.3 
Central Bank 1.2 1.o 0.3 
Office of the Accountant-General 
Federation/State 
1,6 1.5 1.9 
Ministry of Education 1.7 1.4 1.6 
Ministry of Health 0.7 0.7 0.3 
Public Registry (ID, Passport) 0.5 0.3 0.3 
Office of Social Welfare 0.2 - 0.8 
Post Office 0.7 1.6 0.7 
Police 30.4 25.7 32.7 
Traffic Police, Traffic Warden, FRSC 2.7 1.5 2.4 
Code of Conduct Bureau 0.1 1.2 0.4 
Court 4.1 2.4 2.9 
Office of Prosecutor (DPP) 0.7 1.3 1.1 
Municipal/Local Government 4.1 3.3 5.5 
State Government 1.5 1.0 1.6 
Water Board 1.4 5.1 1.8 
NEPA 4.1 1.7 8.4 
NITEL 0.3 0.7 0.8 
The Armed Forces/Military 1.8 1.8 1.5 
The News Media 0.7 0.3 1.0 
 
Source: World Bank Report (2001, 55) 
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seriously harassed and sometimes their vehicles could be impounded for days until 
they cooperate (Interview with a Market trader at Festact Town Lagos State -  26th 
July 2008) 
 
As a result of this, Nigerians do not have confidence in the police (see: Human 
Rights Watch 2007). In the discharge of their duties, the Nigerian police are 
extraordinarily empowered by law, which includes the use of coercion and lethal 
force. The Police can stop at will, question, and search and can issue citations, fines 
and may arrest without warrant, which provides them with ample opportunities for 
corruption. This may include the petty corruption already mentioned and small-scale 
bribery but may also extend to collusion with criminals to accepting kick- backs for 
looking the other way, in extorting regular pay-offs, or even in taking direct part in 
criminal activities. There are numerous reports detailing the existence of systematic 
corruption within the Nigerian police (see: TI Report 2004, Human Rights Watch 
2007 and Umeagbalasi and Ijeoma, 2010). This systematic abuse operates via lower 
ranking officers collecting bribes from road users, bus and taxi drivers, and passing 
on a certain amount to the station officer who then passes part on to the head of the 
police station, known as the district police officer (DPO). The DPO then makes 
returns to superior officers, which eventually extends to the top echelons of the 
police (see: TI Report 2004). A Civil Servant with the Federal Ministry of Justice 
describes the situation effectively in the following interview extract. 
 
“Corruption has always been endemic in the Nigerian police over the years. The 
former Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun, who stole N17 billion, 
institutionalised it. When Balogun was the IG, money was everything in the Police. A 
poor candidate pays between N25, 000 and N30, 000 before they are recruited into 
the Nigeria Police. Corruption is a normal thing that happens down the entire rank 
and file of the police. The majority of Nigerians do not report personal cases to the 
police anymore because both complainants and defendants are made to pay bribes. 
In some cases, the police pervert the cause of justice to favour a criminal suspect, 
when the price is right” (Research interview with Iluobe Agidigbi - Civil Servant, 
Federal Ministry of Justice, 28th April)   
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the unfortunate incident49 of the former 
inspector general of police, Tafa Balogun, only exemplifies the degree of wanton 
looting that occurs in high public offices. Nevertheless, the interviews also revealed 
the existence of somewhat different interpretations particularly amongst interviewees 
from civil society backgrounds. For example, a project officer with a 
nongovernmental organisation in Nigeria sees corruption within the Nigerian police 
force as a reflection of wider Nigerian society.  
 
“The problem of corruption is not peculiar to the Nigerian police, rather is a reflection 
of the endemic nature of corruption in our system. Public officials generally use the 
privileges of office to corruptly enrich themselves in Nigeria. People often perceive 
the police to be more corrupt because they are frequently involved in petty corruption 
in their dealing with members of the public on a daily basis. The corruption that 
happens at the top is even more harmful to our economy than the petty corruption 
within the police. Just like in every other sector of our public service, where low 
ranking officials often engage in petty corruption to supplement their low wages,  
many police officers are involved in corruption for the same reasons” (research 
interview with a Project Officer of a leading Nigerian nongovernmental organization -  
7th June 2008). 
 
Interestingly, while this project officer‟s view does not in any way suggest that the 
phenomenon of corruption is not pervasive within the Nigerian police, it does point to 
the fact that the phenomenon is generally pervasive across every sector and that the 
police is often perceived to be most corrupt because they openly demand bribes 
from members of the public in every-day situations. This situation may well explain 
the reason why the Nigerian police appear not have made much contribution to the 
nation‟s anti-corruption drive. 
 
7.2.3 The Nigerian Media 
 
The Nigerian media is the only professional group with a specific role under the 
constitution to serve as society‟s watchdog. Since 1859 when the first indigenous 
newspaper was published and 1999 when the Fourth Republic was inaugurated, the 
                                            
49
 Tafa Balogun, Nigeria‟s former police chief, was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment for looting and 
diverting over $52 million into a network of fifteen bank accounts (see: Lawson 2009). 
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Nigerian media has been actively involved in the process of nation building (Adesoji 
2010). By the provisions of section 6.6.c and section 22 of the 1999 Constitution 
(International Press Centre, nd), the media has an important role to play in 
governance, which includes the monitoring of governance and holding government 
accountable to the people.  
 
The Nigerian media represents one of the most vibrant on the Africa continent; 
particularly, in terms of exposing corruption in the public and private sectors (see: 
Ozekhome 2009). Even during times when it was dangerous for journalists to do so, 
the Nigerian press has contributed significantly to combating and preventing 
corruption in Nigeria, and the promotion of accountability, transparency and good 
governance. In terms of size and influence of the press in Africa, the Nigerian Press 
comes before those of South Africa and Kenya.  
 
Before independence in 1960, in its prolonged and articulate struggle against 
colonialism and later under the brutal and oppressive regimes of the Nigerian 
military, the Nigerian Press has remained vibrant. Some of the challenges faced by 
the media over the years have included the withdrawal of patronage (like the 
placement of government advertising), the promulgation of draconian rules and 
regulatory policies that were aimed at reducing the freedom of the press, 
harassment, intimidation and confiscation of assets belonging to the media as well 
as arbitrary arrest detention and frivolous trials (see: Mgbejume 1991, Oloruntola 
2007). However, despite these challenges, the press coverage of corruption among 
political office holders and the anti-corruption war has been remarkable (see: 
Sowunmi et al., 2010).    
 
For over a decade, since the establishment of the ICPC and EFCC in 2003, the 
media has demonstrated a good measure of interest in the government‟s anti-
corruption campaigns. There appear to have been open collaboration efforts by the 
media and anti-corruption agencies in tackling corruption, particularly, during the era 
of Ribadu‟s chairing of the EFCC. The press has followed up on cases of corruption 
investigated by the anti-corruption institutions, whilst the anti-corruption institutions 
on the other hand, have often investigated cases of corruption after their initial 
exposure by the press. This has received favourable comments from outside 
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observers. For example, the following extract from an interview with a Programme 
Officer at a leading International Agency in Nigeria, clearly expresses this sentiment.     
 
“I think the press have been doing a good job. They were very instrumental to the 
realisation of the new democracy, as they made the country ungovernable for the 
military, despite all the odds. For instance, in 1999, when the first speaker to the 
Federal House of Representatives, Salihu Buhary, falsified his age and academic 
qualification to clinch the exalted position, the News Magazine was the first to expose 
him and the magazine further pursued the allegations until Buhary was forced to 
resign. Similarly, in 2007, the press was the first to expose the first female speaker‟s 
scandal, Etteh Giwa, before she was invited by the EFCC and ICPC for an 
interrogation that eventually saw her out of office. Apart from making available 
current news about Nigeria on the internet every 24 hours, the press coverage of the 
corruption scandals and prosecution of two senate presidents, Tafa Balogun, the 
former Inspector-General of Police, and state governors was very remarkable” 
(Research interview with a Programme Officer at a leading International Agency in 
Nigeria, 17th June 2008). 
 
The extract above clearly explains the role of the Nigerian media in the anti-
corruption campaigns which have been waged since the establishment of the fourth 
republic. In addition to the press coverage on corruption, various privately owned 
television stations like the African Independent Television (AIT) have produced 
television programmes that provide a common platform for debates on state affairs, 
with some touching on corruption. It is, therefore, not surprising, that the Nigerian 
media was rated as the second most honest Nigerian institution in the NBS and 
EFCC Business Survey on Crime and Corruption (see: chapter 5.5, figure 5.6) and 
the most effective ant-corruption watchdog in the electronic survey conducted for this 
research (see: figure 7.1).    
 
However, despite the plaudits discussed above, the Nigerian media has also been 
heavily criticised from other quarters for lacking quality in terms of investigative 
journalism (Alyetan 2011). Apart from the consistent coverage of corruption 
scandals, as the conscience and watchdog of the public, perhaps the Nigerian press 
may need to do more in undertaking deep investigations about particular issues of 
public interest (see: Stapenhurst 2000). Another challenge that the Nigerian media 
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faces are the charges of bias that have been levelled at the style of coverage and 
the reporting of corruption investigations (see: Alyetan 2011). In 2007, for example, 
in an effort to protect their sponsors, some Nigerian newspapers conspired with 
some political elites facing corruption charges to discredit the anti-corruption 
campaign exercise championed by Nuhu Ribadu (the former EFCC Chairman). The 
following interview extract from an interview held with a very prominent lawyer and 
human rights activist in Lagos clearly described this situation.            
 
"I do not make my judgment by what I read in some Nigerian newspapers who own 
the newspapers that are crucifying the EFCC and Ribadu. The Nation is owned by 
Asiwaju Bola Tinubu, the Sun is owned by former governor Orji Uzor Kalu, the Daily 
Independent is owned by James Ibori and some of these actors even own some 
radio stations in Nigeria. The best thing these papers and their allies can do is to 
stigmatise the EFCC and Ribadu, particularly, when they are the people that Ribadu 
was prosecuting as EFCC boss" (Research Interview with a leading lawyer and 
human rights activist in Lagos-31th July 2008). 
 
This sentiment was also clearly expressed in the following extract by Femi Kuti50. 
According to Kuti, many Nigerian citizens have been deprived of their rights because 
of corruption and the media has done very little fighting against it.  
 
"I have not read Nigerian papers for a good nine years because of the corruption in 
journalism. The press encouraged Obasanjo's corrupt government. The press 
encouraged Yar'Adua. The press has encouraged this corruption by writing in 
support of one person or the other. If the press had been saying „no, we are not 
going to tolerate a bad government, give us electricity, good education, repair the 
roads,' the people will follow the press and Nigerians will be united. But because 
journalists are spreading the corruption, the masses have accepted this and now it is 
embedded in their psyche” (Kuti, 2009). 
 
Within this context, despite claims for the remarkable role of the Nigerian press in 
exposing corruption as suggested by Ozekhome, (2009), the continued widespread 
corruption, coupled with the fact that many of these private media bodies are owned 
                                            
50
 Femi Kuti is a very popular Nigerian musician and the eldest son of afrobeat pioneer Fela Kuti. These sentiments were 
expressed at an event organised by the Anyiam Osigwe Foundation, an organisation that is committed to promoting social 
edifying interaction between policy and the wider public, in Lagos Nigeria. 
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and financed by key political figures (godfathers), may perhaps, according to 
Adesina (2008), account for the reason why many journalists/media bodies often 
distort stories in favour of those who have compromised them.  
 
7.2.4 The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) 
 
The Code of Conduct Bureau is one of the Nigerian oversight agencies that were 
strengthened by Obasanjo‟s administration. It was first given legal status under the 
Babangida military regime and was established to maintain a high standard of public 
morality in the conduct of government business, and to ensure that the actions and 
behaviour of public officers conformed to the highest standard of public practices in 
terms of morality and accountability. Specifically, the duties of the Bureau include: 
crime prevention and investigation, promotion of public education and enlightenment 
amongst public officials and the constitutional provisions of assets declaration 
(Okogbule 2007). Those who default may be recommended for disciplinary actions 
(see: www.codeofconductbureau.com). Public officials are required by law to declare 
their assets, every four years while in office and at the end of their tenure in office. 
However, criticisms have continued to trail the bureau‟s activities, in terms of its 
efficiency in verifying the sources and accuracy of the value of assets declared by 
public officials.  One Director with the Code of Conduct Bureau clearly recognizes 
some of these limitations surrounding the activities of the Bureau in this extended 
interview extract.  
 
“The activities of the bureau require a lot of logistics and financial resources, which 
have been in very short supply. This has made the development of core personnel 
skills, verification, investigation and other functions of the Bureau a difficult task. The 
administration and verification of assets declarations involves a substantial volume of 
data, which can only be managed effectively using Information Technology. For 
example, in 2007 alone, the total number of forms that were issued was 100,750. 
This is a huge volume of data which could be very difficult to manage without 
adequate information technology in place” (Research interview with one Director, 
Code of Conduct Bureau, 31th May 2008) 
 
237 
 
There are also questions relating to the level of independence of the commission. 
The commission is established under the Presidency, which makes it vulnerable to 
partisan pressures by powerful political elites (see: Ughegbe 2007). The failure of the 
National Assembly to pass the freedom of information bill into law has also not 
helped in insuring strict compliance. This relates to the fact that information held by 
the Bureau is not accessible to members of the public, making it almost impossible 
for the various stakeholders like the media to verify the value of assets declared by 
public officials, as against the value of their actual assets. Given these issues, it is 
hardly surprising that the Bureau was ranked the 2nd least efficient institution in the 
electronic survey (see Table 7.1).  
 
7.2.5 The Independent Corrupt Practice and other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC) 
 
As discussed earlier in chapter 3 and elsewhere in this chapter, upon assuming 
office in 1999, former president Obasanjo, apparently disturbed by the alarming rate 
of corruption in the country, made the first bill he sent to the National Assembly, the 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 (CPA). The Independent 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), was thereafter 
established (Enweremadu and Okafor 2009). Headed by a retired judge of the Court 
of Appeal, Justice Mustapha Akanbi, the commission was mandated to investigate 
and prosecute reported cases of corruption. The commission acts mainly upon 
petition or report of corrupt allegations against public officials. However, the 
commission has been perceived as slow and relatively ineffective in its fight against 
corruption (Arowolo 2006 and Enweremadu 2010). One Director with the Ministry of 
Education describes some the challenges faced by the commission in the following 
interview extract. 
  
“From what I know of Justice Akanbi, I think he is noted for his uncompromising 
nature. When he was newly appointed to head the ICPC, he initially made some 
spirited attempts at investigating and prosecuting some state governors on 
allegations bordering on corruption. But about a year after, the situation returned 
back to the status quo as little progress appeared to have been achieved by the 
commission in fighting the problem. Some have blamed this on the National 
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Assembly leadership, for refusing to amend a section of the law establishing the 
commission. Other factors like the frivolous injunctions granted by the court, and the 
unnecessary delays in hearing corruption charges in court may have also 
contributed. However I think that, the EFCC was actually established to actually fill 
this gap” (Research interview with one Director of the Ministry of Education – 15 
April, 2008). 
 
These views were also shared by the Chief Editor of a leading Nigeria Newspaper. 
This interviewee is even more critical of the EFCC and ICPC‟s role in the fight 
against corruption in Nigeria. 
 
“Corruption is still wide spread, despite the establishment of the ICPC and EFCC. 
Some of us are beginning ask certain questions about the reason why the ICPC was 
set up in the first place, because it appeared not to be in existence or overwhelmed 
by the dynamics involved in the manifestation of corruption in Nigeria, such that 
people now often describe it as a mere informative/educative agency. This situation 
has further been compounded by the countries criminal justice system, which has 
remained an obstructive impediment to the commission‟s anti-corruption crusade. 
The indiscriminate court injunctions and frequent adjournments of court proceedings 
have rendered ineffective adjudication of corruption cases” (Research interview with 
the Chief Editor of a leading Nigerian Newspaper - 18th June 2008) 
       
The above narratives illustrates some of the challenges faced by the ICPC, which 
perhaps may account for the reason why the commission is perceived as not very 
efficient in its anti-corruption activities (see: earlier discussion in chapter 5, figure 
5.6). This is also reflected in figure 7.1, where the ICPC was ranked the fourth (3.22) 
most effective amongst the six anti-graft agencies considered in the electronic 
survey. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 3.8 it was due to these perceived 
inefficiencies within the ICPC that the EFCC was established in 2003.     
 
7.2.6 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission  
 
The need for the establishment of the EFCC was informed by the failure of the ICPC 
to effectively tackle the problems associated with corruption in Nigeria after three 
years of its establishment. The EFCC, under the headship of Ribadu, worked closely 
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with other anti-corruption departments like the Nigerian Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) and the Budget Monitoring Price Intelligence Unit 
(BMPIU), to help institutionalise a culture of transparency and accountability in public 
office and improve the battered image of Nigeria both at home and abroad.  The 
following interview extract from an interview with a Nigerian human rights advocate 
and anti-corruption activist, puts forward the argument that the EFCC, under Ribadu, 
was a breath of fresh air in a corruption-infested society like Nigeria. It captures the 
general sentiment of civil society groups, both in Nigeria and abroad towards the 
EFCC. 
 
“There was a time in this country, when the internet fraudsters like Fred Ajudua and 
Emmeka Nwude were going about everywhere in a convoy of posh cars, without 
questions from state security and anti-corruption agents. But however, the day I saw 
Nuhu Ribadu giving out a cheque to the Brazilian banker, Nelson Sakaguchi, who 
was defrauded by the Nigerian fraudsters; uncontrollably, tears ran down my cheeks. 
The EFCC used to be an unprecedented success, because of the committed efforts 
of the leadership of the organization” (Research interview with a Nigerian human 
rights advocate and anti-corruption activist - June 15, 2008). 
 
Many Nigerians believed that the success of the EFCC, under Ribadu, represented a 
departure from the old norms of anything goes. When corrupt public officials and 
fraudsters realised that it was no longer business as usual, that no matter how highly 
placed, that they were being brought to justice, they themselves adjusted their 
perceptions and some of them without prompting, took action to safeguard and 
sanitize their own business and investment environments. Nevertheless, the 
commission‟s anti-corruption activities under Ribadu, have also themselves been 
criticised for a number of reasons (see: Eweremadu 2010).   
 
Whilst the research interviews generally supported the positive assessments of 
Ribadu and the EFCC which have been presented so far within this section, it is true 
to say there are two schools of thought on this issue. There are those like Gani 
(leading Nigerian lawyer and human rights activist) and the former Senate president, 
Ken Unnemani, who applaud the EFCC, under Ribadi but there are others who have 
raised serious questions over the methodologies employed. Ribadu‟s supporters 
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generally argue that tackling entrenched corruption justified whatever measures that 
may have been employed by the former chief of the commission. The question was 
not whether his methods were acceptable but rather whether those accused of 
corruption were actually innocent of the charges against them. On the other hand, 
people like Lanke Odogiyon and Olisa Agbakoba (both are former Presidents of the 
Nigerian Bar Association) are representative of those that are more antagonistic 
towards the EFCC‟s former chief. They suggest that the commission at this time was 
nothing but an extra-judicial body riding roughshod over the constitution in the name 
of an anti-corruption crusade. This group also argue that the successes of the EFCC 
came only at the expense of the constitutional rights of many of its victims. An 
extract from an interview with a former President of the Nigerian Bar Association 
clearly expresses this school of thought on this issue.  
  
The EFCC under Ribadu, lacked in terms of professional practise in its conduct of the 
anti-corruption campaign exercise. Instead of focusing on the establishment of a solid 
institution that will stand the test of time by adhering to the dictates of the law, 
emphases were placed on individualism. For instance, by virtue of our constitution, 
an accused is declared innocent, until the court of law determines otherwise. Thus, 
when an arrest is made on account of a corruption allegation, the constitution 
stipulates that suspects cannot be detained for more than 24 hours before charges 
are profiled against them before the court. But the EFCC under Ribadu failed to 
comply with this constitutional provision. He even labelled them criminals before their 
cases are heard in the court, which should not be the case, but then he was also 
perceived to be selective. I am not saying the anti-corruption fight should not 
continue and be sustained, but instead the point that I am trying to make is that, it 
should be done within the rule of law” (Research interview with a former President, 
Nigeria Bar Association – 19 June, 2008)  
 
According to Gani (2008), critics like the former president of the NBA, may be 
resentful of the work of the commission under Ribadu, since some of their biggest 
clients (for example state governors) were targets of the commission‟s investigation 
and prosecution. 
 
There is yet another group of interviewees (mainly in the civil service) who also think 
that the EFCC at a time (particular in 2007) served as a weapon for fighting political 
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opponents of former president Obasanjo. One top civil servant of the National 
Assembly Commission, describe this issue in the following extract.  
 
“I used to have much respect for the EFCC and Rubadi until 2007 when it became 
obvious that the EFCC had deviated from the initial excellent job that he was doing. 
In a desperate bid to stay unto power, the EFCC became a tool for blackmailing and 
silencing political opponents into submission by Obasanjo. I think that was Ribadu‟s 
greatest mistake, because it was like a pot calling a kettle black.” (Research interview 
with one of the Directors - National Assembly Commission - 17th April 2008)  
 
This alludes to Lawson‟s argument (2009,) that the failure of Obasanjo to alter the 
constitution to pave the way for his return to office for a third time, led to the EFCC 
becoming a weapon for witch-hunting political opponents. Nevertheless, despite 
these criticisms, according to Justice Mustapha Akanbi, pioneer chairman of the 
ICPC, what remains clear is that Ribadu did succeed in instilling a form of attitudinal 
change in the country. 
 
"I am not saying that Ribadu was perfect. But whatever he must have done, he 
worked hard in instilling fear into the hearts of corrupt people. He worked hard to 
ensure that everybody was on his toes. It was like the Buhari/Idiagbon 
administration, you dare not get to your office late. I think it is good for Nigeria to 
once in a while, produce characters who are tough but diligent and the nation must 
appreciate them" (Igbanoi 2009). 
 
The achievements of the EFCC under Ribadu were outlined in Chapter 3.8 Similarly, 
as outlined in chapter 5, it is clearly obvious that Nigeria‟s position in TI‟s CPI 
surveys witnessed some progress in the years after the creation of the EFFC in 2003 
(see: table 5.4) before declining in the last few years as Ribadu‟s influence has 
waned. In addition, the EFCC was rated by businesses as the best performing and 
least corrupt institution in the NBS and EFCC Business Survey on Crime and 
Corruption conducted in 2007 (see: figure 5.6), and the second most effective anti-
corruption institution in the country in the electronic survey (as shown in figure 7.1).   
The achievements of the EFCC were, however, greatly enhanced by the support it 
received from the international community. Therefore, the section that follows will 
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move on to explore the influence and perceived level of effectiveness of international 
donor‟s involvement in anti-corruption activities in Nigeria.  
 
7.3 Corruption in Nigeria: International Donors Support 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there has been a dramatic increase of international 
interest in corruption since the 1990s, both in terms of exposing the degree to which 
corruption exists and in formulating measures by which it could be curtailed (see: 
Brown and Cloke 2004). As explained previously, in the year 2001, due in part to 
pressure from the international community (such as possible dept relief by the Paris 
Club), the Nigerian government, under Obasanjo, introduced a series of policy 
reforms (already discussed in section 7.1.2 of the chapter) to curb corruption and 
build more transparent and effective institutions. 
  
The primary anti-corruption agencies like the ICPC and EFCC in particular (under 
Ribadu), established financial ties with international partners, which helped to 
increase their institutional capacity. For instance, during the early stage of the EFCC, 
the international community helped to deploy the instruments of the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF)51 to help kick-start necessary reforms, which provided the EFCC 
with a model for building the strong national reform programmes needed to clean up 
the financial institutions and bring to justice those who sought to undermine them 
(see:  Lawson 2009).   
 
The EFCC‟s efforts under Ribadu were supported by various international institutions 
like the United Nations and many bilateral institutions (such as the US Secret 
Service, the FBI, the US Postal Service, and the Department of Justice, others 
include the British Council and Department for International Development). By late 
2007, the EFCC had received over $37 million from the European Union, individual 
European governments, the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Program (EFCC 2006). The major part of these funds were used for infrastructural 
development, including the construction of the EFCC Training and Research Institute 
and a Data Centre at EFCC headquarters, with additional support from the US, for 
                                            
51
The intentional Action Task Force is an inter-governmental organisation which develops and promotes policies, both at the 
national and international levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (FATF, nd)        
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training 800 prosecutors, valued at an additional $1 million (Ribadu 2006). In 
addition, Ribadu established ties with other law enforcement agencies across the 
world, these included INTERPOL, the UK Metropolitan Police, the US FBI, the 
Canadian Mounted Police and the South African „Scorpions‟ giving the EFCC a 
connection to anti-corruption campaigns in other parts of the globe where most of the 
resources appropriated through corruption are kept (Ribadu 2006: 30).  
 
In efforts to also support more effective oversight functions in the national assembly, 
the US have also worked with international and domestic civil society organisations 
to promote transparency, accountability and the rule of law. These efforts were 
focused on legislative support for greater transparency in the budget process by 
establishing the National Assembly Budget and Research Office (NABRO) in 2007 
and the inclusion of civil society in the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative Process (NEITI) in 2004 (see: Bryan and Hofmamann 2007).   
 
Clearly then, the Nigerian government has over the years, particularly since the 
return to democracy, enjoyed support of various kinds from the international 
agencies in its bid to clamp down on corruption. However, several criticisms have 
targeted the mode and effectiveness of the international donors‟ support to the 
nation‟s anti-corruption exercise. The debate has spawned several different schools 
of thought. There are those (particularly officials from the major anti-corruption 
agencies in Nigeria) who believe that the anti-corruption reforms such as the civil 
service reform, the establishment of more transparent public procurement processes 
and the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), which were all 
undertaken under the Obasanjo‟s administration with the support of the international 
donors, were remarkable. Those subscribing to this school of thought assert that the 
successes recorded by the administration of Obasanjo‟s anti-corruption campaigns 
were only possible as a result of the support they enjoyed from the donor 
community. Those working in the EFCC were certainly appreciative of the support 
which they received from the international community at the time as the following 
interview extract clearly expresses.   
 
“I believe that Obasanjo‟s administration, particularly the EFCC and ICPC, have 
benefited immensely from bilateral and multilateral donor agencies since the year 
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2000. These include capacity building and financial support. For instance, in 2003, 
the British Council and DFID assisted the EFCC in equipping our training school, 
setting up of our financial intelligence unit and special money laundering control units 
in the federal ministry of commerce. The international donor agencies applications in 
law enforcement have made it possible for us to recover assets worth millions of 
dollars. The anti-corruption war is not something you can do alone. You need 
partnership and co-operation from other countries to successfully tackle cross-border 
crimes like identity theft, credit card fraud, money laundering and advanced fee fraud. 
As such, I would say that success in the anti-corruption campaign, as recorded so 
far, is significantly due to the supports we have received from the members of the 
international community” (Research interview with a Senior Investigation officer, 
EFCC  July 24 2008) 
 
Certainly the success story of the EFCC‟s anti-corruption drive, under Ribadu, would 
not be complete without acknowledging the support and efforts of the international 
donors. However, it may be that the design of anti-corruption activities in Nigeria and 
their clear heavy focus on institution building and governance reforms may be part of 
the reason why the improvements under Ribadu were not sustained in the longer 
term. This appears to underscore the argument by UNODCCP (1999: 9), referred to 
in chapter 2.7.3, which suggested that many of the anti-corruption reforms promoted 
by international donor organisations appear to be working mainly with the executive 
arm of government and specific anticorruption institutions, while down-playing the 
role of civil society. Another salient issue which arose during several of the research 
interviews were the perceived imbalances in the global anti-corruption campaigns. 
As discussed in previous chapters, those on this side of the divide (political officials 
in particular) argued that the international anti-corruption campaigns appear to have 
focused more on public and political official‟s bribery in the developing countries and 
Nigeria in particular, while bribe givers from Western Countries and the activities of 
off-shore havens and Western Banks where these looted funds from Nigeria are 
kept, appear to remain unchallenged. A member of the Federal House of 
Representatives even goes as far as arguing in a research interview that: 
 
The majority of these international donors that claimed to be fighting corruption are 
hypocritical. For example, they talk about privatisation, deregulation and civil service 
reforms as the antidote to eliminating corruption, but in the UK and America for 
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example, the government provide the poor people with social security systems and 
their multinationals pay bribes to secure lucrative contracts in our country. The issue 
is that no one is making noise over foreign multinationals who pay bribes or those 
Banks in the West where the stolen money is kept. But almost all the discussions 
have been centred around the developing country as if they are not corrupt as well” 
(Research Interview with a Representative Member of the National Assembly - July 
7, 2008) 
 
The law maker‟s view is perhaps illustrative of the ways in which officials in 
developing countries have frequently been very defensive in global anti-corruption 
debates. The controversies trailing the global anti-corruption exercises are also 
surely related to the ambiguity and lack of agreement regarding the meaning, 
causes, and measurement of corruption. Nevertheless, insight gleaned from 
discussions in chapters two and three does seem to suggest that, whilst much 
activity is being devoted internationally to address the demand side of corruption 
through the types of anti-corruption reforms already mentioned in the chapter, more 
attention is now also being directed towards addressing the supply side of 
corruption via various international anti-corruption laws and treaties. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter began by highlighting the various anti-corruption strategies and 
approaches of different governments in Nigeria. Over the years, successive 
government regimes have enacted a series of decrees and varieties of anti-
corruption measures for dealing with the problem of corruption in Nigeria. However, 
despite all of these anti-corruption measures, as we have seen from the discussion 
above, corruption appears to remain unabated in Nigeria. The chapter examined 
various anti-corruption programmes of successive governments (both military and 
civilian) to better understand why this trend has remained the case, despite the 
existence of anti-corruption laws for dealing with the problem. One of the most 
important observations to emerge from the chapter is that a combination of factors 
(such as the unusually severe inconsistencies in anti-corruption policy 
implementation, the general lack of sustained and genuine political commitment of 
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governments to fight corruption and the lack of preventive measures to deal with the 
root causes of corruption) account for why corruption remains unabated, despite the 
various anti-corruption laws and activities initiated by successive governments. 
However, another important observation was that some degrees of progress were 
made during Obasanjo‟s administration (1999/2007), specifically after the 
establishments of the ICPC and the EFCC in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Despite 
this progress, critics have argued that Obasanjo‟s anti-corruption campaigns were 
aimed to mollify the international donor agencies, while using anti-corruption policies 
and agencies as instruments for witch hunting political opponents and reinforcing 
the personal loyalty of others. Nevertheless, whatever the validity of these 
suggestions, what is clear is that, for all of its limitations, the anti-corruption 
campaign exercise during Obasanjo‟s administration does appear to have 
succeeded in making some serious impacts in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. 
In addition, we also saw in the chapter how regime change can severely influence 
anti-corruption reforms. Following the exit of Obasanjo in 2007, the general 
perception is that the anti-corruption campaign became increasingly inefficient under 
Yaradua‟s administration. While some have argued that the government was 
protective of certain public officials (particularly former governors who assisted in his 
election) accused of corruption by the major anti-corruption institutions, others also 
suggested that key anti-corruption crusaders themselves (who were loyal to former 
president Obasanjo) became the object of persecution and prosecution by 
Yaradua‟s administration. 
The main body of the chapter then moved on to consider opinions regarding the role 
and impacts of key anti-corruption institutions in the fight against corruption in 
Nigeria and the key challenges which they face, in order to better understand why 
the problem of corruption seems to remain unabated in Nigeria despite the fact that 
some of these institutions have existed since independence in 1960. While the 
capacity of some of these institutions to control corruption has clearly been 
undermined by corruption within these institutions themselves, others have been 
seen as convenient tools for witch hunting political opponents. The credibility, 
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productivity and efficiency of the Judiciary52 in the fight against corruption for 
instance, were shown to have been undermined by corruption within the judicial 
system. In a similar vein, the effectiveness of the police in preventing crime and 
maintaining law and order was also shown to have been seriously undermined by 
corruption across the rank-and-file in the Nigeria police force. In addition, whilst the 
media was shown to have been the most trusted of anti-corruption institutions, it has 
itself not been spared from accusations of corruption and partiality. On the other 
hand, while the more recent anti-corruption institutions such as EFCC and ICPC 
have not been particularly perceived as corrupt, these anti-corruption institutions are 
said have often been instrumentalised for disciplining or protecting followers 
(loyalists) and witch hunting political opponents.  
 
The final part of the chapter examined the influence and perceived level of 
effectiveness of international donor‟s involvement in the fight against corruption in 
Nigeria. The Nigerian government and its institutions have enjoyed some level of 
international support in their efforts to tackle the problem of corruption since the 
return to democracy in 1999. Although this international support has been useful, 
particularly in relation to the initial progress achieved by EFCC during Obasanjo‟s 
administration, the influence of the international institutions has perhaps been to 
induce a focus on institution building and governance reforms which may be part of 
the reason why the improvements under Ribadu were not sustained in the longer 
term. Thus, the chapter argued that for a more sustained struggle against anti-
corruption, the design and implementation of anti-corruption reforms may require the 
much more active involvement of civil society. This is an issue which is returned to in 
more detail in the conclusion to the thesis. 
  
                                            
52
 The fight against corruption depends upon a fair and impartial judicial system for enforcement. To inspire public confidence in 
the judicial process, the judiciary should not only be seen as transparent but also as an institution that adheres to the rule of 
law.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
This chapter draws together the major findings of this thesis and explores the 
contribution of this study to our understanding of the complex relationship between 
governance and development in Africa by zooming in on the complexities involved in 
the manifestation of corruption in Nigeria. For the purposes of clarity, to distil the 
essential elements of the contribution of this study, the ensuing discussion is 
organised thematically around the thesis‟ research aims and objectives which were 
initially articulated in chapter 2. These aims and objectives were expressed in the 
following way: 
 
1. To provide a historical overview on competing perspectives on the relationship 
between Governance, Corruption and Economic Development in the Nigerian 
context. 
 
2. To analyse the different interpretations of major stakeholders over the perceived 
degree of corruption in Nigeria, its major causes and its effects on Nigeria‟s 
economic development trajectory. 
 
3. To assess the perceived effectiveness of the Nigerian government‟s anti-
corruption initiatives and institutions, as expressed by major stakeholders. 
 
4. To examine the role of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in promoting 
the idea of good governance and anti-corruption strategies in Nigeria. 
 
Before beginning however, I would like to reflect briefly upon what I consider to be 
perhaps the most essential contribution of this thesis to the broader debate over 
governance and underdevelopment in Africa. To the best of my knowledge, this 
thesis represents one of very few studies of corruption in Africa that (on the basis of 
extensive and detailed analyses of a variety of views from both external and 
domestic stakeholders) has attempted to assess the complex interplay between the 
historical patterns of poor governance, corruption and development experience and 
the implementation of anti-corruption reforms in Africa. The treatment of these issues 
in this thesis has hopefully provided a unique contribution to our understanding of the 
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critical questions surrounding these issues through its detailed exploration of the 
factors underlying Nigeria‟s continued experience of underdevelopment/poverty in 
the midst of plenty. One of the major themes to emerge from the thesis, at least 
within the Nigerian context, is the importance of understanding the inter-relationships 
between external influences and domestic factors within the evolution of attitudes 
towards corruption, as well as how it might be combated. For example the decisive 
shift in policy towards corruption under Obasanjo did not occur just because of some 
change in the political will of the President to do something about corruption during 
his second term in office, it occurred because of the interplay between the President 
and other important political actors, growing internal dissatisfaction with the status 
quo and important changes in external expectations regarding governance, 
corruption and access to concessional finance. In more general terms the thesis has 
addressed in several chapters the importance of combining action on supply and 
demand in relation to corruption and Nigeria provides a good exemplar of why this is 
important.     
 
8.1 Competing Perspectives on the Relationship between Governance, 
Corruption and Development Experience in Nigeria: An Historical Overview 
 
One of the central arguments of the thesis is that the problem of underdevelopment 
in the midst of fabulous oil wealth in Nigeria is intimately connected to the historical 
patterns of poor governance and the endemic corruption which appears to have 
taken root in the country since 1960 when Nigeria attained independence. Over the 
years, there has not been a lack of state polices designed to boost overall levels of 
economic development, improve living standards or tackle poverty in Nigeria but, as 
argued in the preceding chapters, decades of poor governance and large-scale 
corruption have meant that successive development strategies, new initiatives and 
changes in direction have seldom proved successful.  The thesis has traced how 
since independence in 1960 the failure to provide effective institutional frameworks 
for the transparent management of public resources and the control of corruption by 
successive governments have led to the wholesale looting of public funds.  Clearly, 
(along with other factors such as the colonial legacy and the devastating civil war) 
endemic corruption and failures of governance at the federal, state and local levels 
have constituted a major source of the disconnect between Nigeria‟s oil wealth and 
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its abysmally high levels of poverty. As argued in chapter 5, corruption appears to be 
a major feature of the circumstances which have combined to produce a situation 
where approximately 80% of Nigeria‟s oil wealth is concentrated in the hands of only 
1% of the population (public officials and economic elites), while over 70 percent of 
the population live below the poverty line (see: Unicef 2003 and World Bank 2006). 
 
Chapter five of the thesis provided a wide range of evidence to suggest that, whilst 
there is some disagreement over the causes of corruption (as discussed below); 
most Nigerians clearly view corruption in government institutions as one of the major 
problems militating against socio-economic development in Nigeria. For example, in 
the 2001 World Bank survey (see table 5.5) corruption in the public sector was 
considered by households as the second most important factor accounting for 
underdevelopment in Nigeria.   
 
The historical elements to the analysis conducted in the thesis together suggest that 
Nigeria is perhaps an exemplar of the view put forward in the review of the general 
literature on governance conducted in Chapter One, which argued that the quality of 
institutions and public management is integral to sustainable economic development. 
Rather than enhance good governance by increasing transparency, accountability 
and equity in the distribution and management of public resources for the common 
good, the thesis argues that Nigeria‟s governance and democratic experience has 
been characterised by wide-spread corruption at all levels of governance which has 
continuously posed a major threat to development and poverty reduction.  
 
8.1.1 Corruption in Nigeria: Dominant Perspectives over its Magnitude, Major 
Impacts and Causation 
 
Nigeria has frequently been presented as one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world by external observers but little previous work had explored the diversity of 
internal perspectives on the extent, major impacts and causation of corruption in the 
country. This thesis has provided a unique and detailed analysis of these issues via 
the perceptions of a large variety of stakeholders for an in-depth understanding of 
the historical complexities involved in the general pattern of the manifestation of 
corruption in Nigeria and how these complexities are inter-related.  
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Nigeria comes across as a country that is highly perceived to be corrupt and this is 
clearly evident in it poor performances in the TI‟s global index. Chapter five provided 
a detailed analytical discussion of Nigeria‟s position within the TI corruption 
perceptions index. As outlined there, between 1980 and 1996, Nigeria consistently 
scored very low in the TI historical index and was perceived as the most corrupt 
amongst the fifty four countries considered in the survey during this period. In a 
similar vein, between 1997 and 2004 (shortly after the EFCC was established in 
2003), Nigeria‟s performance in the newly established annual index was also not 
impressive. During this period, Nigeria was consistently perceived by contributors to 
the TI surveys as either the most or second most corrupt country in the world (see: 
section 5.1 for more details). In a similar vein, the 2001 World Bank survey gave a 
strong indication that Nigerians (in surveys conducted with public officials, 
businesses and households) view corruption as a, if not the, major problem affecting 
their country (see detailed discussions in chapter five). At the same time, the majority 
of private enterprises that were interviewed in the same survey admitted that they 
often gave bribes in order to access basic services. For example, a combined total of 
69.4% of private enterprises in the World Bank survey admitted that they always, 
mostly or frequently gave bribes to officials in order to get government contracts, 
while only 6.8% of them suggested that they seldom/never had to give bribes. 
Additionally, the 2007 NBC/EFCC survey revealed that, 76% of the surveyed 
business executives identified high levels of criminal activities as the most serious 
problem to doing business in Nigeria, whilst 71% of them also indicated that endemic 
corruption in the system was a serious obstacle to doing business in Nigeria. These 
views were further supported by the dominant views expressed by respondents in 
the electronic survey undertaken for this research where endemic corruption was 
identified as the most serious problem Nigeria faces today (see: chapter 5, section 
5.3 for more details). This trend was also confirmed by the research interviews 
where interviewee after interviewee, despite expressing differences over the 
causation of corruption or how to combat it, agreed that corruption was a massively 
significant phenomenon in Nigeria. In summary therefore, from the staggering figures 
involved in the cases of stolen public funds which have come to light, the external 
perceptions of the high levels of corruption in Nigeria (as we saw in the historical 
data from the TI indexes) and the dominant views expressed by households, public 
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officials and businesses in the various surveys as well as the dominant views held by 
Nigerians in the electronic survey and the interviews, one can easily come to the 
conclusion that corruption is generally perceived to be an all pervasive issue in 
Nigeria.  
 
Chapter six moved the debate on to consider in more detail the variety of views on 
how corruption has affected development in Nigeria. This was particularly useful in 
reflecting upon the issues first raised in chapter 2.6, surrounding the effects of 
corruption upon socio-economic development and poverty. The discussion began by 
briefly turning to the results of the 2001 World Bank survey again. The World Bank 
study revealed that patronage of public office and the paying of bribes to public 
officials to avoid tax regulations were generally perceived by households, 
businesses, and public officials in the survey as the corrupt acts that had the most 
important impacts upon them.  The singling-out of patronage of state office as one of 
the most important impacts of corruption in the survey was also reflected in the 
interview data, where it was suggested by some interviewees that Nigerian public 
officials often tend to favour people from their own ethnic backgrounds when they 
are in position of power53 (see Chapter 6.2.2). This can be connected to Ajetumobi‟s 
(1991) and Guest (2004: 120) work referred to in chapter 3, which connected the 
historical pattern of sectional politics and patronage of state office to the character of 
the Nigerian state.  
 
One of the debates considered in chapter 2 concerned the cloud of ambiguity 
surrounding the effects of corruption on economic development. It will be recalled 
that it was suggested in chapter 2 that there is no fixed correlation between the 
incidence of corruption and the level or quality of economic development in a 
particular country and the experience of China was presented as a country which 
has both the phenomenon of economic growth and high levels of corruption. It was 
also however suggested that in reality, the direct and indirect cost of corruption in 
China, such as the widened gap between the rich and the poor, are enormous (see: 
Pei 2007). This thesis sheds further light on this issue; interviewees from a wide 
range of sectors indicated a variety of ways in which they believed that corruption 
                                            
53
 By awarding them lucrative contracts, government employments or appointments in choice government agencies.  
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had negatively impacted Nigerian development. For example, while some (for 
example several of the academics interviewed) were more critical about the impacts 
of corruption on the levels and direction of public spending, others (mainly from the 
private sector) were more concerned about its impacts on basic infrastructures.  In 
the case of the former, there were expressions of concern that corruption often leads 
to waste and leakages in public revenues. Several respondents Illustrated this view 
via reference to the activities of particular state governors and cases where 
substantial amounts of state resources (up to 75% of state budgets in the most 
extreme cases) had been corruptly diverted into personal foreign bank accounts, 
thereby disproportionately limiting the capacity of government to provide basic 
infrastructural services such as good roads, electricity, well functioning schools and 
hospitals etc. Other interviewees also emphasized the impacts of corruption on 
infrastructural projects and other basic services, providing a series of illustrations of 
how the failures of successive governments to provide basic infrastructures such as 
good roads and electricity have adversely affected economic and business activities, 
a situation which has had an influence upon the movement of industries from Nigeria 
to other neighbouring African countries where the costs of production is much lower 
(see chapter 6.1.2 where these issues were discussed in more detail and also 
Owonibi (2001) for a detailed interview with the consular general of the Ghanaian 
Embassy, Sylvester Allortey, on the impacts of corruption in Nigeria upon the 
migration of industries from Nigeria to Ghana).  
 
The second part of Chapter 6 moved on to explore in detail the different 
interpretations of major stakeholders over the complexities surrounding the major 
features and causes of corruption in Nigeria. This was particularly useful in shedding 
some more light on the discussions in chapter 2; section 2.6 where some of the 
debates over the major causes of corruption were generally articulated. One theme 
that emerged from the interviews was a reinforcement of the key role of the periods 
of military rule in the consolidation of a „culture of impunity‟ and corruption in Nigeria. 
Whilst the incidence of corruption cannot be limited to the periods of military rule (as 
we saw in section 3.3, corruption has also been a major issue in Nigeria‟s 
democratic experience), many interviewees argued strongly that the prolonged 
periods of military rule (with the exception of Buhari‟s regime) had played a major 
role in institutionalizing corruption in Nigeria. As argued in detail in chapter six, the 
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military distorted the constitution and denigrated the rule of law and democratic 
oversight structures. During the successive military regimes, democratic values were 
supplanted by decrees and military councils and tribunals, these regimes were also 
generally perceived to be repressive and hostile to members of civil society and the 
press. This period, particularly during Ibrahim Babangida‟s administration, was 
characterised by the use of state powers and resources as tools for acquiring 
political support and legitimacy, this situation was linked partly to the complexities 
surrounding the character of the Nigerian state (which makes Nigeria a difficult 
country to govern under any circumstances: see. Ajetumobi, 1991, Easterly and 
Levine 1997: 1214). As argued in the previous section, one of these complexities 
relates to the role of ethnic and religious sentiments within Nigerian political culture. 
Religion and inter-ethnic loyalties are often stronger than loyalty to the state in 
Nigeria, this perhaps may account for part of the reasons why Nigeria‟s post-
independence political trajectory has seen various fragmented groups engage in 
bitter struggles over power and the control of state resources (see: Guest 2004: 
120). The research interviews frequently touched on this issue with a range of 
interviewees suggesting that ethnic sentiment and solidarity have been major 
elements that have continued to ferment the culture of impunity and endemic 
corruption in Nigeria. This re-enforces Nwosu, (1977) suggestions, as discussed in 
chapter 2, which noted that, many African leaders, and public officials have tended to 
see government positions as avenues to advance their personal and family interests 
via the exploitation of the conflict of interest between ethnic groups and the low 
social stigma attached to corruption (particular when such corrupt acts are potentially 
meant to benefit one‟s own ethnic background). This connects to the view often 
expressed in the interviews that Nigerians easily forgive, indeed they sometimes 
celebrate, indicted public officials (on corruption charges) when they come from their 
own ethnic background, and that they also frequently come to the defence of the 
perpetrators if they are members of their own tribes and communities (see: Osaghae 
1998: 21). Nevertheless, as argued in chapter 6, an adequate explanation for the 
widespread tolerance for corruption in Nigerian society must go beyond ethnic 
sentiments, it also involves the historical belief that the state does not belong to any 
one. This is an attitude that is said to have taken root during the colonial era. 
Historical research has suggested that during this period it was deemed acceptable 
to steal from the state because the people generally felt alienated from control over 
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state affairs; hence any acts of sabotage to undermine or frustrate the colonial 
administration at that time were tolerated or indeed celebrated. There is a strong 
suggestion amongst many commentators and several of the interviewees that these 
historical attitudes, reinforced by the general lack of patriotic disposition toward state 
affairs, have been allowed to remain since independence in 1960.  Nevertheless, this 
would certainly have been the case in many other African nations which have not 
enjoyed the same reputation for corruption which Nigeria has suffered from during 
the years since independence. 
 
Alongside the role of the periods of military rule, the fragmented nature of the 
Nigerian state and the impacts of the colonial legacy, another important issue which 
was high-lighted by some interviewees in discussing the specificities of the causation 
of corruption in Nigeria was the role of Godfatherism54 in Nigeria politics. The 
phenomenon of godfatherism, as first discussed in chapter 3, has had an important 
impact in Nigeria‟s political space and the dynamics of Nigerian political culture. 
Individual godfathers clearly exercise enormous control over important aspects of 
Nigerian political life, such as appointment opportunities and the management of 
public resources. This phenomenon and other factors such as the low salaries and 
poor incentives of public officials in Nigeria were connected by respondents to the 
general lack of efficiency, the culture of impunity and petty and major corruption that 
have come to characterise public institutions in Nigeria (although there was also a 
recognition that poor conditions exist in the public sectors of other countries without 
the same apparent influence upon corruption levels). Finally, the lack of political will 
of successive government regimes to tackle corruption (which to some extent, has 
also been associated with the complexities surrounding the character of the Nigeria 
state), has had a cumulative negative influence upon the independence and 
effectiveness of major anti-corruption institutions (with particular emphases on the 
judiciary) in the fight against corruption.  
 
 
                                            
54
 Godfatherism is a broad concept, built on the belief that certain individuals have considerable 
powers to unilaterally determine who gets elected or appointed into government office (see: Gambo, 
2006:88). 
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8.1.2 Corruption in Nigeria: Perceived Effectiveness of Nigeria’s Government 
Anti-corruption Initiatives and Institutions 
Having explored Nigerian stakeholders‟ views on the extent, impacts and causation 
of corruption in chapter six, chapter seven moved on to place the various anti-
corruption initiatives and institutions that have been initiated over the years in Nigeria 
within the context of the issues discussed within the preceding chapters. As outlined 
in the chapter, successive governments have initiated a series of legal and 
educational approaches for dealing with the problem of corruption in Nigeria. Most 
military regimes (with few exceptions) came to power promising to stamp out 
corruption by enacting a series of decrees and special military tribunals for dealing 
with corruption, ironically they often left the government apparently far more corrupt 
than their predecessors. The analysis presented in the chapter suggested that a 
combination of factors including the ad-hoc and draconian nature of the majority of 
government anti-corruption approaches, the general lack of political will or genuine 
commitment to anti-corruption reform implementation and the lack of preventive 
mechanisms for dealing with the root causes of corruption, were major factors in 
understanding why corruption appears to remain unabated in Nigeria despite these 
efforts.  
Much of chapter 7 was devoted to analyzing the anti-corruption measures initiated 
under the fourth republic administration of Olushegun Obasanjo which was noted for 
arguably achieving some measure of progress in fighting corruption in Nigeria, 
particularly shortly after the establishment of the ICPC and EFCC. Most 
interviewees, for example, acknowledged the progress made by institutions such as 
the EFCC in prosecuting some high ranking public officials during Obasanjo‟s 
administration. Interviewees remarked upon the fact that this kind of prosecution 
would have been unimaginable during previous administrations and attributed its 
success at least partly to the involvement and support (financial and technical) from 
international donor agencies. Despite the acknowledgement of progress under 
Obasanjo expressed by many of the interviewees, this was not a universally-held 
view and the sincerity of Obasanjo‟s anti-corruption efforts was criticized by some 
respondents. These argued that his anti-corruption exercises were merely designed 
to mollify the international community and to serve his political interest by 
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manipulating anti-corruption reforms to witch-hunt political opponents.  Furthermore, 
what remained of the progress made by Obasanjo‟s anti-corruption efforts appeared 
to be quickly reversed by Yaradua‟s government after taking over from Obasanjo in 
2007. The new administration was criticized for undermining the activities of major 
anti-corruption agencies such as the EFCC from prosecuting public officials 
(particularly some former state governors), while key anti-corruption crusaders such 
as Nuhu Ribadu (the former chairman of the EFCC) were unceremoniously removed 
from office. This raises serious questions about the sustainability of the kinds of 
reforms promoted and financed via international cooperation in the fight against 
corruption, these are discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.  
 
Another major focus of chapter 7 was an exploration of the perceptions of 
stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of each of the major anti-corruption 
institutions in Nigeria (some of which have been in existence since independence in 
1960). The thesis revealed widely held views that the capacities of some of the major 
anti-corruption institutions (in particular the Judiciary, the Police and the Media) have 
been seriously undermined by corruption within these institutions themselves. For 
example, the level of public confidence in the ability of the Nigerian Judiciary to 
deliver criminal justices is very poor. Corrupt judges, it was frequently argued, abuse 
their official positions by granting frivolous injunctions to frustrate the prosecution of 
wealthy political elites. In a similar vein, the effectiveness of the Nigerian police in 
preventing crime and maintaining law and order is perceived as having been 
seriously eroded by corruption. The Nigerian police have long been perceived to be 
notoriously corrupt, and the institution was consistently ranked as the least honest 
and least efficient anti-corruption institution in the surveys conducted by other 
organisations, as well as the electronic survey conducted for this study.  
 
The survey and interviews suggested that whilst the media is generally perceived to 
be less corrupt than the police and the judiciary and was highlighted by some 
interviewees for its role in publicizing corruption cases, there was a generally held 
view that the effectiveness of the media in the fight against corruption in Nigeria has 
been seriously undermined by the editorial influence of the ruling political elites who 
own and finance some of them. Similarly, while the more recent anti-corruption 
institutions such as the ICPC and EFCC have not been particularly perceived as 
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corrupt themselves and were viewed very favourably by many interviewees, there 
was also evidence of unease over the ways in which they had often been deployed 
to serve the political interest of the authorities (see: Lawson 2009, Eweremadu, 
2010).   
 
  8.1.3 Good governance and Anti-corruption Strategies in Nigeria: 
Assessment of International Donor’s Efforts 
 
It will be recalled from the discussions in chapter 1.3 that between 1980 and 1989, 
donor agencies (such as the World Bank and IMF) prescribed structural adjustment 
reforms to many developing countries which they argued would in themselves have 
a beneficial impact on the struggle to reduce corruption. As outlined in chapter 3.2.1, 
one of the earliest international donor involvements in promoting good governance in 
Nigeria occurred in 1986 when the first Structural Adjustment Programme was 
introduced. As explained in Chapter two, the World Bank‟s perspective on corruption 
which emerged over this period was that measures which reduced the role of the 
state within the running of economies such as Nigeria‟s would have important anti-
corruption implications. As such, it was intended that major SAP components in 
Nigeria (for example the downsizing in government workforce levels, the abolishing 
of non-statutory allocation to state governments, the privatisation of public 
institutions and market liberalisation, see: Iyoha 2008) would have positive impacts 
on economic development and governance outcomes.  Analyzing the experience of 
the economic reforms at that time provides little support for the World Bank stance 
on the impacts of neo-liberal reforms on corruption described above. Rather, 
Nigeria‟s experience suggests that, rather than reducing corruption, what often 
emerge during these market reforms are other forms of rent-seeking and 
opportunities for personal wealth accumulation (Lewis 2000).  
 
Furthermore, as outlined in detail in chapter 3, following the return to democracy in 
1999, soon after the inception of Obasanjo‟s administration, the government 
introduced a set of vigorous governance and anti-corruption reforms under the 
umbrella of what it called the National Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (NEEDS). This period coincided with the global period of transition from 
SAPs toward PRSPs and the introduction of NEEDS policy was a reflection of these 
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global changes. Accordingly, the Nigerian government was assisted (both financially 
and technically) by a host of international donor agencies in implementing a series of 
structural, macroeconomic, governance and institutional reforms. In a similar vein, 
steps were also taken to build more transparent and effective institutions, creating an 
environment for a freer press and more independent judicial and criminal justice 
systems. Major ant-corruption institutions such as the ICPC and EFCC were created 
during this period and established financial ties with international partners, which 
assisted in strengthening their institutional capacities.  
 
The research interviews revealed some interesting attitudes towards the reforms 
adopted during this period and there were sharp differences in opinion over the 
impacts and methodological approaches of international involvement in 
implementing these reforms. Whilst some interviewees (mainly from the public 
sector) believed that the international donors‟ involvement in promoting the good 
governance and ant-corruption agenda has brought about remarkable achievements 
in the fight against corruption in Nigeria, particularly with reference to the 
achievements of the EFCC during Obasanjo‟s administration, others were more 
sceptical suggesting that the global anti-corruption campaigns (and by extension 
those promoted in Nigeria specifically) appeared to focus more on the disposition  of 
public officials towards bribery in Nigeria than the corrupt activities of multinationals 
and western banks who, it was claimed, are often complicit in corruption in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, despite the historical validity of some of these accusations, the 
argument advanced in the thesis is that, at least within the recent Nigerian context, 
there have been some improvements in international action designed to address the 
demand side of corruption (see discussions in chapter 2.7.2). In fact, in recent years 
(for example, between 2007 and 2010), there is some evidence to suggest that it has 
actually been the Nigerian government/authorities that have failed to cooperate in 
actions being taken against indicted Nigerian public officials (see the discussion in 
chapter 3.9).55 
                                            
55
 As discussed in various chapters of the thesis, between 2007 and 2010 the fight against corruption in Nigeria was seriously 
weakened by Yaradua‟s government. This included a demonstrable weakening in the level of the Nigerian government‟s 
commitment toward international cooperation in the fight against corruption. While several actions were taken against the 
corrupt behaviours of some multinationals and the high ranking Nigerian public officials who had illicitly cooperated with them 
by the international community (the UK and the US in particular), the Nigerian government under Yaradua failed to cooperate 
in these cases (allegedly because the administration was protective of key public officials). The first case in this regard was 
the Willbro (an American engineering company) scandal, involving the distribution of over $6 million in bribes to key public 
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Drawing together some of the insights from the analysis of the research interviews 
and the various strands of the academic literatures reviewed, it would appear that 
the Nigerian case provides further evidence of the ways in which donor agencies‟ 
approaches towards the design, funding and implementation of anti-corruption 
measures have tended to focus on generic institutionally-focussed measures (such 
as the formation of specialist anti-corruption institutions and the promotion of „good 
governance‟ reforms), without adequately putting the underlying causes of corruption 
in Nigeria (such as the historical and political complexities surrounding the general 
lack of political will of successive governments and institutions to implement reforms) 
into sufficient context and without adequately considering the potential role or still 
less harnessing the active involvement of civil society in building momentum, political 
will and civic pressure for governance and  anti-corruption reform initiatives. Within 
this context, evidence from this thesis shows that the mainstream approaches to 
governance and anti-corruption reforms promoted by the international agencies in 
Nigeria have largely failed to yield the expected results, as they have been faced by 
numerous political, institutional and operational challenges. For example the 
observations regarding the suggested manipulation of governance and anti-
corruption reforms by Obasanjo and Yaradua‟s administrations for political 
expediencies re-enforces the validity of such arguments (see: chapter 7, sections 
7.1.3 and 7.1.4 where these issues were discoursed in more detail). This apparent 
lack of political will to implement anti-corruption reforms (even amongst those, such 
as Obasanjo, with a reputation for promoting anti-corruption activities), underscores 
the strategic and vital role that non-governmental organisations (in the field of human 
rights, transparency and democratization), labour unions, professional bodies, the 
independent media, religious and other pressure groups and individuals can play in 
shaping the demand for and the nature of local and national anti-corruption policies.  
Additionally, the Nigerian experience can be related to earlier discussion in chapter 
2.8.3, where it was suggested that, since public officials/authorities often benefit 
more from wide spread corruption, they often lack the moral and political will to 
                                                                                                                                       
officials in Nigeria. While the American government fined Willbro over $32 million for their actions in this case (in addition to 
forcing it to forfeit some assets), Yaradua‟s government failed to take action against the public official who benefitted from that 
transaction in Nigeria. Other examples include the Siemens and Halliburton scandals as well as the case of James Ibari, the 
former governor of Delta State, who is currently facing trail in the UK (see: Heimann and Dell 2010, U.S. Security and 
Exchange Commission 2009, Elombah 2009 and Mojeed 2011). 
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implement governance and anti-corruption reforms (see: Blundo and Olivier 2006). In 
other cases, the potential benefits of governance and anti-corruption reforms can be 
undermined by political expediency, as reforms are manipulated to serve the political 
and economic interest of vested groups (see: Chabal & Daloz 1999 and Bayart et al 
1999). In other words, instead of the mainstream generic approach to governance 
and anti-corruption reforms, intervention should consider the interplay between 
government, politics and civil society rather than government institutions alone. We 
explore this issue in a little more detail in the next section. 
 
8.2 Good Governance and Corruption in Nigeria: Tentative Recommendations 
and the Potential role of Civil Society 
 
Underlying all of the discussion thus far is the fundamental question of how 
corruption could be better combated and how it might be ensured that public 
resources were managed in a transparent and accountable manner for the common 
good in Nigeria. It is beyond the scope of a single thesis to do justice to all of the 
wide-ranging academic and political debates that are involved in the answering of 
this question and clearly there is no single answer to such a politically-loaded 
question. Nevertheless, insights gleaned from the analysis conducted in the thesis 
can be used to suggest some tentative recommendations regarding how the struggle 
against corruption in Nigeria might be strengthened.  
 
Clearly, one of the observations strongly articulated in this thesis is the general lack 
of political will and commitment of successive Nigerian governments for dealing with 
the problem of corruption. This re-enforces the argument of Achebe (1985: 75-7, 
referred to earlier in chapter 3.6), that “Nigerians are corrupt because the system 
under which they live today makes corruption easy and profitable and that they will 
cease to be corrupt when corruption is made difficult and inconvenient, thus the 
Nigeria problem is the unwillingness and inability of its leaders to rise to the 
responsibility, to the challenge of leadership by example”. Leadership is indeed 
crucial in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the progress made 
by the internationally-supported institutional reform process of recent years, real 
progress in tackling corruption will require considerable further strengthening of 
Nigeria‟s institutional checks and balances, and the strengthening of accountability 
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and control via more effective separation of powers amongst the legislature and 
judiciary as well as the major anti-corruption institutions. Furthermore, the major anti-
corruption agencies such as the Judiciary, the Nigerian police, ICPC and the EFCC 
should be restructured to allow them to function more independently in tackling 
corruption, although this will only bear fruit if such efforts were to be complemented 
by the development of more effective corruption preventative measures amongst 
other key stakeholders such as the private sector and the more effective involvement 
of civil society (which is considered in more depth below). 
 
Since oil serves as the main source of revenue for the country, the other key issue is 
the status and power of the Extractive Industries Transparency initiative introduced 
by Obasanjo‟s administration. Again the important role of this institution could be 
strengthened by working in partnership with civil society organizations in 
documenting and accounting for income from oil revenues and making them public. 
Other additional contemporary elements include: speedily educating the various 
stakeholders (public officials, ant-corruption agencies, civil society/media, private 
sector etc.) in the effective operationalization and the benefits of the Freedom of 
Information Bill, which has just been enacted into law by the current president, 
strengthening the requirements of the code of conduct for public officials by 
compelling public officials to declare their assets before and after leaving office and 
making such information accessible by the public, and improved vetting of public and 
political officials before they are either elected or appointed to public office.  
 
In terms of international cooperation in promoting good governance and anti-
corruption reforms in Nigeria, one of the central arguments of the thesis is that a 
detailed understanding of historical, political and socio-economic complexities based 
is essential for successful and long lasting outcomes in governance and anti-
corruption interventions. External support and pressure for anti-corruption reforms 
can be more effective and sustainable when they are complemented by an effective 
understanding of local contexts and clear internal support amongst at least sections 
of the government and the wider civil society (see: Chene 2008). Accordingly, 
intervention in relation to governance/corruption issues should consider the interplay 
between government, politics and civil society rather than government institutions 
alone. Governance and anti-corruption reforms need to be supported by systematic 
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efforts to increase the capacity of citizens to demand better governance and hold 
service providers accountable through a wide variety of anti-corruption mechanisms.   
 
In fact, there appears to be a growing recognition amongst development actors that 
the mainstream economic, legal and institutional reform programmes may not 
represent the best approach to promoting good governance and controlling 
corruption across countries in the south. The analysis conducted in this thesis 
supports the view that governance and anti-corruption reforms have often not been 
properly implemented or sustained in even the medium term when they have 
primarily involved working with government institutions (even when this has involved 
the creation of new institutions). Corruption is notoriously complex (as demonstrated 
by the divergent views of key stakeholders in Nigeria presented in this thesis) and is 
often deeply rooted amongst public officials as well as the dominant elites (see: 
Ruggie 2003 and McConnel 1998).  
 
 Within this context, it is important to sustain the argument that anti-corruption 
reforms must be tailored to specific circumstances, be longer-term in their orientation 
and perhaps most importantly of all should contemplate the active participation of 
civil society.  
 
Civil society, as alluded to above, can actively engage in the fight against corruption 
in Nigeria by putting pressure to bear upon the government over the need to 
implement reforms effectively. Civil society organizations can also monitor the 
performances of government and its agencies (particularly the major anti-corruption 
institutions) and make findings public, thus, acting as independent assessors of their 
governments‟ progress in the fight against corruption in Nigeria. In a similar vein, 
organizations can also work in partnerships with other stakeholders in focussing and 
directing action on particular manifestation of corruption in Nigeria and ensuring the 
long time sustainability of anti-corruption reforms. Coalition 2000 is a good example 
of a civil society based anti-corruption coalition which has had some success 
elsewhere. Officially set up in 1998, Coalition 2000 is an initiative of a Bulgarian 
nongovernmental organisation committed to fighting corruption through broad based 
consensus and coalition building amongst governmental institutions, businesses, 
civil society groups and private individuals. Its strategies have included the 
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convening of policy forum and designing anti-corruption action and monitoring plans. 
Some scholars like Dimitrova (2009) have assessed this mutually beneficial 
partnership between government, civil society and the private sector to be a very 
successful method in the fight against corruption. However, some other critics such 
as Chene (2008) have argued that many anti-corruption coalitions of this type 
ultimately fail to gain broad based public support in the long run, because they are 
often perceived as being too close to the government.   
 
Nigeria has instances of active citizenship as well. For example, in the early 1990s, 
as described in chapter 3.2.1, in partnership with other major stakeholders like 
businesses, Nigerian professional bodies mounted a series of anti-SAP protests and 
riots against the military regime. In a similar vein, in 1993, NGOs, key political figures 
and the media played a major role in forcing the Nigerian former military ruler, 
Ibrahim Babangida to step aside from office after he annulled the popular June 12 
presidential elections (see Jega in Olukoshi 1993). More recently, in 2010, a coalition 
of civil society groups, professional and religious bodies mobilised for the installation 
of Good Luck Jonathan (current Nigerian president) as the acting president, after it 
became obvious that former president Yaradua had been incapacitated by a severe 
illness. Nevertheless, the capacities of Nigerian civil society to sustain active 
participation and engagement against unpopular policies have been seriously 
undermined by a number of factors. One of the major factors militating against the 
effectiveness of civil society engagement in governance and anti-corruption issues in 
Nigeria according to Boadi (1995) is the issue of insufficient funding. There are 
limited sources of independent funding for civil society organisations in Nigeria and 
many of them depend on government funding for their various activities. This 
situation has weakened the capacity of many civil society organisations to function 
as independent actors within the country‟s development and political spaces. Many 
them are susceptible to government influence and control, because financial aid from 
the state, in most cases, can only be accessed on the bases of strong loyalty to the 
incumbent government (see: Osaghae 1998). Some other African scholars like Jega 
(2006) have also identified the issue of ethnic and religious differences as major 
constraints to building broad based alliances and coalitions against unpopular 
government policies in Nigeria. In a similar vein, Ezeazu (2005: 2) has also identified 
the „oath of secrecy policy‟ of the Nigerian government as a major constraint to the 
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active engagement of civil society in governance and anti-corruption reforms in 
Nigeria. Public information about the activities of government is still shrouded in 
secrecy and this make it difficult for the Nigerian media and other civil society 
organisations to monitor the performances of government and its agencies on how 
national budget and states revenues are allocated. Although the freedom of 
information bill has just been signed into law by the current administration of 
President good-luck Jonathan, it is yet to become fully operational. 
 
There is a need for anti-corruption activities in Nigeria to develop more effective 
awareness and enlightenment campaigns in order for citizens to known about the 
socio-economic and development impacts of corruption. Such campaigns must be 
targeted toward instilling attitudinal changes and re-orienting Nigerians on their civic 
rights and moral responsibilities to facilitate change. Given the level of illiteracy in 
Nigeria, such campaigns would have to go beyond the conventional print media to 
include radio programmes and lectures in public places like the market and religious 
centres. The social media (such as the use of the internet and other mobile 
technology for sharing and discussing information) is another effective tool that is 
increasingly changing the way people engage with each other. These types of tools 
are particularly useful for sharing alternative opinions and information that 
encourages collaboration in a socially and politically hostile environment, accessing 
groups who are often excluded by the conventional media outlets and mobilising and 
building coalitions amongst like minded individuals and organizations (see: UNODC 
2004). However, major disadvantages include a lack of access to computer networks 
amongst many Nigerians, particularly the majority of the poor rural dwellers who are 
mostly illiterate.  
 
8.3 Directions for Future Research 
 
This final chapter has addressed the main findings of this thesis and highlighted its 
core contribution to debates surrounding the complex relationship between 
governance, corruption and economic development in Nigeria. The chapter has also 
made some tentative recommendations56 regarding how corruption can better be 
                                            
56
 Based on key themes that have emerged from the thematic development of this study 
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combated in Nigeria, with a particular focus on the role of enhanced civil society 
engagement with the more institutional approaches that have dominated thus far. 
This final section will reflects on the possibilities for future research.  
 
There are a whole variety of directions where future research in this field could lead. 
The thesis has concluded by focusing on the potentially key role of civil society in the 
planning and implementation of anti-corruption policies, this is clearly an emerging 
theme within critical studies of corruption and which warrants more detailed 
exploration in the Nigerian context and more broadly as the donor community 
increasingly recognizes its importance. Chapter five of the thesis presented evidence 
from the electronic survey which suggested that the oil-producing states of the 
country were perceived as being more corrupt than other regions of Nigeria. There is 
clearly more work to be done in exploring the role of the oil industry in both the 
general manifestation of corruption in Nigeria and its impacts in the region‟s most 
directly affected by its activities. Another theme that resurfaced several times in the 
thesis was that regarding ethnicity and regional identity and its relationship towards 
the acceptance of corrupt activities and so on, further exploration of this issue is also 
a potentially fruitful direction for research to take, particularly in relation to, for 
example, competing religious discourses on corruption, cultural practices and 
toleration for corruption and so on. There is a tradition of comparative research on 
the successes and limitations of particular anti-corruption interventions in  different 
countries, there is little however which had adopted a similar comparative focus in 
research on the cultural attitudes towards corruption displayed within different 
political cultures, research which placed the Nigerian experience in the context of a 
wider exploration of these issues in other African states would also be a fascinating 
direction for future research in this field.  
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Appendix A: Administered Questionnaire 
Corruption and Governance in Nigeria 
Corruption has become a major issue of development debate in Nigeria's socio-economic and political 
landscape. This has attracted an array of controversial opinions from different quarters, and has led to 
a very popular and widely accepted belief, that corruption and bad leadership are the 'major causes 
of poverty‟ in Nigeria. As efforts are being put in place by the International Community and the 
Country's Anti-corruption agencies to combat this ugly scourge, I invite you to join me, in trying to 
understand what is happening in the country by sparing a little bit of your time to 'fill in this 
questionnaire'. My name is Benjamin Iremiren and I am a PhD student at Loughborough University, 
United Kingdom. I am studying the effect of Corruption and Governance on Economic Development 
and this questionnaire is part of this exercise. The information herein provided will remain 
confidential and will only be used for the purpose of this study. It will not be disclosed to the 
public and anonymity will be maintained throughout and after the study. 
1. Are you a Nigerian citizen?         Yes     No                     
   If yes, which state do you come from?                
   If No, which Country do you come from?           
 2. Please indicate the type of organisation that you work for/represent (e.g. National/State or Local 
Government, Civil service, international business, Nigerian business, trade union, non - governmental 
organisation, church, university etc.) or student if you are in full - time education. 
 
 3. What are the main problems Nigeria faces today, Please rank from 1 (MOST SERIOUS) to 7 
(LEAST SERIOUS) 
Issues/Problems Rank 
Poverty 
 
Poor Education 
 
Unemployment 
 
Corruption 
 
Ethnic/Religion Conflict 
 
Personal Security 
 
Poor Infrastructure/Public Services 
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 4. From the Nigerian states listed below (including the federal capital territory - Abuja). 
Abia                 Benue              Enugu              Kebbi              Ondo              Yobe 
Abuja               Borno              Gombe              Kogi                Osun               Zamfara 
Adamawa         Cross River      Imo                  Kwara             Oyo  
Akwaibon         Delta                Jigawa             Lagos              Plateau 
Anambra           Ebonyi             Kaduna           Nasarawa        Rivers     
Bauchi               Edo                 Kanu                Niger               Sokoto   
Bayelsa             Ekiti                 Katsina            Ogun               Taraba  
a. Please indicate which FIVE Nigerian states you would rank as the MOST corrupt over the        
years.                                                      
   A.                                                                   
   B.                                                          
   C.                                            
   D.                                            
   E.                                                   
b. Please indicate which FIVE Nigerian states you would rank as the LEAST corrupt over the 
years.         
   A.                                             
   B.                                            
   C.                                                     
   D.                                            
   E.                                          
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 5. Have you heard of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)?   
       Yes     No 
   6. Have you heard of the Independent, Corrupt Practices and other related offences Commission 
(ICPC)?     
Yes     No 
 
   7. Have you heard of the Code of Conduct Bureau?    
   Yes    No 
   8. Have you heard of any other Anti-Corruption Agency operating in Nigeria?      
 Yes     No 
   9.  If yes, please give names.    
   
 10. How would you rate the effectiveness of the following anti-graft institutions in the fight against 
corruption in Nigeria? 
Institution 
V. Effective    Effective      Neutral     Ineffective     V. Ineffective  
                                                        
Don't 
Know 
EFCC                                                                    
ICPC                                                        
Code of 
Conduct 
Bureau 
                                                       
Judiciary                                                        
Police                                                        
Media                                                        
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11. Since 1976 there have been seven governments in Nigeria. Please rank these government from 1 
(MOST CORRUPT) to 7 (LEAST CORRUPT)? 
Period Name Type Rank 
1976-79 
General (rtd.) Olusegun Aremu Okikiola 
Matthew Obasanjo 
Military 
 
1979-83 Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu Shagari Civilian 
 
1983-85 Muhammadu Buhari Military 
 
1985-93 General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida Military 
 
1993-98 General Sani Abacha Military 
 
1999-
2007 
General (rtd.) Olusegun Aremu Okikiola 
Matthew Obasanjo 
Civilian 
 
2007 Umaru Musa Yar'Adua Civilian 
 
Thank you for participating 
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